scholarly journals Putusan Nomor 74/PUU-XII/2014 dan Standar Konstitusional Dispensasi Perkawinan

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 573
Author(s):  
Faiq Tobroni

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) Nomor 74/PUU-XII/2014 meninggalkan harapan yang belum terpenuhi, yakni rumusan standar konstitusional sebagai pertimbangan dalam pemberian dispensasi umur perkawinan. Makalah ini akan menjawab alasan mengapa MK menolak merumuskannya? dan bagaimana standar konstitusional yang bisa dirumuskan? MK menolak permohonan pemohon judicial review untuk menjadikan kehamilan di luar perkawinan sebagai satu-satunya standar pemberian dispensasi umur perkawinan. Penolakan ini mengisyaratkan MK menganggap bahwa hal itu merupakan open legal policy; suatu saat bisa berubah sesuai dengan kebutuhan dan konteks masyarakat. MK juga tidak menggunakan UUD 1945 untuk merumuskan rumusan standar konstitusional dispensasi perkawinan karena hal itu harus ditempuh melalui legislative review. Sebagai tawaran dari penulis dalam legislative review, standar konstitusionalnya bisa dirumuskan melalui pendekatan hukum non sistematik dan pembacaan maqashid syari’ah. Pertimbangannya harus memperhatikan perlindungan kepentingan agama (Pasal 28E ayat (1) UUD 1945), kepentingan kepastian hukum bagi pelaku (Pasal 28D ayat (1) UUD 1945), kebebasan kehendak dan keyakinan (Pasal 28E ayat (2) UUD 1945), kepentingan kesejahteraan hidup (Pasal 28H ayat (1) UUD 1945), dan hak asasi yang dimiliki keturunan (Pasal 28B ayat (1) UUD 1945).The decision of Constitutional Court Number 74/PUU-XII/2014 leaves the unmet expectations, which is the standard for an exemption in marital age. The paper will provide the answer to the reason why the Court refused to set the standard? And how the Court should formulate it as the constitutional standards? The Court rejected the petitioner arguments in the judicial review case to make pre-marital pregnancy as the only standard to set an exemption of marital age. It suggests that the Court considers it is an “open legal policy”; where the policy may change according to the needs of society. The Court also did not use the Constitution to give the interpretation on the constitutional standard in marital exemption because it must be pursued by way of review by the parliament. The author offers, in term of legislative review, that the standards can be formulated through a non-systematic legal approach and the interpretation of maqashid syari’ah. The arguments should pay attention to the protection of religious interests (Article 28E (1) of the Constitution), the interests of legal certainty of the citizens (Article 28D (1) of the Constitution), free will and belief (Article 28E (2) of the Constitution), the welfare (Article 28H (1) of the Constitution), and the rights of descendants (Article 28B (1) of the 1945 Constitution).

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Edi Hudiata

Since the verdict of the Constitutional Court (MK) Number 93/PUU-X/2012 pronounced on Thursday, August 29, 2013, concerning the judicial review of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Islamic Banking, it is no longer dualism dispute resolution. The verdict as well as strengthen the jurisdiction of Religious Court to resolve Islamic banking disputes. In consideration of the judges, judges agreed stating that Article 55 paragraph (2) and (3) of Law No. 21 of 2008 which is an ideal norm, contains no constitutional problems. The problem is the explanation of the constitutional article 55 paragraph (2) of the Act. The emergence of the Constitutional Court verdict No. 93/PUU-X/2012 which substantially states that the explanation of Article 55 paragraph (2) of Law No. 21 of 2008 does not have binding force, basically does not violate the principle of freedom of contract which is common in contract law. The parties are allowed to make a dispute resolution agreement out of religious court based on provisions as Act No. 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Keywords: dispute resolution, legal certainty and the principle of freedom of contract


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 452-474
Author(s):  
Priyo Handoko

The study aims to provide a constitutional analysis of judicial review (PK) in civil cases for more than once. The research-based is the decision of the Constitutional Court No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 in which the two judgments provide a different classification between criminal and civil cases. The method used in this research is a normative juridical with a conceptual, legislation, and case approach. The results of the study assert that: first, the opportunity for judicial review (PK) more than once in a criminal case is an effort to uphold justice substantively by the Constitutional Court. Whereas the restriction of judicial review (PK) only once in civil cases is intended to guarantee legal certainty. Secondly, there is rational inconsistency in the arguments of the Constitutional Court which is indicated in Decision No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013. Both criminal and civil cases must seek to establish and maintain substantial justice, especially since there is a due process of law principle that requires that everyone can get the same opportunity before the law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Lauddin Marsuni ◽  
Salle Salle ◽  
Syarifuddin Syarifuddin ◽  
La Ode Husen

