scholarly journals The Behavior Mechanism of the Urban Joint Distribution Alliance under Government Supervision from the Perspective of Sustainable Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 6232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Xiangxiang Zhang ◽  
Yingjie Yang
Keyword(s):  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Distribution Operations ◽  
The Government

Urban joint distribution is closely related to the national economy and people’s livelihood, and governments and enterprises play an active role in the process of urban joint distribution. From the perspective of government regulations, this paper explores the mechanism and evolution law of the behavior of an urban joint distribution alliance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, a model of homogeneous enterprises participating in urban joint distribution operations under the guidance of government regulations is constructed. The mechanism and follow-up of alliance behavior are analyzed through the simulation of the relationship between parameters. It is found that, firstly, from the perspective of government regulations, in the early stage of the implementation of urban joint distribution projects, when the benefits of synergetic cooperation of enterprise alliances are relatively low and the costs are relatively high, it is necessary for the government to formulate incentive policies to improve government subsidies or to increase the penalties for non-cooperation of enterprises; Once a benign logistics environment and market mechanism are formed, the cooperation benefits increase, and the costs decrease, the government can then withdraw its supervision. Secondly, in the process of establishing urban joint distribution alliance under government supervision, it is better for the enterprises to actively achieve alliance cooperation and obtain government subsidies instead of passively accepting government supervision and paying penalties, in order to promote the formation of logistics ecological environment and market mechanism.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Government Supervision and Private Sector Ecological Technology Innovation Behavior for Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects on the basis of Public Participation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huimin Li ◽  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Lelin Lv ◽  
Qing Xia ◽  
Lunyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Water Environment ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Behavior

Ecological technology innovation with environmental benefits as the core has become an inevitable choice for water environment treatment PPP projects (WETP-PPP), and government supervision and public participation are essential driving factors for eco-technological innovation. To explore the influence of the public participation on the behavior of government and private sector in the WETP-PPP, this study constructed an asymmetric evolutionary game model of government supervision and private sector ecological technology innovation behavior under public participation. The main contribution of this study is to explore the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior in different scenarios. The results showed that the government can reduce the supervision cost by increasing the public's active participation and improving environmental regulation measures to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental performance.

scholarly journals The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (18) ◽  
pp. 3351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingxin Chen ◽  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Pandu R. Tadikamalla ◽  
Xutong Gao
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Wastes ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Positive Effect

Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China’s current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China’s 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government’s reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government’s environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction.

scholarly journals An Evolution Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Network considering Government Subsidies and Supervision

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Liangqun Qi ◽  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Xinyu Zang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Networks ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Scale Free Network ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Free Network ◽  
The Government

Collaborative innovation networks have the basic attributes of complex networks. The interaction of innovation network members has promoted the development of collaborative innovation networks. Using the game-based theory in the B-A scale-free network context, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of network members and explores the emergence mechanism from collaborative innovation behavior to the macroevolution of networks. The results show that revenue distribution, compensation of the betrayer, government subsidies, and supervision have positively contributed to the continued stability of collaborative innovation networks. However, the effect mechanisms are dissimilar for networks of different scales. In small networks, the rationality of the revenue distribution among members that have similar strengths should receive more attention, and the government should implement medium-intensity supervision measures. In large networks, however, compensation of the betrayer should be attached greater importance to, and financial support from the government can promote stable evolution more effectively.

scholarly journals Government Supervision Mode Selection in the Promotion Period of Prefabricated Construction Using Evolutionary Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Shuwei Jing ◽  
Zhuangyi Zhang ◽  
Junai Yan
Keyword(s):  
Behavior Pattern ◽  
Mode Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Case ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Supervision Mode ◽  
Minimum Probability ◽  
The Government ◽  
Speculative Behavior

Aiming at the speculative behavior of some developers who seek private interests in the promotion period of prefabricated construction, this research combines the actual situation, objectively and reasonably determines the parameters in the model, and builds an evolutionary game model to study the choice of government supervision mode in different situations, from the perspective of government supervision. The results showed that the choice of government supervision mode has great connection with the probability of identifying developers’ speculative behavior when the government adopts node supervision. When the probability is greater than the developers’ speculative value, the government will choose node supervision, while the developers will not adopt speculative behavior. Conversely, there will be a periodic behavior pattern in the evolutionary system, and the choice of government supervision mode is related to the value of each parameter. At the same time, the minimum probability of identifying speculative behavior that keeps the optimal situation stable is obtained. On this basis, the paper takes a practical case to discuss the influence of different parameter variations on the choice of government supervision mode and makes numerical simulations; then it puts forward some specific suggestions for government to restrain the speculative behavior of developer.

