scholarly journals Tipificando o terrorismo no Congresso brasileiro: os projetos de lei e literatura acadêmica/Typifying terrorism in the Brazilian Congress: the bills and academic literature

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-134
Author(s):  
Guilherme Frizzera ◽  
José Maria de Souza Junior

O presente estudo se debruça sobre a temática da tipificação de terrorismo no poder legislativo brasileiro. O assunto envolve certa complexidade à medida não há consenso sobre a definição do próprio termo. Portanto, o artigo resgata algumas definições da academia acerca do que vem a ser terrorismo, ressaltando dois aspectos importantes: por um lado, é necessário que haja uma definição para que os agentes de segurança possam enquadrar práticas terroristas como crime; por outro, a atribuição de terrorismo se faz pejorativa, uma vez que um grupo pode designar outro grupo ou uma prática como terrorista ou não dependendo de interesses políticos e da rivalidade de grupos existente em um contexto político-social. A partir dos conceitos da academia e de organizações que tem o terrorismo como preocupação pertinente, pode-se considerar que duas dimensões operam na tarefa de defini-lo: as motivações subjetivas das ações e os métodos pelo qual tais ações são conduzidas. Tomando como metodologia a análise das definições sobre terrorismo e análise documental dos projetos de lei no legislativo brasileiro sobre o tema e, posteriormente, a comparação entre os dois tipos de análise conclui-se que o projeto que provavelmente vá para votação no Congresso deixa de lado a dimensão da motivação subjetiva para definir práticas terroristas e considera apenas a metodologia do ato como critério para definir terrorismo.  Palavras-Chaves: Terrorismo; Brasil; Tipificação; Projeto de Lei  Abstract: This research focuses on the typification of terrorism in the legislative power in Brazil. The issue involves complexity for there is no consensus about the definition of the term itself. Therefore, the article brings some academic definitions regarding what terrorism really is. These definitions highlight two aspects: on the one hand, it is necessary to have a definition for the security agents to consider the practices as a type of crime and punish them; on the other hand, the attribution of the term to a group or act is pejorative, once one group might call another group or a practice terrorist or terrorism depending on political interests and on group rivalry in a political and social context. From the concepts developed in the academy and in groups which have the terrorism as a preoccupation, it is possible to consider two dimensions that operate in the task of defining it: the subjective motivations of the actions and the methods in which such actions are performed. Having as methodology the analysis of the definitions on terrorism, the documentary analysis of the bills of Law in the Brazilian legislative on the same issue and the comparison between the two source of analysis, the conclusion is that the probable Bill which is to be approved excludes the subjective motivation dimension to define terrorist practices and considers only the method of the act as criterion to define terrorism.Key Words: Terrorism; Brazil; typing, Bill.  DOI: 10.20424/2237-7743/bjir.v4n1p111-134

Author(s):  
Touré Bassamanan

This paper highlights the different layers of meaning that characterize the notion of manhood in Gaines’ fiction. The quest for manhood represents an imperative for the frustrated men in the framework of the social context wherein they are emasculated. Here, manhood should be grasped through a binary paradigm. On the one hand, the expression of manhood equates with male domination and violence. On the other hand, due to social expectations, manhood refers to the struggle for freedom. It undermines the white racial superiority and it claims blacks’ humanity. Manhood fosters humanistic principles. Thus, it takes on a universal dimension.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (101) ◽  
pp. 122-139
Author(s):  
Thor Grünbaum

Action in Narratology, Literature, and LifeIn this article I argue that the representation of simple, bodily action has the function of endowing the narrative sequence with a visualizing power: It makes the narrated scenes or situations ready for visualization by the reader or listener. By virtue of this visualizing power or disposition, these narrated actions disrupt the theoretical divisions, on the one hand, between the narrated story and the narrating discourse, and on the other hand, between plot-narratology and discourse-narratology. As narrated actions they seem to belong to the domain of plot-narratology, but in so far as they serve an important visualizing function, these narrated actions have a communicative function and as such they can be said to belong to the domain of discourse-narratology. In a first part of the article, I argue that a certain type of plot-narratology, due to its retrospective epistemology and abstract definition of action, is unable to conceive of this visualizing function. In a second part, I argue that discourse-narratology fares no better since the visualizing function is independent of voice and focalization. In a final part, I sketch a possible account of the visualizing function of simple actions in narratives.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104-116
Author(s):  
Ivan O. Volkov ◽  

