scholarly journals The ending effect of negative-expected value gambles: Emotional motivation induces risk taking

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 789
Author(s):  
Yuqi MENG ◽  
Cai XING ◽  
Xinhui LIU
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathy T. Do ◽  
Paul B. Sharp ◽  
Eva H. Telzer

Heightened risk taking in adolescence has long been attributed to valuation systems overwhelming the deployment of cognitive control. However, this explanation of why adolescents engage in risk taking is insufficient given increasing evidence that risk-taking behavior can be strategic and involve elevated cognitive control. We argue that applying the expected-value-of-control computational model to adolescent risk taking can clarify under what conditions control is elevated or diminished during risky decision-making. Through this lens, we review research examining when adolescent risk taking might be due to—rather than a failure of—effective cognitive control and suggest compelling ways to test such hypotheses. This effort can resolve when risk taking arises from an immaturity of the control system itself, as opposed to arising from differences in what adolescents value relative to adults. It can also identify promising avenues for channeling cognitive control toward adaptive outcomes in adolescence.



2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Jammernegg ◽  
Peter Kischka


2018 ◽  
Vol 285 (1881) ◽  
pp. 20180180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Sandeep Mishra ◽  
Adam Maxwell Sparks

Who takes risks, and when? The relative state model proposes two non-independent selection pressures governing risk-taking: need-based and ability-based. The need-based account suggests that actors take risks when they cannot reach target states with low-risk options (consistent with risk-sensitivity theory). The ability-based account suggests that actors engage in risk-taking when they possess traits or abilities that increase the expected value of risk-taking (by increasing the probability of success, enhancing payoffs for success or buffering against failure). Adaptive risk-taking involves integrating both considerations. Risk-takers compute the expected value of risk-taking based on their state —the interaction of embodied capital relative to one's situation, to the same individual in other circumstances or to other individuals. We provide mathematical support for this dual pathway model, and show that it can predict who will take the most risks and when (e.g. when risk-taking will be performed by those in good, poor, intermediate or extreme state only). Results confirm and elaborate on the initial verbal model of state-dependent risk-taking: selection favours agents who calibrate risk-taking based on implicit computations of condition and/or competitive (dis)advantage, which in turn drives patterned individual differences in risk-taking behaviour.



2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Martin Braunstein ◽  
Stefanie J. Herrera ◽  
Mauricio R. Delgado
Keyword(s):  


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikella A Green ◽  
Kendra L Seaman ◽  
Jennifer L Crawford ◽  
Camelia M Kuhnen ◽  
Gregory R Samanez-Larkin

Pharmacological manipulations have revealed that enhancing dopamine increases financial risk taking across adulthood. However, it is unclear whether baseline individual differences in dopamine function, assessed using PET imaging, are related to performance on risky financial decision making tasks. Here, thirty-five healthy adults completed an incentive-compatible learning-based risky investment decision task and a PET scan at rest using [11C]FLB457 to assess dopamine D2-like receptor availability. In the task, participants made choices between a safe asset (bond) and a risky asset (stock) with either an expected value less than the bond (bad stock) or expected value greater than the bond (good stock). Five measures of behavioral performance (choice inflexibility, risk seeking, suboptimal investment) and beliefs (absolute error, optimism) were extracted from the task data and average non-displaceable dopamine D2-like binding potential was extracted from four brain regions of interest (midbrain, amygdala, anterior cingulate, insula) from the PET imaging data. Given the presence of multiple independent and dependent variables, we used canonical correlation analysis (CCA) to evaluate multivariate associations between learning-based decision making and dopamine function controlling for age. Decomposition of the first dimension (r = .76) revealed that the strongest associations were between measures of choice inflexibility, incorrect choice, optimism, amygdala binding potential, and age. Follow-up univariate analyses revealed that amygdala binding potential and age were both independently associated with choice inflexibility. The findings reveal latent associations between baseline neural and behavioral measures suggesting that individual differences in dopamine function may be associated with learning-based financial risk taking in healthy adults.



2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Olschewski ◽  
Marius Dietsch ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig

When deciding for others based on explicitly described odds and outcomes, people often havedifferent risk preferences for others than for themselves. In two pre-registered experiments, we examine risk preference for others where people learn about the odds and outcomes by experiencing them through sampling. In both experiments, on average, people were more risk averse for others than for themselves, but only when the risky option had a higher expected value. Furthermore, based on a separate set of choices, we classified people as pro- or anti- social. Only those people classified as anti-social were more risk averse for others, whereas those classified as prosocial chose similarly for themselves and others. When the uncertainty was removed, however, all participants exhibited less anti-social behavior. Together, these results suggest that anti-social motives contribute to the observed limited risk-taking for others and that outcome uncertainty facilitates the expression of these motives.



2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory R. Samanez-Larkin ◽  
Anthony D. Wagner ◽  
Brian Knutson


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. e0245969
Author(s):  
Inkyung Park ◽  
Paul D. Windschitl ◽  
Andrew R. Smith ◽  
Shanon Rule ◽  
Aaron M. Scherer ◽  
...  

When making decisions involving risk, people may learn about the risk from descriptions or from experience. The description-experience gap refers to the difference in decision patterns driven by this discrepancy in learning format. Across two experiments, we investigated whether learning from description versus experience differentially affects the direction and the magnitude of a context effect in risky decision making. In Study 1 and 2, a computerized game called the Decisions about Risk Task (DART) was used to measure people’s risk-taking tendencies toward hazard stimuli that exploded probabilistically. The rate at which a context hazard caused harm was manipulated, while the rate at which a focal hazard caused harm was held constant. The format by which this information was learned was also manipulated; it was learned primarily by experience or by description. The results revealed that participants’ behavior toward the focal hazard varied depending on what they had learned about the context hazard. Specifically, there were contrast effects in which participants were more likely to choose a risky behavior toward the focal hazard when the harm rate posed by the context hazard was high rather than low. Critically, these contrast effects were of similar strength irrespective of whether the risk information was learned from experience or description. Participants’ verbal assessments of risk likelihood also showed contrast effects, irrespective of learning format. Although risk information about a context hazard in DART does nothing to affect the objective expected value of risky versus safe behaviors toward focal hazards, it did affect participants’ perceptions and behaviors—regardless of whether the information was learned from description or experience. Our findings suggest that context has a broad-based role in how people assess and make decisions about hazards.



2010 ◽  
Vol 44 (10) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
PATRICE WENDLING
Keyword(s):  


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