scholarly journals Leadership Role of Hassan Rouhani and Nuclear Deal of Iran

2018 ◽  
Vol I (I) ◽  
pp. 43-50
Author(s):  
Noor Fatima ◽  
Sajida Begum

Hassan Rouhani had been serving as secretary to Supreme National Security Council for 16 years. Hassan Rouhani was the person who was tasked to lead the team of technically, politically and legally expert's negotiators on nuclear program of Iran to start talks with the western powers to decreased the tension between IAEA body and foreign ministry of Iran on reports published by the IAEA and adoption of the UN Security Council resolution condemning Iran. Iran's nuclear program was started in the era of the reign of Raza Shah Pahlavi before the Islamic Revolution. It was not only another country providing nuclear technology but also America. Iran's foreign policy will not be affected by the slogans, but we will safely defend our national interests. Hassan Rouhani After elected as President in 2013, promised that he would work to bring relief in economic sanctions on the country due to which the economy was destroyed and life was difficult for the Iranian people. Iran's hardliner leaders had been opposing the any deal and talks on the matter of nuclear program. On the other end reformist groups in the Iran always favored the new ideas and negotiations on nuclear program and when the balance of power turned in favor of President Rouhani when won the elections in 2013 and he gave the green signal to the negotiators.

Author(s):  
Grégoire Mallard

As the critical sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program demonstrate, the implementation of sanctions against nuclear proliferators has led to the creation of a global system of surveillance of the financial dealings of all states, banks, and individuals, fostered by United Nations Security Council resolutions—a new and unprecedented development. This chapter asks: Which actors have been in charge of designing and implementing sanctions against nuclear proliferators? Which legal technologies have they developed to regulate global financial transactions? Answering these questions generates a better understanding of key processes in global governance: the increasing role of the Security Council as a global legislator; the “financialization” of global regulation, with the increasing role played by international and US domestic financial institutions that were historically foreign to the field of nuclear nonproliferation; and the judicialization of the enforcement of sanctions, which is accompanied by the multiplication of secondary sanctions against sanctions-evaders.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 17-39
Author(s):  
Ambassador Colin Keating

This article discusses the role of the UN Security Council during the crisis in Rwanda in 1993/94. It focuses on the peacekeeping dimensions of the Council’s involvement. It is a perspective from a practitioner, rather than an academic. It also makes some observations about whether the Rwanda crisis has had an enduring influence on Security Council practice. It does not address the impact on practical aspects of peacekeeping or on the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-161
Author(s):  
Hans Blix

International institutions given the task to maintain collective security and to seek disarmament need to build on cooperation between major powers. The authors of the un Charter vested great powers in the Security Council but a consensus between the five permanent great powers was required for use of the powers. This inevitably paralyzed the Council during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the permanent members have remained unable jointly to pursue disarmament, but they have succeeded in several remarkable cases to reach consensus, notably on measures to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction. The quick action to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria was a win-win case led by us-Russian diplomacy, while the comprehensive deal settling the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program was a victory for patient diplomacy involving all permanent members and the eu. These actions show the potentials of the Council.


Balcanica ◽  
2007 ◽  
pp. 243-268
Author(s):  
Predrag Simic

Nearly ten years since the 1999 NATO military intervention against Serbia and the establishment of UN administration, Kosovo and Metohija has resurfaced as a topical issue in international politics, separating the positions of the USA and Russia, and becoming a precedent in international relations, possibly with far-reaching consequences not only for the future of the western Balkans but also for many territorial disputes worldwide. Russia has only recently pulled herself out of the years-long Chechnya crisis, and facing similar problems in her 'new neighborhood' (Abkhazia, South Ossetia Transdniestria), is among the countries that might be affected by this precedent. Secondly, with her bad experience in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Russia has become sensitive not only to any disturbance in the balance of power in the Balkans but also to any change to the existing international order. Moscow has not forgotten that during the 1990s many Westerners saw Serbia as a 'metaphor for Russia' and that the NATO interventions against the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and against Serbia (1999) revealed Russia's weakness, sending her the message to give up her interests in the Balkans and Europe. Thirdly, diverging American and Russian policies on Kosovo and Metohija coincide with their strained relations over the deployment of an antimissile 'shield' in Poland and the Czech Republic, the war in Iraq, policy towards Iran and other issues currently at the top of the list of international problems. Fourthly, meanwhile Russia has managed to recover from the disintegration of the USSR and to consolidate her economic and political power in Europe and the world, owing above all to oil and gas exports, but also to the export of industrial products (military in particular). The precedent that an independent Kosovo and Metohija would constitute in international relations is therefore a test of Russia's role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. She has found herself in the role of the defender of the fundamental principles of international law such as the inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the UN members.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1056-1062

In July 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Pursuant to that agreement, Iran committed to limiting the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. By law, the U.S. State Department is required to certify Iran's compliance with the agreement every ninety days. The Trump administration first certified Iran's compliance with the agreement in April 2017, albeit reluctantly. In its first certification, the Trump administration expressed ongoing concern about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, and repeated previous criticism of the JCPOA as “fail[ing] to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran.”


2020 ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Alexander Thompson

The UN Security Council increasingly authorizes weapons inspections to enforce nonproliferation. These are cases of indirect governance, where the Council (the governor) relies on separate bodies (intermediaries) to conduct inspections in states of concern (targets). Despite the risks, the Council often seems willing to forego control in return for gaining the benefits of a competent intermediary that can address its ambitious policy goals and capability deficits. These cases point to important differences between preexisting intermediaries (such as the IAEA and OPCW) and ad hoc intermediaries created for specific tasks (such as the inspection commissions that operated in Iraq). The latter are far more amendable to control, both ex ante and ex post. Over time, we see increasing goal divergence between the governor and intermediaries, driven mainly by the shifting interests of Security Council members, but we also see the competence of intermediaries increase as they gain on-the-ground experience, making control more difficult. The collective nature of the Security Council further complicates control efforts, creating a temptation for individual members to interfere unilaterally with intermediaries and targets. The analysis suggests that the role of sovereign, strategic targets deserves more attention in the study of indirect governance at the international level.


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