scholarly journals Social and Economic Political Ideology Consistently Operate as Mutual Suppressors: Implications for Personality, Social, and Political Psychology

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H Costello ◽  
Scott O. Lilienfeld

Right-left political views can be decomposed into distinct economic and social dimensions that bear differing relations with external criteria. In three community samples (total N = 1487), we identified replicable suppressor situations in which statistically controlling for either social or economic political ideology increased the other ideology dimension’s relations with variables reflecting cognitive rigidity, authoritarianism, dangerous worldview, and lethal partisanship. Specifically, positive relations between social conservatism and these outcomes were enhanced after controlling for economic conservatism, while, after controlling for social conservatism, positive bivariate relations between economic conservatism and external criteria became negative and negative bivariate relations were enhanced. We identified similar, albeit less consistent, suppressor phenomena for general personality. Taken together, our results suggest that social and economic conservatism differ substantially in their psychological implications, and that following statistical control, these differences emerge even in samples in which social and economic conservatism are highly positively correlated.

2020 ◽  
pp. 194855062096467
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Costello ◽  
Scott O. Lilienfeld

Right–left political views can be decomposed into distinct economic and social dimensions that bear differing relations with external criteria. In three community samples (total N = 1,487), we identified replicable suppressor situations in which statistically controlling for either social or economic political ideology increased the other ideology dimension’s relations with variables reflecting cognitive rigidity, authoritarianism, dangerous worldview, and lethal partisanship. Specifically, positive bivariate relations between social conservatism and these outcomes were enhanced after controlling for economic conservatism, whereas, after controlling for social conservatism, positive bivariate relations between economic conservatism and external criteria became negative and negative bivariate relations were enhanced. We identified similar, albeit less consistent, suppressor phenomena for general personality. Taken together, our results suggest that social and economic conservatism differ substantially in their psychological implications, and that following statistical control, these differences emerge in samples in which social and economic conservatism are highly positively correlated.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maciej Karwowski ◽  
Marta Kowal ◽  
Agata Groyecka ◽  
Michal Bialek ◽  
Izabela Lebuda ◽  
...  

Drawing upon the Parasite Model of Democratization across two preregistered experiments conducted in the USA and Poland (total N = 1,237), we examined the psychological and political consequences of the recent COVID-19 pandemic. By manipulating saliency of COVID-19, we found that activating thinking about coronavirus may elevate Americans' and Poles' anxiety and indirectly promote their social conservatism all the way to support for more conservative presidential candidates. The pattern obtained was consistent in both countries, and it suggests that the pandemic may result in a shift in political views.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vukašin Gligorić ◽  
Allard Feddes ◽  
Bertjan Doosje

Frankfurt defined persuasive communication that has no regard for truth, knowledge, or evidence as bullshit. Although there has been a lot of psychological research on pseudo-profound bullshit, no study examined this type of communication in politics. In the present research, we operationalize political bullshit receptivity as endorsing vague political statements, slogans, and political bullshit programs. We investigated the relationship of these three measures with pseudo-profound bullshit, ideology (political ideology, support for neoliberalism), populism, and voting behavior. Three pre-registered studies in different cultural settings (the United States, Serbia, The Netherlands; total N = 534) yielded medium to high intercorrelations between political bullshit measures and pseudo-profound bullshit, and good construct validity (hypothesized one-factor solution). A Bayesian meta-analysis showed that all political bullshit measures positively correlated with support for the free market, while only some positively correlated with social (political statements and programs) and economic conservatism (programs), and populism (programs). In the U.S., higher receptivity to political bullshit was associated with a higher probability that one voted for Trump (vs Clinton) in the past and higher intentions to vote for Trump (vs Biden and Sanders). In the Netherlands, higher receptivity to political bullshit predicted the intention to vote for the conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy. Exploratory analyses on merged datasets showed that higher receptivity to political bullshit was associated with a higher probability to vote for right-wing candidates/parties and lower probability for the left-wing ones. Overall, political bullshit endorsement showed good validity, opening avenues for research in political communication, especially when this communication is broad and meaningless.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-57
Author(s):  
See Seng Tan

