scholarly journals Iran-Saudi-Turkish Rivalry and Implications of the Iran-US/West Nuclear Agreement on Wahabis in Indonesia

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 576-585
Author(s):  
Herdi Sahrasad ◽  
Al Chaidar ◽  
Muhammad Ridwan ◽  
Dedy Tabrani ◽  
Mohamad Asrori Mulky
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Economy ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Globalized World ◽  
Us West

A world agreement on Iran's Nuclear was reached in Vienna, Austria, in July 2015. Negotiations between Iran and the six world powers namely the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia plus Germany began in 2006 and reached an agreement with Iran at the Vienna Meeting in July 2015 in an effort to reduce Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for lifting sanctions or embargoes. international economy that has lasted three decades. United States President Barack Obama (2015) said that with the agreement that opened the new page, all Iranian nuclear weapons had been cut off for Iran so that the Middle East nuclear power was held militarily by Israel. In this regard, international sanctions against Iran are lifted, and Iran has a stronger chance to improve its posture in the international arena. The Vienna Agreement has caused ideological anxiety among Wahabis with the implication that Wahabis are unhappy and they do not like the strengthening of Iran politically and culturally in a globalized world. Wahhabi ideological interests will be eroded to some extent by treaties that will seriously divide the Islamic world by Sunni-Shiite competition. However, the rise of Turkey which is competing with Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East political arena, will open the eyes of Wahabis in Indonesia that it is very likely Turkey is their hope for the future.

scholarly journals Looking Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran: The Major Implications of Nuclear Iran for the Middle East

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. p50
Author(s):  
Sayed Reza Hussaini
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Cascade Effect ◽  
The Face ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Socioeconomic Consequences

Iran has pursued nuclear weapons for over four decades. The basic reasons for this quest have remained unchanged in the face of the most crippling sanctions. Almost three and a half years after Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Pact (JCPOA), Tehran officially announced that it has enriched uranium up to 60%, very close to the 90% suitable for nuclear weapons. Iran is highly likely to be the world’s next nuclear state. A nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution. Moreover, Iran’s network of proxies would adopt a more confrontational approach towards Israel. Besides, Iran’s politics of threat can have serious socioeconomic consequences for Israel.Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons could arguably set off a cascade effect, encouraging other major regional powers to move in the same direction. The West, particularly the United States, would seek to offset this risk by providing a “defenceumbrella”. HhhhjkhggHowever, some might be reluctant to be openly protected by the United Statesor would find the umbrella questionable and choose nuclear option for both security concerns and prestige.

The Era of Distrust

2021 ◽  
pp. 217-248
Author(s):  
Jacob Darwin Hamblin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Energy Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Developing World ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Nuclear Technology ◽  
Government Interests

By the mid-1980s, the state-sponsored positive framing of the peaceful atom served a range of government interests. It enabled the United States and European states to use nuclear power as leverage against developing countries in a time when petroleum seemed to swing the pendulum of global resource dominance toward several so-called backward countries. It was useful to countries trying to prop up the legitimacy of their nuclear weapons programs, while secretly working on bombs, and it provided environmental arguments to those whose priority was actually energy security. The peaceful atom’s promise of plenty helped to maintain a veneer of credibility for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at a time when the IAEA seemed to have become the treaty’s policing instrument. The more the United States relied on the IAEA, the more it recommitted to making promises of peaceful nuclear technology, especially to the developing world.