For the first time, in the article, Vladimir Titov’s letter (dated 12/24 February 1869) is published and commented. In the 1820s, in Russia, Titov was well-known as a writer and literature theorist, the author of a romantic novella The Remote House on Vasilyevsky Island (1829) close to Society of Lyubomudriye. The letter extracted from the archives of the National Library of Russia is addressed to Duke Vladimir Odoevsky whose relationship with Titov was friendly from the very beginning of their acquaintance. The letter focuses on Ivan Turgenev’s speech published in the first issue of Sovremennik and titled “Hamlet and Don Quixote”. Reacting to Turgenev’s article, Titov shortly and critically accesses the comparison concentrating mainly on the image of Hamlet and thoroughly expresses his opinion on the essence of his tragic state. Titov’s opinion is just the opposite of Turgenev’s complex and multidimensional interpretation. Having experienced the great impact of the philosophy of German idealism at the beginning of his career, Titov to a great extent idealizes Shakespeare’s character whom he long knows and whom he is clearly eager to vindicate. Meanwhile, Titov does not pursue the aim to absolutely advocate the romantic halo of Hamlet as a Titanic personality (grandiose intellect and scale of feeling) and to enact the tragic pathos of the inner fight only. Developing Goethe’s definition of the essence of the character’s inner conflict, Titov, on the one hand, approaches its real understanding underlying the prince’s necessity to stay in a derogatory position of a “pitiful semiclown, indecisive grouch and shred”. On the other hand, the assessment can not be absolutely objective because Titov wants to see Hamlet as a victim of the fatal fortune which turns him into a character of an almost classical tragedy of fate. Titov’s bright and developed reaction (in the document of private nature) to Turgenev’s article is attractive and important first of all for its vividly demonstrated novelty and creativity of the writer’s view, wideness and multimodality of the author’s perception of Hamlet’s image. For the first time, Turgenev gave a developed interpretation of Shakespeare’s image in the tale “Hamlet of Shchigrovsky Province” (1848). Continuing his searches in the area of “Russian” (or “steppe”) Hamlet, Turgenev creates moral and philosophical problems of the English tragedy in the crisis socio-historical and cultural atmosphere of Russia of the 1840s. However, the principles of the artistic generalization and the peculiarities of the new reading, not mentioned and not fully comprehended by his contemporaries, were surprising and rejected when the speech “Hamlet and Don Quixote” appeared, in which Shakespeare’s character is presented ultimately vividly and lively in the then current interpretation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

Spinoza's ethics is grounded by a conviction which is as simple as it is programmatic: Subjective experience can be explained, and its successful explanation is of ethical relevance. For it makes us smarter, freer and happier. This is the programmatic conviction behind Spinoza's ethics and motivates many of the theses it puts forward. Ursula Renz shows which kind of a theory of the human mind informs this program. The systematic differentiation of theory parts in the architecture of ethics proves to be a decisive move: A theory part that deals with questions of the ontology of the mental is followed by a definition of the human mind as a kind of subject theory, which in turn is separated from a theory part dealing with the constitution of content. This structure makes it possible to deal separately with different problems that arise in the course of the explanation of experience. In the end, Spinoza succeeds in avoiding both reductionisms and skepticisms right from the start. In this way, two intuitions are brought together that are often considered incompatible: on the one hand, the view that experience is something irreducibly subjective, and on the other hand, the assumption that there are better and worse explanations of experience.


