scholarly journals Argumentative Theory of probability in the philosophy of Science

2018 ◽  
Vol 225 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-450
Author(s):  
Dr. Karim Mousa Hussein Mezban

     This research was devoted to elaborate various models of probability theory which is adopted by a number of philosophers of science in the twentieth century.  The debate between them about the validity of probability theory is shown through philosophical researches, the research is distributed to fifth sections which can be listed as follow: Part (1): The theory of classical probability (classical) has been devoted to knowledge of the basic model of probability theory. Part (2): the theory of repetitive probability adopted by the philosopher of science Hans Reichenbach to fill the lack of the model The basis of probability theory part (3): The theory of logical probability adopted by the philosopher of science Rudolf Carnab to fill the logical deficit in the theory of the repetitive probability of Rischenbach, and also included sparring between them. part(4): The theory of probability of vascular, divided into two parts: Section 4.a: Pragmatisms is adopted by philosopher Charles Pierce to enshrine pragmatism or tendency in the concept of probability. Section 4.b: Karl Popper's Probabilistic Probability Theory, in which he defended the inability of probability to justify the induction method. part(5): The theory of entropy probability, which was devoted to the contemporary theory of probability that took all previous models of probability according to information theory.

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel M. Pothos ◽  
Irina Basieva ◽  
Andrei Khrennikov ◽  
James M. Yearsley

Abstract Research into decision making has enabled us to appreciate that the notion of correctness is multifaceted. Different normative framework for correctness can lead to different insights about correct behavior. We illustrate the shifts for correctness insights with two tasks, the Wason selection task and the conjunction fallacy task; these tasks have had key roles in the development of logical reasoning and decision making research respectively. The Wason selection task arguably has played an important part in the transition from understanding correctness using classical logic to classical probability theory (and information theory). The conjunction fallacy has enabled a similar shift from baseline classical probability theory to quantum probability. The focus of this overview is the latter, as it represents a novel way for understanding probabilistic inference in psychology. We conclude with some of the current challenges concerning the application of quantum probability theory in psychology in general and specifically for the problem of understanding correctness in decision making.


Author(s):  
Ross B. Corotis

Infrastructure decisions reflect multiple social, political, and economic aspects of society, leading to information/partial knowledge and uncertainty in many forms. Alternatives to classical probability theory may be better suited to situations involving partial information, especially when the sources and nature of the uncertainty are disparate. Methods under the umbrella of generalized information theory enhance the treatment of uncertainty by incorporating notions of belief, evidence, fuzziness, possibility, ignorance, interactivity, and linguistic information. This paper presents an overview of some of these theories and examines the use of alternate mathematical approaches in the treatment of uncertainty, with structural engineering examples.


Author(s):  
Jochen Rau

Statistical mechanics concerns the transition from the microscopic to the macroscopic realm. On a macroscopic scale new phenomena arise that have no counterpart in the microscopic world. For example, macroscopic systems have a temperature; they might undergo phase transitions; and their dynamics may involve dissipation. How can such phenomena be explained? This chapter discusses the characteristic differences between the microscopic and macroscopic realms and lays out the basic challenge of statistical mechanics. It suggests how, in principle, this challenge can be tackled with the help of conservation laws and statistics. The chapter reviews some basic notions of classical probability theory. In particular, it discusses the law of large numbers and illustrates how, despite the indeterminacy of individual events, statistics can make highly accurate predictions about totals and averages.


