scholarly journals Prvenstvo prava pred idejama dobra

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 1011-1029
Author(s):  
Petar Popović

In the paper, the author analyzes the concept of law in John Rawls’s political conception of justice. After analyzing Rawls’s relevant texts that contain certain elements of the argument for the concept of law as an institution, of the legal system, of legal norms and of the rights, as well as the secondary literature on these texts, the metajuridical foundation of the concept of law is researched. The author then claims that Rawls’s argument for the priority of right over ideas of good is the central thesis for an adequate understanding of his legal constructivism. It is then affirmed that we can legitimately refer to his thought on the subject under the rubric of the priority of the law over the ideas of the good. Rawls’s conception of the natural rights is researched next. The paper concludes with the evaluation of the results of the whole line of analysis, especially with regard to the place of Rawls’s concept of law within the contemporary juridical-philosophical debates.

Author(s):  
Bejan Felicia

As a consequence of the transposition of european Directives regarding the merger, division, and cross-border mergers, the Romanian legal system established a special legal framework with regard to the sanction of nullity for such juridical acts. The peculiarities of internal and cross-border reorganisation operations, and the imperative of protecting the interests of third parties, associates, and the companies involved led to the creation of a derogatory legal system on the matter. An analysis of both theoretical and practical perspectives of the subject matter may result in a useful instrument for the application of incidental legal norms, or every time restructuring juridical acts contravene the legal norms. 


Author(s):  
Giovanni Bisogni

H.L.A. Hart says that The Concept of Law is focused on municipal or domestic law because that is the “central case”1 for the usage of the word ‘law.’ At the beginning of the book he states that “at various points in this book the reader will find discussions of the borderline cases where legal theorists have felt doubts about the application of the expression ‘law’ or ‘legal system,’ but the suggested resolution of these doubts, which he will also find here, is only a secondary concern of the book.”2 Yet among those borderline cases there is one that is rather intriguing, since Hart closely discusses a particular instance of them: it is international law, to which he devotes an entire chapter—the final one—of The Concept of Law. My goal in this article is therefore to make clear why the ‘resolution’ of the borderline case of international law is not entirely ‘secondary’ to Hart’s overall project in The Concept of Law and, in so doing, to show that Chapter X is not as unhappy as many think it is.


2021 ◽  
pp. 47-49
Author(s):  
Sanjith Chandrashekar

For his bold declaration that international law is not "true law" since there is no sovereign, John Austin has been extensively attacked and praised in equal measure. According to Austin, the concept of law is, “Law is a command of the sovereign backed by a sanction.” This study investigates Austin's viewpoint and evaluates it in light of current legal systems, present international law, modern Indian laws, and the analysis of legal issues in the treaty law. While Austin's viewpoint was correct in terms of the legal systems of his day, it cannot be applied to the current international, and Indian legal system


Author(s):  
EKATERINA KHODYREVA ◽  

In the present article, the author considers various doctrinal judgments on the question of what constitutes inheritance law and what place it occupies in the legal system. The purpose of the research is to determine the structural divisions of the sub-branch of inheritance law and substantiate the view on the recognition of inheritance law as a sub-branch of civil law with the designation of its inherent institutions and subinstitutions. Results. Based on the results of the study, the author came to the conclusion that inheritance law, taking into account the content of the legal norms forming it, can only be recognized as a sub-branch of civil law. There are no sufficient grounds to consider inheritance law as an institution of civil law or as an independent legal branch as a structural unit of the legal system. Due to the subject of legal regulation, inheritance law is separated from other sub-sectors in the civil law system. Taking into account the specifics of the subject and method of legal regulation, the sub-branch "inheritance law" is subject to further differentiation into its constituent institutions and sub-institutes. It is concluded that it is necessary to distinguish five main institutions within the studied sub-sector, the central place among which belongs to the institute of inheritance law. The legal norms of this institution are currently dispersed in separate chapters of section V of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and cover the specifics of regulating both hereditary and some related legal relations. It is this diversity to be included in the Institute of law of inheritance relations allows to conclude on the need for it subinstitute three: hereditary sub instructions, sub succession and sub the exercise of the right of inheritance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 214-232
Author(s):  
Natalia A. Zheleznova

The article deals with the specific features of the interpretation of the sallekhanā ritual in the context of the philosophical, ethical and religious doctrine of Jainism based on the analysis of disciplinary texts for monks and laity. The author stresses the ethical ambiguity of this practice from the point of view of modern legal norms and emphasizes that the idea of a worthy “good death” through gradually increasing fasting in Jainism is based on the key idea of non-violence (ahiṃsā) for this tradition, including the prohibition of self-harm. For an adequate understanding of sallekhanā in the context of Jain ethics is necessary to take into consideration who (which person – the factor of the subject), how (in which way – the factor of method), when (at what time – the factor of time), why (on which reason – the factor of purpose) and where (in what place – the factor of place) makes it. It is only with proper preparations and in keeping all the requirements it could be reckoned as the ethically right way to finish a properly (i.e. according to all the precepts of Jain doctrine) lived life both for monks and laypeople. In this case, sallekhanā could be considered as a Jain solution to the moral dilemma of the entire Western European philosophy about whether an individual has the right to leave life independently.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 491-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Mullender

