scholarly journals Dennett and Scientific Realism: Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Argument from Error

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-60
Author(s):  
N. V. Golovko
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Fundamental Concept ◽  
Historical Period ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
The Real ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
History Of

The paper aims to show that the interpretation of D. Dennett’s concept of real patterns as a fundamental concept of existence makes it possible to offer a new conception of the development of scientific knowledge containing: (a) L. Laudan’s conclusion that the real history of science contradicts the idea of convergence of scientific theories, and (b) the problem of pessimistic meta-induction will not be decisive in refuting scientific realism for a given historical period of time. Within the framework of the accepted ontology, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction is presented as one of the variants of the skeptical argument – argument from error, and the notion of «projectivity in respect to a given physically possible perspective» (D. Ross) fully reveals the notion of «additional information» that a «new» theory should have over the «old one», in order to refute the skeptic's reasoning.

From the Evidence of History to the History of Evidence

2021 ◽  
pp. 70-98
Author(s):  
Stathis Psillos
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Pessimistic Induction ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Universal Gravitation ◽  
History Of ◽  
Second Shift

This chapter looks into the transition from the Cartesian natural philosophy to the Newtonian one, and then to the Einsteinian science, making the following key point: though the shift from Descartes’s theory to Newton’s amounted to a wholesale rejection of Descartes’s theory, in the second shift, a great deal was retained; Newton’s theory of universal gravitation gave rise to a research program that informed and constrained Einstein’s theory. Newton’s theory was a lot more supported by the evidence than Descartes’s and this made it imperative for the successor theory to accommodate within it as much as possible of Newton’s theory: evidence for Newton’s theory became evidence for Einstein’s. This double case study motivates a rebranding of the “divide et impera” strategy against the pessimistic induction introduced in the book Scientific Realism, which shifts attention from the (crude) evidence of the history of science to the (refined) history of evidence for scientific theories.

scholarly journals O episódio histórico das teorias do flogisto e calórico: criando interfaces entre a História e Filosofia da Ciência e o Ensino de Química na busca pela humanização do trabalho científico.c

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 153-180
Author(s):  
Letícia Do Prado ◽  
Marcelo Carbone Carneiro
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
Phlogiston Theory ◽  
Chemistry Teaching ◽  
The Real ◽  
Historical Episode ◽  
History Of ◽  
Caloric Theory

ResumoA análise de episódios da história da ciência pode ser usada como uma estratégia didática que promove a superação de visões descontextualizadas da ciência. Permitindo que os alunos vivenciem a construção do conhecimento científico e percebam que eles não são feitos a partir de lampejos de genialidade ou de maneira isolada. Tornando-se impossível elencar apenas um indivíduo para representar a formulação de uma lei ou teoria. Neste trabalho nosso objetivo é apresentar a contribuição de Lavoisier no episódio histórico sobre o abandono da teoria do flogisto e ascensão da teoria do calórico, salientando a importância dada a experimentação no século XVII e XVIII e buscando com isto nos livrar de narrativas anedóticas, descontextualizadas e elitistas ainda presentes no Ensino de Química que colocam este personagem como pai da química moderna.Palavras-chave: História e Filosofia da Ciência; Ensino de Química; Lavoisier.AbstractThe analysis of episodes of the history of science can be used as a didactic strategy that promotes the overcoming of decontextualized visions of science. This makes the students experience the construction of scientific knowledge and realize that they are not made from glimpses of genius or in an isolated way, being impossible to list only an individual to represent the formulation of a law or theory. In this work, our objective is to present the real contribution of Lavoisier in the historical episode about the phlogiston theory abandonment and the rise of the caloric theory. From this, it is possible to stress the importance given to experimentation during the 17th and 18th century, seeking to get rid of anecdotal, decontextualized and elitist narratives that are still present in the Teaching of Chemistry that put this personage like father of the modern chemistry.Keywords: History and Philosophy of Science; Chemistry teaching; Lavoisier.

Virtues in Scientific Practice*

2021 ◽  
pp. 200-222
Author(s):  
Dana Tulodziecki
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Puerperal Fever ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Theoretical Virtues ◽  
Empirical Level ◽  
History Of

This chapter relocates the debate about the theoretical virtues to the empirical level and argues that the question of whether the virtues (and what virtues, if any) have epistemic import is best answered empirically, through an examination of actual scientific theories and hypotheses in the history of science. As a concrete example of this approach, the chapter discusses a case study from the mid-nineteenth-century debate about the transmissibility of puerperal fever. It argues that this case shows that the virtues are at least sometimes epistemic, but also that neither scientific realists nor anti-realists get it quite right: the virtues, even if epistemic, are not necessarily truth-conducive, but neither are they merely pragmatic. It also argues that the discussion of puerperal fever shows that the virtue question, as it is currently featured in the scientific realism debate, ought to be reformulated. We should examine not just whether a given scientific theory has virtues or not, but rather how debates among competing theories, all of which have some virtues, get resolved.