Abstract: The longstanding effort to develop a people-based regionalism in Southeast Asia has been shaped by an inherent tension between the liberal inclination to privilege the individual and the community under formation, on the one hand, and the realist insistence on the primacy of the state, on the other. This article explores the conditions and constraints affecting ASEAN’s progress in remaking Southeast Asia into a people-focused and caring community in three areas: disaster management, development, and democratization (understood here as human rights). Arguably, the persistent gap in Southeast Asia between aspiration and expectation is determined less by political ideology than by the pragmatic responses of ASEAN member states to the forces of nationalism and protectionism, as well as their respective sense of local and regional responsibility.Resumen: El esfuerzo histórico para desarrollar un regionalismo basado en las personas del sudeste de Asia ha estado marcado por una tensión fundamental entre la inclinación liberal de privilegiar el individuo y la comunidad y la insistencia realista sobre la primacía del estado. Este artículo explora las condiciones y limitaciones que afectan el progreso de la ASEAN en la reestructuración de Asia sudoriental en una comunidad centrada en el cuidado de las personas en: gestión de desastres, desarrollo y democratización (i.e., derechos humanos). La brecha persistente en el sudeste asiático entre la aspiración y la expectativa está determinada por las respuestas pragmáticas de los miembros de la ASEAN sometidos a las fuerzas del nacionalismo y proteccionismo, así como su respectivo sentido de responsabilidad local y regional.Résumé: L’effort historique pour développer un régionalisme fondé sur les peuples en Asie du Sud-Est a été marqué par une tension fondamentale entre l’inclination libérale qui privilégie, d’une part, l’individu et la communauté et, d’autre part, l’insistance réaliste sur la primauté de l’État. Cet article explore les conditions et les contraintes qui nuisent aux progrès de l’ANASE dans le cadre d’une refonte de l’Asie du Sud-Est en une communauté centrée et attentive aux peuples dans trois domaines : la gestion des désastres, le développement et la démocratisation (en référence aux droits humains). Le fossé persistant en Asie du Sud-Est entre les aspirations et les attentes est vraisemblablement moins déterminé par l’idéologie politique que par les réponses pragmatiques des États membres de l’ANASE soumis aux forces du nationalisme et du protectionnisme ainsi que par leur sens respectif de la responsabilité locale et régionale.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Scott Liebertz ◽  
Jason Giersch

ABSTRACT This article addresses three related questions. Does voicing a political ideology in class make a professor less appealing to students? Does voicing an ideology in class make a professor less appealing to students with opposing views? Does the intensity of professors’ ideology affect their appeal? We conducted survey experiments in two public national universities to provide evidence of the extent to which students may tolerate or even prefer that professors share their political views and under which conditions these preferences may vary. Results from the experiments indicate that expressing a political opinion did not make a professor less appealing to students—and, in fact, made the professor more appealing to some students—but the perception that a professor’s ideology is particularly intense makes the class much less favorable for students with opposing views. Students are indifferent between moderately political and nonpolitical professors.


