scholarly journals Attributes of Land Forces for Approaching Future Full Spectrum Operations

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-172
Author(s):  
Paul Tudorache

Abstract At present, the current strategies used to address security issues are increasingly changing, this constant being founded mainly on the volatility of behaviors of different target audiences. In the same direction, the various military services, including Land Forces, supporting national and allied strategies, are looking for solutions that can continuously improve the military response, targeting both operational and force reconfiguration issues. Therefore, the present study aims, firstly, to highlight the attributes of Land Forces for addressing future operations, and secondly, to clarify the future framework of the FSO where the organic military structures will have to operate to fulfill the required tasks and missions.

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-308
Author(s):  
Fabiana Martinescu-Bădălan

AbstractThis work is designed to challenge the maintenance of the highest standards of physical training required to perform armed tasks. It is desired to accumulate a development experience that will culminate with the set upof very well-trained leaders. The training of the military is based on physical training. It ensures the possibility and availability of the military to cope with combat missions, obligations in the military environment, ensures the maintenance and development of resistance to intense physical and mental effort, and develops self-confidence and teamwork. The physical training considers the fulfillment of some general objectives and of some specific objectives, absolutely necessary in the conditions of carrying out the combat actions.


Author(s):  
Omar Ashour

How can a widely hated, massively outnumbered and ludicrously outgunned organisation expands to occupy over 120 cities, towns and villages from the Southern Philippines to Western Libya? How can it endure and survive a military coalition of over 150 armed state and nonstate actors? How did ISIS/IS and their predecessors fight? And how can we account for their combat effectiveness? This book describes and analyses how ISIS/IS fights in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt. It analyses the military-making of ISIS/IS and their predecessors. The analysis focuses on 17 urban battles in Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, Raqqa (City and Governorate), Derna, Sirte and Northeastern Sinai. The book is based on fieldwork, dozens of interviews with soldiers and fighters who engaged ISIS/IS and their predecessors, and hundreds of ISIS/IS combat-relevant publications, audio- and video-releases. The findings contribute to our understanding of insurgencies’ combat effectiveness and offer insights on how ISIS/IS, like-minded organisations, and other armed nonstate actors may or will fight in the future.


Author(s):  
Jun Koga Sudduth

Political leaders face threats to their power from within and outside the regime. Leaders can be removed via a coup d’état undertaken by militaries that are part of the state apparatus. At the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded opposition groups in civil wars. The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them vulnerable to the other threat due to the role of the military as an institution of violence capable of exercising coercive power. On one hand, leaders need to protect their regimes from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are strong enough to prevail against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup successfully. On the other hand, leaders who cope with coup threats by weakening their militaries’ capabilities to organize a coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel challengers. This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-proofing. Though most research on this subject has focused primarily on rulers’ maneuvers to balance the threats posed by the military and the threats coming from foreign adversaries, more recent scholarship has begun to explore how leaders’ efforts to cope with coup threats will influence the regime’s abilities to address the domestic threats coming from rebel groups, and vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars address whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries’ capabilities also increase the regime’s vulnerability to rebel threats and the future probability of civil war. Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by rebel groups will determine leaders’ strategies toward the militaries, and how these strategies affect both the militaries’ influence over government policy and the future probability of coup onsets. These lines of research contribute to the conflict literature by examining the causal mechanisms through which civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. The literatures on civil war and coups have developed independently without much consideration of each other, and systematic analyses of the linkage between them have only just began.


2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (4I-II) ◽  
pp. 875-894
Author(s):  
Fiaz Hussain ◽  
Shahzad Hussain ◽  
Naila Erum

Recent increase in defense expenditure (Dexp hereinafter) in Pakistan due to increase in internal security and terrorism is an issue of concern to many Pakistani and other stakeholders in the Pakistan economy. Presently, internal security issues especially that of the increasingly violent homegrown terrorism is forcing increasing financial cost on government‘s expenditure towards defense sector. According to Budget documents, defense budget amounts to Rs 700. 2 billion for the 2014-15 fiscal year compared with Rs 627.2 billion allocated in the preceding fiscal year, showing an increase of Rs 73 billion. However, these figures do not include Rs 163.4 billion allocated for pensions of the military personnel.1 In addition to this, military would also be given Rs 165 billion under the contingent liability and Rs 85 billion under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF). This means that in reality Rs 1113 billion has been allocated for the military which is about 28.2 percent of the country‘s total budget [Sheikh and Yousaf (2014)]. This has led to diversion of the money needed for much-needed development projects, as the share of current expenditure in total budgetary outlay for 2014-15 is 80.5 percent.2 This diversion of funds has economic implication since some social sectors are likely to suffer in Pakistan


