Family Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allison Anna Tait

In the past year, Virginia courts have addressed a range of family law questions—new and old—that reflect the changing landscape of families and marriage. Questions related to same-sex marriage and divorce have begun to appear on Virginia court dockets, including an important case the Supreme Court of Virginia decided this year with respect to same-sex couples cohabiting and the termination of spousal support. Family law courts also saw shifts in gender norms—wives paying spousal support to their husbands and fathers being awarded physical custody of their children. These legal questions tested the limits of statutory language and helped to expand the legal understanding of marriage, family, and parenthood. In addition, recurring questions about entry into and exit from marriage persisted. Courts addressed varied claims relating to marriage validity, equitable distribution, separate property, spousal and child support, and visitation rights. This brief article provides an overview of some of the most salient cases, and those cases that will most likely have a lasting impact on this state‘s family law jurisprudence.

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-734
Author(s):  
Julien D. Payne

The objective of this paper is to alert Bench and Bar to the cutting edge of tomorrow’s arguments in Family Law. The dichotomy between law in theory and law in action is underlined, and practical hints are offered to lawyers concerning the proper management of a family law file. Substantive legal issues are also addressed with specific regard to current controversies concerning spousal support orders under the Divorce Act, 1985, (S.C. 1986, c. 4). The popular notion that this Act introduced only cosmetic changes is challenged and the significance of the rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada in Pelech, Richardson and Caron is addressed in some detail. Particular attention is paid to the effect of prior agreements on spousal and child support claims under the new Divorce Act. The conduct of the parties is viewed from a realistic as well as a doctrinal perspective and the role of fixed term spousal support orders is briefly analysed. The blending of theory and practice should prove that there is much to be said for the proposition that “each case depends on its own facts” and one of these facts is the philosophical approach of the particular judge to marriage, divorce and ongoing spousal support after the judicial termination of marriage.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 143-175
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik ◽  
Peteris F. Timofejevs

Over the last two decades, family law has undergone changes in Western Europe, widening the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples. In addition, some East European countries offer a legal recognition of civil unions of same-sex couples, while others do not offer any legal recognition at all. This diversity in family law has been recently challenged by developments at the European level. It is argued here that this constitutes an adaptational pressure on those European Union (EU) member states that do not offer any or offer only formal recognition of same-sex couples. We examine two cases when member states faced such an adaptational pressure, namely Estonia and Latvia, focusing on the interplay of two types of factors. First is that of formal institutions which, due to their constitutional role or their expertise in the EU law, may act as facilitators of legal changes. On the other hand, there are also political actors which have tried to constrain such an adaptation. We examine here especially the role of two political parties which have made a considerable effort to oppose the change in the two countries. It is argued here that the ideological orientation of these parties explains, at least partly, their opposition to the ongoing Europeanization of family law. The paper concludes with a discussion of the main findings and their implications.


2020 ◽  
pp. 127-153
Author(s):  
Linda C. McClain

This chapter argues that evaluating the arguments the parties made in Loving v. Virginia (1967), the iconic case in which the Supreme Court struck down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law, aids in understanding puzzles about bigotry. Virginia attempted a modern, sociological defense of its racist law. Loving illustrates the role of generational moral progress in constitutional interpretation: laws justified by appeals to nature, God’s plan for the races, and children’s well-being were repudiated as rooted in racial prejudice, intolerance, and white supremacy. The chapter then considers Loving’s crucial (but contested) role in constitutional challenges to bars on same-sex marriage, first analyzing the successful challenge to Virginia’s defense of marriage law. It then analyzes the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry; the dissenters argued Loving was inapt. The chapter concludes by discussing the role of moral progress and new insight in constitutional interpretation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2005
Author(s):  
Ronalda Murphy

The Reference re Same-Sex Marriage1 is not a major opinion on the rights of same-sex couples in Canada, but it is nonetheless an important and fascinating case. There are only a few lines that are about the “rights” of same-sex couples. Did the Supreme Court of Canada “duck” the issue? Was the Court carefully gauging how much or little political capital it had and making a political decision to say as little as possible on this topic? The Court certainly displayed strategic brilliance, but it did not do so in the name of avoiding the “political” hot topic of same-sex marriage. It is factually difficult to maintain the view that the Supreme Court of Canada is loath to enter into this political debate. It has been the lead social institution in Canada in terms of responding to the claims of gays and lesbians to equality in law,2 and it has never been shy of dealing with topics simply because they involve controversial political issues.3 Rather, the Court’s brilliance lies in its minimalist and almost weary tone. This approach had the effect of taking the wind out of the sails of those opposed to same-sex marriage: the same-sex advocates definitely win the constitutional race, but they do so because according to the Supreme Court, there is no provincial constitutional headwind that can stop them. In short, provinces can complain all they want about the federal position in favour of same-sex marriage, but the wedding will go on despite and over their objections to the ceremony.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-167
Author(s):  
Halima Mechouet ◽  
Asma Akli Soualhi