Author(s):  
Flavia Palma

Giovanni Boccaccio is quoted several times in Castiglione’s Cortegiano, but all these mentions are inserted in two specific contexts: on the one hand, the debate on literary language, developed in the letter of dedication to don Michel De Silva and in the first book; on the other hand, the definition of the joke in book II. Starting from these premises, this essay analyses the meanings of Boccaccio’s presence in the Cortegiano. It shows that Castiglione’s treatise provides two different and concurrent representations of the author of the Decameron: a positive one, connected to the ‘questione della lingua’, that offers Boccaccio as a promoter of the usage (‘uso’); a critical one, deriving from the theory of the ‘facezia’, that makes Boccaccio a challenging and challenged model.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-92
Author(s):  
Matthias Löwe

Abstract Heterodiegetic narrators are not present in the story they tell. That is how Gérard Genette has defined heterodiegesis. But this definition of heterodiegesis leaves open what ›absence‹ of the narrator really means: If a friend of the protagonist tells the story but does not appear in it, is he therefore heterodiegetic? Or if a narrator tells something that happened before his lifetime, is he therefore heterodiegetic? These open questions reveal the vagueness of Genette’s definition. However, Simone Elisabeth Lang has recently made a clearer proposal to define heterodiegesis. She argues that narrators should be called heterodiegetic only if they are fundamentally distinguished from the ontological status of the fictional characters: Heterodiegetic narrators are not part of the story for logical reasons, because they are presented as inventors of the story. This is, for example, the case in Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s novel Elective Affinities (1809): In the beginning of this novel the narrator presents himself as inventor of the character’s names (»Edward – so we shall call a wealthy nobleman in the prime of life – had been spending several hours of a fine April morning in his nursery-garden«). Based on that recent definition of heterodiegesis my article deals with the question whether such heterodiegetic narrators can be unreliable. My question is: How could you indicate that the inventor of a fictitious story tells something which is not correct or incomplete? In answering this question, I refer to some proposals of Janina Jacke’s article in this journal. Jacke shows that the distinction between homodiegetic and heterodiegetic narrators should not be confused with the distinction between personal and non-personal narrators or with the distinction between restricted and all-knowing narrators. If you make such differentiations, then of course heterodiegetic narrators can be unreliable: They can omit some essential information or interpret the story inappropriately. Heterodiegetic narrators of an invented story can even lie to the reader or deceive themselves about some elements of the invention. That means: A heterodiegetic narration cannot only be value-related unreliable (›discordant narration‹), but also fact-related unreliable. My article delves especially into this type of unreliability and shows that heterodiegetic narrators of a fictitious story can be fact-related unreliable, if they tell something which was not invented by themselves. In that case, the narrator himself sometimes does not really know whether he tells a true or a fictitious story. Such narrators are unreliable if they assert that the story is true, although they are suggesting at the same time that it is not. I call this type of unreliable narrator a ›fabulating chronicler‹ (›fabulierender Chronist‹): On the one hand, such narrators present themselves as chroniclers of historical facts but, on the other hand, they seem to be fabulists who tell a fairy tale. This type of unreliability occurs especially if a narrator tells a legend or a story from the Bible. My article demonstrates this case in detail with two examples, namely two novels by Thomas Mann: The Holy Sinner (1951) and Joseph and His Brothers (1933–1943). My article also discusses some cases where it is not appropriate or counter-intuitive to call a heterodiegetic narrator ›unreliable‹: i. e. the narrator of Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain (1924) and the narrator of Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s novel Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795/1796). On the one hand, these narrators show some characteristics of unreliability, because they omit essential pieces of information. On the other hand, these narrators are barely shaped as characters, they are nearly non-personal. However, in order to describe a narrator as unreliable, it is – in my opinion – indispensable to refer to some traces of a narrative personality: Figural traits of a narrator provoke the reader to identify all depicting, describing and commenting sentences of a narration as utterances of one and the same ›psychic system‹ (Niklas Luhmann). Only narrators who can be interpreted as such a ›psychic system‹, provoke the reader to assume the role of an analyst or ›detective‹, who perhaps identifies the narrator’s discordance or unreliability. In my article the unreliability of a narration is understood as part of the composition and meaning of a literary work. I argue that a narrator cannot be described as unreliable without designating a semantic motivation for this composition by an act of interpretation. Therefore, my suggestion is that a narration should be merely called unreliable if it encourages the reader not only to imagine the told story, but also to imagine a discordant or unreliable storyteller.


