scholarly journals Generalizing Culprit Resolution in Legal Debugging with Background Knowledge

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wachara Fungwacharakorn ◽  
Ken Satoh
Keyword(s):  
Background Knowledge ◽  
Legal Rule ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Intended Interpretation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
The Way

Since the legal rules cannot be perfect, we have proposed a work called Legal Debugging for handling counterintuitive consequences caused by imperfection of the law. Legal debugging consists of two steps. Firstly, legal debugging interacts with a judge as an oracle that gives the intended interpretation of the law and collaboratively figures out a legal rule called a culprit, which determines as a root cause of counterintuitive consequences. Secondly, the legal debugging determines possible resolutions for a culprit . The way we have proposed to resolve a culprit is to use extra facts that have not been considered in the legal rules to describe the exceptional situation of the case. Nevertheless, the result of the resolution is usually considered as too specific and no generalizations of the resolution are provided. Therefore, in this paper, we introduce a rule generalization step into Legal Debugging. Specifically, we have reorganized Legal Debugging into four steps, namely a culprit detection, an exception invention, a fact-based induction, and a rule-based induction. During these four steps, a new introduced rule is specific at first then becomes more generalized. This new step allows a user to use existing legal concepts from the background knowledge for revising and generalizing legal rules.

Obligations from Artifacts

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian H. Bix
Keyword(s):  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Recent Approach ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

A persistent question in modern legal philosophy is whether or how (human-created) legal rules and legal systems can produce moral obligations for citizens. Contemporary theorists have sought answers to this problem in the ideas of conventions, coordination problems, and plans. Some theorists argue that the law—that all legal rules—create general and at-least-presumptive moral obligations; others argue that the law, at best, occasionally triggers pre-existing moral obligations—some legal rules creating moral obligations for some people. This chapter explores the issue of how and when law creates moral obligations, and also considers a more recent approach to the nature of law which has raised doubts regarding whether the law is in fact artifactual in the way most theorists (and most citizens) believe.

Can American Courts Respect Religious Reasoning?

2017 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 464-469
Author(s):  
James R. Stoner
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
York Review ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legal Concepts

In 1977, legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin published Taking Rights Seriously, and it quickly received wide notice. At the time recently appointed H.L.A. Hart's successor at Oxford, Dworkin combined jurisprudential analysis with pointed commentary on United States Supreme Court cases, the latter developed principally in essays in the New York Review of Books. Defining law through its aspiration to justice and defining justice in terms of rights, Dworkin argued that judges were entitled to use moral philosophy both to interpret legal rules through the principles they instantiate and to fill in gaps in the law by leveraging general legal concepts into more precise conceptions. Often paired with his contemporary John Rawls's Theory of Justice, Dworkin's theory that judges should rework the law when possible to insure “equal concern and respect” was seen to elaborate the practical meaning of Rawls's first principle of justice (equal rights to basic liberties) as well as to boost the activism of judges, whom he encouraged to model “Hercules.”

Regulation of Fresh Water Uses

2021 ◽  
pp. 8-68
Author(s):  
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes
Keyword(s):  
Fresh Water ◽  
Energy Production ◽  
Water Regulation ◽  
Minimum Flow ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Human Needs ◽  
Legal Regimes ◽  
The Law ◽  
Water Uses ◽  
The Way

Chapter 2 traces the evolution of fresh water regulation. It identifies the various uses of fresh water that have been subject to legal rules, including boundary delimitation along international watercourses, navigation, fishing, irrigation, energy production, other industrial uses, and recreational purposes. Areas where conflicts of uses arise are also highlighted, and the way in which these are sometimes resolved by the law is explained, with an emphasis on the importance of human needs and the notion of minimum flow. The major treaties that purport to govern international watercourses, such as the UN Watercourses Convention of 1997, which entered into force in 2014, as well as other sources of fresh water and their accompanying legal regimes, are similarly presented.

The normative role of the economic legal rule and the results of its application to the investment law in the Kurdistan region

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tahseen Hamah Saeed
Keyword(s):  
Law And Economics ◽  
Legal Rule ◽  
Kurdistan Region ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Transnational Companies ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
Modern Era

The reciprocal treatment between law and economics has become a fact in the real world. And that the influence and influence between them reached the point of putting the independence of each under question. The central role that the economy plays in the modern era, especially after the emergence of the phenomenon of globalization and the spread of transnational companies and the dominance of the liberal and capitalist intellectual current, caused the emergence of a special type of law and legal rules called economic legal rules that have characteristics that distinguish them from other legal rules. This is due to the special nature of the economy of change. Fast and complex. And it came to the point that some scholars claimed that the economy has become in the center and that the law lacks its independence and has no function but to regulate the affairs of the economy so that the latter performs its original and important function in modern societies. Although the opinion regarding the relativity of this independence differs among the jurists of the Latin school from the Anglo-Saxon school. The jurists of the Latin school in general recognize more independence of the law, while the Anglo-Saxon jurists go to the more influence of the economy on the law than the effect of the law on the economy. Especially in developing countries in need of development and development. That is why the researcher tries to apply the result of the structural role of the economic legal base on one of the economic laws in the afflicted Kurdistan region, which needs the most what it needs is change and development in both areas of law and economy. Especially with regard to investing and working with internal capital and attracting foreign investors, in order to remove some injustice from the oppressed people at a time when the reality was finally fair and gave them the opportunity to have their legitimate authority and enjoy the opportunity to rise and move to reach the level of progress of the world in the modern era and keep pace with what its brothers have reached in humanity from other peoples.

