scholarly journals Critical Latinx Indigeneities and Education: An Introduction

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Urrieta, Jr. ◽  
Melissa Mesinas ◽  
Ramón Antonio Martínez

Indigenous Latinx children and youth are a growing population that has been largely invisible in U.S. society and in the scholarly literature (Barillas-Chón, 2010; Machado-Casas, 2009). Indigenous Latinx youth are often assumed to be part of a larger homogenous grouping, usually Hispanic or Latinx, and yet their cultural and linguistic backgrounds do not always converge with dominant racial narratives about what it means to be “Mexican” or “Latinx.” Bonfil Batalla (1987) argued that Indigenous Mexicans are a población negada—or negated population—whose existence has been systematically denied as part of a centuries-long colonial project of indigenismo (indigenism) in Mexico and other Latin American countries. This systematic denial in countries of origin often continues once Indigenous people migrate to the U.S., as they are actively rendered invisible in U.S. schools through the semiotic process of erasure (Alberto, 2017; Urrieta, 2017). Indigenous Latinx families are often also overlooked as they are grouped into general categories such as Mexican, Guatemalan, Latinx, and/or immigrants. In this issue, we seek to examine the intersections of Latinx Indigeneities and education to better understand how Indigenous Latinx communities define and constitute Indigeneity across multiple and overlapping colonialities and racial geographies, and, especially, how these experiences overlap with, and shape their educational experiences.

Author(s):  
Gisela Mateos ◽  
Edna Suárez-Díaz

On December 8, 1953, in the midst of increasing nuclear weapons testing and geopolitical polarization, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace initiative. More than a pacifist program, the initiative is nowadays seen as an essential piece in the U.S. defense strategy and foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. As such, it pursued several ambitious goals, and Latin America was an ideal target for most of them: to create political allies, to ease fears of the deadly atomic energy while fostering receptive attitudes towards nuclear technologies, to control and avoid development of nuclear weapons outside the United States and its allies, and to open or redirect markets for the new nuclear industry. The U.S. Department of State, through the Foreign Operations Administration, acted in concert with several domestic and foreign middle-range actors, including people at national nuclear commissions, universities, and industrial funds, to implement programs of regional technical assistance, education and training, and technological transfer. Latin American countries were classified according to their stage of nuclear development, with Brazil at the top and Argentina and Mexico belonging to the group of “countries worthy of attention.” Nuclear programs often intersected with development projects in other areas, such as agriculture and public health. Moreover, Eisenhower’s initiative required the recruitment of local actors, natural resources and infrastructures, governmental funding, and standardized (but localized techno-scientific) practices from Latin American countries. As Atoms for Peace took shape, it began to rely on newly created multilateral and regional agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) of the Organization of American States (OAS). Nevertheless, as seen from Latin America, the implementation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was reinterpreted in different ways in each country. This fact produced different outcomes, depending on the political, economic, and techno-scientific expectations and interventions of the actors involved. It provided, therefore, an opportunity to create local scientific elites and infrastructure. Finally, the peaceful uses of atomic energy allowed the countries in the region to develop national and international political discourses framing the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean signed in Tlatelolco, Mexico City, in 1967, which made Latin America the first atomic weapons–free populated zone in the world.


Author(s):  
Katherine M. Marino

The chapter explores how tensions over Doris Stevens’s leadership exploded at the 1933 Seventh International Conference of American States in Montevideo, where Bertha Lutz launched serious challenges against her. There, Lutz allied with representatives from the U.S. State Department and U.S. Women’s and Children’s Bureaus in the new administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, including Sophonisba Breckinridge, who also opposed Stevens’s leadership of the Commission. The conflict between Stevens’s “equal rights” feminism, focused on political and civil rights, versus an inter-American feminism that also encompassed social and economic justice, became even more pronounced in the wake of the Great Depression, Chaco War, and revolutions throughout Latin America. Feminist debates took center stage in Montevideo. There, Lutz promoted women’s social and economic concerns. But her assumptions of U.S./Brazilian exceptionalism prevented her from effectively allying with growing numbers of Spanish-speaking Latin American feminists who opposed Stevens’s vision. The 1933 conference pushed forward the Commission’s treaties for women’s rights, and four Latin American countries signed the Equal Rights Treaty. It also inspired more behind-the-scenes organizing by various Latin American feminists and statesmen, including the formation of a new group, the Unión de Mujeres Americanas, that would later bear fruit.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 320-325
Author(s):  
Guillermo Jorge

Most Latin American countries are in the process of implementing international anticorruption standards, including standards for combating corporate corruption. Primarily based on the U.S. experience with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), these international standards for combating corporate corruption are coalescing into a standardized paradigm, which requires states to establish corporate liability regimes that incentivize companies to prevent, self-police, and cooperate with law enforcement authorities in exchange for more lenient sanctions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 75 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Post

Child labor negatively affects children’s learning and futures if it lowers their chance to acquire math and reading skills. However, work outside of school could also provide an alternative path to adult socialization and material welfare where schools do not provide such a path. In Latin America the possible development of skills from work is not only an academic question, but also a critical point bearing on policy, because many children and youth divide their time and energies between both schooling and work. This article contributes to the debate about the net impact on academic achievement among children who both work and study during sixth grade. The article reports analysis of data from the TERCE survey of students and families in fifteen Latin American countries. OLS regression estimations suggest there is no level of paid or unpaid out-of-school work that is not associated with lowered academic achievement. HLM estimates controlling for school quality also show a negative association between work and proficiency in math and reading.


