scholarly journals ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT VERDICT NUMBER 14/PUU-XI/2013 ON THE PRESIDENTIAL THRESHOLD

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
. Suparto

In judicial review on Article 9 of Law No. 42 of 2008 on Election of President and Vice-President which regulates presidential threshold, the Constitutional Court declined it since it is an open legal policy mandated by Article 6 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution that the administration of President and Vice-President election will be further regulated in a Law. This reason is deemed insufficient as the Article 6 paragraph (5) regulates procedures (phases of the process), not requirements for candidates of President and Vice President to be eligible on participating in the election. Moreover, Article 9 of Law No. 42 of 2008 potentially expands the norms as stipulated in Article 6A paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution in which the candidates for President and Vice President shall be nominated by a political party or coalition of political parties participating in the election prior to the election without any other frills (the threshold).The term presidential threshold that is being used up until now is actually incorrect term; instead, presidential candidacy threshold should be considered as the more appropriate term.Keywords: Presidential Election, Presidential threshold, Constitutional Court Verdict.

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-108
Author(s):  
Suparto Suparto

Abstract. In judicial review on Article 9 of Law Number 42 of 2008 on The Election of President and Vice-President which regulates Presidential threshold, the Constitutional Court refused on the grounds that it is an open legal policy which mandated by Article 6 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution that the administration of the election of President and Vice-President will be further regulated in a Law. This reasoning is insufficient because Article 6 paragraph (5) regulates procedures (phases of the process), not requirements for candidates of President and Vice President to be eligible on participating in the election. Moreover Article 9 of Law Number 42 of 2008 has the potential to expand the norms as stipulated in Article 6A paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution that the candidates for President and Vice President shall be nominated by a political party or coalition of political parties participating in the election before the election without any other frills (the threshold). Keywords: Presidential Election, Presidential Threshold  Abstrak. Dalam pengujian Pasal 9 Undang-Undang Nomor 42 Tahun 2008 tentang Pemilihan Umum Presiden dan Wakil Presiden mengatur tentang Presidential threshold. Mahkamah Konstitusi menolak dengan alasan hal tersebut merupakan open legal policy dengan bersandarkan pada Pasal 6 ayat (5) Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 bahwa tata laksana pelaksanaan pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden lebih lanjut diatur dalam Undang-Undang. Argumentasi tersebut kurang tepat karena Pasal 6 ayat (5) mengatur tata laksananya (proses tahapan pelaksanaan) bukan persyaratan bagi pasangan calon Presiden dan Wakil Presiden untuk menjadi peserta pemilu. Selain itu, Pasal 9 Undang-Undang Nomor 42 Tahun 2008 tersebut berpotensi memperluas norma sebagaimana yang diatur dalam Pasal 6A ayat (2) Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 bahwa pasangan calon Presiden dan Wakil Presiden diusulkan oleh partai politik atau gabungan partai politik  peserta pemilu sebelum pemilu  tanpa adanya embel-embel lain (adanya ambang batas).Kata kunci: Pemilu Presiden, Presidential Threshold.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Aprilian Sumodiningrat

The presidential threshold is a requirement for the nomination of the President and Vice President to meet the minimum threshold percentage for support from the DPR or the number of valid national votes. Presidential threshold provisions are contained in various laws and regulations regarding Elections. This research is juridical study using a conceptual approach and statute approach. The legal materials used in this research are primary and secondary legal materials. The two legal materials are inventoried; then used as a basis for compiling a prescriptive study of the legal issues raised. The results of this study state that the presidential threshold has started since 2004. Regulations regarding post-reform elections always include a presidential threshold. Then, the presidential threshold has been 'tested' several times by the Constitutional Court. Various decisions of the Constitutional Court stated that the presidential threshold is one of the provisions which is the domain of open legal policy for legislators or the making of laws. Furthermore, the implication of the presidential threshold is aimed at simplifying the fragmentation of political parties in parliament. The nominations for the President and Vice President promoted by the parliamentary political party actually allow for more than two candidates; and it is also possible to have an Election that does not get the support of more than 50 persen of the voters' vote. Thus, effectiveness is needed regarding the implementation of the presidential threshold provisions in the presidential system by strengthening relations between presidential institutional actors and the President's non-institutional personnel. KEYWORDS: Presidential Threshold, General Election, Open Legal Policy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Supandi Supandi

The judgement of the Constitutional Court (MK) Number 53/PUU-XV/2017 oblige all political parties participating in the 2019 general election both established parties or new ones to comply to the re-verification process. Political parties participating in the 2019 General Election must adhere to a verification starting by completing a Political Party Information System (SIPOL). The issue started when the General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) decided that the SIPOL is not the decisive factor to decide whether a political party passed or failed the administration screening, resulting in the General Election Committee (KPU) to issue a Decision Letter regarding Political Parties participating in the 2019 General Election after the decision of the Bawaslu RI. After the KPU also issued SK Number 58/PL.01.1/Kpt/03/KPU/II/2018 regarding Political Parties participating in the 2019 General Election provoked the political parties stated to fail to become participants in the General Election, to submit complaint through the administrative court. The problem became more entangled when parties winning the complaint in the administrative court reported the KPU commissioners stating to conduct efforts of a judicial review (PK). This paper intents by normative approach to provide an evaluation on the verification process of political parties participating in the 2019 General Election and provide input on the efforts to improve the political parties’ verification process in the future.


