Waiting for 2022: strategy and tactics of the French party «Europe. Ecology – The Greens»

2021 ◽  
pp. 212-234
Author(s):  
Galina Kaninskaya

Political ecology entered the history of the Fifth Republic in France relatively recently, since 1974, when the candidate of «The Greens» party R. Dumont took part in the first round of presidential elections. From that moment until the emergence of the modern party «Europe. Ecology – The Greens», political ecology went through several organizational stages, each with one of the most important issues for «The Greens» was the electoral strategy and tactics, invariably associated with positioning on the political scene. In essence, «The Greens» parties always face an alternative choice: to act in joint electoral lists with the socialists or to present their own autonomous lists at all levels of elections. With that, there is no doubt that French ecologists make up the left of the political spectrum. And for a long time, French ecologists were much more successful separately from the socialists in the European elections to the European Parliament (EP). The French «Greens» were particularly successful in the 2019 EP elections, after the creation in 2010 of a kind of «political cooperative» in the form of the party «Europe. Ecology – The Greens». The article is devoted to the situation in and political role of the French party «Europe. Ecology – The Greens» (EELV). The party's activity is analyzed since the European Parliament elections in 2019. The reasons for the success of the ecologist party in the municipal elections of 2020 and the results of the elections to the senate of the Fifth Republic on 27 th September, 2020 are also considered. An explanation is given for the phenomenon of the growing popularity of the ecological movement in contemporary France, it is shown what impact the problem of climate warming and problem of environment’s deterioration, and also what adjustments have the COVID-19 pandemic made on the electoral process. The article examines how the EELV is preparing to perform in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2022, examines the political programs of the main candidates, and assesses the prospects of the ecologist party for uniting «progressive forces» behind itself and its relationships with other left-wing parties within the framework of the «two concentric circles» tactic. Some doubts were expressed about EELV’s willingness to lead the highest echelons of power.

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
Boris Guseletov ◽  

The article analyzes the phenomenon of the emergence and development of a new pan-European political Party of the European left in the political arena. Its forerunner was a Forum of the new European left, formed in 1991, close to the Communist and workers’ parties and the group «European United Left – Nordic Green Left» in the European Parliament, which emerged in 1995 through the merger of «Confederal Group of the European United Left» faction of environmentalists «Left-wing Green of the North». Many experts viewed these parties as a vestige of a bipolar world, and believed that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, they should finally disappear from the political arena of Europe, giving up the left flank to the socialists and social Democrats. However, European Communists and left-wing radicals demonstrated incredible political vitality and in the tenth years of the twentieth century in a number of EU countries (Greece, France, the Czech Republic) managed to bypass their opponents on the left flank. In 2004 a pan-European party of the European left was created, which is characterized by a commitment to unorthodox Communist and environmental values and a moderately eurosceptic view of the EU’s development prospects. In the last European elections in 2019, this party lost some ground, but nevertheless managed to maintain its small faction in the European Parliament. So today it is difficult to speak about prospects of the European left, although the strength of parties in Germany, Greece, Spain, France and other countries, as well as the weakening of the party of European socialists, gives us reasonable confidence in the fact that the radical left will be able to maintain its presence on the political stage of Europe in the next 10-15 years. The author of the article tried to identify the causes of this political force and its future prospects.


Res Publica ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 471-501
Author(s):  
Dusan Sidjanski

The results of the first European elections reflect the general distribution of the European electorate slightly center-right oriented, even if the abstentionism of almost 40 % caused some distorsions as in the case of United Kingdom. After the comparison of the results, state by state, it appears globally that the socialists ( 113) and liberals (40) regressed, the gaullists and their allies (22) suffered a serious defeat, white the christian democrats ( 107) and the communists (44) progressed and some minor parties (leftists and regionalists) entered the European Parliament.The second part contains a portrait of the new European Parliament which is younger than its predecessor, has more women including its president and has many high personnalities. As in the past, the political groupsplay a central and dynamic role. The question is to know if they will be capable of maintaining their cohesion. The examined cases give no evidence of the existence of the center-right majority in front of the left opposition. In fact, there were changing coalitions and voting constellations according to different problems, ideological options or concrete choices. The recent vote rejecting the proposed budget expresses a will of the European Parliament to impose its style and its democratic control on the European Community.


Author(s):  
Laurențiu Ștefan

In Romania, a highly segmented and extremely volatile party system has contributed to a predominance of coalition governments. Alternation in power by coalitions led by either left-wing or right-wing parties used to be a major feature of Romanian governments. Thus, until a short-lived grand coalition in 2009, ideologically homogeneous coalitions were the general practice. Since then, parties from the right and left of the political spectrum have learned to work together in government. Given the semi-presidential nature of the political regime and the exclusive power to nominate the prime minister, the Romanian president plays an important role in coalition formation. The president also plays a pivotal role by shadowing the prime minister and therefore influencing the governance of coalitions. She has the power to veto ministerial appointments and therefore she can also shape the cabinet line-up. Pre-election coalitions are a common feature, more than two-thirds of Romanian coalition governments have been predicated on such agreements. Coalition agreements dealt with both policy issues and coalition decision-making bodies and the governance mechanisms that have been in most cases enforced and complied with—until the break-up of the coalition and the downfall of the respective government. One very common decision-making body is the Coalition Committee, which has been backed on the operational level by an inner cabinet made up of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers, which usually are the heads of the junior coalition parties.