Author(s):  
David B. H. Denoon

This chapter lays out the basic themes of the book and examines the commercial and strategic interests of U.S. and China in Latin America. China has become the largest trading partner for more than half of the Latin American countries, while the U.S. has sought to be the preeminent power in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1823 and the announcement of Monroe Doctrine. China does not pose a direct military threat to the U.S. or its Latin interests, but it does represent serious competition in the economic and diplomatic arenas. In the past decade, a clear East-West split has developed among the Latin American states. Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina became more nationalistic and anti-U.S., while Chile, Columbia, and Peru have tended to be more market-oriented and comfortable working with U.S. power. The U.S. currently benefits from disarray on the Left in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Newly developed institutions, e.g., UNASUR, the New Development Bank, and TPP, may also change the U.S.’s and China’s influence in the region.


2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Urdinez ◽  
Fernando Mouron ◽  
Luis L. Schenoni ◽  
Amâncio J. de Oliveira

AbstractIf one interprets China's sizable rise in Latin America as an unprecedented phenomenon, it follows that the concurrent story of declining U.S. influence in the region is an event hastily acknowledged at best and ignored at worst. In this article, we ask whether Chinese economic statecraft in Latin America is related to the declining U.S. hegemonic influence in the region and explore how. To do so we analyze foreign direct investments, bank loans, and international trade from 2003 to 2014, when China became a major player in the region. We use data from 21 Latin American countries, and find that an inversely proportional relationship exists between the investments made by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), bank loans, manufacturing exports, and the U.S. hegemonic influence exerted in the region. In other words, Beijing has filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the latter's own backyard.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-218
Author(s):  
Maria Paula Bertran ◽  
Maria Virgínia Nabuco do Amaral Mesquita Nasser

This paper discusses the adaptation and feasibility of some of the tools shared by the OECD Convention and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The article highlights three of them: incentives and protection to whistleblowers, prosecutorial discretion, and different forms of negotiated justice, including plea bargaining. We call these tools the OECD/FCPA paradigm. We claim that the OECD/FCPA paradigm hardly reconciles criminal punishment needs in Latin American countries. We offer three primary reasons for this inadaptation. The first reason is that most Latin American countries have what the literature calls “disseminated corruption as a point of equilibrium” for grand corruption. In an environment with disseminated corruption (as described in the plea agreement in the Odebrecht case), all actors have incentives to accept or offer bribes. It creates a pragmatic incompatibility with prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining, as some politicians or businesspersons would suffer anti-bribery enforcement, while many others - including the former’s competitors - would not. The second reason is that the OECD/FCPA paradigm weakens the system of control implemented in many countries, as it reserves the power to a limited number of agencies and prosecutors. Considering environments with disseminated corruption, the concentration of power - and discretion - over a limited number of agents creates the institutional design for the lack of accountability and perhaps collusion. The third reason is mainly connected to Latin America's political history. We argue that collaboration agreements, whistleblowers, and discretion are prone to magnify certain cases of corruption. Considering the traditional connection between corruption scandals and political instability in Latin America, we argue that the OECD/FCPA paradigm offers deleterious tools to political exploitation of anti-bribery enforcement.


2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 424-447
Author(s):  
André Luiz Reis da Silva ◽  
Isadora Loreto da Silveira

 Este trabalho procura, primeiramente, analisar o processo de negociações da Área de Livre Comércio das Américas (Alca), que reuniria 34 países do continente americano, ou seja, todos que o compõem, à exceção de Cuba. Busca-se também examinar os desdobramentos diretos e indiretos das negociações, pois se infere que o impacto desse projeto sobre as relações entre os EUA e os países da América Latina e Caribe, e entre os próprios países latino-americanos, foi muito significativo. A proposta foi lançada na I Cúpula das Américas, em 1994, por iniciativa dos EUA, e tinha o encerramento de suas negociações previsto para 2005. Embora não tenha sido implementada, a negociação da Alca produziu efeitos, contrabalançando processos de integração latino-americanos. A corroboração do fracasso da proposta da Alca, em 2005, em Mar del Plata, sublinhou a importância dos processos próprios de integração e concertação política sul e latino-americanos. Esse acontecimento é relevante, pois tais processos se configuram como vias para o desenvolvimento e a defesa dos interesses nacionais dos países da região. A análise deste artigo parte das negociações da Alca durante o governo de Fernando Henrique Cardoso, examina a proposta de "Alca light" do governo Lula, e culmina na derrocada do projeto da Alca, nas iniciativas latino-americanas autônomas - como a CALC e a CELAC - e na nova estratégia dos EUA para a região.   Abstract: Firstly, this paper seeks to analyze the Free Trade Area of ??the Americas (FTAA) negotiation process, which would bring together 34 countries in the Americas, that is, all who compose it, except for Cuba. We also examine the direct and indirect consequences of negotiations, because the impact of this project on relations between the U.S. and Latin America and the Caribbean, and also among Latin American countries, was very significant. The proposal was launched at the 1st Summit of the Americas in 1994, as a U.S. initiative, and the closure of negotiations was scheduled for 2005. Although it has not been implemented, the FTAA has produced effects, counterbalancing processes of Latin American integration. The corroboration of the failure of the proposed FTAA, in 2005, in Mar del Plata, stressed the importance of the development of Latin and South America's own processes of integration and political coordination. This event is relevant, since such processes constitute ways for the development and defense of national interests of the countries in the region. This paper's analysis departs from the negotiations during the Cardoso government, examines the Lula administration proposal of a "light FTAA", and culminates with the collapse of the FTAA project, with autonomous Latin American initiatives - such as CALC and CELAC - and with the new U.S. strategy for the region. 


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