scholarly journals Zones of political power: cell phones and group formation in Kenya and the Philippines.

Author(s):  
Mark J. Jones

This thesis proposes a way to examine the form of connection between cell phone use and the formation of groups advocating political change and democratic reform in developing countries. It uses two political events - the People Power II demonstration in Manila, Philippines in 2001, and the national election in Kenya in 2002 - as case studies to test a framework, one that draws from articulation theory and actor-network theory, and is informed by a history of development communication. Cell phone technology has achieved a worldwide subscriber adoption rate like no other digital technology. People in so-called developing countries have been particularly fast adopters of cell phone technology, with Africa being the fastest growing market in the world since 2002, and the Philippines now the world's leader in the number of text messages sent each day. Popular media reports describe people's use of the cell phone as an instrument for the organization of potent political resistance in the digital age. This thesis strives to ground assumptions of the "power of texting" in a robust examination of the factors that lead to the formation of social groups that successfully and peacefully replace governments believed by popular opinion to be corrupt. The first part of the paper reviews the theoretical foundations used to triangulate an examination of the topic. The second part reviews details of the two case events, including socioeconomic and telecommunications conditions that may have contributed to the formation and organization of social groups and the political ideology conveyed during these events. The third part brings together various types of data - voting patterns, poverty, telecommunication policy, and cell phone network coverage - to expose possible correlations between those geographic areas in developing countries that are cell phone enabled and the potential political influence those with access to mobile handsets can exert. The thesis concludes by arguing that cell phone network coverage maps are useful tools in the study of social and cultural phenomenon for three reasons: cell phone networks are dedicated and singular, they track network penetration density in targeted regions with specific economic and demographic criteria, and they enable the tracking of network expansion over time, indicating emerging regions for wireless social communication and economic development. These maps may be read as zones of political power, enabling those with access to the technology to promote their political agenda, while those without access may be disadvantaged.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark J. Jones

This thesis proposes a way to examine the form of connection between cell phone use and the formation of groups advocating political change and democratic reform in developing countries. It uses two political events - the People Power II demonstration in Manila, Philippines in 2001, and the national election in Kenya in 2002 - as case studies to test a framework, one that draws from articulation theory and actor-network theory, and is informed by a history of development communication. Cell phone technology has achieved a worldwide subscriber adoption rate like no other digital technology. People in so-called developing countries have been particularly fast adopters of cell phone technology, with Africa being the fastest growing market in the world since 2002, and the Philippines now the world's leader in the number of text messages sent each day. Popular media reports describe people's use of the cell phone as an instrument for the organization of potent political resistance in the digital age. This thesis strives to ground assumptions of the "power of texting" in a robust examination of the factors that lead to the formation of social groups that successfully and peacefully replace governments believed by popular opinion to be corrupt. The first part of the paper reviews the theoretical foundations used to triangulate an examination of the topic. The second part reviews details of the two case events, including socioeconomic and telecommunications conditions that may have contributed to the formation and organization of social groups and the political ideology conveyed during these events. The third part brings together various types of data - voting patterns, poverty, telecommunication policy, and cell phone network coverage - to expose possible correlations between those geographic areas in developing countries that are cell phone enabled and the potential political influence those with access to mobile handsets can exert. The thesis concludes by arguing that cell phone network coverage maps are useful tools in the study of social and cultural phenomenon for three reasons: cell phone networks are dedicated and singular, they track network penetration density in targeted regions with specific economic and demographic criteria, and they enable the tracking of network expansion over time, indicating emerging regions for wireless social communication and economic development. These maps may be read as zones of political power, enabling those with access to the technology to promote their political agenda, while those without access may be disadvantaged.


