scholarly journals Are Defense Expenditures Pro Poor or Anti Poor in Pakistan? An Empirical Investigation

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (4I-II) ◽  
pp. 875-894
Author(s):  
Fiaz Hussain ◽  
Shahzad Hussain ◽  
Naila Erum

Recent increase in defense expenditure (Dexp hereinafter) in Pakistan due to increase in internal security and terrorism is an issue of concern to many Pakistani and other stakeholders in the Pakistan economy. Presently, internal security issues especially that of the increasingly violent homegrown terrorism is forcing increasing financial cost on government‘s expenditure towards defense sector. According to Budget documents, defense budget amounts to Rs 700. 2 billion for the 2014-15 fiscal year compared with Rs 627.2 billion allocated in the preceding fiscal year, showing an increase of Rs 73 billion. However, these figures do not include Rs 163.4 billion allocated for pensions of the military personnel.1 In addition to this, military would also be given Rs 165 billion under the contingent liability and Rs 85 billion under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF). This means that in reality Rs 1113 billion has been allocated for the military which is about 28.2 percent of the country‘s total budget [Sheikh and Yousaf (2014)]. This has led to diversion of the money needed for much-needed development projects, as the share of current expenditure in total budgetary outlay for 2014-15 is 80.5 percent.2 This diversion of funds has economic implication since some social sectors are likely to suffer in Pakistan

2020 ◽  
pp. 123-153
Author(s):  
Muhammad Maigari Abdullahi ◽  
Usman Ahmad Karofi ◽  
Uthman Abdullahi Abdul-Quadir ◽  
Ibrahim Arafat

This article identifies different operational codenames adopted by the Nigerian military in special domestic operations from 1966-2019 and examined whether the operations were executed in line with the codenames. In Nigeria, the military has an established tradition of codenaming special operations, in both internal and foreign missions. Since 1966, the Nigerian military has been involved in internal security management and codenamed all the operations using both English and local language names. The aftermath of the first military coup d'état on 15th January 1966, was the beginning of military involvement in domestic security operations in addition to their constitutional responsibility of defending the territorial integrity of the country. The Effect Perspective (TEP) is adopted as the theoretical framework which gives proper nuance to the study. Methodologically, data were elicited through in-depth interviews. The findings explain why several military operations have failed to achieve the objectives of their codenames. It concludes that there is no correlation between the operational codenames and their outcomes of special military operations in Nigeria because the desired results of restoring peace have not been achieved within the specific time frame given when they were launched. The paper concludes that the majority of special military operations launched in Nigeria failed below expectations and unable to restore peace in their country in line with the operational codenames as a result of factors identified in the study.


Author(s):  
Stanislav Malkin

The Interbellum era was marked by the competition of various interpretations of guerrilla warfare and small wars, which were a practical expression of rebel activity in the colonies and on the outskirts of the British Empire. Discussions in that regard reflected both theoretical and doctrinal contradictions and the bureaucratic rivalry between the departments responsible for its internal security and the confrontation between the military and civilian authorities over the boundaries of their responsibility to preserve colonial order. The evolution of the meaning of the concept of “guerilla warfare” within the British military thought in the first half of the 20th century is demonstrated by highlighting the stages of the process, historical reconstruction of the levels of discussion of this topic in a professional environment, and identifying the degree of mutual influence of its basic provisions in the face of budgetary constraints and new challenges to colonial rule after the First World War. This approach allowed to specify ideas about the place and role of the army in the functioning of the internal security system of the British Empire at the final stage of its existence. The analysis of the semantics and content of the “guerilla warfare” concept between two world wars makes it possible to apply a new approach to the issue of disagreements between the military and civilian authorities over the choice of the military and political course in the conflicts of this kind. Thus, the identified differences may be viewed as a result not of the bureaucratic differences only, but as the absence of the unified understanding of the “modern rebellion” problem among the military as itself.


The Somali militant Islamist and proto-state insurgent organization known as “Al-Shabaab” (Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Arabic and Xarakada Mujaahidiinta Al Shabaab in Somali) is a group with multiple layers of identity. Ranging from the local and national to the regional and transnational, it is a group whose multifaceted self-perception and public portrayals have been some of its greatest sources of endurance since its emergence in 2006. On the one hand, Al-Shabaab’s ideology, goals, and membership are grounded in the domestic Somali context, though it has been able to localize and establish networks of sympathizers and recruits in neighboring East African states, including in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. On the other hand, Al-Shabaab is also the official East African affiliate of the transnational militant Islamist group al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab first emerged publicly in 2006 as the most radical faction within the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU succeeded in forming a coalition that led to the establishment of an environment of both relative law and order as well as economic stabilization. When, in 2006, the Ethiopian military invaded Somalia and occupied parts of the country to prop up the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the ICU collapsed. Al-Shabaab emerged as an independent group spearheading a growing insurgency against Ethiopian military forces and, later, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers. Beginning in 2008, as Al-Shabaab started to rapidly capture territory, it pursued the establishment of civil-governing mechanisms in areas it controlled. These mechanisms and institutions included a judiciary, police force (the Jaysh al-Hisba), a military wing (the Jaysh al-Usra), and offices of taxation, political affairs and clan relations, education, religious affairs and missionary propagation (daʿwa), health services, agriculture, and social services and charity programs, including a drought and humanitarian relief committee. Alongside its domestically rooted identity, Al-Shabaab also has a transnational, globalist aspect to its organizational identity and is an official affiliate of al-Qaeda, with its leadership having pledged allegiance to the group publicly in February 2012, an oath accepted by al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. As of 2021—and despite national, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to combat it—Al-Shabaab continues to operate as both an insurgency and a proto-state power, controlling and governing wide swathes of land within the southern, central, and western parts of the country. This article seeks to provide an overview of the best literature available on the history, evolution, activities, and multifaceted identity of Al-Shabaab as an organization with local/domestic Somali, regional East African, and transnational/globalist markers. While existing literature on the group is heavily focused on security issues, more-recent studies have also begun to pay more attention to other aspects of the group, including its proto-state governance and engagement with domestic Somali and local dynamics in other East African countries.