Author(s):  
Sodikin Sodikin

Permasalahan ini dilatarbelakangi adanya putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi yang dalam putusannya memutuskan uji materi norma Pasal 3 ayat (4), Pasal 9, Pasal 14 ayat (2) dan Pasal 112 Undang-Undang Nomor 42 Tahun 2008 tentang Pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden terhadap UUD 1945. Mahkamah Konstitusi memutuskan bahwa pasal-pasal tersebut, kecuali Pasal 9 Undang-Undang Nomor 42 Tahun 2008 tidak mempunyai kekuatan mengikat, sehingga pemilu dapat dilaksanakan secara bersamaan atau serentak antara pemilu Presiden dan Wakil Presiden dengan pemilu legislatif tahun 2019. Terjadinya polemik atas putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi tersebut, karena pemilu serentak dapat dilaksanakan pada 2019, bukannya dilaksanakan pada 2014 sekarang ini. Selain itu, Mahkamah Konstitusi tidak mempermasalahkan ambang batas ( presidential threshold ) yang terdapat dalam Pasal 9 Undang-Undang Nomor 42 Tahun 2008, karena masalah tersebut dikembalikan kepada pembentuk Undang-Undang. Permasalahannya dalam tulisan ini adalah apakah pemilu serentak pada 2019 dapat meniadakan atau masih mempergunakan ambang batas ( presidential threshold ) dalam pemilu presiden dan wakil presiden. Ada perbedaan pendapat terhadap ambang batas ( presidential threshold ) karena akan mempengaruhi penguatan sistem presidensial yang dianut dalam UUD 1945. UUD 1945 menganut sistem presidensial murni yang mempunyai kedudukan yang kuat, sehingga presiden dalam menjalankan pemerintahannya mempunyai posisi yang kuat, meskipun tidak didukung oleh mayoritas parlemen, karena presiden tidak bertanggung jawab kepada parlemen, tetapi bertanggung jawab kepada rakyat yang memilihnya.<p>This problem is motivated from the Constitutional Court’s verdict that decide to judicial review norms of Article 3 verse (4), Article 9, Article 14 verse (2) and Article 112 of Law Number 42 Year 2008 on the Election of President and Vice- President under the Republic of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution. The Constitutional Court decided all that articles except article 9 in Law Number 42 Year 2008 did not have legal bonding to make the President and Vice President’s election run alongside the legislative’s election in 2019. Problems comes because the President and Vice President’s election run alongside the legislative’s election will run in 2019 not in this 2014’s election. Besides, The Constitutional Court did not matters the presidential threshold contained in Article 9 of Law No. Number 42 Year 2008, because that matter returned to the legislators. The problem in this paper is whether simultaneous election in 2019 may negate or still using presidential threshold election for president and vice president. There are different opinions on the presidential threshold because it will affect the strengthening of the presidential system adopted in the Republic of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution. the Republic of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution adheres pure presidential system that has a strong position, so the president in running his government has a strong position, even though not supported by a majority of the parliament, because the president is not responsible to parliament, but responsible to the people who choose him.</p>


Author(s):  
Musrafiyan Musrafiyan ◽  
Mutiara Fahmi ◽  
Zahlul Pasha Karim

The existence of local political parties is one of the special powers for Aceh and Papua Provinces. Unlike Aceh, the rules regarding local political parties in Papua are not clearly stated in Law no. 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua Province. This paper attempts to analyze the comparison between Law Number 11 of 2006 concerning the Government of Aceh and Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua regarding local political parties, and the consequences for Aceh and Papua of differences in local political party arrangements. The method that the author uses is library research with a law approach and a sociological approach. The results of the research show that the Aceh special autonomy law contains 20 articles concerning the formation of local political parties. Furthermore, the existence of local political parties in Aceh can be seen in the participation of some of these parties in the 2009 2014 and 2019 general elections. While Article 28 of the Papua Special Autonomy Law which accommodates political parties does not have permanent legal force to be further interpreted as local political parties. it is also not applicable because it is not equipped with government regulations regarding the formation of local political parties in Papua. Even the Constitutional Court through its decision Number 41/PUU-XVII/2019 rejected the judicial review of Article 28 of the Papua Special Autonomy Law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 800
Author(s):  
Muchamad Lutfi Hakim ◽  
Rasji .

