scholarly journals Developing a Construction Safety Standard System to Enhance Safety Supervision Efficiency in China: A Theoretical Simulation of the Evolutionary Game Process

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (23) ◽  
pp. 13364
Author(s):  
Wenxin Su ◽  
Xin Gao ◽  
Yukun Jiang ◽  
Jinrong Li
Keyword(s):  
Safety Management ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Construction Safety ◽  
Standard System ◽  
Safety Standard ◽  
Theoretical Simulation ◽  
Safety Control ◽  
Safety Standards ◽  
The Government

Labor safety is one of the most fundamental indicators to improve contractors’ sustainability. Safety supervision plays a crucial role in affecting the safety performance of infrastructure projects. However, studies of standards development to enhance safety supervision efficiency are far from complete. Safety standards define safe behaviors for construction workers and hazard control processes in the workplace, and they are usually considered as an important part of safety control. In addition, the systematic reform of construction safety standards in China provides an innovative perspective to enhance safety supervision efficiency by linking standards to supervision. For this purpose, this paper proposes the concept and framework of the “Construction Safety Standard System (CSSS)” through expert interviews. CSSS hierarchically classifies safety standards and integrates similar standards. Its implementation will significantly influence the behavioral decisions of safety supervision stakeholders. Evolutionary game (EG) theory is applied to demonstrate the decision-making procedure in CSSS establishment and application. Furthermore, system dynamics (SD) is utilized to model and analyze equilibrium states under different supervision strategies. Meanwhile, case studies are implemented to assess the CSSS’s effectiveness in reality. The numerical results indicate that through CSSS implementation, the strategy choice fluctuation of supervisors and contractors is suppressed and a more desirable stable equilibrium is reached. The government tends to supervise and contractors tend to obey safety standards consciously. The findings reveal that CSSS can enhance safety supervision efficiency and have meaningful implications for theoretical study on safety supervision and construction safety management practice.

Research on Measures to Promote Mechanical Safety

2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 4614-4618
Author(s):  
Wen Long Liu ◽  
Hong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Safety Management ◽  
Safety Issues ◽  
Safety Standards ◽  
Safety Requirements ◽  
Social Organizations ◽  
Technical Institutes ◽  
The World ◽  
Mechanical Products ◽  
Safety Production ◽  
The Government

Mechanical Safety is very important in safety production. Not only China, but all over the world, the machinery safety issues are still in study. Safety becomes more and more important nowadays. So, to ensure the mechanical safety is not ones responsibility but all society. Measures must be taken jointly by the government, social organizations, enterprises and technical institutes to maintain the machinery safe. Government should develop the safety standards, the same as certification for social organizations. For enterprises, they must ensure that mechanical products meet the safety requirements. Strengthen the safety management in production process is the responsible of technical institutes. Together through a series of measures to make the mechanical safety situation has a good development in China.

Research on Safety Management to Promote Mechanical Safety

2013 ◽  
Vol 765-767 ◽  
pp. 291-294
Author(s):  
Wen Long Liu ◽  
Hong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Production Process ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Safety Issues ◽  
Safety Standards ◽  
Safety Requirements ◽  
Social Organizations ◽  
Technical Institutes ◽  
Mechanical Products ◽  
Safety Production ◽  
The Government

Mechanical Safety is very important in safety production. Not only China, the machinery safety issues are still not optimistic. Safety becomes more and more important nowadays. So, to ensure the mechanical safety is not ones responsibility but all society. Measures must be taken jointly by the government, social organizations, enterprises and technical institutes to maintain the machinery safe. Government should develop the safety standards, the same as certification for social organizations. For enterprises, they must ensure that mechanical products meet the safety requirements. Strengthen the safety management in production process is the responsible of technical institutes. Together through a series of measures to make the mechanical safety situation has a good development in China.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game of Trust in Public-Private Partnership Project Networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiangtian Nie ◽  
Kai Feng ◽  
Guoxiang Zhao ◽  
Tianyu Fan ◽  
Shengnan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Trust Model ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Project Networks ◽  
The Government

In public-private partnership (PPP) projects, the government plays a role as both regulator and participant. Trust between the government and the private sector is important as it may affect project performance and even cause the problem of a breach of contract, which may lead to project failure. Little is known, however, about the formation and evolution mechanisms of trust in this context. This study analyses the complex evolution of trust in PPP project networks. An evolutionary game of trust model between government and the private sector is established and analysed, the strategic equilibrium points are obtained by solving the replication dynamic equation, and the Jacobian matrix and differential equation stability theory are introduced to analyse the stability of the equilibrium points. The results reveal the relationships among the stable state of trust, the initial state of trust, and the payment matrix, indicating that the payment matrix can effectively shape the evolution process and stable state of trust to influence performance. This study provides a novel contribution in solving the complex trust problem in PPP project networks and it provides a new analytical tool for PPP project management practice.

