State and Morality According to Spinoza
Though Spinoza certainly argues that a well-ordered political society is necessary for human beings to achieve lasting happiness and goodness, he does not, like other philosophers, argue that society exists for the sake of moral ends. In this essay, Matheron reconstructs Spinoza’s views on the relationship between State and morality all the while accounting for the illusion that has caused other philosophers to mistake the State as having an essentially moral function. Spinoza avoids such an error by referring to his critique of teleology found in the Appendix to Part I of the Ethics: we make an error by transforming imagined norms into ontological norms that we project onto nature. Philosophers from Aquinas to Hobbes thus mistake the rational desires of philosophers for ontological models that ought to dictate the formation of political society. Spinoza’s position, however, is markedly different: humans do not inherently desire one thing or the other, but rather pursue only that towards which they tend here and now. That political society necessarily arises, Matheron argues, is due not to the intervention of a utilitarian calculus or the imposition of an artificial contract, but rather under the influence of a common fear or common hope.