The problem began because there was an Application to Judicial Review Article 182 Letter l specifically in the phrase "other work" Law Number 7 of 2017. The applicant requested the Constitutional Court to interpret the phrase "other work". The request was finally granted by the Constitutional Court which interpreted the phrase "other work" in Article 182 letter l of the Act to also serve as a Political Party Functionary. For the Decision, there are Parties who disagree, finally the KPU Regulation Number 26 Year 2018 which accommodates the MK Decision so that candidates for DPD members resign from Political Parties to the Administrative Court and MA. The problem is that the Decision of the Administrative Court and Supreme Court is different from the Constitutional Court Decision, both decisions allow political party functionaries to register as candidates for the DPD. In solving these problems the author uses the Normative Legal Research Method, the author's conclusion is that the principle of the Erga Omnes and the principle of the Negative legislator attached to the Constitutional Court Decision is not effective. While the author's suggestion is that there is a need for a revision of the Constitutional Court Law by adding sanctions to institutions or communities that do not follow the MK Decision.


Slavic Review ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Venelin I. Ganev

Infamously, the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution contains a provision banning political parties “formed on an ethnic basis.” In the early 1990s, the neo-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party invoked this provision when it asked the country's Constitutional Court to declare unconstitutional the political party of the beleaguered Turkish minority. In this article, Venelin I. Ganev analyzes the conflicting arguments presented in the course of the constitutional trial that ensued and shows how the justices’ anxieties about the possible effects of politicized ethnicity were interwoven into broader debates about the scope of the constitutional normative shift that marked the end of the communist era, about the relevance of historical memory to constitutional reasoning, and about the nature of democratic politics in a multiethnic society. Ganev also argues that the constitutional interpretation articulated by the Court has become an essential component of Bulgaria's emerging political order. More broadly, he illuminates the complexity of some of the major issues that frame the study of ethnopolitics in postcommunist eastern Europe: the varied dimensions of the “politics of remembrance“; the ambiguities of transitional justice; the dilemmas inherent in the construction of a rights-centered legality; and the challenges involved in establishing a forward-looking, pluralist system of governance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Agus Manfaluthi

Objective research titled Judicial Review of Registration Mechanism for Independent Candidates and Political Parties in the General Election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor (Pilwali) in 2013 to determine the depth of the registration mechanism for independent candidates and political parties in the general election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor in Kediri. The question is whether Kediri has been carrying out the registration procedure in accordance with the rules applicable. To mind the new independent candidates Pilwali adopted in 2013 in Kediri where it is the first time to implement Election Mayor followed by independent candidates. This research is conducted using empirical methods to the scope of research locations in the Election Commission office Kediri. The result: Based on Law Number 12 Year 2008 began chapters 58 to 60, the General Election Commission (KPU), Kediri City has been implementing a mechanism for registration of candidates for May or and Deputy Mayor came from political parties, the combined political parties and candidates Individual earnest, result all independent either from independent or from political party and coalition of political parties passed the registration stage


Jurnal Hukum ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 612
Author(s):  
Widayati

Indonesia is a sovereign country folk. One implementation of the sovereignty of the people is the election that followed by political parties for members of Parliament and members of parliament and individuals for DPD.Political parties are the main pillars of democracy. Establishment of political parties must meet the requirements in accordance with legislation. Terms of founding a political party regulated under Article 2 of Law No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties.As the main pillar of democracy, political parties should be able to carry out its functions properly. There are some restrictions on political parties, among others, are prohibited from engaging in activities contrary to the Constitution of 1945 NRI and legislation; engage in activities that endanger the integrity and safety Homeland. If the ban is violated, then the government may ask the parties to the freezing of the District Court. If the parties do not accept the decision of freezing the District Court, it can be appealed to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the PN, then the Government may propose the dissolution of the parties to the Court.The procedure by which parties to the Court daitur dissolution under Article 68 paragraph (1) and (2) of Law No 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court's decision regarding the request for the dissolution of political parties must be decided upon within a period of 60 (sixty) days after pemoohonan recorded in the Register of Case Constitution.Keywords: Parati dissolution of political, constitutional systemIndonesia


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 257
Author(s):  
Sulistyani Eka Lestari ◽  
Ahmad Siboy

The number of political parties continues to increase from time to time. Ironically, the establishment of a political party is not based on the desire to carry out the functions of political education, political recruitment, and political regeneration. It is only to fulfill the desire for the power of a group of political elites. This research aims to analyze the need to simplify the number of political parties and determine the ideal simplification design of political parties This research used normative juridical research with statutory, historical, and conceptual approaches. The results indicated that political party simplification is needed for creating effectiveness and efficiency, minimizing segmentation or the emergence of friction among Indonesian citizens, preventing voter confusion, and maintaining political stability. Meanwhile, the ideal design to simplify political parties that can be executed is through submitting the dissolution of political parties to the Constitutional Court (Indonesian: Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK)) by expanding the criteria for those who can propose for dissolution (legal standing), imposing strict sanctions, implementing a moratorium on permits for the establishment of new parties, and extending the authority of the government to unilaterally dissolve political parties, such as the power to dissolve banned community organizations.


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