scholarly journals Crimea as Saguntum?

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (86) ◽  
pp. 42-70
Author(s):  
Yunus Emre Özigci

The developments in Ukraine in 2014, namely the annexation of Crimea and the secessionist upheaval in Donetsk and Lugansk areas caused — or appeared as the content of — a rift between the “West” and Russia. The core questions of this article explore the nature of this rift and its significance on the shape of the international system in their relatedness to the Ukrainian crisis. The concepts employed in the study belong to phenomenology as adapted to the field of international relations, in order to answer to the apparent need to develop a tool that would enable us to ground the study on its subjective/intersubjective infrastructure that is adequate to the nature of the concepts of state, territory, international system and relations. Within this framework, the Ukrainian crisis and Crimean annexation appear as a positional and systemic content that marks a new temporal phase of the post-bipolar intersubjectivity. An existential framework shall thus be provided to policy contents, as a posteriori yet “real” elements of the phenomena which may be extended, on subjective/intersubjective grounds of international relations, towards positional and systemic horizons as defining and restraining fundamentals of causal interactions.

Author(s):  
Luca Raineri ◽  
Edoardo Baldaro

Abstract The Global IR research agenda lays emphasis on the marginalised, non-Western forms of power and knowledge that underpin today's international system. Focusing on Africa, this article questions two fundamental assumptions of this approach, arguing that they err by excess of realism – in two different ways. First, the claim that Africa is marginal to international relations (IR) thinking holds true only as long as one makes the whole of IR discipline coincide with the Realist school. Second, the Global IR commitment to better appreciate ‘non-Western’ contributions is ontologically realist, because it fails to recognise that the West and the non-West are dialectically constitutive of one another. To demonstrate this, the article first shows that Africa has moved from the periphery to the core of IR scholarship: in the post-paradigmatic phase, Africa is no longer a mere provider of deviant cases, but a laboratory for theory-building of general validity. In the second part, the Sahel provides a case for unsettling reified conceptions of Africa's conceptual and geographical boundaries through the dialectical articulation of the inside/outside dichotomy. Questioning the ‘place’ of Africa in IR – both as identity and function – thus paves the way to a ‘less realist’ approach to Global IR.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricky Wai-kay Yue

The landscape of post-colonial development is marked by deepening dependency of the developing states on the core states consisted mainly of western developed countries. The continuous widening of the north–south divide is not surprising given that the discourse on international relations has been dominated by western ideologies of realism, liberalism and constructivism, resulting in an insufficient attempt to examine international relations from a non-Westphalian perspective. Through the implementation of the Washington Consensus, developing countries are being forced to follow the development model of liberal democracy designed by the West, for the benefit of the West. This paper attempts to investigate an alternative approach from a Chinese historical structural perspective. By highlighting the key tenets of Confucianism, this paper aims to contribute towards a non-Western international relations discourse that is based on moral values. Attempts by China to provide assistance to the “poor south” are marred by accusations of neo-colonialism. In order to fulfil its great power responsibility, China needs to incorporate these Confucian values into its Beijing Consensus so that the global south can abandon their dependency on the West and truly set the stage for south-south cooperation.


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAREL PAUL

That states are sovereign units interacting under conditions of anarchy has long been the core assumption of the discipline of International Relations. Operating largely with an anthropomorphic conceptualization of the state, 'statists' create a stunted ontology of the international system dominated by the concepts of state survival and an assumed state survival interest. By constituting sharp lines of demarcation between being and non-being, between 'life' and 'death', statists ignore a host of more subtle changes in the ontological status of states which are ill-treated by reference to 'survival'. This Westphalian ontology leads ultimately to a dead end, for such a definition rejects from the outset an ontology of overlapping political authorities in a single territory but at distinct scales which is characteristic not only of the present international system but of the so-called Westphalian era as well.


2005 ◽  
Vol 31 (S1) ◽  
pp. 127-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEREMY BLACK

Writing on international relations frequently makes reference to the use of force, but rarely integrates changes in its nature into a central role in the explanatory model. In particular, force, in the shape of military capability, is often seen as the ‘servant’ of ideas about its appropriate use, and thus of the norms of the international system, rather than as an independent element, let alone playing a central role in affecting the latter. This article addresses the issue with particular reference to relations between the West and the ‘non-West’, arguing that the contested relationship between the different narratives of military history impinge directly on the character of international relations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Burgstaller

AbstractSince there is no coercive power in the international system comparable to that which enforces the laws of a state, the question what motivates states to comply with international law remains among the most perplexing ones in international relations. For a long time, however, scholars have generally avoided the causal question 'why states obey international law'. Nevertheless, recent research agendas in international law and international relations have converged around the issues of norm creation and norm compliance. One influential strand of the compliance scholarship–commonly labelled reputational theory – is at the core of this article. Starting with some general characteristics of compliance with norms, mainly two contemporary theories of compliance with international law are dealt with. First, a variant of rationalist theory, Jack Goldsmith's and Eric Posner's monograph The Limits of International Law, is discussed. It shows that although these two authors seem to have some sympathy for a reputational theory of compliance with international law, they tend to stress the shortcomings of such an approach. To the contrary, Andrew Guzman's work, as exemplified in his article A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, more readily embraces reputational concerns. It turns out that the essential thesis of a reputational theory is that reputation can alter the equilibrium: it causes future relationships to be affected by today's actions. Accounting for reputational effects, a decision to violate international law will increase today's payoff but reduce tomorrow's. International law succeeds when it alters a state's payoffs in such a way as to achieve compliance with an agreement when, in the absence of such law, states would behave differently. A reputational theory of compliance with international law is particularly well suited for areas such as international financial and economic law, i.e.for situations in which competitive market forces induce compliance with international law mainly because enforcement and monitoring are strong. Reputational incentives, like all incentives, act at the margin.


