scholarly journals Welfare States Matter for Democracy: Income-based Participatory Inequality in Post-WW 2 Western Democracies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantin Manuel Bosancianu ◽  
Carsten Q. Schneider

Poorer citizens generally participate less in politics; at the same time, the income-based gap in participation is not the same across democracies. Whereas in Denmark in 1977 turnout among poorer citizens was 6 percentage points higher than among wealthier ones, in the United States in 1988 the gap is reversed: turnout among wealthier Americans is 31 percentage points higher than among their poorer peers. Existing attempts at understanding the sources of this variation point to macro-level factors, such as compulsory voting, ballot complexity, or income inequality (Gallego, 2015; Solt, 2008). Though important, we argue that existing accounts aren't successful in explaining temporal variation in this participation gap, over periods of time in which the institutional framework is stable. We propose instead a largely neglected, yet plausible, reason for why a differential effect of income on political participation exists: the characteristics of the welfare state. In addition to providing resources relevant to participation, welfare state arrangements also create political constituencies that can be mobilized around a shared goal by political entrepreneurs. Building on Schneider and Makszin's (2014) education-based analysis we inductively develop, with the use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), various welfare regime types that condition patterns of income-based participatory inequality in democracies. These are produced based on an original data set of roughly 150 merged surveys from 19 OECD members, between 1960 and 2010. We label these types the supportive and mobilizing welfare regimes, along with their non-mobilizing and non-supportive counterparts. These welfare state regimes correspond to different mechanisms through which welfare state characteristics shape participatory patterns: (1) resource endowments available to individuals for participation and (2) unions' and parties' ability to politically mobilize and inform their members. We complement our aggregate-level QCA analysis with individual-level tests of these hypothesized mechanisms. Relying on six cross-national survey programs, such as the European Social Survey or the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we find consistent support for the mobilization-based mechanisms, while revealing mixed evidence that they also spill over into attitudinal factors which underpin participation. Only weaker evidence is found for our resource-based mechanisms. Overall, our results indicate the effect of welfare state characteristics on political participation gaps in advanced industrial democracies. Welfare state reforms, and in particular retrenchment, are likely to have (damaging) consequences for democracy.

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTHONY KEVINS ◽  
ALEXANDER HORN ◽  
CARSTEN JENSEN ◽  
KEES VAN KERSBERGEN

AbstractSocial class, with its potentially pivotal influence on both policy-making and electoral outcomes tied to the welfare state, is a frequent fixture in academic and political discussions about social policy. Yet these discussions presuppose that class identity is in fact tied up with distinct attitudes toward the welfare state. Using original data from ten surveys fielded in the United States and Western Europe, we investigate the relationship between class and general stances toward the welfare state as a whole, with the goal of determining whether class affects how individuals understand and relate to the welfare state. Our findings suggest that, although class markers are tied to objective and subjective positional considerations about one's place in the society, they nevertheless do not seem to shape stances toward the welfare state. What is more, this is equally true across the various welfare state types, as we find no evidence that so-called ‘middle-class welfare states’ engender more positive middle-class attitudes than other regimes. Based on our analysis, we propose that researchers would do better to focus on household income rather than class; while income may not be a perfect predictor of attitudes toward the welfare state, it is a markedly better one than class.


2005 ◽  
Vol 70 (6) ◽  
pp. 921-948 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Brady ◽  
Jason Beckfield ◽  
Martin Seeleib-Kaiser

Previous scholarship is sharply divided over how or if globalization influences welfare states. The effects of globalization may be positive causing expansion, negative triggering crisis and reduction, curvilinear contributing to convergence, or insignificant. We bring new evidence to bear on this debate with an analysis of three welfare state measures and a comprehensive array of economic globalization indicators for 17 affluent democracies from 1975 to 2001. The analysis suggests several conclusions. First, state-of-the-art welfare state models warrant revision in the globalization era. Second, most indicators of economic globalization do not have significant effects, but a few affect the welfare state and improve models of welfare state variation. Third, the few significant globalization effects are in differing directions and often inconsistent with extant theories. Fourth, the globalization effects are far smaller than the effects of domestic political and economic factors. Fifth, the effects of globalization are not systematically different between European and non-European countries, or liberal and non-liberal welfare regimes. Increased globalization and a modest convergence of the welfare state have occurred, but globalization does not clearly cause welfare state expansion, crisis, and reduction or convergence. Ultimately, this study suggests skepticism toward bold claims about globalization's effect on the welfare state.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sue Thomas ◽  
Ryan Treffers ◽  
Nancy F. Berglas ◽  
Laurie Drabble ◽  
Sarah C. M. Roberts

As U.S. states legalize marijuana and as governmental attention is paid to the “opioid crisis,” state policies pertaining to drug use during pregnancy are increasingly important. Little is known about the scope of state policies targeting drug use during pregnancy, how they have evolved, and how they compare to alcohol use during pregnancy policies. Method: Our 46-year original data set of statutes and regulations in U.S. states covers the entirety of state-level legislation in this policy domain. Data were obtained through original legal research and from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism’s Alcohol Policy Information System. Policies were analyzed individually as well as by classification as punitive toward or supportive of women. Results: The number of states with drug use during pregnancy policies has increased from 1 in 1974 to 43 in 2016. Policies started as punitive. By the mid- to late 1980s, supportive policies emerged, and mixed policy environments dominated in the 2000s. Overall, drug/pregnancy policy environments have become less supportive over time. Comparisons of drug laws to alcohol laws show that the policy trajectories started in opposite directions, but by 2016, the results were the same: Punitive policies were more prevalent than supportive policies across states. Moreover, there is a great deal of overlap between drug use during pregnancy policies and alcohol/pregnancy policies. Conclusion: This study breaks new ground. More studies are needed that explore the effects of these policies on alcohol and other drug use by pregnant women and on birth outcomes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 189 (4) ◽  
pp. 354-357
Author(s):  
Mikael Rostila

