scholarly journals Anomalous Cognition: An Umbrella Review of the Meta-Analytic Evidence

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrizio Tressoldi ◽  
Lance Storm

Objective: The aim of this study was to assess the results of all meta-analyses on anomalous cognition conducted between 1989 and 2021 in order to find moderators associated with greater effect sizes.  Method: We included all meta-analyses of studies related to anomalous cognition published up to 2021. Results: Our dataset, accumulated over more than 80 years of investigation, refers to 11 meta-analyses related to six different states of consciousness. The evidence clearly shows that anomalous cognition seems possible and its effects can be enhanced by using a combination of some non-ordinary or altered states of consciousness (e.g., dreaming, ganzfeld, etc.), coupled with free-response procedures, or neurophysiological dependent variables. These conditions facilitate an alternative form of cognition seemingly unconstrained by the known biological characteristics of the sense organs and the brain. Conclusion: The accumulated evidence expands our understanding of the mind-brain relation and the nature of the human mind.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrizio Tressoldi ◽  
Lance Storm

This brief study presents the accumulated evidence for a range of meta-analyses on nonlocal (anomalous) perception (a.k.a. a communication anomaly) conducted between 1935 and 2020. What emerged from thirteen meta-analyses related to six different states of consciousness, is a more than tenfold gap in effect size (ES), ranging from the lowest ES for forced-choice normal state of consciousness (i.e., non-noise-reduction), to the highest ES for free response unconscious physiological reactions and modified states of consciousness (e.g., dreaming, ganzfeld, etc.). The evidence accumulated over more than 80 years of investigation clearly shows that nonlocal perception is possible, and effects can be enhanced by altering normal states of consciousness, thus facilitating an alternative form of perception seemingly unconstrained by the normal biological characteristics of the sense organs and the brain. This research expands our understanding of the mind-brain relationship and the nature of human mind.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. e1008418
Author(s):  
Thomas F. Varley ◽  
Olaf Sporns ◽  
Aina Puce ◽  
John Beggs

Whether the brain operates at a critical “tipping” point is a long standing scientific question, with evidence from both cellular and systems-scale studies suggesting that the brain does sit in, or near, a critical regime. Neuroimaging studies of humans in altered states of consciousness have prompted the suggestion that maintenance of critical dynamics is necessary for the emergence of consciousness and complex cognition, and that reduced or disorganized consciousness may be associated with deviations from criticality. Unfortunately, many of the cellular-level studies reporting signs of criticality were performed in non-conscious systems (in vitro neuronal cultures) or unconscious animals (e.g. anaesthetized rats). Here we attempted to address this knowledge gap by exploring critical brain dynamics in invasive ECoG recordings from multiple sessions with a single macaque as the animal transitioned from consciousness to unconsciousness under different anaesthetics (ketamine and propofol). We use a previously-validated test of criticality: avalanche dynamics to assess the differences in brain dynamics between normal consciousness and both drug-states. Propofol and ketamine were selected due to their differential effects on consciousness (ketamine, but not propofol, is known to induce an unusual state known as “dissociative anaesthesia”). Our analyses indicate that propofol dramatically restricted the size and duration of avalanches, while ketamine allowed for more awake-like dynamics to persist. In addition, propofol, but not ketamine, triggered a large reduction in the complexity of brain dynamics. All states, however, showed some signs of persistent criticality when testing for exponent relations and universal shape-collapse. Further, maintenance of critical brain dynamics may be important for regulation and control of conscious awareness.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Young

ArgumentThroughout his career as a writer, Sigmund Freud maintained an interest in the evolutionary origins of the human mind and its neurotic and psychotic disorders. In common with many writers then and now, he believed that the evolutionary past is conserved in the mind and the brain. Today the “evolutionary Freud” is nearly forgotten. Even among Freudians, he is regarded to be a red herring, relevant only to the extent that he diverts attention from the enduring achievements of the authentic Freud. There are three ways to explain these attitudes. First, the evolutionary Freud's key work is the “Overview of the Transference Neurosis” (1915). But it was published at an inopportune moment, forty years after the author's death, during the so-called “Freud wars.” Second, Freud eventually lost interest in the “Overview” and the prospect of a comprehensive evolutionary theory of psychopathology. The publication of The Ego and the Id (1923), introducing Freud's structural theory of the psyche, marked the point of no return. Finally, Freud's evolutionary theory is simply not credible. It is based on just-so stories and a thoroughly discredited evolutionary mechanism, Lamarckian use-inheritance. Explanations one and two are probably correct but also uninteresting. Explanation number three assumes that there is a fundamental difference between Freud's evolutionary narratives (not credible) and the evolutionary accounts of psychopathology that currently circulate in psychiatry and mainstream journals (credible). The assumption is mistaken but worth investigating.


2016 ◽  
Vol 127 (8) ◽  
pp. 667-672 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fangfang Xie ◽  
Wu Xing ◽  
Xiaoyi Wang ◽  
Weihua Liao ◽  
Wei Shi

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minkyung Kim ◽  
Hyoungkyu Kim ◽  
Zirui Huang ◽  
George A. Mashour ◽  
Denis Jordan ◽  
...  

