scholarly journals Ludzka próbka biologiczna wykorzystywana dla celów naukowych jako przedmiot prawa cywilnego

2015 ◽  
pp. 91-136
Author(s):  
Dorota Krekora-Zając

The article is concerning analysis of legal status of human biological samples used in research purposes. Historical evolution of human body status, possible use of human biological samples and legal status of human biological samples under the European Community, Polish, Italian Law has been described in the article, as well as regulation in the Common Law countries. In author’s opinion the human biological samples should be recognized as a res for the legal purposes. Aforementioned approach provides the best protection of interests of both donors and biobanks. Paper contains conclusions de lege lata and de lege ferenda, including proposals of future legislation regarding biobanks and potential influence of foreign courts judicial decisions in this area on Polish legal practice.

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-138
Author(s):  
Christopher Phiri

Abstract On 23 November 2018, the Supreme Court of Zambia delivered a judgement which suggests that Zambian judges have virtually unbridled power to move on their own motion to punish for contempt of court anyone who criticises their judicial decisions. This article considers that judgement. It argues that whilst justice might well have been done in the case in question, it was certainly not seen to be done. Two main reasons are given for this argument. First, the judges appeared to have acted both as prosecutors and adjudicators in their own cause when it was neither urgent nor imperative to act immediately on their own motion. Second, the classification by the Court of the contempt in question as civil contempt rather than criminal contempt is alien to the common law world. The article culminates in a clarion call for the Zambian legislature to intervene and clarify the law of contempt of court to avert capricious and unbridled invocation of the judicial power to punish for contempt.


Author(s):  
Maksymilian Hau ◽  
Stanisław Jędrczak

This article is divided into two parts. In the first part, which was published in 2018, we presented arguments in support of the concept of posthumous interests. Posthumous interests are understood as events that constitute a benefit or a harm to the deceased person, who no longer exists. A right is the interest of a person, which is recognized and protected by law. In the second part, we examine the possibility of applying the theory of posthumous interests in the Polish legal system. We address the following issues: medical confidentiality, protection of medical data after the death of a patient, author’s moral rights, protection of the memory of the deceased, the law on orders and decorations, and the legal status of human corpses. The theoretical background for this article was the book by Daniel Sperling Posthumous Interest, in which the author outlined the problem in point from the perspective of the common law regime.


Author(s):  
Kamaliah Salleh ◽  
Noor ‘Ashikin Hamid ◽  
Noraida Harun ◽  
Asiah Bidin ◽  
Zuhairah Ariff Abd Ghadas

The members own the company by virtue of their shareholding and the directors manage and exercise control over the company’s affairs through the company’s board meeting. Despite segregation of powers and roles between the members and directors, there has been an inclination on the part of the members to participate to a greater extent in the company’s affairs. This paper aims to establish the legal position as between the directors and members that reflect the separation of control and ownership in the company under the common law and the Malaysian law. The method used in this study is the content analysis of the reported Malaysian and international law cases as well as the statutory provisions in order to examine the legal position established under the common law, the previous Companies Act 1965 and the newly introduced Companies Act 2016. The study reveals that the separation between the two has long been recognized and upheld by the common law as well as the Malaysian Acts. The introduction of section 195 of the Companies Act 2016, however, allows members to raise their voice in relation to matters which are within the powers of directors, hence the separation becomes slightly vague. In the absence of the latest judicial decisions to test the application of section 195, further review on its application may be required in order to determine methods to measure if a members’ recommendation is truly made in the best interests of the company.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (6) ◽  
pp. 585-615
Author(s):  
Moses Muchiri

Abstract Publicity rights fall in the intersection between classic intellectual property rights law, unfair trade practices law and privacy rights law. This is an area that has recently witnessed notable judicial decisions in Kenya which have not gained ample exposure and is therefore worth looking into as an area for potential emerging jurisprudence. A look at the existing practices across different jurisdictions in the world reveals various positions and approaches with respect to publicity rights. On one hand, there are jurisdictions in which publicity rights are categorized within the broad spectrum of personality rights, while in other jurisdictions these rights are treated as proprietary rights. Some jurisdictions also take a hybrid approach that amalgamates both proprietary and personality rights approaches. Publicity rights cut across four broad legal areas: tort, property, privacy and unfair trade practice law. These rights also have common similarities with copyright and trademark rights, although they are not synonymous. A significant number of countries which recognize a right of publicity have a mixture of elements of these areas, either as a form of common law approach based on the tort of passing off, or specific statutory enactments on publicity rights. Legal practice and development in each jurisdiction must be considered in the knowledge that each country has developed specific publicity rights mechanisms in response to the socio-economic needs and realities existing in its particular jurisdiction. This study surveys the legal landscape with respect to development of personality rights in Kenya. It also takes a brief look at several other select jurisdictions in an attempt to answer the question whether there is a jurisprudential justification for the recognition of a publicity right in Kenya.