1968 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-269
Author(s):  
André Vachet

Division of power and social integrationExplanation of some of the recent challenges to western democracy may be found in a re-examination of Montesquieu's thought. Here we find the theory of the separation of power to be far more complex than is implied in the simple divisions of legislature, executive, and judiciary. For Montesquieu, the separation of power is more a social division than a political or juridical one. He contemplated returning the organs of political power to various social forces, e.g. monarchy, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie, and that then the self-assertion of forces would be restrained by the resistance of other social groups. The realization of its goals would require every important social group to integrate itself both to society and to the state and to seek its goals through realization of the general good.Since Montesquieu's time, political structures would seem to have been very little changed even though social structures have been greatly altered by the rise of economic powers. Political institutions have been losing touch with the vital forces of society and these have had to find other channels of expression. The personalization of power, the rise of the executive, violence, and increasing paternalism may be viewed as phenomena of compensation by which attempts are being made to bridge the gap between the structures of political power and those of a society which has been restructured.Revigoration of parliamentary democracy would seem to require that all vital social forces be reintegrated into the political system and be given meaningful channels of political expression. Failure to make such changes opens the way to identification of the political powers with technocracy and the increasing general use of violence in the resolution of social problems.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 616-633 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Dressel ◽  
Tomoo Inoue

To what extent do informal networks shape the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines? Though often raised in the Philippines, this question has never been studied empirically. To answer it, we constructed a set of social network variables to assess how informal ties, based on university connections and work affiliations, may have influenced the court’s decisions between 1986 and 2015 in 47 politically high-profile cases. Providing statistically significant evidence for the effects of political influence (presidential appointments) and hierarchical pressure (the vote of the Chief Justice) on related networks, our analysis suggests a continuing tension on the Supreme Court bench between professionalism and informality. Because the findings advance both theoretical and empirical understanding of larger issues at the intersection of courts and society throughout the region, we recommend more attention to the role of judicial networks, external to the courts as well as within them.


IZUMI ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-142
Author(s):  
Muhammad Reza Rustam

One of the reasons foreign workers are looking for jobs abroad is that there are not enough jobs in their home countries. Indonesia is one of the countries that send migrant workers to more developed Asian and Middle Eastern countries. The increasingly rapid flow of globalization in the world goes together with the need for new workers to fill the industry, especially in Japan. This condition has forced Japan to open doors for foreign workers from developing countries to satisfy demand. These workers usually come from developing countries, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, China, the Philippines, and others. In general, they occupy the less desirable working positions over Japanese youth, the so-called 3D work (dirty, dangerous, and demanding). Therefore, the current dynamics of these migrant workers' life in Japan becomes an exciting subject to comprehend, especially for the Indonesian migrant workers. This study aims to determine the dynamics of Indonesian worker's life while working in the Japanese fisheries sector. In particular, the study looks at those who work in oyster cultivation in Hiroshima prefecture. This research was carried out using descriptive analysis methods and field study with in-depth interviews conducted from 2016-2018. The interviews performed in this study were structured to find answers for the following questions: What problems do the workers face while living in Japan? What kind of processes did they go through before coming to Japan? While working in the Japanese fishing industry, how was their life as a Muslim minority?


2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-41
Author(s):  
Eiji Yamada ◽  
Satoshi Shimizutani ◽  
Enerelt Murakami

Recent literature has revealed that financial inclusion enhances economic opportunities and security in developing countries. Moreover, a greater inflow of remittances can promote inclusiveness. In this paper, we explore the potential impacts of the COVID-19 outbreak on financial inclusion by focusing on its detrimental effect on remittance flows to developing countries. Using a household-level dataset collected in rural regions of the Philippines prior to the outbreak, we confirm that remittances are associated with financial inclusion, particularly for women. We discuss the potential impacts of the pandemic on financial inclusion through the change in the flow of remittances. We show that a substantial decline in remittances caused by the COVID-19 crisis may have an adverse effect on financial inclusion in the Philippines.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0261927X2110657
Author(s):  
Cristina Jayme Montiel ◽  
Joshua Uyheng ◽  
Nmanuel de Leon

Swearing in public discourse represents a contentious rhetorical feature of populist leaders’ transgressive politics. This paper argues that, beyond constituting merely “offensive” speech, swearing generatively accomplishes a host of discursive functions which contribute to the fortification of a populist regime. Taking populist President Duterte of the Philippines as a case in point, we utilize a critical text analytics approach to examine his use of profane language across a corpus of 746 of his public speeches. We find that Duterte discursively harnesses swear words to: (a) affirm vernacular identities with hostile humor, (b) claim outsider virtues against corrupt institutions, and (c) marshal insider force as the nation's sovereign leader. Swearing thus represents a rich discursive resource for populist leaders to navigate their contradictory positions as insiders and outsiders to political power, toward both public endearment and coercion of the nation's people. Our findings suggest the importance of critically examining language in relation to collective-level phenomena like populism and the utility of mixed methods approaches for enriching global psychologies of politics and language.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110403
Author(s):  
Noemí Peña-Miguel ◽  
Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros

