scholarly journals Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and Enactivism

Philosophies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Riccardo Manzotti

Over the last three decades, the rise of embodied cognition (EC) articulated in various schools (or versions) of embodied, embedded, extended and enacted cognition (Gallagher’s 4E) has offered AI a way out of traditional computationalism—an approach (or an understanding) loosely referred to as embodied AI. This view has split into various branches ranging from a weak form on the brink of functionalism (loosely represented by Clarks’ parity principle) to a strong form (often corresponding to autopoietic-friendly enactivism) suggesting that body–world interactions constitute cognition. From an ontological perspective, however, constitution is a problematic notion with no obvious empirical or technical advantages. This paper discusses the ontological issues of these two approaches in regard to embodied AI and its ontological commitments: circularity, epiphenomenalism, mentalism, and disguised dualism. The paper also outlines an even more radical approach that may offer some ontological advantages. The new approach, called the mind-object identity, is then briefly compared with sensorimotor direct realism and with the embodied identity theory.

2021 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 04057
Author(s):  
Shengfang Peng ◽  
Baoying Peng ◽  
Xiaoxuan Li

In recent years, embodied cognition has become a new approach in the field of cognitive psychology. The shift in cognitive psychology from a focus on the brain to a focus on the human body,just as from the disembodied cognition to the embodied cognition is valuable for many fields related to cognitive science including product design and its method. With Gibson’s theory of affordances, embodied cognition is a perfect explanation of today’s products guided by the idea of intuitive design and its logic. On the premise of embodied cognition, it is the “Mind-Body complex” that serves as the subject of behavior and interaction, the basis of “natural interaction” in Intelligent age, and the foundation for building a more complete theory of “user experience”. Based on the embodied cognitive, the method of design and its research should put more emphasis on specific tools.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Rade

Emulators are internal models, first evolved for prediction in perception to shorten the feedback on motor action. However, the selective pressure on perception is to improve the fitness of decision-making, driving the evolution of emulators towards context-dependent payoff representation and integration of action planning, not enhanced prediction as is generally assumed. The result is integrated perceptual, memory, representational, and imaginative capacities processing external input and stored internal input for decision-making, while simultaneously updating stored information. Perception, recall, imagination, theory of mind, and dreaming are the same process with different inputs. Learning proceeds via scaffolding on existing conceptual infrastructure, a weak form of embodied cognition. Discrete concepts are emergent from continuous dynamics and are in a perceptual, not representational, format. Language is also in perceptual format and enables precise abstract thought. In sum, what was initially a primitive system for short-term prediction in perception has evolved to perform abstract thought, store and retrieve memory, understand others, hold embedded action plans, build stable narratives, simulate scenarios, and integrate context dependence into perception. Crucially, emulators co-evolved with the emergence of societies, producing a mind-society system in which emulators are dysfunctional unless integrated into a society, which enables their complexity. The Target Emulator System, evolved initially for honest signaling, produces the emergent dynamics of the mind-society system and spreads variation-testing of behavior and thought patterns across a population. The human brain is the most dysfunctional in isolation, but the most effective given its context.


Author(s):  
John De Ridder ◽  
Robin Eckermann

Rural and remote areas will continue to struggle to keep up with urban telecommunications despite the progress that has been made with initiatives such as the Mobile Black Spot Program (MBSP) and the NBN fixed wireless and satellite. But, now a more radical approach is needed as we consider updating the Universal Service Obligation, public safety network options and mobile roaming. Instead of more expensive small gains at the margin, or a counterproductive roaming arrangements, we should take a large step forward by having the Commonwealth, States and MNOs work together.