This study aims to understand the legal review on Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 28/PUU-XI/2013 on the review of Law No. 17 of 2012 on Cooperatives against The 1945 Constitution. The benefits of this research are socialization and provide legal awareness about cooperatives activities in Indonesia. This research uses a normative approach that focuses on studying the legal and regulatory norms associated with the object of the problem. The technical analysis used in this study is the Hermeneutic and Interpretation analysis methods. The results of the study indicate that Phrase “natural person” in the cooperatives sense was based on Article 1 point 1 of Law No. 17 of 2012 is against Article 33 section (1) of The 1945 Constitution because that definition leads to individualism. Furthermore, although the Petitioner's petition is only regarding certain articles it contains substantial norm content, it will cause other articles in Law No. 17 of 2012 has no binding legal force. Therefore the Petitioner's petition must be declared in accordance with the law for all contents of Law No. 17 of 2012. As for the sake of legal certainty, Law No. 25 of 1992 valid for a while awaiting the establishment of a new Law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 369
Author(s):  
Titis Anindyajati

Pada pokoknya, persekongkolan tender merupakan salah satu bentuk persekongkolan yang dilarang UU Nomor 5/1999 tentang Larangan Praktek Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat dan juga menjadi perkara yang paling sering diproses KPPU. Namun baik secara teoritis maupun praktik menimbulkan permasalahan yaitu karena adanya pemaknaan yang bias akan frasa “pihak lain” dalam Pasal 22 UU Nomor 5/1999. Hal inilah yang melatarbelakangi adanya pengujian Pasal 22 ke MK. Dalam penulisan ini yang dibahas yaitu bagaimana pengaturan persekongkolan tender menurut peraturan perundang-undangan, bagaimanakah implikasi yuridis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 85/PUU-XIV/2016 tentang pengujian Pasal 22 UU Nomor 5/1999 serta bagaimana analisis hukum terhadap pertimbangan hukum Putusan MK tersebut. Penelitian ini menggunakan penelitian yuridis normatif dimana obyek penelitian ini adalah peraturan perundang-undangan dan Putusan MK. Dalam hal ini Penulis menyimpulkan, yaitu, Pertama, persekongkolan tender yang merupakan suatu bentuk kerja sama antara dua pihak atau lebih untuk menguasai pasar yang bersangkutan dan/atau memenangkan peserta tender yang mengakibatkan terjadinya persaingan usaha tidak sehat diatur secara eksplisit dalam Pasal 1 angka 8 dan Pasal 22 UU Nomor 5/1999 serta Peraturan KPPU Nomor 2/2010, Kedua, Implikasi yuridis Putusan MK Nomor 85/PUU-XIV/2016 bermanfaat untuk menjamin kepastian hukum dan keadilan bagi para pihak seperti pengusaha utamanya masyarakat. Untuk itu, perlu adanya harmonisasi antara satu peraturan dengan peraturan lainnya, pengujian UU terhadap UUD terkait pengaturan persekongkolan tender dalam persaingan usaha tidak sehat ataupun revisi terhadap UU Nomor 5/1999.Principally, tender conspiracy is one form of conspiracy that subjected by the Law No. 5/1999 on The Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, and also as a type of case that frequently occurred and processed by the KPPU. However, in theory, and in practice, there are some issues that plague the regulation, because of the occurrence of bias and unclear interpretation of the phrases “other parties” contained in Article 22 of Law 5/1999. This interpretation issue then became the background in the petition for review of Article 22 to the Constitutional Court. This paper mainly discussed the regulation of tender conspiracy according to the existing Law, and also to study the juridical implications of Constitutional Court Decision Number 85/PUU-XIV/2016 concerning the review of Article 22 Law 5/1999. This paper also delves into the legal analysis of the court considered in the aforementioned Decision. This paper utilized the means of normative juridical research methodology, with the existing regulations and Constitutional Court Decision as the object of research. In the paper, the writer concludes that, first, tender conspiracy is a form of cooperation between one party or more to control particular market and/or to determine the awardees of tenders which may cause unfair business competition explicitly regulated in Article 1 number 8 and Article 22 Law 5/1999 and also the KPPU Regulation Number 2/2010, second, the juridical implications of Constitutional Court Decision Number 85/PUU-XIV/2016 was necessary in order to guarantee the equitable legal certainty and fairness toward all parties especially business practising citizens. Thus, there is a necessity to achieve harmony among these regulations, which can be obtained through the judicial review of laws against the Constitution concerning the regulations of tender conspiracy and by means of legislative revision toward Law 5/1999.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-253
Author(s):  
Prianter Jaya Hairi

