scholarly journals Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?

Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

This Article focuses on an unappreciated and significant aspect of thedebate over property rules in the technology law context. In particular, itargues that the classic justification for legal entitlements protected by aproperty rule - i.e., a right to injunctive relief - depends on the abilityto define and enforce property rights effectively. In the case of manytechnology markets, the inability to tailor injunctive relief so that itprotects only the underlying right rather than also enjoining noninfringingconduct provides a powerful basis for using a liability rule (i.e.,awarding the relevant damages to the plaintiff) instead of a property rule.Notably, where injunctive relief cannot be confined to protecting theunderlying right, the availability of such relief can give rise to a"holdup strategy," whereby a firm threatens or uses litigation to obtain asettlement significantly in excess of any harm it suffers. Such strategies,as the Article explains, arise in a variety of technology law contexts,including patent law, digital copyright cases, and spectrum regulation.Depending on the particulars of the context, either courts or agenciesshould superintend the relevant liability regime and, in some cases, theadministrative challenges may undermine the case for a liability rule atall. Unfortunately, legal scholars have generally focused on thesubstantive debate as to the proper scope of property rights - oftenarguing for an all or nothing solution - at the expense of evaluating theinstitutional considerations as to whether and when courts or agencies cansuperintend a liability regime in lieu of a property right.

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-126
Author(s):  
Antonio Nicita ◽  
Matteo Rizzolli

Abstract In this paper we argue that traditional explanations of the dichotomisation of property rules and liability rules are somehow misleading, since they tend to neglect the evolutionary complementarity between die two rules in a world of incomplete property rights characterised by sizeable ex-ante transaction costs in rights’ definition. When rights are a complete bundle of well-defined uses, the application of a property rule reaffirms and reinforces the correlation between rights and duties. In a world of incomplete rights, externalities over undefined uses call for a court intervention aimed at defining a new property right through either a property rule or a liability rule. Independently of whether new rights are created by property or liability rules, die nature and die extent of future externalities over conflicting undefined uses could generate new processes of rights’ definition. The emergence of an externality always implies an evolutionary complementarity between property rules and liability rules whose boundaries actually depend, in alternative legal systems, on die degree of incompleteness of original rights.


Author(s):  
Shubha Ghosh

A patent is a legal right to exclude granted by the state to the inventor of a novel and useful invention. Much legal ink has been spilled on the meaning of these terms. “Novel” means that the invention has not been anticipated in the art prior to its creation by the inventor. “Useful” means that the invention has a practical application. The words “inventor” and “invention” are also legal terms of art. An invention is a work that advances a particular field, moving practitioners forward not simply through accretions of knowledge but through concrete implementations. An inventor is someone who contributes to an invention either as an individual or as part of a team. The exclusive right, finally, is not granted gratuitously. The inventor must apply and go through a review process for the invention. Furthermore, a price for the patent being granted is full, clear disclosure by the inventor of how to practice the invention. The public can use this disclosure once the patent expires or through a license during the duration of the patent. These institutional details are common features of all patent systems. What is interesting is the economic justification for patents. As a property right, a patent resolves certain externality problems that arise in markets for knowledge. The establishment of property rights allows for trade in the invention and the dissemination of knowledge. However, the economic case for property rights is made complex because of the institutional need to apply for a patent. While in theory, patent grants could be automatic, inventions must meet certain standards for the grant to be justified. These procedural hurdles create possibilities for gamesmanship in how property rights are allocated. Furthermore, even if granted correctly, property rights can become murky because of the problems of enforcement through litigation. Courts must determine when an invention has been used, made, or sold without permission by a third party in violation of the rights of the patent owner. This legal process can lead to gamesmanship as patent owners try to force settlements from alleged infringers. Meanwhile, third parties may act opportunistically to take advantage of the uncertain boundaries of patent rights and engage in undetectable infringement. Exacerbating these tendencies are the difficulties in determining damages and the possibility of injunctive relief. Some caution against these criticisms through the observation that most patents are not enforced. In fact, most granted patents turn out to be worthless, when gauged in commercial value. But worthless patents still have potential litigation value. While a patent owner might view a worthless patent as a sunk cost, there is incentive to recoup investment through the sale of worthless patents to parties willing to assume the risk of litigation. Hence the phenomenon of “trolling,” or the rise of non-practicing entities, troubles the patent landscape. This phenomenon gives rise to concerns with the anticompetitive uses of patents, demonstrating the need for some limitations on patent enforcement. With all the policy concerns arising from patents, it is no surprise that patent law has been ripe for reform. Economic analysis can inform these reform efforts by identifying ways in which patents fail to create a vibrant market for inventions. Appreciation of the political economy of patents invites a rich academic and policy debate over the direction of patent law.


Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

A number of doctrines in modern copyright and patent law attempt to strikesome balance between the rights of original developers and the rights ofsubsequent improvers. Both patents and copyrights are limited in durationand in scope. Each of these limitations provides some freedom of action tosubsequent improvers. Improvers are free to use material that is in thepublic domain because the copyright or patent has expired. They are free toskirt the edges of existing intellectual property rights, for example bytaking the ideas but not the expression from a copyrighted work or"designing around" the claims of a patent. However, improvers cannot alwaysavoid the intellectual property rights of the basic work on which they wishto improve. Some improvements fall within the scope of the preexistingintellectual property right, either because of an expansive definition ofthat right or because economic or technical necessity requires that theimprover hew closely to the work of the original creator in some basicrespect. Here, the improver is at the mercy of the original intellectualproperty owner, unless there is some separate right that expressly allowscopying for the sake of improvement.


2009 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Flynn ◽  
Aidan Hollis ◽  
Mike Palmedo

Not all intellectual property rights grant the right to exclude that is indicative of “property rules,” as that term was used by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in their seminal article. Some intellectual property rights are “liability rules,” in which the right holder has an entitlement to compensation for use of the protected invention, not a right to preclude the use. Although patent laws normally grant a right to exclude others from use of the protected invention as a default, most countries’ laws allow the government to convert the patent property rule into a liability rule through a compulsory license. It has been noted, for example, that by the end of the 1950s, the U.S. had issued compulsory licenses covering 40 to 50 thousand patents, including substantial portions of the patent portfolios of AT&T, General Electric, IBM, and Xerox. The U.S. Supreme Court recently expressed a willingness to accept liability rules over injunctions in some patent infringement cases.


Author(s):  
Myroslava Hudyma ◽  

Within the framework of the general doctrine of constitutive and translational acquisition of rights, the publication made an attempt to identify their suitability for describing the phenomenon of ownership transfer. The general characteristics of translational and constitutive acquisition of rights are analyzed, their differences are highlighted, and it is emphasized that the specified types can cover such legal situations as full transfer of the right (the right as a whole), and transfer of a part of powers (as components of the certain right). The paper underlines that the differences between the types of acquisition of rights are not so much quantitative (one jurisdiction or their complex is transferred), as qualitative characteristics and such issues are especially relevant in the spectrum of research on the transfer of ownership as a right that includes a triad of powers. Close attention is paid to the construction of constitutive acquisition of right, the possibility of use of which is extremely controversial, due to the overwhelming denial of the correctness of separation and alienation of a separate authority from ownership right, because the approval of the latter will lead to theoretical dissonance on the existence of incomplete (split ownership). It is emphasized that the application of the construction of the transfer of authority can take place in different shades of meaning and be combined with the right alienation, and without it. Therefore, the construction of right granting without alienation of the right is quite viable. Moreover, the transfer of one or even several powers of the owner is not only practically possible, but also necessary to establish limited property rights on the basis of full property right (ownership right). However, it is noted that in these cases, the acquirer will not receive the right of the alienator as a whole, but only certain legal possibilities of behavior in relation to a particular good. The legal capacity of the acquirer will not coincide with the legal capabilities of the alienator in content and scope, and therefore to talk about the transfer of ownership is incorrect, only a certain authority (powers) of the owner will be transferred, provided its (their) separation admissibility. The paper concludes that the specifics of property rights, which forms a triad of indivisible powers, determines the possibility of applying the construction «transfer of ownership» only to cases of translational acquisition of right, in which the acquirer receives a right identical to the right of the grantor both in content and volume.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Celia Castro ◽  
Maria Beatriz Amorim Bohrer

