Rehabilitating Islamic Ethics

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Norman K. Swazo

The debate between modernity and postmodernity in western discourses about law and morality calls for a similar debate in contemporary Islam. For Islam, the question is whether a rehabilitation of its classical discipline of ethics (`ilm al-akhlaq) may contribute to international morality even as it disabuses Islam of privileging Islamic jurisprudence (`ilm al-fiqh), which conceives of the Shari`ah as merely law. Islam’s strong tradition of ethical discourse is similar to the West’s classical and contemporary formulations of virtue ethics. Such a renewal constitutes a postmodern opportunity for contemporary Islam as it faces the globalization of western values and jurisprudence.

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Norman K. Swazo

The debate between modernity and postmodernity in western discourses about law and morality calls for a similar debate in contemporary Islam. For Islam, the question is whether a rehabilitation of its classical discipline of ethics (`ilm al-akhlaq) may contribute to international morality even as it disabuses Islam of privileging Islamic jurisprudence (`ilm al-fiqh), which conceives of the Shari`ah as merely law. Islam’s strong tradition of ethical discourse is similar to the West’s classical and contemporary formulations of virtue ethics. Such a renewal constitutes a postmodern opportunity for contemporary Islam as it faces the globalization of western values and jurisprudence.


2020 ◽  
pp. 333-376
Author(s):  
Mohsen Kadivar

Although the rules on slavery are part of Islamic jurisprudence, there are a few verses about slaves in the Qur’an. In addition, there are a lot of hadith about them. However, this was a “temporal rule” and the time of slavery is now over. As such, slavery is now an “abrogated rule” of Islam. It is a forbidden and illegal act. This chapter describes the process of this paradigm shift. With the elimination of the conventions of reasonability, which was the main basis for the ratified ruling (hukm imda’i) on slavery and ownership of humans in Islam, it is natural that this ruling too be recognised as a temporary and seasonal ruling of shari‘a, a ruling whose limit and duration of credibility has come to an end and which in these times is lacking credibility and legitimacy. That is to say, slavery, servitude and the owning of humans in such a context is illegitimate and forbidden (haram). There is no evidence for permanent and continuous ratification (imda’) of the slavery ruling. All ratified rulings (al-ahkam al-imda’i) are conditional on continuity of justice and reasonability.


ICR Journal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-203
Author(s):  
Ahmad Badri Abdullah

As the dynamic cognitive part of the Shari’ah, fiqh is inclined to adapt to new challenges by adopting new methodologies and approaches. One such approach that has emerged recently is ‘applied Islamic ethics’. This new ethical approach is essentially based on the principles of the higher objectives of Shari’ah (maqasid al-Shari’ah) and attempts to anchor Islamic jurisprudence in its ethical dimension, which has been significantly neglected for some time. This article attempts to analyse the new approach by surveying its historical developments, its possible methodologies, the benefits emanating from its application and the possible challenges it needs to face.  


1993 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 30-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. B. Bosworth

My title is deliberately provocative. What could be less humanitarian than the Melian Dialogue? For most readers of Thucydides it is the paradigm of imperial brutality, ranking with the braggadocio of Sennacherib's Rabshakeh in its insistence upon the coercive force of temporal power. The Melians are assured that the rule of law is not applicable to them. As the weaker party they can only accept the demands of the stronger and be content that they are not more extreme. Appeals to moral or religious norms are quite irrelevant, for in their position the Melians simply cannot afford them—as little as Mr. Doolittle could afford middle-class morality. The message is a hard one, and it has elicited outrage over the centuries from the majority of scholars (usually comfortable citizens of a colonial empire) who tend to prefer the καλὰ ὀνόματα of propaganda to the harsh underlying realities of imperial expansion. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing shortly after a war to protect western values had resulted in a new world order, finds it inconceivable that Athenian generals could discount divinely-inspired hope and insist on the imperative of force or that the Melians, that tiny state, would prefer the nobler to the safer course. In this he is echoed by George Grote, writing in the expansionist days of the early nineteenth century: ‘a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification—a good plea, if he can—a false plea or a sham plea if he has not better’. Instead, says Grote, the Athenian envoy ‘disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy’; and the inevitable conclusion for him, as it had been for Dionysius, is that the Dialogue is fundamentally bogus, a composition of Thucydides ‘to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis’.


2021 ◽  
pp. 49-87
Author(s):  
Martin Wight

This essay presents the three main traditions of thinking about international relations in Western societies since the sixteenth century, with particular attention to the ‘middle ground’ between extremes. These extremes are typified by thinkers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes at one pole, and Kant and Wilson at the other. The via media is associated with the development of constitutional government and the rule of law, as represented by thinkers such as Grotius and Gladstone. The essay illustrates the differences among these three traditions by analysing their distinct positions concerning international society, the maintenance of order, intervention, and international morality. ‘Western values’ are most effectively supported by thinkers and leaders who neither deny the existence of international society nor exaggerate its foreseeable prospects for gaining greater cohesion and strength. The middle course—the mainstream of the ‘Western values’ tradition—respects moral standards and sees moral challenges as complex, instead of regarding them as simple or nonexistent.