2020 ◽  
Vol 145 (2) ◽  
pp. 495-505
Author(s):  
EIRINI DIAMANTOULI

Ideologically motivated attempts to elucidate Shostakovich’s political views and to determine whether and how they may be coded into his compositions have come to characterize the Western reception of the composer’s works since his death in 1975. Fuelled by the political oppositions of the cold war, Shostakovich’s posthumous reputation in the West has been largely shaped by two conflicting perspectives. These have positioned him on the one hand as a secret dissident, bent and broken under the unbearable strain of totalitarianism, made heroic through his veiled musical resistance to Communism; and on the other hand as a composer compromised by his capitulation to the regime – represented in an anachronistic musical style. Both perspectives surrender Shostakovich and his music to a crude oversimplification driven by vested political interests. Western listeners thus conditioned are primed to hear either the coded dissidence of a tragic victim of Communist brutality or the sinister submission of a ‘loyal son of the Communist Party’.1 For those prepared to accept Shostakovich as a ‘tragic victim’, the publication of his purported memoirs in 1979, ‘as related to and edited by’ the author Solomon Volkov, presents a tantalizing conclusion: bitterly yet discreetly scornful of the Stalinist regime, Shostakovich was indeed a secret dissident and this dissidence was made tangible in his music.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amon Eddie Kasambala

AbstractThe article contrasts the meaning of empowerment in a political ideological perspective with a Christian mission understanding of empowering as a process of reaching out to the other with the love of the triune God; Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is argued that as far as the developing world is concerned there are many reasons for an empowering process in Christian mission, and one of them is an existing identity crisis facing churches in the developing countries (sometimes referred to as third world churches). The article also undertakes to work with a proposition that states that the solution to a perceived paternalism from the churches in the developed world over those in developing nations does not necessary lie in a moratorium call, however, it should be found in embracing a notion of empowering that creates an attitude of partnership between both churches. Three basic principles are proposed that should under gird this process; namely, Unconditional acceptance, Unconditional respect, Unconditional dignity. An African tale is given to illustrate the basic working assumptions and presuppositions of this article.


1998 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-248
Author(s):  
George Barany

Historians and political scientists have already begun to explore different aspects of modern Austria's political culture. But as Helmut Konrad has reminded us, this relatively new concept is loosely defined; he considers “political culture” to mean “the values held by individuals, groups, and society as a whole that affect the behavior of peoplewithin and in relation to the political system of a country.” Lucian Pye stresses the behavioral approach in political analysis to make “more explicit and systematic” our understanding of “such long-standingconcepts as political ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political psychology, and the fundamental values of a people.”


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madison Leigh Pesowski ◽  
Ori Friedman

From ancient objects in museums to souvenirs obtained on vacation, we often value objects for their distinctive histories. The present experiments investigate the developmental origins of people’s feelings that objects with distinctive histories are special. In each of four experiments, 4- to 7-year-olds (total N = 400) saw pairs of identical-looking objects in which one object was new and the other had a history that was either distinctive or mundane. In the first experiment, the histories did not involve people; in the remaining experiments, the histories were personal and related the objects to particular people. Distinctive histories affected children’s valuations of regular objects (all experiments), but not their valuations of stuffed animals. Both older and younger children viewed regular objects with distinctive histories as more special than those with mundane histories. Older children mostly viewed objects with distinctive histories as more special than new objects, and younger children showed similar judgments when judging which object a person cared about more. Together, the findings reveal a novel way that information about the past influences children’s judgments about the present and suggest that young children’s valuations of objects depend on objects’ histories.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Fischer ◽  
Quentin Atkinson ◽  
Ananish Chaudhuri

This chapter provides an overview of studies that use incentivised experiments to study political ideology. We look first at studies that conceptualise political ideology along a unidimensional liberal-conservative spectrum and explore whether there are behavioural differences between liberals and conservatives. While recent studies find that liberals display more pro-sociality, many other studies find that liberals and conservatives display similar levels of pro-social, ingroup-biased, normative, and punitive behaviour. We then turn to experiments that study two-dimensional political ideology as embodied in the concepts of economic conservatism/progressivism (often measured with the Social Dominance Orientation scale) and social conservatism/progressivism (usually measured with the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale). In such experiments, economic conservatives display lower levels of pro-sociality and universalism and greater tolerance of inequality and tendencies to harm outgroups. Social conservatives tend to display “groupishness”, including distrusting anonymous strangers, cooperating with ingroup members, following rules, punishing in the ultimatum game, and sometimes harming outgroups.


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