This article analyses the effect of political factors on the use of Public Private Partnerships in developing countries. According to a sample of 80 low- and middle-income countries over the period 1995–2017, our findings suggest that Public Private Partnership projects are affected by political ideology, the strength of the government and electoral cycles. Concretely, they tend to be used by left-wing governments to a greater extent than governments with other ideologies. Public Private Partnerships also tend to be more frequently used by fragmented governments and when there is greater political competition. There is also some evidence (although slight) on the relevance of the proximity of elections in explaining Public Private Partnerships in developing countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (10) ◽  
pp. 91-102
Author(s):  
N. Rogozhina

The choice of the countries of Southeast Asia as an example for analyzing the nature of interaction between developing countries and China within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative is not accidental. The very logic of China’s stated goals of gaining dominant positions in the world economy and politics makes it inevitable that the countries of Southeast Asia located in geographic proximity to it are included in its long-term economic and political plans. The question, however, is to what extent do they meet the interests of the Southeast Asian countries themselves? The solution to this question is the main subject of research in the article. There are objective prerequisites for mutually beneficial cooperation. The Belt and Road projects are viewed by China as a tool for economic expansion into the region with the prospect of taking a leading position there, using the interest of Southeast Asian countries in the inflow of foreign investment to create modern infrastructure, the lack of which narrows their opportunities for further economic growth, maintaining competitiveness and developing integration ties within ASEAN Community. Expert assessments made by international organizations confirm the positive impact of OBOR projects on the economic development of Southeast Asian countries and although today it is too early to draw any conclusions, since the initiative is only at the initial stage of its implementation in the region, nevertheless the case studies presented in the article indicate a mismatch in the positions of the parties on a number of issues related to the financing of projects, their lack of transparency. non-compliance with environmental and social requirements. The support of the initiative on the part of the Southeast Asian countries does not automatically mean their acceptance of the terms of the agreements proposed by China, which are far from always consistent with their national interests and give rise to fears in society about its expansionist intentions. Therefore, in many Southeast Asian countries, participation in OBOR projects is turning into a subject of political discourse, which reflects the presence of disagreements in society and confrontation of interests regarding the advisability of rapprochement with China, given the associated economic and political risks. The countries of Southeast Asia can be conditionally divided into two groups according to their relation to the Belt and Road initiative. The first group includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Myanmar, whose position can be described as national pragmatism. While supporting the Chinese initiative in general, they nevertheless assess the possible risks of their participation in projects and seek to reduce them. The second group is represented by Laos and Cambodia, whose leadership unconditionally supports the Chinese initiative, guided by the interests of their own survival, which largely depends on Chinese assistance. Therefore, the prospect of falling into a debt trap and increasing economic dependence on the PRC and even the threat of losing sovereignty does not deter them from participating in highly controversial projects from a commercial point of view. Based on the analysis made, the author comes to the conclusion that, given the existing alignment of political forces in Southeast Asia, China can count on promoting its initiative in the region, which, however, does not automatically lead to an increase in its political influence and to the creation of a China-centric model of regional order. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the project “Post-crisis world order: challenges and technologies, competition and cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (agreement № 075-15-2020-783).


Author(s):  
Luke Mayville

This chapter turns to the question of how, precisely, John Adams understood wealth to translate into political influence. It shows that Adams was a careful student of the Scottish Enlightenment. More than any other Founding Era American, he engaged with the long tradition of thought that emphasized the psychological bases of social and political power. The fruit of his efforts was the series of essays entitled Discourses on Davila, a work that Adams would describe as the fourth and final volume of his Defence. The chapter draws from Discourses on Davila and other writings an understanding of oligarchic power that traces the political power of wealth not to the capacity of the rich to buy influence but instead to public admiration and sympathy for the rich.


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