scholarly journals Islamic Law from the Internal Point of View

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Haider A. Hamoudi
Keyword(s):  
Islamic Law ◽  
Legal Rule ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Internal Point ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Internal View ◽  
Historical Method ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
The Law

Haider Hamoudi notes the different perspectives lawyers and historians employ in making sense of the law. Invoking H.L.A. Hart’s famous distinction between “internal” and “external” points of view with respect to law and legal rules, Hamoudi describes lawyers as primarily adopting the former, and historians, the latter point of view. This is not to suggest that lawyers do not take history into consideration, but rather to mean that when they do, their focus is results oriented in that they use history to understand the ultimate endpoint, the contemporaneous meaning of a legal rule or institution. Hamoudi observes two consequences emanating from lawyers’ adoption of the internal view that puts lawyers somewhat at odds with the demands of historical method and meaning. While deliberately omitting discussion on the normative desirability of either method, Hamoudi concludes by observing value in merely pointing out the differences between the internal and external viewpoints of law and history, respectively, to help expose “our own biases and assumptions.”

Truth

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Eekelaar
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Private Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Right To Know ◽  
Biological Reality ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
The Way

Starting from the observation that the law constructs a reality which may not correspond to ‘physical’ truth, this chapter begins by considering the way kin relationships have been designed to project a social order from one generation to successor generations. Legal concepts of legitimacy, illegitimacy, and the circumstances in which paternity is recognized subordinate recognizing biological reality to upholding a social order. But, while arguing that children’s right to know their identity generally demands that their biological origins should be known, the chapter maintains that parents do not have an equivalent right to develop a relationship with a child for no other reason than that they are the child’s parent, even though the parent may have a duty to support the child. The argument is developed in the context of the rights to family and private life in the European Convention on Human Rights

The Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 256-269
Author(s):  
Diego Quaglioni
Keyword(s):  
Legal Culture ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
The Political ◽  
Legal Thought ◽  
The Law ◽  
Political Philosopher ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
The Way

This chapter discusses the way Dante’s major works, like Monarchia and Convivio, articulate a strong and complex interrelation among religious, political, and legal concepts. Dante’s Commedia, too, is a universal masterpiece whose literary-theoretical framework is simultaneously and manifestly a legal one. Dante the political philosopher as well as Dante the poet fully assimilated the legal culture of his century. He was not a canonist or a jurist either, even though he quoted canon and Roman law everywhere, castigating papal decretals and the decretalists in the harshest terms but also following some traditional lines of legal thought. Indeed, the legal maxims quoted by Dante are one with the structure of his discourse and argumentation, even when Dante follows closely precise legal enunciations of the sources, showing how phrases from the texts of the Corpus iuris civilis or of the Corpus iuris canonici had become part of general educated discourse among non-lawyers.

scholarly journals Em defesa do Direito Probatório fundado em regras- e da Epistemologia também

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 319
Author(s):  
Frederick Schauer
Keyword(s):  
Jeremy Bentham ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Relevant Evidence ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Rules Of Evidence ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Appraisal ◽  
Formal Rules

<p><strong>RESUMO:</strong></p><p>Desde que Jeremy Bentham escreveu a sua severa crítca ao Direito Probatório, filósofos e juristas têm critcado as regras probatórias excludentes argumentando que as regras formais que excluem classes inteiras de provas em razão da sua alegada infabilidade violam máximas epistemológicas fundamentais que exigem que toda prova pertinente seja levada em consideração. Embora algumas partes da prova possam ser excluídas por falta de fabilidade – argumentam eles – seria um erro fazer tais juízos em relação a categorias inteiras, em oposição a fazê-los somente em relação à provas específcas apresentadas para propósitos específicos. Este artgo põe em causa essas alegações, argumentando que exclusões fundadas em regras servem a propósitos similares àqueles desempenhados pelas regras nas teorias morais consequencialistas de regras, e que, de maneira ainda mais importante, elas são totalmente consistentes com a natureza excludente das regras jurídicas em geral. Na verdade, uma vez visto o papel que as regras excludentes podem desempenhar na Epistemologia Jurídica, se torna possível ver que elas poderiam ter um papel a desempenhar na avaliação epistêmica em geral.</p><p><strong>ABSTRACT:</strong> </p><p>Ever since Jeremy Bentham wrote his scathing critque of the law of evidence, both philosophers and legal scholars have criticized the exclusionary rules of evidence, arguing that formal rules excluding entre classes of evidence for alleged unreliability violate basic epistemological maxims mandating that all relevant evidence be considered. Although particular pieces of evidence might be excluded as unreliable, they argue, it is a mistake to make such judgments for entire categories, as opposed to making only in the context of partcular pieces of evidence ofered for specifc purposes. This paper challenges these claims, arguing that rule-based exclusions serve similar purposes to those served by rules in rule-consequentalist moral theories, and that, even more importantly, they are entrely consistent with the exclusionary nature of legal rules in general. Indeed, once we see the role that exclusionary rules might serve in legal epistemology, we can see that they might have a role to play in epistemic appraisal more generally.</p>

The specificity of extensive and restrictive interpretations of the law

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 13-17
Author(s):  
Евгений Тихонравов ◽  
Evgeniy Tikhonravov
Keyword(s):  
Legal Rule ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The Law

Some scholars maintain that all legal rules are subject to extensive and restrictive interpretation. Others argue that certain kinds of legal norms cannot be construed in this way. The author attempts to resolve this contradiction. The findings suggest a rule for determining when extensive or restrictive interpretation of a particular legal rule is acceptable.

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