AbstractContinuous switching between internal and external modes in the brain is a key process of constructing inner models of the outside world. However, how the brain continuously switches between two modes remains elusive. Here, we propose that a large synchronization fluctuation of the brain network emerging only near criticality (i.e., a balanced state between order and disorder) spontaneously creates temporal windows with distinct preferences for integrating internal information of the network and external stimuli. Using a computational model and empirical data analysis during alterations of consciousness in human, we present that synchronized and incoherent networks respectively bias toward internal and external information with specific network configurations. The network preferences are the most prominent in conscious states; however, they disrupt in altered states of consciousness. We suggest that criticality produces a functional platform of the brain’s capability for continuous switching between two modes, which is crucial for the emergence of consciousness.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiorenzo Artoni ◽  
Julien Maillard ◽  
Juliane Britz ◽  
Martin Seeber ◽  
Christopher Lysakowski ◽  
...  

It is commonly believed that the stream of consciousness is not continuous but parsed into transient brain states manifesting themselves as discrete spatiotemporal patterns of global neuronal activity. Electroencephalographical (EEG) microstates are proposed as the neurophysiological correlates of these transiently stable brain states that last for fractions of seconds. To further understand the link between EEG microstate dynamics and consciousness, we continuously recorded high-density EEG in 23 surgical patients from their awake state to unconsciousness, induced by step-wise increasing concentrations of the intravenous anesthetic propofol. Besides the conventional parameters of microstate dynamics, we introduce a new method that estimates the complexity of microstate sequences. The brain activity under the surgical anesthesia showed a decreased sequence complexity of the stereotypical microstates, which became sparser and longer-lasting. However, we observed an initial increase in microstates' temporal dynamics and complexity with increasing depth of sedation leading to a distinctive U-shape that may be linked to the paradoxical excitation induced by moderate levels of propofol. Our results support the idea that the brain is in a metastable state under normal conditions, balancing between order and chaos in order to flexibly switch from one state to another. The temporal dynamics of EEG microstates indicate changes of this critical balance between stability and transition that lead to altered states of consciousness.


The research incorporated encircles the interdisciplinary theory of cognitive science in the branch of artificial intelligence. It has always been the end goal that better understanding of the idea can be guaranteed. Besides, a portion of the real-time uses of cognitive science artificial intelligence have been taken into consideration as the establishment for more enhancements. Before going into the scopes of future, there are many complexities that occur in real-time which have been uncovered. Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary, scientific study of the brain and its procedures. It inspects the nature, the activities, and the elements of cognition. Cognitive researchers study intelligence and behavior, with an emphasis on how sensory systems speak to, process, and change data. Intellectual capacities of concern to cognitive researchers incorporate recognition, language, memory, alertness, thinking, and feeling; to comprehend these resources, cognitive researchers acquire from fields, for example, psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, neuroscience, semantics, and anthropology. The analytic study of cognitive science ranges numerous degrees of association, from learning and choice to logic and planning; from neural hardware to modular mind organization. The crucial idea of cognitive science is that "thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures."


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 769-806
Author(s):  
Peter Goldberg

A psychosomatic model of dissociation is proposed that addresses the ever adjusting mind-body relation—the constant titration of the quality and degree of the psyche’s embeddedness in the sensorial and temporal life of the body. The model highlights the function of hypnoid mechanisms (autohypnosis, distraction, somatic autostimulation) and of altered states of consciousness in facilitating and masking the work of mind-body dissociation. Transient altered states, which enable new and creative forms of mind-body experience in everyday life and in the therapy situation, are contrasted with pathological forms of retreat into alter worlds—rigidly organized, timeless, often inescapable trancelike states of mind-body dislocation. These pathological dissociative structures reshape the life of the mind and of the body, requiring new clinical approaches to these phenomena.


Author(s):  
Pascual F. Martínez-Freire

The mind is a collection of various classes of processes that can be studied empirically. To limit the field of mental processes we must follow the criteria of folk psychology. There are three kinds of mind: human, animal and mechanical. But the human mind is the paradigm or model of mind. The existence of mechanical minds is a serious challenge to the materialism or the mind-brain identity theory. Based on this existence we can put forward the antimaterialist argument of machines. Intelligence is a class of mental processes such that the mind is the genus and the intelligence is a species of this genus. The capacity to solve problems is a clear and definite criterion of intelligence. Again, like in the mind, the human intelligence is the paradigm of the intelligence. There are also three kinds of intelligence: human, animal and mechanical. Searle’s Chinese room argument is misleading because Searle believes that it is possible to maintain a sharp distinction between syntax and semantics. The reasonable dualism in the brain-mind problem defends the existence of brain-mental processes, physical-mental processes, and nonphysical-mental (spiritual) processes. Constitution of the personal project of life, self-consciousness and free volitions are examples of spiritual processes. Usually the intelligence has been considered the most important quality of human beings, but freedom, or the world of free volitions, is a more specific quality of human beings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Benjamin Hutchinson ◽  
Lisa Feldman Barrett

In the last two decades, neuroscience studies have suggested that various psychological phenomena are produced by predictive processes in the brain. When considered together, these studies form a coherent, neurobiologically inspired program for guiding psychological research about the mind and behavior. In this article, we consider the common assumptions and hypotheses that unify an emerging framework and discuss the ramifications of such a framework, both for improving the replicability and robustness of psychological research and for renewing psychological theory by suggesting an alternative ontology of the human mind.


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