A New Image for Science

2021 ◽  
pp. 194-208
Author(s):  
Steven L. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Body Of Knowledge ◽  
History Of ◽  
Theory Acceptance ◽  
Practice Of Science

Thomas Kuhn subverted the image of science that had become entrenched by the mid-twentieth century, that science was a body of knowledge produced by logical reasoning about objective facts. Kuhn argued that a new approach to the history of science revealed that the process of discovery was integral to the practice of science and that nonlogical factors played a role in theory acceptance and theory change. Insofar as they entered into the reasoning leading to the formulation of a theory, facts were not objective but interpreted consistent with contingent assumptions on which the theory rested. Kuhn himself believed that scientific knowledge was about reality. His theory of how scientific knowledge was produced, however, strongly supported the view that scientific theories were contingent interpretations of experience.

scholarly journals Using History as Evidence in Philosophy of Science: A Methodological Critique

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Qualitative Approaches ◽  
History Of

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.

Critical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 69-72
Author(s):  
Dominik Giese ◽  
Jonathan Joseph
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Science And Society ◽  
The Real ◽  
Critical Realist ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
The World

This chapter evaluates critical realism, a term which refers to a philosophy of science connected to the broader approach of scientific realism. In contrast to other philosophies of science, such as positivism and post-positivism, critical realism presents an alternative view on the questions of what is ‘real’ and how one can generate scientific knowledge of the ‘real’. How one answers these questions has implications for how one studies science and society. The critical realist answer starts by prioritizing the ontological question over the epistemological one, by asking: What must the world be like for science to be possible? Critical realism holds the key ontological belief of scientific realism that there is a reality which exists independent of our knowledge and experience of it. Critical realists posit that reality is more complex, and made up of more than the directly observable. More specifically, critical realism understands reality as ‘stratified’ and composed of three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. Here lies the basis for causation.

Scientific realism and antirealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Fine
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Dual Character ◽  
Objects Of Knowledge ◽  
The One ◽  
Independent Existence

Traditionally, scientific realism asserts that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or acts of scientists and that scientific theories are true of that objective (mind-independent) world. The reference to knowledge points to the dual character of scientific realism. On the one hand it is a metaphysical (specifically, an ontological) doctrine, claiming the independent existence of certain entities. On the other hand it is an epistemological doctrine asserting that we can know what individuals exist and that we can find out the truth of the theories or laws that govern them. Opposed to scientific realism (hereafter just ‘realism’) are a variety of antirealisms, including phenomenalism and empiricism. Recently two others, instrumentalism and constructivism, have posed special challenges to realism. Instrumentalism regards the objects of knowledge pragmatically, as tools for various human purposes, and so takes reliability (or empirical adequacy) rather than truth as scientifically central. A version of this, fictionalism, contests the existence of many of the objects favoured by the realist and regards them as merely expedient means to useful ends. Constructivism maintains that scientific knowledge is socially constituted, that ‘facts’ are made by us. Thus it challenges the objectivity of knowledge, as the realist understands objectivity, and the independent existence that realism is after. Conventionalism, holding that the truths of science ultimately rest on man-made conventions, is allied to constructivism. Realism and antirealism propose competing interpretations of science as a whole. They even differ over what requires explanation, with realism demanding that more be explained and antirealism less.

History of Science and Medicine

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Staffan Müller-Wille
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Revolution ◽  
Medical Sciences ◽  
Growth Of Knowledge ◽  
History Of ◽  
Research Agendas ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
The Relationship

This article explores what both historians of medicine and historians of science could gain from a stronger entanglement of their respective research agendas. It first gives a cursory outline of the history of the relationship between science and medicine since the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century. Medicine can very well be seen as a domain that was highly productive of scientific knowledge, yet in ways that do not fit very well with the historiographic framework that dominated the history of science. Furthermore, the article discusses two alternative historiographical approaches that offer ways of thinking about the growth of knowledge that fit well with the cumulative and translational patterns that characterize the development of the medical sciences, and also provide an understanding of concepts such as ‘health’ and ‘life’.

Aspects of knowledge

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Material Culture ◽  
Intellectual History ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Middle Ages ◽  
Cross Sections ◽  
Historical Period ◽  
Postgraduate Students ◽  
History Of Art ◽  
History Of ◽  
Literature History

This edited collection explores how knowledge was preserved and reinvented in the Middle Ages. Unlike previous publications, which are predominantly focused either on a specific historical period or on precise cultural and historical events, this volume, which includes essays spanning from the eighth to the fifteenth centuries, is intended to eschew traditional categorisations of periodisation and disciplines and to enable the establishment of connections and cross-sections between different departments of knowledge, including the history of science (computus, prognostication), the history of art, literature, theology (homilies, prayers, hagiography, contemplative texts), music, historiography and geography. As suggested by its title, the collection does not pretend to aim at inclusiveness or comprehensiveness but is intended to highlight suggestive strands of what is a very wide topic. The chapters in this volume are grouped into four sections: I, Anthologies of Knowledge; II Transmission of Christian Traditions; III, Past and Present; and IV, Knowledge and Materiality, which are intended to provide the reader with a further thematic framework for approaching aspects of knowledge. Aspects of knowledge is mainly aimed to an academic readership, including advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students, and specialists of medieval literature, history of science, history of knowledge, history, geography, theology, music, philosophy, intellectual history, history of the language and material culture.

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