scholarly journals The Inevitable Consequences of Nuclear Armament: An Urgent Call for Nuclear Disarmament

Advancement in technology and growth in human wisdom and knowledge has become a boom and at the same time, a bane to the continued survival of mankind. Despite been born free, mankind has become enslaved to the products of their hands. The invention of weapons of human destruction (nuclear weapons), which remains the most destructive form of armory ever created, with the capacity to inflict a large-scale disaster in the shortest time, in just a strike. These weapons and their mass destructive capacity were first experienced in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing in the year 1945, from that moment on the world, have seen an increase in nuclear testing, nuclear armory, and nuclear race among nuclear-weapon states. The mere presence of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to the earth's environment and its inhabitants. Many islands have become inhabitable or declared a no-go zone due to the high presence of radiation and radioactivity in those places which is a direct result of years of nuclear testing. As a consequence, many people have been displaced from their ancestral lands, while some victims have lost their time to radiation-induced diseases such as cancer and its various variation. This article, therefore, will focus on the global threat to humanity posed by nuclear armament.

2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michael Martinez

In the wake of India's May 1998 decision to resume nuclear testing for the first time since 1974, as well as arch-rival Pakistan's subsequent response, the attention of the world again has focused on nuclear nonproliferation policy as a means of maintaining stability in politically troubled regions of the world. The 1990s proved to be an uncertain time for nonproliferation policy. Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities. Iraq displayed its well-known intransigence by refusing to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arms inspectors access to facilities suspected of manufacturing nuclear weapons. North Korea maintained a nuclear weapons program despite opposition from many Western nations. Troubling questions about nuclear holdings persisted in Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. New nuclear powers were created in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Even the renewal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995 failed to assuage the concerns of Western powers fearful of aggressive measures undertaken by rogue nuclear proliferants.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald Müller ◽  
Carmen Wunderlich

The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (tpnw) represents a daring act of self-empowerment: nuclear have-nots produced an international disarmament treaty without the involvement of the nuclear-weapon states or their allies. In this essay, we assess how the new treaty relates to the existing nuclear order and its four central norms: constraints on use, political restraint, non-proliferation, and disarmament. We discuss the tpnw's origin in and impact on this contested order. At the heart of contestation are two security concepts: deterrence versus the immediate ban of nuclear arms, which result in fundamentally different ideas on how to pursue the road to “global zero.” Whether or not the tpnw and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are compatible depends on how the opponents handle their controversies. The key is to overcome the emotionalized polarization and rediscover a common basis in order to prevent damage to the existing nuclear order and bring forward nuclear disarmament in practice.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Pedrazzi

On 7 July 2017 a UN Conference, convened in New York by the General Assembly, adopted a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, providing for the first total ban on these weapons intended to be global in scale. The Treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017. The process and its outcome, were, however, firmly opposed by nuclear-weapon States and by NATO countries, including Italy: they refused to take part in the effort, fearing that it could definitively undermine the stability of the non-proliferation architecture built upon the 1967 Non-Proliferation Treaty. In reality, the Treaty is consistent with the ultimate purpose of the NPT regime, and the obligations assumed by States under the NPT remain untouched. Its main deficiencies relate to its verification apparatus, and it would be advisable to remedy them through future negotiations. Whether this instrument will enter into force is not clear, although it has the potential to acquire, and surpass, the fifty ratifications necessary. However, the absence of support from nuclear-weapon States risks rendering it irrelevant. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that broad support for this new regime, from non-nuclear-weapons States, as well as from civil society, could contribute to exerting pressure towards the adoption of concrete steps in the nuclear disarmament agenda.


2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-598
Author(s):  
Annette Schaper

The Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (fm(c)t) has been on the negotiation agenda since 1996, but has seen little progress. This is due to a fundamental disagreement over whether emphasis should be placed on nuclear disarmament or nuclear non-proliferation. Several delegations perceive the fm(c)t as a tool to draw in states from outside the non-proliferation regime, while others understand it to be a disarmament measure that reduces quantities of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. They however, regard the unwillingness of nuclear weapon states to engage toward this end as deeply unjust. Additional disagreements also concern justice: Should there be different standards of verification? May some states continue to produce unverified military fuel? As long as the nuclear weapon states only push their interests through pure power instead of respecting the notion of justice, no progress can be expected and the non-proliferation regime will further erode.


Author(s):  
Steven P. Lee

Many of those concerned about global peace advocate a policy of nuclear disarmament in order to eliminate the danger posed by these weapons. The logic is that eliminating the weapons would eliminate the danger they pose. But I argue that these are separate goals, that eliminating the weapons would not eliminate the danger, and in fact might make it worse. After the cold war, many thought that it was finally possible to rid the world of nuclear weapons, but since 1991, the world has not moved substantially towards this goal. The reason is that nuclear weapons create a security dilemma in which efforts to use them to make societies safer, through the practice of nuclear deterrence, end up making them less safe. This is because efforts (through minimum deterrence) to use them to avoid a deliberate nuclear attack create risk of nuclear war by escalation, and efforts (through counterforce deterrence) to minimize the risk of nuclear war by escalation, create the risk of deliberate nuclear attack. The way out of this dilemma is through delegitimization of nuclear weapons.