The Battle for Syria

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Phillips
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Middle East ◽  
The United States ◽  
External Factors ◽  
International Dimension ◽  
Regional Order ◽  
Regional Factors

This book provides an analysis of the crucial but underexplored roles the United States and other nations have played in shaping Syria's ongoing civil war. Most accounts of Syria's brutal, long-lasting civil war focus on a domestic contest that began in 2011 and only later drew foreign nations into the escalating violence. The book argues instead that the international dimension was never secondary but that Syria's war was, from the very start, profoundly influenced by regional factors, particularly the vacuum created by a perceived decline of U.S. power in the Middle East. This precipitated a new regional order in which six external protagonists — the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar — have violently competed for influence, with Syria a key battleground. Drawing on a plethora of original interviews, the book constructs a new narrative of Syria's war. Without absolving the brutal Bashar al-Assad regime, the book untangles the key external factors which explain the acceleration and endurance of the conflict, including the West's strategy against ISIS. It concludes with some insights on Syria and the region's future.

scholarly journals Arab Spring, Islamist Ice Age

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdelwahab El-Affendi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Islam ◽  
Ice Age ◽  
Obama Administration ◽  
Religious Extremism

Between June 30th, the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Islamist military takeover in Sudan, and July 4th, Independence Day in the United States, something miraculous happened in the Middle East. Suddenly everyone was in agreement, and – almost – everyone was happy. President Bashar al-Assad was ecstatic. In an interview with the Baath Party’s newspaper Al-Thawra shortly after the army deposed Muhammad Morsi, Egypt’s first-ever freely elected civilian president, on July 3, Assad applauded the coup as marking “essentially the fall of political Islam.”1 In his lengthy interview, he categorized his enemies into two groups: those “who completely abandoned their identity and embraced a ‘Western Dream’ even with all its flaws” and those “who went in exactly the opposite direction and abandoned their identity and embraced religious extremism.”2 The latter he alternatively designated as “Wahhabis” or “Takfiris.” In the presumed bastions of Wahhabism in the Gulf, Morsi’s downfall was received with even more elation. Within days, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE pledged an aid package worth USD 12 billion to cash-strapped Egypt, showing how much they appreciated this outcome.3 And while Israel joined its sworn enemy Hamas in maintaining a guarded silence,4 its media (and some politicians) did not hide their glee at Morsi’s political demise.5 As usual, the Obama administration was either unable to make up its mind or was too embarrassed to say what it believed. But that was in itself a clear stance, since the United States was happy to permit its key allies to provide massive cash injections to the new army-backed regime. It also refrained from ...

scholarly journals Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma in the Middle East Is Characterized by Low Incidence Rates With Advancing Age

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Rafil T. Yaqo ◽  
Sana D. Jalal ◽  
Kharaman J. Ghafour ◽  
Hemin A. Hassan ◽  
Michael D. Hughson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Hodgkin Lymphoma ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
B Cell Lymphoma ◽  
Cancer Registries ◽  
The United States ◽  
Incidence Rates ◽  
Non Hodgkin Lymphoma

PURPOSE In the Middle East, incidence rate ratios (IRRs) of non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NHL) to Hodgkin lymphoma (HL) are more than 50% lower than the United States. MATERIALS AND METHODS Age-specific incidence rates (ASIRs), age-adjusted incidence rates (AAIRs), and IRRs of NHL:HL were compared using the cancer registries of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and US SEER. RESULTS The NHL AAIR (95% CI) per 100,000 population was 4.4 (4.1 to 4.7) for Iraq, 5.4 (4.6 to 6.2) for Jordan, 4.7 (4.4 to 5.1) for Saudi Arabia, and 13.2 (13.0 to 13.4) for the United States. The HL AAIR was 1.8 (1.6 to 2.0) for Iraq, 1.8 (1.4 to 2.2) for Jordan, 2.1 (1.9 to 2.2) for Saudi Arabia, and 2.3 (2.2 to 2.4) for the United States, with respective NHL:HL IRR of 2.4 (2.2 to 2.7), 3.0 (2.4 to 3.8), 2.2 (2.0 to 2.5), and 5.7 (5.5 to 6.0). NHL ASIRs for the Middle East and the United States were similar until 30 to 39 years of age. Thereafter, ASIR of NHL peaked at 20 to 33 per 100,000 at age 70 years in the Middle East regions, all much lower than the US age 70 years rate of greater than 100 per 100,000. Diffuse large B-cell lymphoma (DLBCL) represented 52% of NHL in Sulaimaniyah Province of Iraq and 51% of NHL in Saudi Arabia. Both regions had AAIR for DLBCL less than 42% of DLBCL in US SEER. Pediatric Epstein-Barr virus–related Burkitt’s lymphoma at 8% was the second most frequent NHL in Sulaimaniyah but made little contribution to overall NHL rates. CONCLUSION The incidence of HL was slightly lower than in the United States, but it was the markedly lower rates of adult NHL with advancing age, including the predominant DLBCL, that accounted for the low NHL:HL IRR in these Middle Eastern countries.

