scholarly journals Azerbejdżan pod rządami Alijewów

2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 191-228
Author(s):  
Barbara Patlewicz

In previous years Azerbaijan experienced only a few of leadership changes following independence in 1991. In 1992 Abulfaz Elchibey, the leader of the Popular Front, won first fairly contested presidential election. However the beginning of the current phase political life took place in 1993. As a result of the ensuing war, Armenian armed forces occupied then 14–16 percent of Azerbaijan (20 percent according to Azerbaijani sources), including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven surrounding districts. The collapse of the Popular Front government led to Heidar Aliev’s former communist party boss return to Baku as national leader. During his presidency (1993–2003), Aliev ensured political order, economic stabilization and peace, but suppressed political pluralism. At the time Azerbaijan has positioned itself on the international scene as an increasingly important actor, but in domestic politics system crafted by Aliev political power was concentrated in the hands post-Soviet cadres and regional clans. Ilham Aliev became president of the country in 2003. The period immediately preceding and following his reelection for a second term in October 2008 was marked by further steps towards the consolidation of the semiauthoritarian and authoritarian regime established by his father – Heidar.

1980 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-154
Author(s):  
Stanley Hoffmann

After a summer of ill humor came an autumn of scandals, and French political life hesitates between immobility and fragmentation. For many years now it has resembled an endless boxing match with countless rounds ; as soon as the elections to the European Parliament (discussed in the previous issue of this Review) were over, all thoughts and maneuvers moved on to the next round : the Presidential election of 1981. De Gaulle, blasting the Fourth Republic, had talked of its games, poisons and delights. In the current phase of the Fifth Republic, the delights are few, the poisons can be deadly and the games are sterile.


Author(s):  
Anita Isaacs ◽  
Rachel A. Schwartz

Since the mid-20th century, the Guatemalan military has played a prominent role in the country’s political life. Yet, this was not always the case. During Guatemala’s first century of independence, the armed forces operated largely as the pawn of personalist rulers and oligarchic elites, utilizing coercion to quell labor unrest and impose order in the countryside. Developments during the Cold War era, however, transformed the Guatemalan military into a centralized source of political and economic power and the key protagonist in domestic politics. Following World War II and on the heels of popular uprising, nationalist junior army officers ushered in a series of popular reforms, which included land redistribution. A 1954 CIA-orchestrated coup supported by the Guatemalan oligarchy and reactionary military factions toppled Guatemala’s “Democratic Spring,” reversed the reforms, and paved the way for four decades of hardline military rule. The subsequent rise of a leftist insurgent movement and the outbreak of armed conflict (1960–1996) gave the armed forces a pretext to dramatically expand their power. They consolidated formal political control over the Guatemalan state and pursued a counterinsurgent campaign, which escalated into genocidal violence in the predominantly Mayan indigenous highlands. Pulled between the political protagonism of civil war and the subordination to civilian rule required in liberal democracy, the Guatemalan military struggled to redefine its institutional identity with the end of armed conflict. It lurched reluctantly toward peace and democracy following a split in its ranks between a moderate institutionalist faction and right-wing groups wary of ceding political control. Despite peace accord provisions to reduce the military’s size and budget and to confine its institutional activities to external defense, military officials, particularly those from intelligence, continued to wield extraordinary control in the postwar era. Challenging the strictures of peace and democracy, they have fought to maintain key interests, notably impunity for war crimes, political decision-making influence, and wartime sources of illicit enrichment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Military forces have had many important roles in political life in Southeast Asia where the military has a full power or major role and influence in the domestic politics. These forms of military intervention in domestic politics are called praetorianism, which is characterized by the military being more inclined to take care of domestic political affairs rather than carrying out its professional duties as guardians of sovereignty from external threats. We can find this practice from seeing the New Order regime in Indonesia to the Military Junta of Myanmar and Thailand. This paper aims to analyze what factors are the background of the widespread practice of praetorianism and how the practice can last for a certain period of time, even still to this day in Southeast Asia. The main argument is the weak political institutions and the low political culture of developing country are the main causes of various intervention efforts made by the armed forces in the domestic political realm of a country.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (04) ◽  
pp. 635-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas A. Hibbs

According to the Bread and Peace Model postwar, American presidential elections should be interpreted as a sequence of referendums on the incumbent party's record during its four-year mandate period. In fact postwar aggregate votes for president are well explained by just two objectively measured fundamental determinants: (1) weighted-average growth of per capita real disposable personal income over the term, and (2) cumulative US military fatalities due to unprovoked, hostile deployments of American armed forces in foreign wars. No other outside variable systematically affects postwar aggregate votes for president.