While recognizing that H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law has exerted a powerful and continuing influence on general jurisprudence, Brian Simpson finds it wanting. Simpson argues that Hart’s determination to make broad generalizations about the nature of a legal system deflected him from the important task of attending to the particularities of actually-existing law. Moreover, he identifies Hart as a ‘hedgehog’ in Isaiah Berlin’s sense: a thinker whose work gives expression to a ‘single central vision’ (in Hart’s case, law as a system of rules). This critique of Hart leads Simpson to argue for an approach to legal philosophy that is more attentive to the details of existing legal systems. But Simpson fails to present his readers with the theoretical approach for which he argues. This essay seeks to make good this deficiency in his response to The Concept of Law. To this end, it uses the writings of two philosophers on whom Simpson draws (Berlin and Michael Oakeshott) with the aim of enriching Hart’s contribution to general jurisprudence. Moreover, it finds in this Hart-Oakeshott-Berlin-based interdisciplinary theory (HOBBIT) a basis on which to throw much light on Britain as a distinctive form of politico-legal life.


Author(s):  
Mikhail Yur'evich Osipov

Correlation between the concepts of “novel” and “innovation” in law is one of the topical problems faced by the modern legal science. Its relevance is substantiated by the fact that the improper use of one or another term in legal science (for example, the term "”innovation” instead of the term “novel” may lead to misperception and complicate the research of these legal phenomena. The goal consists in establishing correlation between the concepts of “novel” and “innovation”, as well as the criteria for their classification based on the analysis of the essence of these two concepts. The subject of this article is such principles of the novels and innovations in the legal system that impact the characteristics of these legal phenomena. In the course of research, it was determined that law incorporates both, novels and innovations, which should not be confused, and correlate with each other as a whole (legal novels) and as a part (legal innovations). The article provides classification of legal novels and legal innovations in accordance to various criteria, namely depending on the type of legal process, form of expression (of novels and innovations in law) and (legal novels and innovations). The latter are distinguished by the fact that they are reflected in the legal norms. At the same time, innovations in the law and legal system imply the fundamentally new and (or) significantly improved processes that take place in the legal system, as well as their results. Novelties, in turn, imply any amendments to the law and the legal system.


Mahakim ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohsi Mohsi

Legal plurality is an indisputable part of the concept of Indonesian statehood, including the construction of marriage law. The pluralism of marriage law in Law No. 01 of 1974 is proof that the marriage law adhered to in the Indonesian legal system still refers to the pluralism and diversity system. This research will examine the plurality of marriage law from the legality aspect which has implications for its legal status, between imperative and facultative. This study uses a statute approach with an emphasis on the concept of law and legal legislation. This research concludes that the plurality of kwainan law in Law Number 01 of 1974 is a necessity in a multicultural country, because the existence of this law aims to accommodate and integrate existing laws on this Bhineka earth.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-37
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka

Summary The paper deals with the changes in the centralized (Kelsenian) model of constitutional review resulting from a state’s membership of the EU, which unequivocally demonstrates the decomposition of the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary. The main point raised in the paper is that European integration has fundamentally influenced on the four above-mentioned basic elements of the Kelsenian model of constitutional review of legislation, which are the following: the assumption of the hierarchical construction of a legal system; the assumption of the supreme legal force of the constitution as the primary normative act of a given system; a centralised model of reviewing hierarchical conformity of legal norms; coherence of the system guaranteed by a constitutional court’s power to declare defectiveness of a norm and the latter’s derogation. All its fundamental elements have evolved, i.e. the hierarchy of the legal system, the overriding power of the constitution, centralized control of constitutionality, and the erga omnes effect of the ruling on the hierarchical non-conformity of the norms. It should be noted that over the last decade the dynamics of these changes have definitely gained momentum. This has been influenced by several factors, including the “great accession” of 2004, the pursuit of formal constitutionalization of the EU through the Constitutional Treaty, the compromise solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon, the entry into force of the Charter, and the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU has used these factors to deepen the tendencies towards decentralization of constitutional control, by atomising national judicial systems and relativizing the effects of constitutional court rulings within national legal systems. The end result is the observed phenomenon, if not of marginalisation, then at least of a systemic shift in the position of constitutional courts, which have lost their uniqueness and have become “only ones of many” national courts.


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