Abstract in English: In the article 46, the Algerian Family Code stipulates the following: "Adoption is prohibited by both the Sharia and Law". Therefore, it is clearly understood that the interdiction of adoption doesn’t contradict the Islamic law (Sharia). But due - on one hand - to the confusion in Algerian society with regard to the conception of adoption with all its consequences, and on the other hand the difficult situation of many abandoned children and the suffering of many families who are not blessed with the fertility or the capacity of reproduction, the Algerian legislature has been forced to find solutions to such difficult cases. Therefore, a child support legislation (guardianship or sponsorship) has been established under the following Articles 116 and 125 of the Family Code. The study was based on the Algerian laws on the issue of the termination of child sponsorship and applied by the Algerian judiciary. The problem of the study is to know the cases of termination of child sponsorship in the Algerian family law, and the position of the Algerian judiciary on this issue. This study aims to mention the cases in which the sponsorship of the child ends in the Algerian family law, and to discuss some of the Algerian judicial decisions issued by the Supreme Court, related to the subject of the study in question. The study relied on the analytical method, in order to analyze legal texts and discuss judicial decisions. The study concluded that the Algerian family law stipulated some cases in which the sponsorship of the child ends, and neglected to mention other cases.   Abstract in Arabic: لقد نص المشرع الجزائري في المادة 46 من قانون  الأسرة على  ما يلي: "يمنع التبني شرعا وقانونا".يتضح من تحليل هذه المادة أن المشرع منع الآخذ بنظام التبني تماشياً مع أحكام الشريعة الإسلامية. لكنه، ونظرا للمشاكل المترتبة على قضية التبني في المجتمع الجزائري من أخذ وردو كذلك بالنسبة للوضعية الصعبة لبعض الأطفال المهملين، وكذا معاناة بعض الأسر التي لا تنعم بالإنجاب، التجأ المشرع الجزائري إلى حل يتجلى في الكفالة، فنظم أحكامها في المواد من 116 إلى 125 من قانون الأسرة. استندت الدراسة إلى القوانين الجزائرية الخاصة بموضوع انتهاء كفالة الطفل والمطبقة  من طرف القضاء الجزائري. تتمثل إشكالية الدراسة في معرفة حالات انتهاء كفالة الطفل في قانون الأسرة الجزائري، وموقف القضاء الجزائري من هذه المسألة. تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى ذكر الحالات التي تنتهي بها كفالة الطفل في قانون الأسرة الجزائري،ومناقشة بعض القرارات القضائية الجزائرية الصادرة عن المحكمة العليا،والمتعلقة بموضوع الدراسة محل البحث. لقد اعتمدت الدراسة على المنهج التحليلي، وذلك من أجل  تحليل النصوص القانونية ومناقشة القرارات القضائية. لقد توصلت الدراسة إلى أن  قانون الأسرة الجزائري نص على بعض الحالات التي تنتهي بها كفالة الطفل،وأغفل عن ذكر الحالات الأخرى


Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill

Tension has long existed in the United State between the equality claims of LGBT individuals, on the one hand, and free exercise claims by those who hold that compelling equal treatment violates their convictions, on the other. This tension increased, however, after the United States Supreme Court extended marriage equality to same-sex couples nationwide. Equality advocates hold that antidiscrimination laws simply allow LGBT individuals to enjoy the same rights as others. Many religious advocates, however, believe that they are being prohibited from living out the implications of their conscientious beliefs. Neutrality between these conflicting claims cannot be achieved, as policies that appear neutral to one group appear non-neutral to the other. Private voluntary organizations are one site of conflict. Although private organizations should not typically be forced to reflect the values of the larger society, not all organizations are similarly situated within it. Groups such as the Boy Scouts should be able to exclude at will. Public authority does not itself always support the values of free and equal citizenship, and organizations may evolve over time as the Scouts itself has done. Organizations that exist within larger entities, however, fall into a different category. The Supreme Court was correct to uphold Hastings Law School in forcing the Christian Legal Society as a registered student organization to admit all comers. These groups also represent the values of a public entity and can continue to operate as independent entities if they so choose. The provision of services in connection with same-sex weddings and commitment ceremonies has been another site of conflict. In Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop (2015), the Supreme Court found narrowly that bakery owner Phillips could refuse to create cakes for same-sex wedding celebrations, as the state of Colorado had displayed animus toward Phillips’s religious beliefs. Commercial establishments, however, are public accommodations and generally should not be allowed to discriminate against customers on the basis of their identities. Discrimination against the activity or conduct of formal commitment is also discrimination against the identity or status of a same-sex couple. These kinds of cases do not admit of neutral solutions. Some suggest that those with religious reservations could advertise that they do not serve same-sex couples, but this is reminiscent of Jim Crow in the post–Civil War South. Jurisdictional pluralists suggest that the government designate a sphere of noninterference as a jurisdictional boundary that it will not cross. Thus individuals and associations with religious commitments would be free to pursue these interests with minimal interference. However, a prior authoritative structure must exist to define the nature and scope of this jurisdiction, just as the Constitution defines the relationships between the national government and the states. Applications for religious exemptions should not be treated more generously when they conflict with LGBT equality concerns than with equality claims based on race or gender. Although religious individuals and groups should be able to exercise their religious convictions within their areas of competence, in a liberal society and state they cannot define the limits of these areas.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-498
Author(s):  
Julien D. Payne