2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-166
Author(s):  
Maxim A. Suchkov

The North Caucasus is a most significant but a least understood problem in contemporary U.S.-Russia relations. The United States as one of the prime pace-setters in the region shaped its own attitude towards Russia’s most volatile region. Over more than twenty years, Washington experienced at least three major stages in its “Caucasus strategy”, and each stage had its impact on the North Caucasus. Since the beginning, the two states stuck to conflicting narratives of developments in the region. With time, some of the assessments were re-evaluated, but some continue to impede cooperation on key security issues. The present article explores these phenomena and examines what implications major events like the 9/11 attacks, the Caucasus Emirate enlistment among top terrorist organisations, the Boston marathon bombings, etc. had for the U.S.-Russia joint efforts in fighting terrorism. It also assesses areas of potential disagreement in the North Caucasus between the two countries.


2018 ◽  
Vol 164 (5) ◽  
pp. 358-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ojas Pujji ◽  
S L A Jeffery

Burn excision is the gold standard treatment for full thickness and some deep partial thickness burns. Early burn excision (24–96 hours) has been shown to improve patient outcomes. However, in the military setting, transporting the patient to a centre which can provide this procedure can be delayed. Especially as control of airspace in the future may be hampered due to the political landscape. For this reason, focus on how to achieve safer burn excision prior to repatriation should be addressed. This paper considers the barriers to early burn excision in the military setting and offers potential solutions for the future.


The Somali militant Islamist and proto-state insurgent organization known as “Al-Shabaab” (Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Arabic and Xarakada Mujaahidiinta Al Shabaab in Somali) is a group with multiple layers of identity. Ranging from the local and national to the regional and transnational, it is a group whose multifaceted self-perception and public portrayals have been some of its greatest sources of endurance since its emergence in 2006. On the one hand, Al-Shabaab’s ideology, goals, and membership are grounded in the domestic Somali context, though it has been able to localize and establish networks of sympathizers and recruits in neighboring East African states, including in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. On the other hand, Al-Shabaab is also the official East African affiliate of the transnational militant Islamist group al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab first emerged publicly in 2006 as the most radical faction within the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU succeeded in forming a coalition that led to the establishment of an environment of both relative law and order as well as economic stabilization. When, in 2006, the Ethiopian military invaded Somalia and occupied parts of the country to prop up the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the ICU collapsed. Al-Shabaab emerged as an independent group spearheading a growing insurgency against Ethiopian military forces and, later, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers. Beginning in 2008, as Al-Shabaab started to rapidly capture territory, it pursued the establishment of civil-governing mechanisms in areas it controlled. These mechanisms and institutions included a judiciary, police force (the Jaysh al-Hisba), a military wing (the Jaysh al-Usra), and offices of taxation, political affairs and clan relations, education, religious affairs and missionary propagation (daʿwa), health services, agriculture, and social services and charity programs, including a drought and humanitarian relief committee. Alongside its domestically rooted identity, Al-Shabaab also has a transnational, globalist aspect to its organizational identity and is an official affiliate of al-Qaeda, with its leadership having pledged allegiance to the group publicly in February 2012, an oath accepted by al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. As of 2021—and despite national, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to combat it—Al-Shabaab continues to operate as both an insurgency and a proto-state power, controlling and governing wide swathes of land within the southern, central, and western parts of the country. This article seeks to provide an overview of the best literature available on the history, evolution, activities, and multifaceted identity of Al-Shabaab as an organization with local/domestic Somali, regional East African, and transnational/globalist markers. While existing literature on the group is heavily focused on security issues, more-recent studies have also begun to pay more attention to other aspects of the group, including its proto-state governance and engagement with domestic Somali and local dynamics in other East African countries.


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