Author(s):  
Alexander Hoseason

Harm as a concept lies at the core of the discipline of International Relations (IR), providing a touchstone for scholars that both motivates and frames scholarly practice. However, its pervasive and varied nature means that it is rarely discussed in explicit terms. Attempts to understand the significance of harm for IR, as a pluralist discipline, can be divided into three key perspectives. First, the problem of harm describes a distinct research program centered on the way that social actors have understood, negotiated, and responded to changing forms of harm. Second, different understandings of harm provide a driver of, and a key point of contestation between, IR’s research programs and subdisciplines in ways that reflect the changing dynamics of scholarly interest and normative concern. Third, harm serves to define IR’s objects of inquiry, pointing toward the need for new theoretical tools and innovation in response to global challenges. Taken together, these perspectives suggest that harm serves as an important normative common ground in a discipline that is often understood as pluralist or divided. This common ground serves as a starting point for understanding how harm may change in response to developments or transformations in the international system.


Author(s):  
K. P. Borishpolets

The article evaluates the qualitative changes in world politics during 2014-2015.In the last two years the system of international relations encountered significant difficulties. Contradictions accumulated in different spheres of world politics that were usually treated as latent, arose in the agenda. The starting point of this transformation was the Ukrainian crisis. However, the further events force one to reassess not only its direct consequences but also wide processes at the global level. One of them is deterioration of relations between Russia and Western countries, increase of influence of large non-Western markets and strengthening of turbulence in developing countries. Project of the unipolar regulation, promoted by the US, demonstrates its ineffectiveness. The main point here is inability of the US to secure the stability of the international system without real consensus of all world powers. We witness an active blend of traditional and new challenges to the international security that decreases the controllability of the situation, first of all in regional segments of the world, Middle East and Europe in particular. These processes give ground for reformatting of the world development, and post-bipolar world politics is gaining a new face. We speak not about going back to pre-crisis order, but about step-by-step elimination of the American hegemony in global and regional decision-making. There will be deepening of the fragmentation of the world politics and growth of strife of the international relations that may continue in the mid-term perspective.


2009 ◽  
Vol 197 ◽  
pp. 87-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Lynch

AbstractChina's evidently unstoppable “rise” energizes PRC political and intellectual elites to think seriously about the future of international relations. How will (and should) China's international roles change in the forthcoming decades? How should its leaders put the country's rapidly-increasing power to use? Foreign China specialists have tended to use an overly-streamlined “resisting” the West versus “co-operating” with it (or even simpler “optimistic” versus “pessimistic”) scale to address such questions, partly reflecting the divide between Realism and Neoliberalism in American international relations theory. By 2002, a near-consensus had developed (though never shared universally) that China had become an increasingly co-operative power since the mid-1990s and would continue to pursue the policy prescriptions of Neoliberal international relations theory. But using more nuanced “English school” analytical techniques – and examining the writings of Chinese elites themselves, aimed solely at Chinese audiences – this article discovers an unmistakably cynical Realism to be still at the core of Chinese thinking on the international future. Even elites who appear sincere in their promotion of co-operation firmly reject “solidarism” among the world's leading states and insist upon upholding the difference between China and all others. Many demand – and foresee – China using its future power to pursue world objectives that would depart in significant respects from those of the other leading states and non-state actors.


1998 ◽  
Vol 154 ◽  
pp. 308-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Deng

The pursuit of national interests is the legitimate goal of a state's foreign policy. Yet in the 1990s, politicians in the West and the U.S. have criticized the Chinese government for its allegedly narrow-minded, backward view, especially on issues concerning human rights and irredentist claims. Many scholarly analyses in North America also point to a “hard-core,” well-entrenched Chinese realpolitik “worldview” with little ingrained liberal thinking. The conclusion seems to be that, in the Chinese worldview, the international system consists essentially of atomistic nation-states locked in a perpetual struggle for power. China's foreign policy is based on an outmoded Westphalian notion of sovereignty in a world where state sovereignty is being eroded and the traditional notion of national interests is under increasing challenge, thanks to unprecedentedly “dense interdependence.” The blunt policy criticisms and subtle scholarly analyses point to a problematic Chinese definition of national interests.


Author(s):  
Marwan Awni Kamil

This study attempts to give a description and analysis derived from the new realism school in the international relations of the visions of the great powers of the geopolitical changes witnessed in the Middle East after 2011 and the corresponding effects at the level of the international system. It also examines the alliances of the major powers in the region and its policies, with a fixed and variable statement to produce a reading that is based on a certain degree of comprehensiveness and objectivity.


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