scholarly journals Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (7) ◽  
pp. 3594
Author(s):  
Shitao Gong ◽  
Xin Gao ◽  
Zhou Li ◽  
Linyan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information System ◽  
Equilibrium State ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretical Simulation ◽  
Information Gap ◽  
Supervision Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Safety Investment

The construction industry suffers from poor safety performance caused by the joint effect of insufficient safety investment by contractors and inefficient safety supervision by the government because of the information gap between the two sides. The present study aims to put forward a new pathway to improve safety investment supervision efficiency and analyze the decision-making interactions of stakeholders under this new pathway. For this purpose, this study establishes a safety investment information system to eliminate the information gap between the government and contractors for construction projects in China and further develops a dynamic safety investment supervision mechanism based on this. Evolutionary game theory is used to describe the decision-making interactions among stakeholders under the current static supervision mechanism and the dynamic supervision mechanism proposed in this research. Moreover, system dynamics is adopted to simulate the evolutionary game process and analyze the supervision effect and equilibrium state of different supervision mechanisms. The results reveal that the proposed safety investment information system could facilitate the transition of the supervision mode from static to dynamic; the evolutionarily stable strategy does not exist in the current static penalty scenario; and the dynamic supervision mechanism that correlates penalties with contractors’ unlawful behavior probability can restrain the fluctuation of the evolutionary game model effectively and the players’ strategy choices gradually stabilize in the equilibrium state. The results validate the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic supervision mechanism in improving supervision efficiency. This study not only contributes to the literature on safety supervision policy-making but also helps to improve supervision efficiency in practice.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (19) ◽  
pp. 10392
Author(s):  
Feng Guo ◽  
Junwu Wang ◽  
Denghui Liu ◽  
Yinghui Song
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Construction Safety ◽  
Construction Workers ◽  
Safety Education ◽  
Behavior Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Construction ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Construction safety is related to the life and health of construction workers and has always been a hot issue of concern for government and construction units. The government can use “construction safety education” to reduce the probability of safety accidents in the construction process and avoid the loss of life and property of construction workers. To encourage construction units to provide safety education for construction workers before construction starts and promote construction workers to actively participate in safety education. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government–construction units–construction workers is established, and the factors affecting each party’s behavior strategy are comprehensively analyzed. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is used to investigate the influence of different behavior strategies among government, construction units, and construction workers on the behavior strategies of the other two parties. Secondly, according to the events in different situations, the influence of critical factors on the evolution process of the model is analyzed. On this basis, combined with the construction experience and construction data of actual construction projects, the established model and preliminary conclusions are verified. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of all parameters is carried out. The results show that: (1) The government’s enhancement of reward and punishment is conducive to promoting the choice of "providing safety education" for construction orders and the choice of “actively participating in safety education” for construction workers, but the excessive reward will lead to the government’s unwillingness of participation; (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is more significant than their speculative gains, to ensure the construction safety under the evolutionary stability; (3) Increasing welfare subsidies for construction workers who choose to participate in safety education actively is an effective way to avoid unwilling participation of construction workers.

scholarly journals Work Safety Management for Optimization Production Process

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (11) ◽  
pp. 371-379
Author(s):  
Jacks Rodrigues da Silva ◽  
David Barbosa de Alencar ◽  
Alexandra Priscilla Tregue Costa ◽  
Antônio Estanislau Sanches
Keyword(s):  
Production Process ◽  
Occupational Safety ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Behavioral Changes ◽  
Work Safety ◽  
Safety Standards ◽  
Safe Environment ◽  
Work Accidents ◽  
The Government ◽  
Safe Working

The safety at work of employees is not always viewed with due importance. However, with the help of technology, such as E-social, the government system that organizes companies to communicate in a unified way as information for their employees, it executes with whom employers comply with strict safety standards. The main objective of this article is to demonstrate that occupational safety management improves accident rates in the company through actions on enforcement methods that are the basic causes of accidents. What's more, quality, management, costs and other values ​​are better through behavioral changes. Within the Thematic service, we seek or develop conscientious and motivated employees, as a safe environment must be in place to support safe working employees. Therefore, after the implant or safety management system, you can reduce a satisfactory reduction of work accidents and get good results in the production process.

System of quality and safety management in medical organization. Modern state

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (6) ◽  
pp. 15-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Игорь Иванов ◽  
Igor' Ivanov
Keyword(s):  
Medical Care ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Internal Quality ◽  
Modern State ◽  
Quality And Safety ◽  
Main Attention ◽  
Medical Organization ◽  
Safety Control

The article presents main approaches to provision of quality and safety of medical organization’s activities. The main attention is focused on the issues of implementation of the Suggestions (recommended practice) of Roszdravnadzor on organization of the internal quality and safety control of medical activities, as well as particular points of the Order of June 7, 2019 No. 381n “On Approval of Requirements for organization and conduction internal control of the quality and safety of medical care in hospitals”.

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