Author(s):  
Marco Bünte

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.


Author(s):  
Derek Lutterbeck

Coup-proofing—that is, measures aimed at preventing military coups and ensuring military loyalty—has been a key feature of civil–military relations in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states. Just as the MENA region has been one of the most coup-prone regions in the world, coup-proofing has been an essential instrument of regime survival in Arab countries. The most commonly found coup-proofing strategies in the region include (a) so-called “communal coup-proofing,” involving the appointment of individuals to key positions within the military based on family, ethnic, or religious ties; (b) providing the military with corporate and/or private benefits in order to ensure its loyalty; (c) creating parallel military forces in addition to the regular military, so as to “counter-balance” the latter; (d) monitoring of the military through a vast internal security and intelligence apparatus; and (e) promoting professionalism, and thus political neutrality, within the military. The experiences of the “Arab Spring,” however, have shown that not all of these strategies are equally effective in ensuring military loyalty during times of popular upheavals and regime crises. A common finding in this context has been that communal coup-proofing (or militaries based on “patrimonialism”) creates the strongest bonds been the armed forces and their regimes, as evidenced by the forceful suppression of the popular uprising by the military in countries such as Syria, or by parts of the military in Libya and Yemen. By contrast, where coup-proofing has been based on the provision of material benefits to the military or on counterbalancing, as in Tunisia or Egypt, the armed forces have refrained from suppressing the popular uprising, ultimately leading to the downfall of these countries’ long-standing leaders. A further lesson that can be drawn from the Arab Spring in terms of coup-proofing is that students of both military coups and coup-proofing should dedicate (much) more attention to the increasingly important role played by the internal security apparatus in MENA countries.


Author(s):  
Willibald Rosner

War and Peace. Land and Military in Direct Confrontation 1797–1918. This chapter focuses on the extremes in relations between the land and the military. The first part deals with the period until 1866, when wars actually took place on Lower Austrian soil and foreign forces were stationed in the land. Here the analysis centres on strategies developed by the population to cope with extraordinary situations. The second section deals with the emergence of the military as a state regulatory power in the sphere of internal and public security in war and peace. The social conflicts following the Vormärz and the political movements in the second half of the 19th century played a role here, as did the First World War, when, although Lower Austria was not a frontline area, the military were the dominant factor in terms of internal security, public control, working life and food security.


Author(s):  
Maiah Jaskoski

Under Ecuador’s “third wave” democracy that began in 1979, the armed forces have exhibited considerable autonomy vis-à-vis civilians in government, as measured by (a) military intervention in politics and (b) the armed forces’ spread into internal security. Perhaps most noteworthy, military participation in politics and internal security increased significantly during the second half of the 1990s, in a permissive environment: as a result of their rule in the 1970s, the armed forces enjoyed a positive reputation within society as an institution capable of getting things done, without committing human rights abuses. Within that context, a traumatic military role crisis prompted the armed forces to expand their political and internal security roles. The armed forces lost their traditional mission of defending Ecuador’s southern border against Peru in the late 1990s, due to the resolution of that border dispute. In its search for institutional justification, the military proactively intensified its participation in politics and internal security. That extensive internal security work not only served as an indicator of military autonomy vis-à-vis civilians but it also made the armed forces ineffective and unreliable in responding to the civilian government’s basic national defense requirements, as evinced by the military’s response to a new sovereignty threat. When Colombian guerrilla crossings into northern Ecuador became a salient border threat in the 2000s, the armed forces focused on internal security in the north and not border defense.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 475-492
Author(s):  
Summer Forester

Contrary to our understanding of when states act on women’s rights, Jordan adopted a policy on violence against women at the same time as it faced a number of external and internal security threats. In this article, I query the relationship between militarism and the gender policymaking process in Jordan to make sense of this puzzle. I specifically consider the ways in which a feminist conceptualization of militarism offers a more fruitful understanding of government action on violence against women in Jordan than studying this policy development through the lens of patriarchy, state institutions, and/or feminist activism alone. Indeed, evaluating the development of Jordan’s Family Protection Law through the lens of militarism and related security practices reveals the depth and breadth of these phenomena: the martial values and priorities of the Jordanian regime extend beyond the realm of traditional, ‘high politics’ security issues and impact civil, social, and even interpersonal relations – relations that are always already gendered – that are seemingly far removed from military concerns. I argue that the Jordanian government adopted its policy on violence against women because this enhanced the state’s image in the international arena and appeased domestic audiences by adhering to a gendered logic of protection that maintains the state as the ultimate protector of women. Overall, the article deepens our understanding of how militarism and the security climate influence the gender policymaking process, particularly in semi-authoritarian regimes.


1995 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang S. Heinz

The article looks at the motives of military governments in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay to introduce ‘disappearances’ as a new method to fight ‘subversion’ and thereby commit human rights violations. Five variables are taken as a point of departure, the country's previous experience with use of state violence, the selection of victims, the role of international public opinion, the selection of methods within the state and ideological factors. Among the key elements were in two countries the shift of responsibility for the use of violence to the military before the coup (except Chile), a lack of civilian control and influence in the formulation and control of internal security policies and an overwhelming, confused ideological definition in Argentina and in Chile (to a lesser degree in Uruguay) of the armed conflict as a war between good and evil and against World Communism which endangered the survival of the nation.


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