The causal connection thesis espoused in Pelech, Caron and Richardson has provoked more questions than solutions. Although conceived with the objective of providing certainty and predictability as well as national uniformity, its subsequent gestation has been fraught with complications. Professor J. McLeod, whose opinions in this context have been cited by the judiciary on frequent occasions, concludes that a causal connection between the applicant's need and a state of economic dependence engendered by the marriage is a legal prerequisite to the success of any claim for spousal support, whether it be governed by the Divorce Act, 1985 or by provincial statute and whether or not any prior settlement has been reached. This blanket approach is, in the opinion of this writer, an unacceptable extension of Pelech, Caron and Richardson. Many questions have arisen concerning the prospective application of the Supreme Court of Canada trilogy. Answers to these questions by the judiciary have generated divergent and irreconcilable opinions and dispositions. The judicial conflict cannot be rationalized simply on the basis that each case is to be determined on its own facts. Consequently, this paper does not provide a detailed analysis of the cases nor even cite the diverse judicial rulings. There must be well over two hundred cases wherein Pelech, Caron and Richardson have been cited. An examination of these decisions leads to the inescapable conclusion that the attitudes of individual judges towards marriage, divorce, and spousal support obligations constitute a major inarticulate premise that explains the wide diversity of opinions expressed and dispositions reached. In an attempt to provide some semblance of order out of judicial chaos, this writer attempts to provide a framework for future decision making that can accommodate the demands of both logic and fairness.


Obiter ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lizelle Ramaccio Calvino ◽  
Desan Iyer

The advent of the Constitution, as well as a reorientation in societal values, has seen old Western traditional rules being confronted with new challenges. The era of social change has consequently underscored the need for family law reform in certain areas of the law. A key aspect of family law and one that has come under constitutional scrutiny in recent times is that of persons living together as same-sex or heterosexual life partners. Life partnerships have none of the ex lege consequences of a civil marriage, and as such the consequences of a legally recognised marriage do not generally apply to life partners. A range of statutes have, however, given rise to specific spousal benefits being awarded to life partnerships , whilst, in the absence of same-sex partners being able to legalise their relationships, a number of ad hoc judgments have extended certain additional consequences of a civil marriage to same-sex life partners. The disparity in extending spousal benefits to same-sex life partners, to the exclusion of heterosexual life partners, raises the question of the tenability of the present legal position of life partnerships in light of the fact that the Constitution of South Africa is underpinned by values of equality and non-discrimination. Despite a decade of the aforementioned inequality, there seems to have been some movement made in restoring the dissimilarity of benefits afforded to same-sex life partners to the exclusion of their heterosexual counterparts. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Appeal has, of late, delivered judgments affording unmarried dependants in heterosexual life partnerships the locus standi to institute claims for loss of support arising from the wrongful death of a breadwinner. In this regard the case of Paixão is of particular importance as the case factors in the boni mores of society by finding that a tacit agreement between heterosexual life partners establishes a contractual reciprocal duty of support that is worthy of protection. The Paixão decision therefore shows a willingness to advance South Africa’s common law by affording protection to unmarried heterosexual life partnerships in line with their same-sex counterparts, as precipitated by the rights and values laid down in the Bill of Rights.  


