The Skeptic and The Madman: The Proto‐Pragmatism of Thomas Reid

2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Lundestad
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
John Dewey ◽  
Charles Sanders Peirce ◽  
The Other ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Other Hand

Even though the philosophy of common sense is not justifi able as such, the assump- tion upon which it rests, namely that there are things which we are not in position to doubt is correct. The reason why Thomas Reid was unable to bring this assumption out in a justifi able manner is that his views, both on knowledge and nature, are to be considered dogmatic. American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the other hand, may be seen as offering us a ‘critical’ and post-Darwinian philosophy of common sense.

David Hume & Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Common Approach to Common Sense?

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-120
Author(s):  
Derek McDougall
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Direct Consequence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Ordinary Life ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum

Abstract With characteristic candour, David Hume is prepared to admit that in ordinary life, but certainly not when reflecting on the nature of perceptual experience, he has no option but to ‘believe in the existence of body’ despite his philosophical reasonings to the contrary. In this instance, his commitment to ‘Common Sense’ has become, as it was not to become for his contemporary Thomas Reid, a direct consequence of participating in a day-to-day existence if nevertheless one which he has no option but to reject when reflecting in the study. Ludwig Wittgenstein, on the other hand, presents us with a picture of what has come to be regarded as a form of Humean ‘phenomenalist language’, private in nature, which, in one of the most famous passages of his later philosophy, he appears to reject via a form of reductio ad absurdum argument. In what follows, it will be questioned whether his ‘argument’ clearly represents phenomenalist proposals which Hume’s successors, e. g., A.J. Ayer, accepted without question. If there is a misunderstanding here on both sides, an investigation into its nature must lead to an appreciation of the varying roles attributed by these philosophers to the notion of ‘Common Sense’.

scholarly journals A Dilemma for the Scientific Realist

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Evidential Basis ◽  
Apparent Conflict

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.

William James, John Dewey, and the ‘Death-of-God’

1971 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-61
Author(s):  
John K. Roth
Keyword(s):  
John Dewey ◽  
William James ◽  
The Other ◽  
Viable Option ◽  
Death Of God ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
American Tradition ◽  
American Thought

Basic issues in the recent ‘death-of-God’ movement can be illuminated by comparison and contrast with the relevant ideas of two American philosophers, John Dewey and William James. Dewey is an earlier spokesman for ideas that are central to the ‘radical theology’ of Thomas J. J. Altizer, William Hamilton, and Paul Van Buren. His reasons for rejecting theism closely resemble propositions maintained by these ‘death-of-God’ theologians. James, on the other hand, points toward a theological alternative. He takes cognizance of ideas similar to those in the ‘radical theology’, but he does not opt for either a metaphorical or real elimination of God. Thus, the contentions of this paper are (1) that there has been a version of the ‘death-of-God’ perspective in American thought before, and (2) that there are resources in the American tradition that suggest a viable option to this perspective.

Sexual Offenses and Consent

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Brett
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Activity ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Prominent Feature ◽  
Sexual Offenses ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Mental Element

In this paper I address a question that has not been a prominent feature of cases or articles which have concerned the issue of consent in relation to sexual offenses. Much work has been done by judges and legal theorists regarding the defendant’s beliefs about the consent of the complainant and the mental element or mens rea of this offense. But, any answers to these questions presuppose some answer to a prior question: What is consent? What must be true of a person who does consent? What must be missing, on the other hand, in a situation where sexual activity takes place without consent?Common sense provides a relatively simple answer to these questions: To consent is to give permission; a person acts without consent where no such permission has been obtained. It is this answer that I want to defend in this paper. This view assumes that talk of consent only makes sense in relation to some autonomy right. Giving consent involves autonomously making changes in a prevailing pattern of rights and obligations. It is a limited withdrawal of a right not to be interfered with; and it will make legally permissible actions that would otherwise be subject to criminal and civil penalties. To me it seems obvious that such a change in the prevailing pattern of rights and obligations can only take place where there is communication between the parties. This means that the question of consent is not just a question about the state of mind or attitude of the complainant. Rather, the matter which should be central to a court’s consideration of consent is the question of what was said or done that could be construed as granting permission to do the acts in question.

The Last Forty Years of the Irish Bar

1929 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-375
Author(s):  
Serjeant A. M. Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
The Other ◽  
Old Order ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Court Of Chancery ◽  
The Doors

Forty years ago in my old country the legal world was in a state of transition. The old order was changing in a great number of ways. The Judicature Act had just got into swing and although four Courts still opened in the hall beside the Liffey they were soon to be fused into one. These were at that time the Court of Chancery, the Court of Queen's Bench, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Common Pleas, and the doors of these four opened on the Central Hall and their names stood over them. The Court of Chancery stood by itself, but it was thought in those days that you had your choice of three Common Law Courts in which to have your case tried. If you had some merit on your side but thought that the law was against you, you issued your writ in the Queen's Bench, which was presided over by Mickey Morris, as he was invariably called although he was a lord, because Mickey had a good deal of common sense, a great deal of humanity, but his ideas of jurisprudence were peculiarly his own. On the other hand, if you were strongly of opinion that however iniquitous your client was, he had the law on his side, you issued your writ in the Court of Exchequer, presided over by Christopher Palles, the greatest judge before whom I have ever appeared. Christopher Palles decided according to what he believed to be the law, and would pay no attention to any other consideration that might be advanced before him.

scholarly journals Koty to dranie. Obraz kota w wybranych słuchowiskach .