scholarly journals Green Innovation Mode under Carbon Tax and Innovation Subsidy: An Evolutionary Game Analysis for Portfolio Policies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengzhong Zhang ◽  
Yingmin Yu ◽  
Qihong Zhu ◽  
Chun Martin Qiu ◽  
Aixuan Tian
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Reduce Carbon Emission ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Mode

Previous literature has shown that manufacturers’ choices between radical and incremental green innovation modes can greatly impact the tradeoff between industry growth and carbon emission reduction. Yet, how the government can motivate manufacturers to implement radical green innovations to reduce carbon emission is unclear. In this paper, the researchers construct an evolutionary game model to analyze the joint impacts of carbon tax and innovation subsidy on manufacturers’ choices of green innovation mode. We derive the conditions for manufacturers’ stable strategies. Based on those results, we find that four factors—carbon tax, innovation subsidy, consumer green preference, and manufacturers’ capabilities of absorbing and adopting new technologies—may facilitate the choice of radical innovation. Furthermore, we conduct numerical simulations to verify the theoretical results, and further illustrate how the synergy of carbon tax rate and subsidy level affects the evolution of the green innovation mode choices. Specifically, we demonstrate the superiority of portfolio policy in the early stage of green innovation over single policy. In contrast, in the later stage, it is carbon tax but not innovation subsidy that remains effective. We discuss the insights for the government to formulate appropriate environmental policies to effectively promote the adoption of green innovation and reduce carbon emission.

Efficient supervision strategy for illegal dumping of construction and demolition waste: A networked game theory decision-making model

2021 ◽  
pp. 0734242X2110320
Author(s):  
Chenyu Liu ◽  
Chunxiang Hua ◽  
Jianguo Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Forest Fires ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Small World ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Construction And Demolition Waste ◽  
Demolition Waste ◽  
Illegal Dumping ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government

While the construction industry has brought substantial economic benefits to society, it has also generated substantial construction and demolition waste (CDW). Illegal dumping, which refers to dumping CDW in an unauthorized non-filling location, has become widespread in many countries and regions. Illegally dumping CDW destroys the environment, causing groundwater pollution and forest fires and causing significant economic impacts. However, there is a lack of research on the decision-making behaviours and logical rules of the main participants, construction contractors and the government in the illegal CDW dumping process. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model on a small-world network considering government supervision to portray the decision-making behaviours of illegal dumping participants and conducts a numerical simulation based on empirical equations to propose an effective supervision strategy for the government to manage illegal CDW dumping efficiently. It is found that the illegal dumping behaviours of contractors are mainly affected by the intensity of government supervision, the cost of fines and the income of illegal dumping; while for government, a supervision strategy is found to be necessary, and a supervision intensity of approximately 0.7 is the optimal supervision probability given supervision efficiency. Notably, under a low-level supervision probability, increasing the penalty alone does not curb illegal dumping, and a certain degree of supervision must be maintained. The results show that in addition to setting fines for illegal dumping, the government must enforce a certain level of supervision and purify the market environment to steadily reduce illegal dumping.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coal Enterprise Resource Integration Under Government Regulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Sun ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Weixing Zhu ◽  
Lin Ma ◽  
Yuting Dong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Resource Integration ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Coal Enterprise ◽  
The Government ◽  
Coal Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper discusses how to guide and restrict coal enterprises to conduct resource integration behavior, and whether the government supervises this behavior. First, through empirical research, government regulations of coal enterprises are given practical policy implications. Second, using evolutionary game and simulation technology, from the perspective of government regulation, we explore the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the dominant and inferior coal enterprises, the mechanism between the government and coal enterprises, and analyze the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is discussed in details, which provides useful decision-making suggestions for the government and enterprises. Results demonstrate that:(1) when the power gap between enterprises is great, government regulations are not effective for inferior enterprises;(2) the combination of government regulation can help to improve the efficiency of coal enterprise strategy selection;(3) excessive government regulations make the strategic choices of the government and coal enterprise tend to swing, failing to achieve effectively resource integration and government supervision.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Chang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Trend ◽  
Product Recall ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Voluntary Recall ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
The Government ◽  
Recall System

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

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