scholarly journals Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Misato Inaba ◽  
Nobuyuki Takahashi
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Subjective Perception ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Social Exchanges ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Social ◽  
Promising Solution ◽  
Selective Incentive ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Since social dilemmas among n-persons are often embedded in other types of social exchanges, the exclusion of defectors in social dilemmas from other exchanges functions as a costless selective incentive. Recently, such “linkage” has been considered as a promising solution to resolve the social dilemma problem. However, previous research showed that cooperation sustained by linkage is fragile when subjective perception errors exist. The purpose of this study is to find linkage strategies that are robust against subjective perception errors. Based on the strategies presented in previous studies on indirect reciprocity, we devised several linkage strategies and examined their evolutionary stability by agent-based simulation. The simulation results showed that the linkage strategy based on kandori was evolutionarily stable even when perception errors existed. Our study provides substantial support for the argument that linkage is a plausible solution to the social dilemma problem.

Gossip and Reputation in Social Dilemmas

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-213
Author(s):  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interaction Partner ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
The Individual

In a social dilemma the interest of the individual is in conflict with that of the group. However, individuals will help their group, if they gain in reputation that pays off later. Future partners can observe cooperative or defective behavior or, more likely, hear about it through gossip. In Indirect Reciprocity games, Public Goods games, and Trust games gossip may be the only information a participant can use to decide whether she can trust her interaction partner and give away her holdings hoping for reciprocation. Even the mere potential for gossip can increase trust and trustworthiness thus promoting cooperation. Gossip is a cheap mechanism for disciplining free riders, potentially even extortioners. The temptation for manipulative gossip defines the gossiper’s dilemma. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity help to avoid being manipulated. The danger of false gossip is reduced when multiple gossips exist.

scholarly journals A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Complete Solution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Theoretical Studies ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Social ◽  
Look Back

Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed. Here, we look back on the research that has been done on indirect reciprocity and identify the issues that have been resolved and the ones that remain to be resolved. This manuscript introduces indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms. Moreover, it presents key results obtained by refining the assessment function, resolving the punishment dilemma, and presenting a complete solution to the social dilemma problem. Finally, it discusses the application of indirect reciprocity in various disciplines.

Why clean the toilet if others don't? Using a social dilemma approach to understand users of shared toilets' collective cleaning behaviour in urban slums: a review

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Innocent K. Tumwebaze ◽  
Hans-Joachim Mosler
Keyword(s):  
Health Risk ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Urban Slums ◽  
Cleaning Behaviour ◽  
The Social

Shared toilets are a common good in urban slums, but need to be maintained and cleaned for users to positively benefit from having access to them. Collective participation of the shared toilet users is required to keep them clean and ensure adequate hygiene. However, users' decisions on whether to participate or not in the cleaning of the shared toilets are a social dilemma. If each of the shared toilets' users decided not to participate in their cleaning, the facilities could end up in a deteriorated unhygienic state and become a health risk to them and to the community at large. In this paper, we provide an overview of the social dilemma approach and highlight how the factors important in the management of social dilemmas can be relevant to understanding the cleaning behaviour of shared toilet users in urban slums.

scholarly journals Do Perceiver Effects in Interpersonal Perception Predict Cooperation in Social Dilemmas?

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Rau ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Simon M. Breil ◽  
Katharina Geukes ◽  
Sascha Krause ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interpersonal Perception ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Social Relations Model ◽  
The Social ◽  
Higher Power ◽  
Perceiver Effects

People’s general tendencies to view others as cold-hearted and manipulative (rather than affectionate and trustworthy) may explain defection in social dilemma situations. To capture idiosyncratic tendencies in other-perceptions, we collected mutual judgments in groups of unacquainted individuals in two studies (N1 = 83, N2 = 413) and extracted perceiver effect scores using the Social Relations Model. In both studies, participants later played a public goods game. In Study 1, perceiver effects predicted cooperation beyond self-reported and group-related control variables. However, results were not replicated in a preregistered second study with higher power and a more diverse sample. We discuss implicit group norms as a likely explanation for the inconsistent findings and suggest future directions for addressing generalized expectations in social dilemmas.

scholarly journals The evolution of strongly-held group identities through agent-based cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger M. Whitaker ◽  
Gualtiero B. Colombo ◽  
Yarrow Dunham
Keyword(s):  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
Identity Fusion ◽  
Agent Interaction ◽  
Group Identities ◽  
Psychology Literature ◽  
Collective Benefit ◽  
Held Group