Abstract In this issue of the Journal, Baranyi et al. (Am J Epidemiol. 2019;000(00):000–000) examine the longitudinal associations of perceived neighborhood disorder and social cohesion with depressive symptoms among persons aged 50 years or more in 16 different countries. An important contribution of their article is that they study how neighborhood-level social capital relates to depression in different welfare-state contexts. Although the authors provide empirical evidence for some significant differences between welfare states in the relationship between social capital and depression, they say little about potential explanations. In this commentary, I draw attention to welfare-state theory and how it could provide us with a greater understanding of Baranyi et al.’s findings. I also discuss the potential downsides of grouping countries into welfare regimes. I primarily focus on the associations between social cohesion and depression, as these associations were generally stronger than those for neighborhood disorder and depression. Finally, I provide some suggestions for future research within the field and discuss whether the findings could be used to guide policies aimed at increasing social cohesion and health.


Author(s):  
Assaf Razin

A more generous welfare state (particularly with an aging population) has financing needs that immigrants could fill. With high-skilled immigrants more likely to pay in rather than draw on the welfare state, more generous welfare states are more inclined to try to attract high skilled. Israel ranks third in the world in the number of university graduates per capita, after the United States and the Netherlands. It possesses the highest per capita number of scientists in the world, with 135 for every 10,000 citizens (compared to 85 per 10,000 in the United States). Israelis took full advantage of the immigration skill bias. When examining the index for educated émigrés, i.e., those with a college degree, the average index is 12.41 and Israel's index is more than three times higher, 41.45. Using this index, Israel is higher than Portugal and the gap between Israel and Ireland (49.09) narrows considerably.


Author(s):  
Johannes Bubeck ◽  
Kai Jäger ◽  
Nikolay Marinov ◽  
Federico Nanni

Abstract Why do states intervene in elections abroad? This article argues that outsiders intervene when the main domestic contenders for office adopt policy positions that differ from the point of view of the outside power. It refers to the split between the government's and opposition's positions as policy polarization. Polarization between domestic political forces, rather than the degree of unfriendliness of the government in office, attracts two types of interventions: process (for or against democracy) and candidate (for or against the government) interventions. The study uses a novel, original data set to track local contenders’ policy positions. It shows that the new policy polarization measurement outperforms a number of available alternatives when it comes to explaining process and candidate interventions. The authors use this measurement to explain the behavior of the United States as an intervener in elections from 1945 to 2012. The United States is more likely to support the opposition, and the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US opposition is facing an anti-US government. It is more likely to support the government, and undermine the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US government is facing an anti-US opposition. The article also presents the results for all interveners, confirming the results from the US case.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 748-750
Author(s):  
Linda A. White

The Politics of the Welfare State: Canada, Sweden, and the United States, Gregg M. Olsen, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. vi, 258This book presents a familiar puzzle in comparative politics: how are we to understand variation in the design and scope of social programs and substantive outcomes for citizens in the three welfare states under scrutiny. As Olsen argues, all three cases are “advanced, industrialized, and highly affluent capitalist nations…. and all three nations enjoy average per capita incomes and standards of living that are among the highest in the world” (10). Yet we find great variation on a number of social indicators such as poverty levels, and income and wealth disparities. All three have also “experienced marked increases in inequality and welfare state retrenchment in recent years” (11) but yet “they continue to differ along these dimensions, even in the face of similar domestic strains and other exogenous pressures related to global integration” (11). The question is how do we account for the variation in the use of social policy to assuage inequalities and respond to these exogenous pressures.


Author(s):  
Stella Z. Theodoulou ◽  
Ravi K. Roy

The Great Depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s compelled policymakers in Western democracies to develop new administrative systems and governing approaches. Leaders in the industrialized countries watched helplessly as the value of their country’s assets plummeted. Meanwhile, national industries collapsed and millions of citizens found themselves unemployed and destitute. ‘The rise of the modern welfare state’ considers the conditions that influenced the rise of modern welfare states in Germany, Sweden, the United States, and Great Britain. Widespread application of Keynesian economic concepts by various governments across the industrialized world led many to refer to the period from 1945 to the 1970s as ‘the golden age of managed capitalism’.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003232922092455
Author(s):  
Yujeong Yang

Why do some Chinese local governments include informal workers in their welfare systems while others exclude them? This article argues that local officials attempt to balance multiple, conflicting, top-down career-evaluation criteria by developing different inclusion mechanisms. The central mandate to build an inclusive welfare regime incentivizes local officials to embrace welfare “outsiders” (informal workers and nonlocal workers). However, other top-down policy goals and the locally defined citizenship ( hukou) system disincentivize the full integration of outsiders. Faced with this political dilemma, local officials have strategically incorporated different types of outsiders into their welfare regimes. Their strategies depend on local labor market structures—specifically, the extent to which informal workers overlap with nonlocal workers. This hypothesis is tested using an original data set derived from thirty-one Chinese provinces, covering the period between 2005 and 2015, as well as two rounds of national-level survey data. Findings suggest that recent Chinese welfare expansion has ironically consolidated, even exacerbated, regional inequality.


1989 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Brian Robertson

Welfare state programs developed later in the United States than in other nations. Today, American programs are less widely accessible, less uniform, and often less generous than programs abroad. Explanations for this relative conservatism usually focus on the lack of a socialist movement or a socialist ideological tradition in the United States. Yet during the Progressive Era, when the gap between the American and European welfare states widened significantly enough for contemporaries to acknowledge it, the forces for social reform had never been stronger in the United States. In many ways these forces resembled those in England, which at the time was laying the foundations for a model welfare state.


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