2020 ◽  
pp. 347-372
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Łogożna-Wypych
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Radio Drama ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Interesting Study ◽  
Human Eyes ◽  
The Invisible

Unpredictable and misunderstood, felines continue to mesmerize, attract and, at the same time, terrify human beings. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cats were terrorizing humans as witches’ familiars, incarnation of Devil and messengers. Nowadays, they are able to convey the same sense of insecurity and menace with a sole appearance in a story. With a number of pets portrayed in radio dramas, cats are undoubtedly the most frequently depicted ones. Radio drama is an excellent medium to portray cats’ elusiveness and mysterious powers. Being the “blind medium” radio drama is able to convey the misconceptions and beliefs about cats most intuitively. In Koty to dranie by Jerzy Janicki the stereotypes about cats take control over man’s common sense, the thoughtless cruelty towards them being depicted as a sudden and surprising action. Grochola in Kot mi schudł offers an interesting study on much too common ill treatment of felines, the worthlessness of cats in human eyes, and, on the other hand, the ability of cats to change human lives, loneliness being the main focus of the radio drama. Felines tend to be quite persuasive, thus it is the cat, more often than any other animal, that not only is able to change the track of events in the plot, but also provides a particular bridge between contrasting worlds or conventions. Cat is never just a cat. It is the beginning, the main body, and the conclusion in the invisible world of radio drama with all archetypical notions that they may possess.

scholarly journals Demokrasi Islam dalam Pandangan Muhammad Natsir dan Muhammad Abid Al-Jabiri

EL-Ghiroh ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (01) ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Tomi Agustian
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Reconstruction Method ◽  
History Of Thought ◽  
Historical Approach ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Western Democracy ◽  
History Of ◽  
Political Background ◽  
Islamic Values

Muhammad Natsir is an Indonesian thinker and politician, including those who take note. He prefers to combine the concept of Western democracy with Islamic values, thus bringing up the concept of theistic democracy. While on the other hand there is Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri who feels that democracy is a 'necessity' for every nation. The argument he built was not because of the compatibility between democracy and Islam, but rather because of the reality faced by the Arabs. Natsir and al-Jabiri were religious nationalists who fought for democracy. Because this research is a study of the history of thought, the approach used is a socio-historical approach, which is an approach used to determine the socio-cultural and socio-political background of a character, because the thought of a character is the result of interaction with the environment. Natsir uses the reconstruction method while al-Jabiri uses the deconstruction method. Both are included in the category of reformistic typology thinkers, namely those who believe that turâŝ and modernity are both good. Therefore, trying to harmonize tour and modernity by not violating common sense and rational standards.

Fate and Guilt in Schiller's Die Braut von Messina

PMLA ◽  
1902 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-124
Author(s):  
W. H. Carruth
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fourth Generation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Common

The “dramatic guilt” or the “tragic fate” differs, it is well known, from fate and guilt in the common sense of the terms. Fate is the equivalent of blind destiny, or of the whimsical decree or the general envy or malice of the gods towards men. This Fate foredooms the victim to some crime which brings a punishment in its train, or to a wholly undeserved calamity, which the Greeks were fond of representing as foretold but unavoidable. The ill-will of the gods had perhaps been incurred by an ancestor of the victim, but was wreaked upon the remote descendant to the third and fourth generation. In this curse of the gods we may see a poetical conception of an hereditary evil. Or on the other hand, in heredity we may see a modern and very real equivalent of the Greek decree of the gods, the “moira.”

scholarly journals The cooked and the raw

1981 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 261-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Hammarberg
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Processing System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Brute Fact ◽  
Process Data ◽  
Information Processing System ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Definition Of Information

The notion of data and information being different in kind is based on the Foundationalist thesis that there exist raw, brute, facts which constitute the data that form the basis for information, and, ultimately, of knowledge. Foun dationalism fails, however, because if these data are really different in kind from information and knowledge, then no comparisons are possible between the former and the latter, and the notion of data (in the sense of raw, brute, fact) becomes useless. If, on the other hand, comparisons can be made between data and information or knowledge, the data would have to be of the same kind as the latter. Given that an Information Processing System (IPS) cannot process data except in terms of whatever representational language is inherent to it, data could not even be apprehended by an IPS without becoming representational in nature, and thus losing their status of being raw, brute, facts. The representational language of the IPS provides the categories in terms of which the IPS 'views' reality, and thus this language will define what constitutes reality for the IPS in question. Consequently, this language will define what constitutes signals, signs, and information for the IPS, as well. Any definition of information must therefore be relative to a given IPS, and, in the case of a human IPS, what is regarded in common sense terms as linguistically encoded information cannot be independently characterized in purely physical terms.

The Promoting and the Financing of the Suez Canal

1956 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Baer
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
World History ◽  
Suez Canal ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Professional Fields

This timely account of the hunching of the Suez Canal project reveals both sides of the coin of innovation. It is, on the one hand, a study of the character and methods of one of the most famous innovators of the nineteenth century. Ferdinand DeLesseps was not a politician, a financier, an engineer, a promoter (in the common sense of the word), or a businessman. Yet he succeeded brilliantly in a venture requiring consummate mastery of all these professional fields. On the other hand is revealed the waterway itself — vital to one civilization, useless and neglected in another, and then of transcendent importance as world history marched on. Realization of the grand scheme envisaged by the Pharaohs came at last when economic and political factors momentarily aligned in a pattern of opportunity for a unique set of entrepreneurial qualifications.

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