AbstractIdentity fusion represents a strongly-held personal identity that significantly overlaps with that of a group, and is the current best explanation as to why individuals become empowered to act with extreme self-sacrifice for a group of non-kin. This is widely seen and documented, yet how identity fusion is promoted by evolution is not well-understood, being seemingly counter to the selfish pursuit of survival. In this paper we extend agent-based modelling to explore how and why identity fusion can establish itself in an unrelated population with no previous shared experiences. Using indirect reciprocity to provide a framework for agent interaction, we enable agents to express their identity fusion towards a group, and observe the effects of potential behaviours that are incentivised by a heightened fusion level. These build on the social psychology literature and involve heightened sensitivity of fused individuals to perceived hypocritical group support from others. We find that simple self-referential judgement and ignorance of perceived hypocrites is sufficient to promote identity fusion and this is easily triggered by a sub-group of the population. Interestingly the self-referential judgement that we impose is an individual-level behaviour with no direct collective benefit shared by the population. The study provides clues, beyond qualitative and observational studies, as to how hypocrisy may have established itself to reinforce the collective benefit of a fused group identity. It also provides an alternative perspective on the controversial proposition of group selection - showing how fluidity between an individual’s reputation and that of a group may function and influence selection as a consequence of identity fusion.

scholarly journals Slowing COVID-19 transmission as a social dilemma: Lessons for government officials from interdisciplinary research on cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Johnson ◽  
Christopher Dawes ◽  
James Fowler ◽  
Oleg Smirnov
Keyword(s):  
Interdisciplinary Research ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Narrative Review ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
The Social ◽  
Staying At Home

To reduce transmission of COVID-19, public officials must help their communities resolve a series of novel social dilemmas. For instance, when social distancing becomes widespread, the likelihood of COVID-19 exposure decreases, thus tempting individuals to leave their homes while others stay sheltered. Yet, if all indulge that temptation, then rates of transmission will increase: everyone would have fared better by cooperatively staying at home. Past research has studied such social dilemmas to understand why cooperation occurs despite incentives that conspire against it. In this narrative review, we select relevant insights from this literature to inform COVID-19 response and we structure those insights around the response stages that government officials face. Together, the measures that we identify can ameliorate the social dilemmas born from the COVID-19 pandemic.

scholarly journals Two ways to overcome the three social dilemmas of indirect reciprocity

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada
Keyword(s):  
Complete Solution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Positive Score ◽  
New Type

Abstract Indirect reciprocity is one of the main principles of evolving cooperation in a social dilemma situation. In reciprocity, a positive score is given to cooperative behaviour while a negative score is given to non-cooperative behaviour, and the dilemma is resolved by selectively cooperating only with those with positive scores. However, many studies have shown that non-cooperation with those who have not cooperated also downgrades one's reputation; they have called this situation the scoring dilemma. To address this dilemma, the notion of justified punishments has been considered. The notion of justified punishment allows good individuals who defect against bad co-players to keep their standing. Despite numerous studies on justified punishment, it is unknown whether this solution leads to a new type of dilemma because reputations may be downgraded when the intent of punishment is not correctly communicated. The dilemma of punishment has so far been rarely analysed, and thus, the complete solution of the mechanism for evolving cooperation using the principle of indirect reciprocity has not been found yet. Here, we identify sufficient conditions to overcome each of the three dilemmas including the dilemma of punishment to maintain stable cooperation by using the framework of evolutionary game theory. This condition includes the principle of detecting free riders, which resolves the social dilemma, the principle of justification, which resolves the scoring dilemma, and the principle of generosity, which resolves the dilemma of punishment. A norm that satisfies these principles can stably maintain social cooperation. Our insights may offer a general assessment principle that applies to a wide range of subjects, from individual actions to national decisions.

scholarly journals Cooperative phenotype predicts climate change belief and pro-environmental behaviour

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Kelly ◽  
Scott Claessens ◽  
Chris G Sibley ◽  
Ananish Chaudhuri ◽  
Quentin Atkinson
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Global Scale ◽  
Environmental Behaviour ◽  
Mediation Analyses ◽  
Collective Interest ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Relationship

Understanding the psychological causes of variation in climate change belief and pro-environmental behaviour remains an urgent challenge for the social sciences. The “cooperative phenotype” is a stable psychological preference for cooperating in social dilemmas that involve a tension between individual and collective interest. Since climate change poses a social dilemma on a global scale, this issue may evoke similar psychological processes as smaller social dilemmas. Here, we investigate the relationships between the cooperative phenotype and climate change belief and behaviour with a representative sample of New Zealanders (n = 897). By linking behaviour in a suite of economic games to self-reported climate attitudes, we show robust positive associations between the cooperative phenotype and both climate change belief and pro-environmental behaviour. Furthermore, our mediation analyses support a motivated reasoning model in which the relationship between the cooperative phenotype and pro-environmental behaviour is fully mediated by climate change belief. These findings suggest that common psychological mechanisms underlie cooperation in both micro-scale social dilemmas and larger-scale social dilemmas like climate change.

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