2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 403-423
Author(s):  
Jacob Weinrib

Abstract In Where Our Protection Lies, Dimitrios Kyritsis develops an innovative constitutional framework that aims to reconcile two commitments: democratic governance and the protection of fundamental rights. This review article argues that the reconciliation fails to provide fundamental rights with meaningful protection. On the one hand, the framework’s moral resources hollow out the duties that rights impose on legislatures. Instead of protecting persons from the abusive exercise of legislative power, the framework narrows what constitutes abuse. On the other hand, the framework’s institutional resources leave persons without the means of vindicating their rights. What Kyritsis terms protection consists in the ongoing susceptibility to the violation of one’s fundamental rights.


2007 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-147
Author(s):  
Gerd Theissen

It is a modern conviction that religion and emotion belong together. It would be an anachronism to presuppose a priori such a connection in pre-modern times. The article shows that the definition of religious experience as mysterium fascinosum et tremendum (R.Otto) is not anachronistic. Biblical texts express an emotional ambivalence of fear and joy when speaking on God. On the one hand, we may explain this ambivalence with the help of evolutionary psychology as part of the universal conditio humana; on the other hand, fear and joy are culturally and historically conditioned. The article gives a sketch of the history and diversity of these emotions in biblical texts and underlines the connection between emotions and rituals.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 13-18
Author(s):  
Коробкина ◽  
N. Korobkina

An oxymoronimis is considered as a reflection of linguistic duality and a result of conceptual integration. An oxymoronimas as a result of a modern word creation and an oxymoron as a well-known stylistic device are compared structurally and semantically. The key semantic sign of an oxymoronim (a unity of contrasts) is singled out. In addition to that a possible definition of this notion is stated.On the one hand a cognitive dissonance of an oxymoron is underlined, on the other hand an attention is paid on the instability, diffusion and emergence of an oxymoronim’s semantics. It is obviously possible to interpret a lexical meaning of an oxymoronim by means of the following: extralinguistic and linguistic contexts of its appearance and functioning and this nomination’ssynonymic paroemias. Uniqueness of an occasional oxymoronimis is noted for the Russian lingvoculture in view of quantitative leveling of these linguistic novelties in the communicative space of the modern English language.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-133
Author(s):  
Nataša Lah

Throughout the entire literary oeuvre of Miroslav Krleža we are faced with a great number of credible descriptions, describing real historic events, or real artists and artworks belonging to the rich resources of European art history. By applying a cryptographic method of incorporating descriptions into his texts, Krleža on the one hand hid his sources, while on the other also revealed them. He hid them in the tissue of fictional texts, and unmasked them using a key work only those familiar with the source could identify. We term this method the use of “belletristic cryptograms”, and can further categorise it into thematic subgroups of concealed artwork descriptions, naming this whole method the use of hidden ekphrasis. The choice of artworks Krleža describes in his work is comprehensive, diverse and each described differently. Since we are dealing with literary texts, descriptions are often used in the function of a wide array of interpretative strategies of depiction; in some aspects, they are used as a mere glimpse into a piece of art with the goal of visually associating, evoking or minutely symbolizing the incorporeal frame of an artist’s mind or of the wider social context. In other aspects, the artworks are richly and meticulously presented with regard to their importance and credibility as they, according to Krleža, possess an “ethical intelligence” and “ethical conscience”. Only Krleža’s prose is researched here, and this is done on two levels. We take a look at examples where real art is incorporated into fictional texts in order to determine the significance and meaning of a certain dialogue, mise-en-scène or situation. This is most commonly found in the author’s plays, novels and novellas. On the other hand, we can trace a completely opposite method by which artworks enter these texts, where, due to their historic determination and already established worth/status, they thus re-enter reality, as seen from the perspective of Krleža’s life and work, so as to yet again test art history’s credibility through the matrix of contemporaneity. This approach is most often found in Krleža’s essays, critiques and diary entries.


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