Author(s):  
M.G.F. Martin

Sense perception is the use of our senses to acquire information about the world around us and to become acquainted with objects, events, and their features. Traditionally, there are taken to be five senses: sight, touch, hearing, smell and taste. Philosophical debate about perception is ancient. Much debate focuses on the contrast between appearance and reality. We can misperceive objects and be misled about their nature, as well as perceive them to be the way that they are: you could misperceive the shape of the page before you, for example. Also, on occasion, it may seem to us as if we are perceiving, when we do not perceive at all, but only suffer hallucinations. Illusions and hallucinations present problems for a theory of knowledge: if our senses can mislead us, how are we to know that things are as they appear, unless we already know that our senses are presenting things as they are? But the concern in the study of perception is primarily to explain how we can both perceive and misperceive how things are in the world around us. Some philosophers have answered this by supposing that our perception of material objects is mediated by an awareness of mind-dependent entities or qualities: typically called sense-data, ideas or impressions. These intermediaries allegedly act as surrogates or representatives for external objects: when they represent aright, we perceive; when they mislead, we misperceive. An alternative is to suppose that perceiving is analogous to belief or judgment: just as judgment or belief can be true or false, so states of being appeared to may be correct or incorrect. This approach seeks to avoid intermediary objects between the perceiver and the external objects of perception, while still taking proper account of the possibility of illusion and hallucination. Both responses contrast with that of philosophers who deny that illusions and hallucinations have anything to tell us about the nature of perceiving proper, and hold to a form of naïve, or direct, realism. The account of perception one favours has a bearing on one’s views of other aspects of the mind and world: the nature and existence of secondary qualities, such as colours and tastes; the possibility of giving an account of the mind as part of a purely physical, natural world; how one should answer scepticism concerning our knowledge of the external world.


Author(s):  
Frank Jackson

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?


Author(s):  
Wayne D. Gray ◽  
Michael J. Schoelles ◽  
Chris Sims

Cognitive Metrics Profiling promises a new approach to minimizing the cognitive workload of interactive systems. By metering high-fidelity computational cognitive models of embodied cognition, Cognitive Metrics Profiles provide a theory-based prediction of the transient changes in workload demanded by dynamic task environments. Although establishing the reliability and validity of this new approach will not be trivial, our profiles stand on the shoulders of the ACT-R architecture of cognition. More than 30-yrs of research have gone into the ACT line of theories. Over the last decade, hundreds of researchers have used ACT-R to build and test models of human cognition. Hence, although many of the details of the architecture are certainly incomplete, much of ACT-R is approximately correct. We expect that the predictions of a Cognitive Metrics Profile based on ACT-R will provide a better estimate of cognitive workload than the estimates used in current human factors practice.


2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 483-500 ◽  

Reynolds et al. offer a version of interactionism based on social identity theory. Although we applaud both interactionism and the social identity approach, we suspect that the marriage the authors propose is unlikely to succeed. The core problem is that interactionism is optimized when the situation and person are on equal footing and the authors’ model weds robust situational influences to a feckless, empty self. The result is a win for the social identity approach at the cost of what may have been an important new approach to interactionism. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


2019 ◽  
pp. 44-51
Author(s):  
Moskowitz Howard ◽  
Gere Attila ◽  
Danny Moskowitz Yeshaya ◽  
Sherman Robert ◽  
Deitel Yehoshua ◽  
...  

This paper introduces a new approach to understanding the mind of the customer with the goal of optimizing the supply chain by creating, marketing and then delivering what the customer(s) want. The underlying notion is that for every product one can discover groups of people with defined preferences for the product and defined messages which drive expected purchase. The approach divides into two parts, knowledge development through Mind Genomics experiments and mind-set sequencing through the PVI (Personal Viewpoint Identifier). The paper shows data for six flavored beverages, the creation of mind-sets and the creation of the PVI to drive the messaging and thus purchase of each product. The paper finishes with the prospects for the world of product design and marketing when one can rapidly discover these product-specific mind-sets and the messages which excite each mind-set.


Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher

An enactivist approach to understanding the mind, in its fullest sense, is not just a matter of action-oriented processes; enactivism is about more than action and sensory–motor contingencies. To understand cognition as richly embodied this chapter considers factors involving affectivity and intersubjectivity. Empirical studies show that affectivity, in a wide sense that includes hunger, fatigue, pain, respiration, as well as emotion, has an effect on perception, attention, and judgment. Likewise, intersubjective factors, including the role of bodily postures, movements, gestures, gaze and facial expressions, and dynamical aspects of interaction, have similar effects. This richer conception of embodied cognition also holds implications for understanding how the brain works.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document