The Middle East

2021 ◽  
pp. 96-132
Author(s):  
Michael Mandelbaum
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Military Forces

The undeniable threat that Iran poses to the other countries of the Middle East has its roots in the fundamentalist Islamist ideology that the ruling clerics there espouse. The clerics aspire to evict the long-engrained military forces, aid, and other influences of the United States from the region and to thus become the dominant power. In pursuit of these ambitious goals, Iran has trained and sponsored various proxy forces and terrorists in other nearby countries and has sought to acquire nuclear weapons for the state. Ultimately, these efforts have served to undermine the prospects of building peace in the region.

Middle Eastern Entanglements

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-156
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Markey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regional Role ◽  
Strategic Value ◽  
Energy Trade ◽  
History Of ◽  
Trade And Investment

This chapter discusses the intersection of Chinese, Iranian, Saudi (and to a lesser extent, American and Russian) interests in the Middle East. It introduces a brief history of China’s links with the Middle East and explains how Beijing’s regional role has, until recently, tended to be relatively limited. But China’s ties to the region have grown significantly, especially in terms of energy trade and investment. The chapter explores how Iranians perceive economic and strategic value in China as a means to sustain the ruling regime, resist pressure from the United States, and compete with Saudi Arabia. It explores Saudi-China ties as well, finding that the monarchy sees China as essential to its strategy for economic development. The chapter concludes that both Tehran and Riyadh will continue to court Beijing and that the Middle East is primed for greater Chinese involvement, less reform, and more geopolitical competition.

The United States and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1975–1990

2019 ◽  
pp. 112-159
Author(s):  
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
South Asia ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Assistance

Chapter 4 examines the proliferation dispute between the United States and Pakistan. As with the Middle East, averting containment failure in South Asia was the overriding aim of the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. Slowing or halting the clandestine Pakistani nuclear weapons program was always a subordinate goal. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the turning point. Chapter 4 examines the oscillations in US nonproliferation policies toward Pakistan, from the Ford administration’s offer of advanced fighters for nuclear restraint in 1975–1976, to the Carter administration’s imposition of sanctions in early1979, to the Reagan administration’s provision of a $1.4 billion foreign military assistance package and efforts to circumvent nonproliferation legislation in exchange for Pakistani dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s pledge not to cross four nuclear “red lines” from 1981 to 1988, to the George H. W. Bush administration’s resumption of sanctions after the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1990.

scholarly journals Erratum to: self-reported psychopathy in the Middle East: a cross-national comparison across Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert D. Latzman ◽  
Ahmed M. Megreya ◽  
Lisa K. Hecht ◽  
Joshua D. Miller ◽  
D. Anne Winiarski ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Middle East ◽  
The United States ◽  
National Comparison ◽  
Cross National

The End of the Middle East’s Unipolar Era

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-306
Author(s):  
Seyed Hossein Mousavian ◽  
Salman Ameri
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Middle East ◽  
United Arab Emirates ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
Security Issues

Abstract This Policy Insight article argues that a growing security partnership between Russia, Iran, China, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria (rictis) will push the Middle East into an era of bipolarity. The paper demonstrates that rictis has significant convergence on regional security issues, and that these interests are distinct from those held by the American Security Camp, a collection of states that include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. The paper also argues that rictis has military and energy advantages that allow it to confront the American Camp’s regional dominance. Our analysis demonstrates how rictis might help deter unilateralism and democratize regional decision-making.

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