2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 111-113
Author(s):  
Norman K. Swazo

Immediately distinctive of Sachedina’s approach to biomedical ethics is hisconception of the Shari`ah as an integrated legal-ethical tradition: TheQur’an provides jurists with moral underpinnings of religious duty, and thegrounding texts are to be taken as an ethical standard of conduct. Legal rulingsare to be extracted accordingly. In short, the Islamic juridical tradition(usul al-fiqh) presupposes ethics.Sachedina argues for an ethical foundation – a strong epistemologicalclaim– and concerns himself with conceptual bases ofmoral reasoning ratherthan with juridically derived judgment per se. He elucidates deontologicalteleologicalprinciples that are “cross-culturally communicable” yet appreciativeof “situational exigencies.” In contrast to the juridical objective ofissuing legal opinions (fatwas), bioethical pluralism motivates Sachedina’spreference for recommended moral conduct (tawsiyah). He therefore movesaway from the tendency of some scholars to conceive of bioethics merely as“applied Islamic jurisprudence.”The author’s epistemic and hermeneutic commitment commends hiswork, given the two facts that he identifies: (1) informed public debate oncritical issues of biomedical ethics within Islam is lacking, relative to thedegree of democratic governance, and (2) the epistemological and ontologicalbases of ethical inquiry remain underdeveloped in the Muslim seminariancurriculum. Consequently, there is a critical need to demonstrate toreligious scholars that Islamic ethics have much in common with secularbioethics and thus that an opportunity for dialogue exists ...


Author(s):  
Nenad Polgar

The article explores the relevancy of the concept of intrinsic evil/intrinsically evil acts in contemporary Catholic theological ethics as a particular way of giving an account of (moral) evil. The argument proceeds in two steps. In the first step the author turns to Francisco Suárez as one of the first theologians who tried to deal with the concept of intrinsic evil in an extensive and systematic way. The point of this historical exploration is to determine the meanings of this concept as it started to appear more frequently in the ethical discourse. In the next step the author presents two contemporary positions within Catholic theological ethics, those of Joseph Selling and Dana Dillon. Although both authors are proponents of virtue ethics, they disagree fundamentally on the role of the concept of intrinsic evil within this approach. While Joseph Selling argues in favour of eliminating this concept from theological ethics, Dana Dillon posits that theological ethics cannot function without it. In the rest of the article, the author explores this disagreement through various ways in which the concept can be used, while taking into account the aforementioned meanings of the concept. In the end, the author sides with Joseph Selling, since the concept of intrinsic evil does not seem to be able to fulfil the role it was assigned within Catholic theological ethics.


Author(s):  
Justine Howe

This chapter focuses on Webb debates about Islamic law and ethics. In 2011, in the midst of a flurry of proposed anti-sharia legislation across the United States, the Webb community held an adult class focused on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). The conversations I track here occurred during the fiqh class and the conversations I had with Webb members about how to live according to God’s will as American Muslims. Students rarely talked about or engaged fiqh as a body of Islamic jurisprudence. Instead, the Webb interest in fiqh derived its urgency from its members’ goals to raise their children to have “seamless” American Muslim identities and to improve the public image of Islam. Webb parents especially want their kids to understand that Islamic ethics is not a rigid, narrow set of guidelines, but rather everyday processes of normative reflection and action, negotiated within families and among individuals, religious scholars, and God.


2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. i-xiv
Author(s):  
Yasien Mohamed ◽  
Norman K. Swazo

Islamic ethics (akhlaq islamiyah), which is concerned with good characterand the means of acquiring it, took shape gradually from the seventh centuryand culminated in the eleventh century with the teachings of Miskawayh(d. 1030), al-Raghib al-Isfahani (d. 1060), and al-Ghazali (d. 1111). Islamicphilosophical ethics combined Qur’anic teachings, the traditions of Muhammad(s), the precedents of Islamic jurists, and classic Greek (Hellenic) ethicalideas.Prophet Muhammad (s) said: “Verily I have been sent in order to perfectmoral character” (Fainnama bu`ithtu-li-utamima makarim al-akhlaq). Suchprophetic traditions, Qur’anic moral exhortations, and Hellenic ethical writingsbecame the main sources of inspiration for Miskawayh, al-Isfahani, andal-Ghazali. Inspired by the Arabic version of Aristotle’s NicomacheanEthics, these moral philosophers Islamized virtue ethics and focused on cultivatingcharacter and purifying the soul (al-nafs). Although al-Isfahaniinspired al-Ghazali and tried to maintain a balance between the justice of thesoul and the justice of society, the latter developed a Sufi ethics that becameincreasingly otherworldly with its focus on purifying the self. This ethicalmodel later became a source of inspiration for St. Thomas Aquinas andMaimonides.This special issue of the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciencesfocuses on Islamic ethics, especially ethics as applied to such contemporaryissues as bioethics, the environment, human rights, and evolution. Thepapers provide insight into how ethical problems are dealt with within ...


Author(s):  
Aria Nakissa

This chapter combines ethnography and textual analysis to examine the key concepts of Sharīʿa, Sunna, and ethics. It argues that these concepts can best be understood in terms of the relationship between mind and action, drawing on insights from hermeneutic theory and practice theory. Building on anthropological work in practice theory, the chapter explains how Islamic ethics is a type of virtue ethics. It also explains the place of the Sharīʿa and Sunna in Islamic ethics. Furthermore, it discusses the view of Muslim scholars that proper legal reasoning depends upon ethical living.


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