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sico van der Meer

AbstractFrom the moment that their enormous destructive capacity was first shown to the world, nuclear weapons are universally considered as the most cruel weapons that exist. Nevertheless, several countries developed nuclear weapons since then. At the same time, much international efforts have been put into stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and, eventually, reaching complete nuclear disarmament. Looking in retrospective, how successful have these efforts been in the last 65 years? After a concise comparison between forecasts and outcomes of the nuclear proliferation process, this article analyses a variety of non-proliferation efforts, and also compares them to the accomplishments in the field of chemical and biological weapons.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 109
Author(s):  
Makarim Wibisono

The article explores the complicated nature of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons even though from the military, ethical and legal perspective, the destructiveness, immorality and illegality of the current situation cannot be perpetuated. Some of the nuclear-weapon states, however, have consistently refused to agree to any approach under multilateral auspices for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Rather, attention has been deflected to the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, while the equally urgent task of complying with the legal obligation of implementing Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) concerning nuclear disarmament has been marginalized. I argue, no form of warfare would confront humanity with dangers even remotely comparable with the danger of nuclear warfare. Such disaster would affect the world economy and other vital aspects of the global infrastructure. The sudden collapse of many of the world’s leading trading nations as well as the mechanisms for international transactions would lead to profound disorganization and leave other nation. In addition to the human cost, the ecology of the world would be severely affected and the infrastructure of civilization would be shattered.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 80
Author(s):  
Melly Masni

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is highly appreciated for its ability to stop further nuclear proliferation in the world.  Since its existence, this treaty has been said to be successful in preventing potential states from possessing weapons of mass destruction. At least, there are more than 40 states who have the capability to develop their own nuclear programmes, although such programmes are restrained from coming to fruition.  However, this successful story has not taken place in the area of nuclear disarmament. None of its nuclear weapon-owning members seem to proceed with realising a full disarmament aim. This raises the question of why the NPT is unable to achieve success in the field of nuclear disarmament as it has in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The NPT does not only contain the idea of nuclear non-proliferation, but also the idea of nuclear disarmament. In understanding this question, using a political psychology approach, this study finds that nuclear-weapon states face the so-called moral dilemma between the desire to achieve national interests and the desire to fulfil social demands required by the international norm. By taking advantage of the shortcomings in the NPT narrative as well as relevant world situations, these states attempt to be exempted from dismantling nuclear weapons under their possession.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 883-886

In recent weeks and months, the issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation have assumed a new urgency on the world stage. Energetic diplomatic efforts are heralding long overdue progress on nuclear weapons issues in the post-Cold War era.


2019 ◽  
pp. 168-173
Author(s):  
Anton Buteiko

The article describes the breakthrough in the world’s perception of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state a quarter of a century ago. The author remembered 1992 for its huge intensity, intensity of work and constant learning, bottomless opportunities for creativity, endlessness of completely new challenges and problems that required almost simultaneous solutions, not tomorrow or the day after, but yesterday and the day before. The author draws attention to several episodes of those days. The year 1992 began for the author in his new position as Advisor to the President of Ukraine – Head of The Presidential Service for International Affairs, and he had a unique opportunity to be at the epicentre of the formation of the foundations of Ukraine’s international policy. The abovementioned position provided an opportunity to help President Kravchuk coordinate foreign policy activities of ministries and departments, to prepare and participate in important meetings between the President and world leaders. They devoted most of the time to the problems of relations with the former Soviet republics. At first, only Ukraine insisted on the resolution of existing issues in accordance with the rules of international law. Our state made even more efforts to transform the relations between the former republics into equal relationship, which would be based on the principles of international law. Accordingly, we aimed to make the communication between the leaders of the republics look like a negotiation process on a real international forum. At that time, after the collapse of the USSR, hundreds of projects, various documents with thousands of pages required studying, and subsequently a formulation of a position after consultations with all the competent ministries and departments of Ukraine. Unlike Russians who had hundreds of specialists of the former USSR, all our work was carried out by a maximum of several dozen employees. During the first few months in 1992, the work on the coordination of materials for the President was done only by his Adviser and Secretary Typist. In the rapid kaleidoscope of the events of 1992, there were numerous memorable dramatic episodes related to Ukraine’s strategic nuclear weapons. The author is convinced that whoever of moderate people could have been in power in those days in independent Ukraine, the final result would be the same: nuclear disarmament. When employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR formulated a draft statement on the nuclear-weapon-free status of Ukraine just before the independence, the authors of this document could not foresee how difficult it would be to implement its provisions. In 1992, Ukraine got acquainted with the world, and the world got acquainted with Ukraine, and it happened not without curiosities. At first, it was not easy for foreign representatives to understand who is who in the hierarchy of Ukrainian politicians in the conditions of the establishment of the institution of presidency. Many important events of that memorable year are now often covered not as they were in fact, and the author seeks to give the younger generation the most complete picture of the first years of restoration of Ukrainian independence, so that they could be perceived with sympathy and understanding. This would allow to shape the future more responsibly and competently. Keywords: Ukraine, 1992, Soviet Union, nuclear weapons, Soviet Republics.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document