In 2017, Constitutional Court has received three calls for judicial reviews regarding treachery (makar) article in the Criminal Code. These articles deemed to be contradicting with the principle of legal certainty and freedom of expression. This study analyzes the important issue that is being debate in those judicial reviews. One of those is about the argument which says that the absence of the definition of treachery in the Criminal Code has caused a violation of legal certainty. Besides, the rule of treachery in the Criminal Code has also considered to have caused a violation of freedom of expression which has been guaranteed by Constitution. Analysis shows that the absence of treachery definition in the Criminal Code is not something that instantly becomes a problem in its application that causing the loss of legal certainty. Law enforcer, especially judge, in enforcing the rule of law must always use the method of law interpretation which appropriate with legal norm. With systematic interpretation, treachery can be interpreted according to the sentence of the rule as a unity of the legal system. In this case, the term treachery as regulated in Article 87 of the Criminal Code can be systematically interpreted as the basis for Article 104-Article 108 of the Criminal Code, Article 130 of the Criminal Code, and Article 140 of the Criminal Code which regulates various types of treason and their respective legal sanctions for the perpetrators. Further, on the argument that the articles of treachery in the Criminal Code also can not necessarily be said to limit the freedom of expression, because every citizen’s freedom has limitation, including the limitation of law and human rights. AbstrakPada tahun 2017, Mahkamah Konstitusi telah menerima tiga kali judicial reviewterhadap pasalpasal tindak pidana makar dalam Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP). Pasal-pasal ini dipandang bertentangan dengan prinsip kepastian hukum dan kebebasan berekspresi. Tulisan ini menganalisis substansi yang menjadi perdebatan dalam perkara judicial review tersebut. Di antaranya perdebatan mengenai tidak adanya definisi istilah makar dalam KUHP yang menyebabkan persoalan kepastian hukum. Selain itu, pengaturan tindak pidana makar dalam KUHP juga dinilai melanggar kebebasan berekspresi yang telah dijamin oleh konstitusi. Analisis terhadap persoalanpersoalan tersebut menunjukkan bahwa ketiadaan definisi kata “makar” dalam KUHP bukanlah merupakan sesuatu yang serta merta langsung menjadi persoalan dalam penerapannya sehingga menyebabkan hilangnya kepastian hukum. Penegak hukum, terutama hakim, dalam menegakkan peraturan hukum selalu menggunakan metode penafsiran hukum yang sesuai dengan kaidah ilmu hukum. Dengan penafsiran sistematis, makar dapat dimaknai sesuai kalimat dari peraturan sebagai suatu kesatuan sistem hukum. Dalam hal ini, istilah makar yang diatur dalam Pasal 87 KUHP, secara sistematis dapat ditafsirkan sebagai dasar bagi Pasal 104-Pasal 108 KUHP, Pasal 130 KUHP, dan Pasal 140 KUHP yang mengatur tentang jenis makar beserta sanksi hukumnya masing-masing bagi para pelakunya. Selain itu, mengenai argumen bahwa pasal-pasal makar dalam KUHP berpotensi melanggar HAM dan dipandang bertentangan dengan konstitusi dapat dikatakan tidak beralasan. Sebab kebebasan HAM setiap orang tidak tanpa batas, di antaranya dibatasi nilai-nilai agama, keamanan, dan ketertiban umum.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (Edsus) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kartono Kartono

Although Indonesia judicial review system is not opens the possibility of regulations review under the act against the constitution, das sollen pracitically these conditions may still occur. From political of law the legal authority of constitutional court should be able to put the interests of citizens rights that are based on the principles of recognition, guarantees, protection and legal certainty of a fair and equal treatment before the law. Given that changes in the constitution can not be done easily, then the judicial review in UUD 1945 should not be formulated too limitedly that restricting the organic law to complete and explore the authority that is adaptable to any concrete problem. Keywords: politics of law, constitutional court, UUD 1945, limitedly.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Ade Adhari