Author(s):  
Stephen Gilmore ◽  
Lisa Glennon

Hayes and Williams’ Family Law, now in its sixth edition, provides critical and case-focused discussion of the key legislation and debates affecting adults and children. The volume takes a critical approach to the subject and includes ‘talking points’ and focused ‘discussion questions’ throughout each chapter which highlight areas of debate or controversy. The introductory chapter within this edition provides a discussion of the law’s understanding of ‘family’ and the extent to which this has changed over time, a detailed overview of the meaning of private and family life within Article 8 of the ECHR, and a discussion of the Family Justice Review and subsequent developments. Part 1 of this edition, supplemented by the ‘Latest Developments’ section, outlines the most up-to-date statistics on the incidence of marriage, civil partnerships and divorce, discusses recent case law on the validity of marriage such as Hayatleh v Mofdy [2017] EWCA Civ 70 and K v K (Nullity: Bigamous Marriage) [2016] EWHC 3380 (Fam), and highlights the recent Supreme Court decision (In the Matter of an Application by Denise Brewster for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2017] 1 WLR 519) on the pension rights of unmarried cohabitants. It also considers the litigation concerning the prohibition of opposite-sex civil partnership registration from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Steinfeld and Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81 to the important decision of the Supreme Court in R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) (Application) v Secretary of State for International Development (in substitution for the Home Secretary and the Education Secretary) [2018] UKSC 32. This edition also provides an in-depth discussion of the recent Supreme Court decision in Owens v Owens [2018] UKSC 41 regarding the grounds for divorce and includes discussion of Thakkar v Thakkar [2016] EWHC 2488 (Fam) on the divorce procedure. Further, this edition also considers the flurry of cases in the area of financial provision on divorce such as Waggott v Waggott [2018] EWCA Civ 722; TAB v FC (Short Marriage: Needs: Stockpiling) [2016] EWHC 3285; FF v KF [2017] EWHC 1903 (Fam); BD v FD (Financial Remedies: Needs) [2016] EWHC 594 (Fam); Juffali v Juffali [2016] EWHC 1684 (Fam); AAZ v BBZ [2016] EWHC 3234 (Fam); Scatliffe v Scatliffe [2016] UKPC 36; WM v HM [2017] EWFC 25; Hart v Hart [2017] EWCA Civ 1306; Sharp v Sharp [2017] EWCA Civ 408; Work v Gray [2017] EWCA Civ 270, and Birch v Birch [2017] UKSC 53. It also considers the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Mills v Mills [2018] UKSC 38 concerning post-divorce maintenance obligations between former partners, and the Privy Council decision in Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 relating to the joint name purchase by a cohabiting couple of investment property.Part 2 focuses on child law, examining the law on parenthood and parental responsibility, including the parental child support obligation. This edition includes discussion of new case law on provision of child maintenance by way of global financial orders (AB v CD (Jurisdiction: Global Maintenance Orders)[2017] EWHC 3164), new case law and legislative/policy developments on section 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (parental orders transferring legal parenthood in surrogacy arrangements), and new cases on removing and restricting parental responsibility (Re A and B (Children: Restrictions on Parental Responsibility: Radicalisation and Extremism) [2016] EWFC 40 and Re B and C (Change of Names: Parental Responsibility: Evidence) [2017] EWHC 3250 (Fam)). Orders regulating the exercise of parental responsibility are also examined, and this edition updates the discussion with an account of the new Practice Direction 12J (on contact and domestic abuse), and controversial case law addressing the tension between the paramountcy of the child’s welfare and the protected interests of a parent in the context of a transgender father’s application for contact with his children (Re M (Children) [2017] EWCA Civ 2164). Part 2 also examines the issue of international child abduction, including in this edition the Supreme Court’s latest decision, on the issue of repudiatory retention (Re C (Children) [2018] UKSC 8). In the public law, this edition discusses the Supreme Court’s clarification of the nature and scope of local authority accommodation under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 (Williams v London Borough of Hackney [2018] UKSC 37). In the law of adoption, several new cases involving children who have been relinquished by parents for adoption are examined (Re JL & AO (Babies Relinquished for Adoption),[2016] EWHC 440 (Fam) and see also Re M and N (Twins: Relinquished Babies: Parentage) [2017] EWFC 31, Re TJ (Relinquished Baby: Sibling Contact) [2017] EWFC 6, and Re RA (Baby Relinquished for Adoption: Final Hearing)) [2016] EWFC 47).


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-262
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

Abstract The legitimacy of recent judgments in the Supreme Court, lower federal courts and State courts which have extended the scope of the Due Process and/or Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment has been a fiercely contested controversy in legal and political circles in the USA. The controversy has been especially sharp in relation to the question of same sex marriage, and specifically whether it is within State competence to refuse to allow same sex couples to marry under State law. This paper explores that legitimation controversy through a multi-contextual analysis of the Supreme Court’s starkly divided judgment in Obergefell v Hodges (2015), in which a bare majority of the Court concluded that a State ban on same sex marriage was incompatible with the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This paper critiques both the majority and dissenting opinions, and suggests that while one might applaud the substantive conclusion the Court has reached, the reasoning offered by the majority suffers from several obvious weaknesses both in narrow doctrinal terms and from the broader perspective of safeguarding the Court from well-founded criticism that it is overstepping the bounds of its legitimate constitutional role.


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