2020 ◽  
pp. 247-270
Author(s):  
Brian Holden Reid

This chapter details how the year 1864 allowed William T. Sherman to operate for the first time not as a subordinate commander but as director of a series of armies in the field. His contribution to overall Union strategy would be significant and thus he began to exercise command at the level military analysts currently refer to as the operational level of war. Such a level links tactics and methods of fighting with strategy, in the overall scheme. It defines the manner in which armies organize in discrete campaigns and seek to fulfill the object of strategy by winning victories. Sherman’s performance overall needs to be considered by taking all aspects into account. As he began to work at the higher levels of the military art, he began to change the way in which people think and talk about war, and he propounded an individual philosophy of war. The higher he progressed, the more Sherman could not avoid confronting the harsh realities of political life, for his campaigns increasingly had an impact not just on American political discourse but indeed in 1864 on the outcome of the presidential election. Sherman expressed clear-cut political views and expounded them perhaps too forcefully. This complex mix worked as a catalyst in developing his ideas about war and his ability to put them into practice.


1986 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 13-31
Author(s):  
Herrick Chapman

Between 1934 and 1938, several million workers took part in the elections, strikes, and protests that made the popular front a pivotal moment in the recent history of France. Giant street demonstrations, the General Strike of November 1938, and above all the massive sit-down strikes of June 1936 made most workers at least momentary actors in the drama of national political life. Yet, for all that has been written about these events, little is known about how labor conflict during the popular front actually affected workers' views. The problem has been in large part one of sources: the speeches, newspapers, leaflets, and memoirs of the period reveal more about trade union leaders and local militants than about the ordinary men and women who made popular protest possible but whose opinions rarely found their way into print. As a result, a number of questions remain largely unanswered: How much of the ethos of the popular front, and how much of the ideology of the Socialist and Communist parties, did rank-and-file workers come to embrace? Which slogans spoke most poignantly to lathe operators at Renault, textile workers in Lille, or sales clerks at the Galeries Lafayette? Were the euphoria of June 1936 and the crushing defeat of the General Strike in November 1938 as important in the lives of these people as they were for labor leaders? How popular, in short, was the political experience of the popular front?


Author(s):  
Sofia K. Ledberg

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a key political actor in the Chinese state. Together with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese state institutions, it makes up the political foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the early years after the founding of the PRC in 1949, the military played an important role in state consolidation and the management of domestic state affairs, as is expected in a state founded on Leninist principles of organization. Since the reform process, which was initiated in the late 1970s, the political role of the PLA has changed considerably. It has become less involved in domestic politics and increased attention has been directed toward military modernization. Consequently, in the early 21st century, the Chinese military shares many characteristics with the armed forces in noncommunist states. At the same time, the organizational structures, such as the party committee system, the system of political leaders, and political organs, have remained in place. In other words, the politicized structures that were put in place to facilitate the role of the military as a domestic political tool of the CCP, across many sectors of society, are expected to also accommodate modernization, professionalization, and cooperation with foreign militaries on the international arena in postreform China. This points to an interesting discrepancy between form and purpose of the PLA. The role of the military in Chinese politics has thus shifted over the years, and its relationship with the CCP has generally been interpreted as having developed from one marked by symbiosis to one of greater institutional autonomy and independence. Yet these developments should not necessarily be seen as linear or irreversible. Indeed, China of the Xi Jinping era has shown an increased focus on ideology, centralization, and personalized leadership, which already has had consequences for the political control of the Chinese armed forces. Chances are that these trends will affect the role of the PLA in politics even further in the early decades of the 21st century.


Subject The impact of the failed July coup on civilian-military relations. Significance The psychological impacts of the attempted coup across political life cannot be understated; it has far-reaching implications for the political, bureaucratic and even ideological structures of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). In the aftermath of the attempted putsch, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is more determined than ever to alter the civilian-military machinery of government in Turkey radically. Impacts The purge and radical reforms will bring into question the TSK's operational and strategic reliability for Western partners. A permanently weakened TSK would ease the way for constitutional reforms strengthening Erdogan's grip on the state. It will take years to rebuild the confidence and prestige the military has lost among broad swathes of Turkish society. Any criticism of the TSK reforms, domestically or from abroad, will meet the authorities' fierce condemnation.


Subject Increasing Hazara involvement in the Afghan conflict. Significance Taliban advances into districts on the southern fringes of the ethnic Hazara heartland have encountered resistance from local militias. Locals are demanding stronger self-defence forces. Iran's influence is rising as a sponsor of paramilitary forces. The clashes risk adding a new ethno-sectarian dimension to the conflict. Impacts President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani is unlikely to win many Hazara votes in next year’s presidential election. Competition among Hazara factions to organise informal armed forces is likely to intensify. Hazara politicians may find it increasingly difficult to avoid Iranian influence.


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