2019 ◽  
pp. 176-188
Author(s):  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter focuses upon the European Parliament (EP), an institution that has seen its power dramatically increase in recent times. The EP has been transformed from being a relatively powerless institution into one that is able to have a genuine say in the legislative process and hold the European Union’s executive bodies (the Commission and Council, introduced in Chapters 9 and 10) to account in a range of policy areas. However, increases in the Parliament’s formal powers have not been matched by an increase in popular legitimacy: turnout in European elections is falling. Thus, while the EP’s legislative power is comparable to that enjoyed by many national parliaments, it has struggled to connect with the wider European public. The chapter explores these issues in detail. In the first section, the EP’s evolution from talking shop to co-legislator is reviewed; its powers and influence are explained in the next section; the EP’s internal structure and organization are then discussed with a focus upon the role and behaviour of the political groups, and finally, the European Parliament’s representative function as the EU’s only directly elected institution is discussed.


2020 ◽  
pp. 147737082096656
Author(s):  
Leonidas K. Cheliotis ◽  
Sappho Xenakis

An important body of scholarly work has been produced over recent decades to explain variation in levels and patterns of state punishment across and within different countries around the world. Two variables that have curiously evaded systematic attention in this regard are, first, the orientation of incumbent governments along the political spectrum, and second, the experience and fiscal implications of national economic downturn. Although recent years have seen both variables receive somewhat greater consideration, there is still precious little research into the effects on state punishment that they have in interaction with one another. With a view to helping fill this gap in the literature, this article identifies the direction and assesses the extent of influence exerted by government political orientation, on the one hand, and by economic downturn alongside its fiscal repercussions, on the other hand, upon the evolution of incarceration in the context of contemporary Greece. In so doing, we offer a uniquely detailed account of carceral trends before and during the period that a coalition government led by the left-wing Syriza party was in power. With regard to carceral trends as such, the scope of our analysis extends beyond conventional imprisonment also to include immigration detention. As well as arguing that economic downturn can place crucial limits on a government’s ability to execute progressive plans in carceral matters, we additionally conclude that a government’s scope of action in this vein may be further restricted depending on the autonomy it can wield in defiance of foreign forces intervening in both economic and political realms.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthijs Rooduijn ◽  
Tjitske Akkerman

How is populism distributed over the political spectrum? Are right-wing parties more populist than left-wing parties? Based on the analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008, we show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse. This is a striking finding, because populism in Western Europe has typically been associated with the radical right; only some particular radical left parties have been labeled populist as well. This article suggests that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. Our explanation is that many contemporary radical left parties are not traditionally communist or socialist (anymore). They do not focus on the ‘proletariat’, but glorify a more general category: the ‘good people’. Moreover, they do not reject the system of liberal democracy as such, but only criticize the political and/or economic elites within that system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svenja Kopyciok ◽  
Hilary Silver

Given rising populist nationalism and multiplying meanings of “right” and “left,” this paper assesses whether Europeans who identify as extremely left-wing on the political spectrum hold anti-immigrant attitudes. In contrast to right-wing xenophobes, we further examine whether the political left, who conventionally emphasize class conflict, oppose immigrants less for cultural reasons and more for materialist reasons. We also consider whether socioeconomic status and values traditionally associated with the political left—favoring redistributive policies, egalitarianism, or social rights to benefits and services for immigrants—temper left- more than right-wing xenophobia. We find that a surprisingly large share of those who identify as far left do express extremely xenophobic attitudes, and we profile them in contrast to far right xenophobes. With logistic regression analysis of nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2018), we find that, all things equal, socioeconomic status influences far left xenophobia more than far right xenophobia, but inegalitarian values, less support for redistributive policies, and welfare chauvinism can only partially account for far left xenophobia and unexpectedly do not distinguish it from far right xenophobia. This implies that far left parties might adopt anti-immigrant policies to try to retain their loyal voters, even though such policies do not comport with broader left-wing values and may increase racial and ethnic inequality. Controlling for demographic and attitudinal differences reduces the probability of xenophobia among the far left by about sixty percent, but there remains some residual anti-immigrant attitudes among this group still to be explained.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karina Bénazech Wendling ◽  
Matthew Rowley

Populism, like nationalism, can be found on the right as well as on the left-wing of the political spectrum. However, current political debates demonstrate how in recent years, nationalist and populist movements have advanced the preservation of Christian “roots” against a global cosmopolitanism. Right-wing populism thus tends to present itself as a guardian of Christian culture, or Judeo-Christian culture. However, there is a struggle over the definition and the ownership of this religious heritage. Whilst it is certainly possible to identify sources within the Protestant tradition that may legitimise support for right-wing populism, the questions this struggle raises often relate to particular intersections of culture, theology, perspectives on history as well as political thought. This special issue explores and critiques these intersections, employing theological, historical, and sociological methods. While the main perspective is that of cross-disciplinary reflections on the fraught relationship between Protestantism and right-wing populism, it also examines the evolution of broader connections between Christianity and nationalism through time.


1979 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Wallace

MUCH OF THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN Parliament has focused on two questions: how far it will or can develop along the lines familiar from national parliamentary experience; and whether it will be able to insert itself effectively into the decision-making processes of the European Communities (EC). The evolution of the Parliament is well summarized in the paper by Hans Nord and John Taylor, as are the constitutional powers and political levereage the might contribute to an enhanced role in the future. A wealth of other studies recently published further amplify the constraints on the Parliament and the opportunities available to it for the gradual extension of its functions. Their conclusions range from the view that Parliament is so heavily circumscribed as to have little scope for effectiveness to the belief that Parliament will gradually enlarge its area of influence, until in practice it has gained a significant political role. Some commentators regard constitutional change, with a formal extension of parliamentary powers, as a necessary condition of an enhanced role, while others anticipate that constitutional change is more likely to take place only to recognise de iure an actual increase in the political authority of the Parliament.


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