ABSTRAKPutusan Nomor 003/PUU-IV/2006 menyatakan materiele wederrechtelijk dalam Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Korupsi bertentangan dengan Pasal 28D ayat (1) UUD NRI 1945, dan tidak berlaku mengikat. Penelitian ini berupaya memahami apakah tepat atau tidak pertimbangan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam putusan tersebut. Dalam menjawab permasalahan tersebut digunakan penelitian doktrinal, norma hukum serta asas yang melandasi lahirnya putusan tersebut. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian diketahui terdapat ketidaktepatan dalam pertimbangan Mahkamah Konstitusi. Mahkamah Konstitusi telah keliru dalam usahanya memvalidasi Penjelasan Pasal 2 ayat (1) Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Korupsi dengan menguji berdasarkan asas legalitas yang terdapat dalam Pasal 1 ayat (1) KUHP. Padahal prinsipnya pengujian yang dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi adalah menguji undang-undang terhadap UUD NRI 1945. Selain itu, Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi berorientasi pada asas legalitas yang hanya mengutamakan rechtssicherheit dan mengesampingkan keberadaan gerechtigkeit dan zweckmässigkeit. Lebih dari itu, tidak diakuinya materiele wederrechtelijk telah meniadakan eksistensi hukum yang hidup di masyarakat sebagai sumber hukum untuk menyatakan suatu perbuatan bersifat melawan hukum. Hal ini bertentangan dengan mandat Pasal 18B ayat (2) UUD NRI 1945, dan berbagai peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku. Dengan demikian materiele wederrechtelijk tidak bertentangan dengan kontitusi.Kata kunci: materiele wederrechtelijk, korupsi, konstitusionalitas. ABSTRACT Constitutional Court Decision Number 003/PUUIV/2006 states unlawful criminal acts (materiele wederrechtelijk) in the Anti-Corruption Law is inconsistent with Article 28D paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, and not binding. Doctrinal research, legal norms and principles underlying the birth of the court decision are used in answering whether the problem arising from the decision is justified. Based on the result of the research, there is an inaccuracy in the consideration of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has erred in its attempt to validate the Elucidation of Article 2 Paragraph (1) of Corruption Law by examining based on the legality principle contained in Article 1 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Code. Whereas in principle, what has been conducted by the Constitutional Court is a judicial review of the law against the 1945 Constitution. In addition, the Constitutional Court’s decision is oriented on the principle of legality which only prioritizes legal  certainty (Rechtssicherheit) and overrides justice (Gerechtigkeit) and utility (Zweckmässigkeit). Moreover, the unrecognized materiele wederrechtelijk has negated the existence of a living law in society as a source of law to declare unlawful acts. This is contrary to the mandate of Article 18B paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution and various prevailing laws and regulations. Thus, the material wederrechtelijk is not contradictory to the constitution. Keywords: materiele wederrechtelijk, corruption, constitutionality.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
. Suparto

In judicial review on Article 9 of Law No. 42 of 2008 on Election of President and Vice-President which regulates presidential threshold, the Constitutional Court declined it since it is an open legal policy mandated by Article 6 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution that the administration of President and Vice-President election will be further regulated in a Law. This reason is deemed insufficient as the Article 6 paragraph (5) regulates procedures (phases of the process), not requirements for candidates of President and Vice President to be eligible on participating in the election. Moreover, Article 9 of Law No. 42 of 2008 potentially expands the norms as stipulated in Article 6A paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution in which the candidates for President and Vice President shall be nominated by a political party or coalition of political parties participating in the election prior to the election without any other frills (the threshold).The term presidential threshold that is being used up until now is actually incorrect term; instead, presidential candidacy threshold should be considered as the more appropriate term.Keywords: Presidential Election, Presidential threshold, Constitutional Court Verdict.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eddy Rifai