Bertrand Russell. My mental development. A reprint of IX 82(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 1–20; also third edition, Tudor Publishing Company, New York 1951, pp. 1-20; also paper-bound reprint of the third edition, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston, and London, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 1-20. - Hans Reichenbach. Bertrand Russell's logic. A reprint of IX 76(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 21–54; also ibid. 1951, pp. 21-54; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 21-54. - Morris Weitz. Analysis and the unity of Russell's philosophy. A reprint of IX 77(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 55–121; also ibid. 1951, pp. 55-121; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 55-121. - Kurt Göde. Russell's mathematical logic. A reprint of XI 75. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 123–153; also ibid. 1951, pp. 123-153; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 123-153. - James Feibleman. A reply to Bertrand Russell's introduction to the second edition of The principles of mathematics. A reprint of IX 77(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 155–174; also ibid. 1951, pp. 155-174; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 155-174. - G.E. Moore. Russell's “theory of descriptions.” A reprint of IX 78(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 175–225; also ibid. 1951, pp. 175-225; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 175-225. - Max Black. Russell's philosophy of language. A reprint of IX 78(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 227–255; also ibid. 1951, pp. 227-255; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 227-255. - Philip P. Wiener. Method in Russell's work on Leibniz. A reprint of IX 82(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 257–276; also ibid. 1951, pp. 257-276; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 257-276. - Ernest Nagel. Russell's philosophy of science. A reprint of IX 79. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 317–349; also ibid. 1951, pp. 317-349; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 317-349. - Andrew Paul Ushenko. Russell's critique of empiricism. A reprint of IX 80. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 385–417; also ibid. 1951, pp. 385-417; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 385-417.

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-496
Author(s):  
Ann S. Ferebee

Author(s):  
James Hawthorne

Revising classical logic—to deal with the paradoxes of self-reference, or vague propositions, for the purposes of scientific theory or of metaphysical anti-realism—requires the revision of probability theory. This chapter reviews the connection between classical logic and classical probability, clarifies nonclassical logic, giving simple examples, explores modifications of probability theory, using formal analogies to the classical setting, and provides two foundational justifications for these ‘nonclassical probabilities’. There follows an examination of extensions of the nonclassical framework: to conditionalization and decision theory in particular, before a final review of open questions and alternative approaches, and an evaluation of current progress.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim C Jenkins

Abstract Superposed wavefunctions in quantum mechanics lead to a squared amplitude that introduces interference into a probability density, which has long been a puzzle because interference between probability densities exists nowhere else in probability theory. In recent years Man’ko and co-authors have successfully reconciled quantum and classical probability using a symplectic tomographic model. Nevertheless, there remains an unexplained coincidence in quantum mechanics, namely that mathematically the interference term in the squared amplitude of superposed wavefunctions has the form of a variance of a sum of correlated random variables and we examine whether there could be an archetypical variable behind quantum probability that provides a mathematical foundation that observes both quantum and classical probability directly. The properties that would need to be satisfied for this to be the case are identified, and a generic variable that satisfies them is found that would be present everywhere, transforming into a process-specific variable wherever a quantum process is active. This hidden generic variable appears to be such an archetype.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Frič ◽  
Martin Papčo

Abstract The influence of “Grundbegriffe” by A. N. Kolmogorov (published in 1933) on education in the area of probability and its impact on research in stochastics cannot be overestimated. We would like to point out three aspects of the classical probability theory “calling for” an upgrade: (i) classical random events are black-and-white (Boolean); (ii) classical random variables do not model quantum phenomena; (iii) basic maps (probability measures and observables { dual maps to random variables) have very different “mathematical nature”. Accordingly, we propose an upgraded probability theory based on Łukasiewicz operations (multivalued logic) on events, elementary category theory, and covering the classical probability theory as a special case. The upgrade can be compared to replacing calculations with integers by calculations with rational (and real) numbers. Namely, to avoid the three objections, we embed the classical (Boolean) random events (represented by the f0; 1g-valued indicator functions of sets) into upgraded random events (represented by measurable {0; 1}-valued functions), the minimal domain of probability containing “fractions” of classical random events, and we upgrade the notions of probability measure and random variable.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-87
Author(s):  
Richard Hudelson

I have been thinking about the history and future of the labor movement for fifty years. As an academic in philosophy I have focused my research on the intersections of the global labor movement with philosophy of history, philosophy of science, ethics, economics, and political theory. ‘The Fix We Are In’ is a summary of my current thinking. At present the grand strategies for emancipation, ascendant in the mid-twentieth century, have faltered. Headless capitalism runs amuck. The conditions of the working class deteriorate. There is no vision of a better world—no clear pathway toward a better future. The ‘popular revolt’ bubbling up around the globe is a product of this moment. My paper concludes with a difficulty regarding my own favored way forward. Responses from readers would be welcome at: [email protected].


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