THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 2009 IN IRAN AS AN ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP A COMPETITION RESPONDING TO THE STATE MONOPOLY

Author(s):  
Nikita A. Filin ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 96-114
Author(s):  
L. Tsedilin

The article analyzes the pre-revolutionary and the Soviet experience of the protectionist policies. Special attention is paid to the external economic policy during the times of NEP (New Economic Policy), socialist industrialization and the years of 1970-1980s. The results of the state monopoly on foreign trade and currency transactions in the Soviet Union are summarized; the economic integration in the frames of Comecon is assessed.


2018 ◽  
pp. 139-168
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Bozhko

The article describes the reminiscences of Oleksnadr Bozhko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Armenia. Having arrived to Yerevan as the first Ambassador of independent Ukraine, the author became a witness to the events that initially led to a long-lasting political crisis, and subsequently to the unconstitutional change of Armenian government. The article analyses the tumultuous events that Ukrainian Embassy faced immediately after its opening in September 1996. At that time, the Armenian society, which for years had been patiently overcoming numerous abuses of power, the arbitrariness of oligarchs, bureaucratic corruption and bribery at courts, broke out with a riot of peaceful disobedience. It was the time when the reminiscences of the fierce Armenian-Azerbaijani War for Nagorno-Karabakh of 1991–1994 were still in minds of people when society had been drawn into an exhaustible internal political confrontation on the eve of the presidential elections. The more electoral confrontation grew, the more dissatisfying was the population with the leadership of the state. Eventually the state of emergency was introduced in the country. These factors affected further activities of Ukrainian diplomats. It was important to quickly find premises suitable for a diplomatic mission and to carry out the diplomatic procedures necessary for the launch of Embassy’s activities. The author states with sorrow that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia did not even find money to fuel a car and bring Ukrainian delegation to Yerevan. Shattered roads that have long been unrepaired, queues near bakeries and kerosene selling points, semi-empty store shelves and even faded eyes of those, with whom the author communicated, – those were sad realities of the Armenian life in the mid-nineties. The formation of the diplomatic services in both countries was carried out under difficult conditions, likewise the maintenance of diplomats’ activity in Ukraine was similarly poor then. The article also describes that the stumbling point in Ukrainian-Armenian relations was an issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. The principle of territorial integrity was one of the fundamental in security sphere of Ukraine, whereas Armenia, which acted as guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh security, adhered to the principle of self-determination of the nation. In this respect, Armenian politicians considered everything related to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. This dramatic problem was originated from 1921, when Nagorno-Karabakh was included to the Azerbaijani SSR. The policy of displacing the Armenians from their ancestral lands, which was deliberately carried out by the authorities of Soviet Azerbaijan, caused frustration of Armenians, dozens of thousands of whom had lived in that territory for centuries. The author analyses the cooperation with the Directorate for Political Analysis and Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the defining Ukraine’s possible position in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The author emphasizes that the article is not just a diplomatic memoirs but also an attempt to comprehend what has happened to us over the past two decades, looking back at the past experience. Keywords: Armenia, Embassy of Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukrainian-Armenian relations.


2004 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 619-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES McALLISTER

The 1967 presidential elections in South Vietnam presented U.S. policymakers with their last opportunity to establish a potentially popular and legitimate non-communist government there. This article examines how and why the Johnson administration squandered this opportunity over the course of 1967. U.S. policymakers faced the choice of intervening actively to promote a more civilian popular government or adopting a stance of non-intervention that would effectively keep the government in the hands of South Vietnam's military rulers. Although many of Johnson's closest advisers and the State Department preferred the former policy, the administration largely pursued the policy of non-intervention advocated by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and the Saigon Embassy. By choosing stability over reform, Johnson's policy toward the South Vietnamese election of 1967 helped ensure that U.S. efforts to wage war would continue to be compromised by its support of a corrupt, unpopular regime in Saigon.