This research uses normative juridical approach to study on the analysis of the death penalty executions and the legal policy of death executions in Indonesia. There are delays on death executions for the convicted person since they entitled to using rights namely filing a judicial review (PK/Peninjauan Kembali). Furthermore, the legal loophole in the execution of the death penalty by the publication of the Constitutional Court Number 107 / PUU-XIII / 2015 which assert that the Attorney as the executor can ask the convicted person or his family whether to use their rights or not if the convict clearly does not want to use his rights, the executions will be carried out. Legal policy on threats and the implementation of the death penalty in the draft of criminal code was agreed by draftsman of the bill with the solutions. The draftsman of the bill agrees that the death penalty will be an alternative punishment sentenced as a last resort to protect the society. The bill also regulates that the execution among others include that the execution can be delayed by ten years probations. If the public reaction on the convict is not too large or convict has regret and could fix it or the role in the crime is not very important and there is a reason to reduce punishment, the death penalty may be changed. For pregnant women and the mentally ill convicts the execution can only be carried after the birth and the person has recovered from mental illness. The existence of this solutions is still kept putting the death penalty in criminal law, whereas the effectiveness of the death penalty is scientifically still in doubt to solve crimes and to prevent crimes by the death penalty punishment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Ani Triwati ◽  
Subaidah Ratna Juita ◽  
Tri Mulyani

<p>Dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013, untuk upaya hukum luar biasa yaitu peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali. Putusan MK yang memperbolehkan upaya hukum luar biasa peninjauan kembali lebih dari satu kali tersebut, berkaitan dengan kepastian hukum dan keadilan. Apabila peninjauan kembali diperbolehkan lebih dari satu kali tetapi tidak ada pembatasan sampai berapa kali maka perkara tersebut tidak akan ada akhirnya, bahwa adanya asas litis finiri oportet (setiap perkara harus ada akhirnya) tidak akan terpenuhi. Beberapa permasalahan yang perlu dibahas adalah apakah dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013 dapat memenuhi nilai keadilan dan kepastian hukum. Selanjutnya bagaimana pengaturan mengenai peninjauan kembali sebagai implementasi Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013 agar asas kepastian hukum dan asas litis finiri oportet akan terpenuhi. Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013, yang menyatakan bahwa Pasal 268 ayat (3) Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 1945 dan tidak mempunyai kekuatan mengikat, dapat memenuhi kepastian hukum tanpa mengabaikan nilai keadilan. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari pihak kepentingan terpidana yang mana dengan diperbolehkannya peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana lebih dari satu kali, memberikan kesempatan untuk memperoleh kebenaran materiil dan keadilan sehingga dapat diperoleh kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan bagi terpidana mengenai perkara yang dihadapi. Untuk memenuhi asas litis finiri oportet, perlu dilakukan pengaturan bahwa untuk upaya hukum peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana dapat dilakukan dua kali, hal ini dilakukan untuk mencapai kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan. Di satu pihak peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali untuk mencari kebenaran materiil dan memenuhi nilai keadilan. Di lain pihak adanya pembatasan permohonan peninjauan kembali yang boleh dilakukan dua kali adalah untuk menjamin kepastian hukum, sehingga nilai kemanfaatan, keadilan dan kepastian hukum dapat terpenuhi.</p><p>With the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, for an extraordinary legal remedy which reconsideration can be done more than once. Constitutional Court ruling that allows an extraordinary legal remedy reconsideration more than once that, with regard to legal certainty and justice. If allowed to review more than one time but there are no restrictions on how many times it is the case there will be no end, that the principle of litis finiri oportet (every case there should be eventually) will not be met. Some issues that need to be addressed is whether the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 can satisfy the value of justice and legal certainty. Furthermore, how the arrangements regarding the review of the implementation of the Constitutional Court as No. 34 / PUU-X / 2013 that the principle of legal certainty and the principle of litis finiri oportet will be met. Constitutional Court decision No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, which states that Article 268 paragraph (3) of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure is contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 and has no binding force, can meet the legal certainty without ignoring the value of justice. It can be seen from the interests of the convict which the permissibility of judicial review in criminal cases more than once, providing an opportunity to acquire the material truth and justice so as to obtain legal certainty to convict justice regarding the case at hand. To meet the principle of litis finiri oportet, it is necessary that the arrangements for legal remedy reconsideration in criminal cases can be done twice, this is done to achieve a just rule of law. On the one hand, the review can be performed more than once to search for the material truth and fulfill justice values. On the other hand the restrictions on the reconsideration request should be done twice is to ensure legal certainty, so that the value of expediency, justice and the rule of law can be fulfilled.</p>


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