TRIPS as it stands is against the interests of developing countries, and needsreform. In developing their own patent law, developing countries need to recognizethat there is now near consensus among informed observers that patentlaw and practice have, in some cases, overshot, and need to be reformed. Thatis the burden of the recent NAS/NRC report on “A Patent System for the 21stCentury.


Author(s):  
Aruna Nair

This chapter examines the law governing the availability of claims to traceable proceeds. It argues that the language used in the case law—which uses the terminology of property rights and of fiduciary relationships—cannot fully explain the law, since such claims are often available in the absence of fiduciary duties and are not available to holders of many types of property right. It argues that such claims instead presuppose a relationship of ‘control of assets’: where the defendant has a legal power to deal with some asset, correlating to a vulnerability to a loss of rights in that asset on the part of the claimant, and coupled with a duty not to exercise the power. It argues that relationships that have this formal structure also share normative characteristics that justify the subordination of defendant autonomy that has been shown to be at the heart of the tracing concept.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Astha Srivastava ◽  
Ankur Srivastava

AbstractIn accident law, we seek a liability rule that will induce both the parties to adopt socially optimal levels of precaution. Economic analysis, however, shows that none of the commonly used liability rules induce both parties to adopt optimal levels, if courts have access only to ‘Limited Information’ on. In such a case, it has also been established (K. (2006). Efficiency of liability rules: a reconsideration. J. Int. Trade Econ. Dev. 15: 359–373) that no liability rule based on cost justified untaken precaution as a standard of care can be efficient. In this paper, we describe a two-step liability rule: the rule of negligence with the defence of relative negligence. We prove that this rule has a unique Nash equilibrium at socially optimal levels of care for the non-cooperative game, and therefore induces both parties to adopt socially optimal behaviour even in case of limited information.


Author(s):  
Krystyna Szczepanowska-Kozłowska

AbstractOne form of industrial property right infringement is stocking for the purpose of offering or marketing. This form of infringement appears both in EU legal acts on trademarks or designs, as well as in national regulations, including those concerning patents. What is specific to stocking when compared to other activities comprising the stipulated exclusivity of the holder of industrial property rights is the fact that the literal meaning of “stocking” does not explain whether the infringing party or the warehouse keeper is the entity that places the goods in storage. The structure of industrial property rights as absolute rights would theoretically permit the view that the law is violated by both the entity that accepts the goods for storage and the entity that places such goods in storage. To determine if there is an infringement, it must be established what the goods being stocked are further intended for. It is not without significance that the finding of an infringement of industrial property rights does not depend on fault or awareness. From the point of view of the industrial property law regime, it is difficult to find arguments against this understanding of infringement by stocking. Since the offeror of goods infringing industrial property rights may be held liable even if the goods have not yet been manufactured, it is conceivable that the entity accepting such goods for stocking is also liable. This interpretation of the concept of stocking would certainly correspond to the absolute nature of liability for infringement.In a recent judgment the CJEU confirmed that the warehouse keeper who, on behalf of a third party, stores goods which infringe trademark rights only creates the technical conditions for trademark use by this third party provided that the warehouse keeper is not aware of that infringement. The CJEU also confirmed that only the person who decides about the purpose of storing the goods can be treated as an infringer. However, the CJEU did not respond to the question regarding whether the warehouse keeper could be treated as an infringer if it pursues the aims of storing the goods at the request of the entity that put the goods into storage.


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