1928 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. A. Rickard

During the Republican Period a number of mining districts were exploited in the territory that the Romans annexed. Mines in conquered countries that had belonged to the former rulers became the property of the Roman people, and others were acquired by confiscation or forced purchase from private owners. But the industry was not entirely a State monopoly: on the contrary, a number of mines remained in private hands, more particularly those yielding the base metals—copper, lead and tin—whereas those that yielded the precious metals—gold and silver—were retained by the State. Under the Empire the mines became a special object of bureaucratic concern: as mineral wealth had been the spoil of conquest, so in due course it became the prize of usurpation.


2013 ◽  
pp. 13-22
Author(s):  
Vincent Duclert

The recent presidential elections in 2012 have shown that left-right cleavage was still dominant in France. The redistribution of political forces, strongly awaited by the center (but also by the extremes) did not take place. At the same time, the major issues, such the European unification, the future of the nation, the future of the Republic, the role of the state, continue to cross left and right fields, revealing other cleavages that meet other historical or philosophical contingencies. However, the left-right opposition in France structured contemporary political life, organizing political families, determining the meaning and practice of institutions. Thence, the question is to understand what defines these two political fields and what history brings to their knowledge since the French Revolution, or they are implemented


1957 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 976-994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard E. Brown

“On jongle trop avec la structure d'un Pays qui a été, dans le monde, le défenseur de l'individu, de la liberté, du sens de la mesure. Un petit paysan sur sa terre, n'est-il pas humainement autre chose que le chômeur de demain ou l'ouvrier qui sera condamné à fabriquer toute sa vie des boulons?”Le Betteravier Français, September 1956, page 1.Large-scale state intervention in the alcohol market in France dates from World War I, when the government committed itself to encourage the production of alcohol. Two chief reasons then lay back of this decision: a huge supply of alcohol was needed for the manufacture of gunpowder, and the devastation of the beet-growing regions of the north had severely limited production of beet alcohol, thereby throwing the domestic market out of balance. A law of 30 June 1916, adopted under emergency procedure, established a state agency empowered to purchase alcohol. At the end of the war, a decree of 1919 accorded the government the right “provisionally” to maintain the state monopoly. In 1922 the beetgrowers and winegrowers gave their support to the principle of a state monopoly which, in effect, reserved the industrial market for beet alcohol and the domestic market for viticulture. In 1931 the state was authorized to purchase alcohol distilled from surplus wine.


Africa ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Fourchard

It is often considered probable that the recent rise of vigilante groups in Nigeria means an erosion of the state monopoly of legitimate violence as well as a marked decline in state sovereignty over the national territory. However, this conclusion does not take into consideration the fact that in Nigeria ‘vigilante’ is a term initially proposed by the police in the mid-1980s as a substitute for an older practice known in the western part of the country since the colonial period as the ‘hunter guard’ or ‘night guard’ system. Hence, instead of looking at vigilante groups as a response to a supposed increase in crime or a supposed decline of the police force, we should consider them – initially at least – as a first attempt to introduce forms of community policing in order to improve the appalling image of the police. As such, in south-western Nigeria ‘vigilante’ is a new name for an old practice of policing that should be considered in an extended timeframe (from the 1930s onward), a period in which violent crime has been perceived as a potential danger. Finally, within the ongoing debate on the ‘privatization of the state’ in Africa, non-state policing in Nigeria testifies to a continuum existing since the colonial period rather than to the appearance of new phenomena in the 1980s or the 1990s.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (04) ◽  
pp. 723-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Klarner

This paper applies the forecasting models of Klarner and Buchanan (2006a) for the U.S. Senate and Klarner and Buchanan (2006b) for the U.S. House of Representatives to the upcoming 2008 elections. Forecasts are also conducted for the 2008 presidential race at the state level. The forecasts presented in this article, made July 28, 2008 (99 days before the election), predicted an 11-seat gain for the Democrats in the House of Representatives, a three-seat gain for the Democrats in the Senate, and that Barack Obama would obtain 53.0% of the popular vote and 346 electoral votes. Furthermore, Obama was forecast to have an 83.6% chance of winning the White House and an 85.9% chance of winning the popular vote.


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