Process Theory

Author(s):  
Martha García-Murillo ◽  
Ezgi Nur Gozen

Because the IS field is grounded in its applications to organizations, the challenge is to develop a coherent theoretical body of scholarly research, while also remaining relevant to the needs of the practitioner community. In this effort, the purpose of this chapter is to provide scholars with a general understanding of process theories and a taxonomy to provide some direction about how to make contributions to the theoretical legacy, particularly through often-ignored process theories, which are also relevant to practice.

Author(s):  
Haekyung Rhee

Motivation theories have been classified into process theory and content theory in the literature. The effectiveness of each of them has been dealt with only in the textbooks and they were not experimented to see their applicability in the real workplace environment. In this essay, to observe this sort of applicability we resort to well known Working Stiff Workplace Diaries in order to find out how WSDs as a grass root type of employees’ sentiment and morale assert which particular one of the two major motivation theories. The whole ten diaries supplied by the Weblab were taken into the experiment. The methodology we have taken is that we measured the affinity of each of diaries to the two categories of motivation theories, that is, process theory and content theory. As a result, WSDs are found to be supportive towards content theory more than towards process theory. This shows that content theory prevails over process theory in the real workplace environment. Thus it seems to me that the issue such as whether process theories are superior to content theories must be reviewed and judged for its validity against these sort of real-world stories on experiences of real-world workforces. Otherwise, the discussion of the issue might result in of no use, since there would be lack or short of real world evidences of vindication.


2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans

AbstractThis excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.


Author(s):  
Phil Dowe

If the core idea of process theories of causation is that causation can be understood in terms of causal processes and interactions, then the approach should be attributed primarily to Wesley Salmon (1925–2001). Salmon takes causal processes and interactions as more fundamental than causal relations between events. To express this Salmon liked to quote John Venn: ‘Substitute for the time honoured “chain of causation”, so often introduced into discussions upon this subject, the phrase a “rope of causation”, and see what a very different aspect the question will wear’. According to the process theory, any facts about causation as a relation between events obtain only on account of more basic facts about causal processes and interactions. Causal processes are the world-lines of objects, exhibiting some characteristic essential for causation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda A. W. Brakel ◽  
Howard Shevrin

In this commentary on Stanovich & West (S&W) we call attention to two points: (1) Freud's original dual process theory, which antedates others by some seventy-five years, deserves inclusion in any consideration of dual process theories. His concepts of primary and secondary processes (Systems 1 and 2, respectively) anticipate significant aspects of current dual process theories and provide an explanation for many of their characteristics. (2) System 1 is neither rational nor irrational, but instead a-rational. Nevertheless, both the a-rational System 1 and the rational System 2 can each have different roles in enhancing evolutionary fitness. Lastly, System 1 operations are incorrectly deemed “rational” whenever they increase evolutionary fitness.


Author(s):  
Kalle Lyytinen ◽  
Thomas Keil ◽  
Vladislav Fomin

Standards have become critical to information and communication technologies (ICTs) as they become complex and pervasive. We propose a process theory framework to explain anticipatory standardizing outcomes post hoc when the standardizing process is viewed as networks of events. Anticipatory standards define future capabilities for ICT ex ante in contrast to ex post standardizing existing practices or capabilities through de facto standardization in the market. The theoretical framework offers the following: a) a lexicon in the form of the ontology and typology of standardizing events; b) a grammar, or a set of combination rules, for standardizing events to build process representations; c) an analysis and appreciation of contexts in which standardizing unfolds; and d) logic yielding theoretical explanations of standardizing outcomes based on the analysis of process representations. We show how the framework can help analyze standardization data as networks of events as well as explain standardizing outcomes. We illustrate the plausibility of the approach by applying it to wireless standardization to explain standardizing outcomes.


Author(s):  
Kalle Lyytinen ◽  
Thomas Keil ◽  
Vladislav Fomin

Standards have become critical to information and communication technologies (ICTs) as they become complex and pervasive. We propose a process theory framework to explain anticipatory standardizing outcomes post hoc when the standardizing process is viewed as networks of events. Anticipatory standards define future capabilities for ICT ex ante in contrast to ex post standardizing existing practices or capabilities through de facto standardization in the market. The theoretical framework offers the following: a) a lexicon in the form of the ontology and typology of standardizing events; b) a grammar, or a set of combination rules, for standardizing events to build process representations; c) an analysis and appreciation of contexts in which standardizing unfolds; and d) logic yielding theoretical explanations of standardizing outcomes based on the analysis of process representations. We show how the framework can help analyze standardization data as networks of events as well as explain standardizing outcomes. We illustrate the plausibility of the approach by applying it to wireless standardization to explain standardizing outcomes.


Author(s):  
Philip Cash ◽  
Jaap Daalhuizen ◽  
Dagny Valgeirsdottir ◽  
Robin Van Oorschot

AbstractDesign research faces a critical 'impact gap' where the potential for scientific and practical impact is yet to be fully realised. A key means of bridging this gap is the adoption of fundamental theory from other fields to support clarification and synergy in design research. In this paper we examine one of the main candidates for adoption: dual-process theory of cognition. Cognition forms a common element across much of the design literature and leads to fundamental dual-process theories of reasoning. While dual- process theory has started to be recognised in design research, its widespread recognition and potential utility have not been widely explored. Following a conceptual theory development approach we identify and logically describe interactions between dual-process theory and design research. We conclude the paper with a proposition of a design research framework with a core rooted in dual-process theory, and based on this, an agenda for theory-driven design research. This contributes to the debate on how to improve impact, and theoretical and scientific rigour in design research, and provides a concrete agenda for discussion and development within the community.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina G. Vilas ◽  
Lucia Melloni

Abstract To become a unifying theory of brain function, predictive processing (PP) must accommodate its rich representational diversity. Gilead et al. claim such diversity requires a multi-process theory, and thus is out of reach for PP, which postulates a universal canonical computation. We contend this argument and instead propose that PP fails to account for the experiential level of representations.


1994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Toppino ◽  
Lance C. Bloom

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