Author(s):  
Oppong Richard Frimpong

This chapter studies the common law African countries Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Their main source of private international law rules is judicial decisions or case law. Because of the relatively underdeveloped nature of their private international law regimes, foreign case law often serves as an important source of persuasive authority. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the English courts is particularly persuasive and is often referred to by the courts. In general, an international convention or treaty does not have the force of law in the legal systems of the countries under study, unless it is expressly incorporated into national law. In essence, they are dualist countries. However, courts in some of the countries under study have demonstrated a willingness to seek guidance from international treaties that are not yet domestically in force, if the circumstances are appropriate. Thus, it is possible, that courts in the countries under study may be receptive to the Hague Principles, especially if argued by counsel.


Author(s):  
Colin Faragher

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter first discusses the five key sources of UK law: the common law in the form of judicial decisions and cases involving the interpretation of statutes, Acts of Parliament, EU law, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the law and custom of Parliament. It then turns to the issue of constitutional conventions, covering the distinction between laws and conventions, whether constitutional conventions are binding, and examples of constitutional conventions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rivka Weill

This article explores the often neglected relationships between constitution-making (including amendment) mechanisms and constitutional-infringement mechanisms by focusing on the override as one of the possible tools to depart from a Constitution. The article suggests that there are two types of override: a ‘common law override’, which is not uniquely Canadian, and a ‘sunset override’. The common law override evolves in the judicial decisions of a given country when the courts require the legislature to explicitly take responsibility for an action. Under the common law override, we may couple together phenomena that are not typically connected, including a means of protecting common law rights, a judicial presumption against delegation of power to administrative agencies, and mechanisms of dealing with procedural or substantive legislative entrenchment. In contrast, the sunset override is a Canadian invention. For the tool to be part of the infringement mechanisms of a country's Constitution, it must be provided for explicitly in that Constitution, and its exercise must be temporary.This article follows the various possible uses of the common law override. It shows that Israel has vast experience with the common law override which may shed light on Israel's future possible exploitation of the sunset override. The article then shows that Israel has adopted the sunset override following the Canadian example. When the Rabin government adopted the tool as part of an exchange deal with the ultra-orthodox religious political party Shas, the terms of the deal included Shas' acquiescence to the peace process in exchange for the Rabin government's use of the override to protect the religious status quo from judicial intervention. In addition, the Israeli justices played an active and unique role in the birth and formulation of the Israeli override. As has happened with the Canadian override, supposedly these circumstances should have made the override illegitimate in Israel. However, this article argues that it is not the political uses of the override that result in its lack of use. Rather, the determining factor is the override's compatibility with the constitution-making process in a given country. From a normative perspective, it is easier for the Israeli legislature to override its own earlier enactments, even those titled Basic Laws, than it is for the Canadian legislature to override the People's enactment of the Charter. Thus, it is expected that Israel might more freely deploy the sunset override were it to become a general mechanism embodied in the Basic Laws, while, in contrast, the sunset override has fallen into disuse in Canada.


1991 ◽  
Vol 4 (01) ◽  
pp. 3-66
Author(s):  
Alan Brudner

This essay defends the thesis that the common law of property exhibits an internal unity worthy of moral respect. There are three distinct elements to this claim, each of which may be elucidated through a contrast with the position it opposes. First, the unity we seek in the law of property is an internal one. This means that we unabashedly seek property law’s own unity, regarding artificial constructions as a defect of interpretation rather than its normal product. We do not set out in advance the underlying ground for the possibility of faithful interpretations of legal practice; for that ground will emerge as the unifying theme of property law and so must be methodically drawn from the object rather than baldly asserted beforehand. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate at the outset how an internalist understanding of property law will differ from interpretations that are constructionist, or that impose on the object a unity alien to it.


The studies included in this volume analyze the legal and social history of Europe and North America by the end of the eighteenth century to the contemporary age. The study investigates the relationship between culture and legal status (science, law and government), the administration of justice and the transformation of the legal professions. That lights up the separation, in the whole complex of Western legal tradition, that identifies the countries of the common law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 43-70
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter examines the characteristics of the UK constitution. The main features of the UK constitution are that it is uncodified; flexible; traditionally unitary but now debatably a union state; monarchical; parliamentary; and based on a bedrock of important constitutional doctrines and principles: parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law, separation of powers; the courts are also basing some decisions on bedrock principles of the common law. Meanwhile, the laws, rules, and practices of the UK constitution can be found in constitutional statutes; judicial decisions; constitutional conventions; international treaties; the royal prerogative; the law and custom of Parliament; and works of authoritative writers. The chapter then looks at the arguments for and against codifying the UK constitution.


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