Kyoto School

Author(s):  
J.W. Heisig

The Kyoto school of philosophy pivots around three twentieth-century Japanese thinkers who held chairs of philosophy or religion at Kyoto University: Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) and Nishitani Keiji (1900–91). Its principal living representatives, who also held chairs at Kyoto until their retirement, are Takeuchi Yoshinori (1913–) and Ueda Shizuteru (1926–). The keynote of the school was struck by Nishida in his attempt, on the one hand, to offer a distinctively Eastern contribution to the Western philosophical tradition by bringing key Buddhist concepts to bear on traditional philosophical questions, and on the other, to enrich Buddhist self-understanding by submitting it to the rigours of European philosophy. The name ‘Kyoto school’ was coined in 1932 by the Marxist philosopher Tosaka Jun (1900–45) to denounce what he saw as a bourgeois ideology – which he characterized as ‘hermeneutical, transhistorical, formalistic, romantic, and phenomenological’ – that had grown up around Nishida, Tanabe and their immediate disciples at the time. These latter included Miki Kiyoshi (1897–1945), Kosaka Masaaki (1900–69) and Koyama Iwao (1905–93) as well as the young Nishitani. At the time the Japanese state had taken its first definitive steps in the direction of a militaristic nationalism that would involve it in the ‘fifteen-year war’ with Asia and finally the West over the period 1930–45. As the leading philosophical movement in Japan, the Kyoto school was caught up in this history, although there was little unanimity among the responses of the principal figures. Postwar criticisms and purges of the Japanese intelligentsia attached a certain stigma to the school’s name, but later and more studied examination of those events, as well as the enthusiastic reception of translations of their works into Western languages, has done much to ensure a more balanced appraisal. Today, the philosophy of the Kyoto-school thinkers is recognized as an important contribution to the history of world philosophy whose ‘nationalistic’ elements are best recognized as secondary, or at least as an unnecessary trivialization of its fundamental inspirations. As a school of thought, the common defining characteristics of the Kyoto school may be seen in an overlap of four nodal concerns: self-awareness, the logic of affirmation-in-negation, absolute nothingness and historicity.

Author(s):  
Robert Chia

Nishida Kitarō, the most significant and influential Japanese philosopher of the twentieth century, was the founder of the Kyoto School of Philosophy which focuses on the notion of pure experience or absolute nothingness. According to this worldview, the existence of social entities such as individuals, organizations, and societies is preceded by actions, relations, and experiences. Nishida’s work contributed to the emergence of a unique Japanese philosophy that combines Anglo-European philosophy with ancient Asian sources of thought such as Zen Buddhism and the philosophy of Lao Tzu. His thinking has profound implications for contemporary process organizational theorizing and especially for a revised comprehension of consciousness, self, world, and organization that is compatible with process philosophy. This chapter examines Nishida’s Zen-based philosophy and its relevance to self and process in organization studies.


1997 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Thomas

I am grateful to Håkan Karlsson for his thoughtful commentary on some of the issues concerning Heidegger and archaeology which were raised in a previous issue of this journal, and find myself fascinated by his project of a ‘contemplative archaeology’. However, one or two points of clarification could be made in relation to Karlsson's contribution. Firstly, as a number of authors have pointed out (e.g. Anderson 1966, 20; Olafson 1993), the gulf between Heidegger's early work and that which followed the Kehre may have been more apparent than real. While his focus may have shifted from the Being of one particular kind of being (Dasein) to a history of Being (Dreyfus 1992), the continuities in his thought are more striking. Throughout his career, Heidegger was concerned with the category of Being, and the way in which it had been passed over by the western philosophical tradition. It is important to note that in Being and time the analysis of Dasein essentially serves as an heuristic: the intention is to move from an understanding of the Being of one kind of being to that of Being in general. What complicates the issue is the very unusual structure of this specific kind of being, for Heidegger did not choose to begin his analysis with the Being of shoes or stones, but with a kind of creature which has a unique relationship with all other worldly entities. ‘Dasein’ serves as a kind of code for ‘human being’ which enables Heidegger to talk about the way in which human beings exist on earth, rather than becoming entangled in biological or psychological definitions of humanity. In this formulations, what is distinctive about human beings is that their own existence is an issue for them; Dasein cares, and this caring is fundamentally temporal.


Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 46-59
Author(s):  
Rita Šerpytytė

Straipsnio tikslas yra atskleisti Vakarų filosofijos tradicijoje savitai įsitvirtinusios patyrimo struktūros, įvardijamos pakartojimu, nihilistinę prasmę. Šioje hermeneutinėje analizėje, viena vertus, re­miamasi tam tikra nihilizmo samprata, numatančia du nihilizmo teorinius modelius – nihilizmą, parem­tą Überwindung teorija, ir nihilizmą, paremtą différance idėja. Kita vertus, remiamasi tam tikru („onto-teologiniu“) pretekstu Vakarų mąstymo tradicijoje atpažįstant pakartojimo struktūrą – Pauliaus Laiško efeziečiams Ef. I, 10 teksto fragmentu, laikomu paradigmine pakartojimo struktūros išsklaida. Herme­neutinė analizė projektuojama į Kierkegaardo ir Agambeno filosofiją, atskirus jų mąstyme atpažįstamus pakartojimo invariantus atskleidžiant kaip minėto Pauliaus Laiško fragmento eksplozijos atvejus. Ke­liamas klausimas, kas yra pakartojimas, kur slypi jo negatyvumas ir kaip pasirodo jo nihilistinė prasmė? Kaip šioje negatyvumo ir nihilizmo atskleistyje „tarpininkauja“ différance? Straipsnyje parodoma, jog skirtis kaip neigimo judesys, atstovaujantis nihilistinei logikai, gali būti traktuojamas ir vien formaliai, ir realiai. Skirties kaip realaus neigimo traktavimas Kierkegaardo ir Agambeno mąstyme atitinka pačios patirties struktūros – pakartojimo – ontologinį (tikrovišką) įšaknytumą.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: pakartojimas, nihilizmas, différance, negatyvumas, laikasPakartojimas ir nihilizmasRita Šerpytytė   AbstractThe purpose of this article is to reveal the nihilistic sense of an experiential structure, which has been distinctively rooted in Western philosophical tradition. On the one hand, this hermeneutical analysis will be based on a certain conception of nihilism presupposing two theoretical models of nihilism – nihilism, which refers to the theory of Überwindung, and nihilism associated with the idea of différance. On the other hand, it builds upon a certain (the so-called “onto-theological”) pretext, which might be used for recognition of the structure of repetition in Western tradition of thinking, – i.e. the fragment of a text from St. Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians Eph. I, 10 – the paradigmatic passage proposing this universal structure of repetition. Focused both on philosophy of Kierkegaard and Agamben, hermeneutical analysis will aim to disclose the separate invariants of such repetition as cases of explosion of the mentioned text fragment. The question is raised – what is repetition? Where does its negativity lie? How does its nihilistic sense appear? How does the différance mediate in this process of revealing of negativity and nihilism? The article argues that difference, as a motion of negation representing nihilistic logic, can be treated both in merely formal and in a realistic way. The treating of différance as real denying in Kierkegaard’s and Agamben’s thinking corresponds to the ontological rootedness of the very structure of experience – repetition.Keywords: repetition, nihilism, différance, negativity, time


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-39
Author(s):  
Krešimir Petković

The author argues that any discourse analysis, as well as other approaches in social sciences and humanities, cannot ultimately avoid the truth and ideology distinction. The first part of the article provides several glimpses at the Western philosophical tradition that preserves the value of truth. In the second part, an idea for political science, grounded in such a history of ideas, is sketched. After a brief discussion of what is ideology as opposed to truth, the author proposes a thesis about ideology, identity and power, and several heuristic ideas how to develop it. In the third part, he briefly provides examples from political and policy analysis that correspond to such a project. In the final part, he explains the importance of preserving the distinction between ideology and truth in the discursively postulated “post-truth” era. This combination of epistemology, science, analysis and teleology is reflected together in one political area of utmost importance for political science operating in the public sphere: the politics of naming.


Hypatia ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 768-783
Author(s):  
Victoria Rimell

This article takes as its stimulus Adriana Cavarero's recent investigation of the postures of rectitude and inclination in the Western philosophical tradition (Cavarero 2013). To showcase how this book might catalyze productive interactions between feminist critics in different areas of the humanities, I will bring Cavarero into dialogue with a thinker she mentions in passing who extensively develops “rectitude as a general principle” (Veyne 2003): Seneca. I argue that a gendered ontology of rectitude is increasingly put under pressure and transformed in Seneca'sEpistles, and propose that the letters are a laboratory for developing a new model of inclination that arises from an urgent need to confront the consequences of political impotence and threats to bodily integrity for Roman aristocratic manhood in the 60sce. The playful, densely literaryEpistlesoffer multiple points of contact with Cavarero's own philosophical strategies, and emerge as a highly stimulating text for feminist thinkers interested in the ethical and political implications of acknowledging vulnerability. Reading Seneca alongside Cavarero reminds us that such investigations have a (tortuous, buried) history in Roman antiquity whose recovery is itself politically significant.


Japanese philosophy is now a flourishing field with thriving societies, journals, and conferences dedicated to it around the world, made possible by an ever-increasing library of translations, books, and articles. The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Philosophy is a foundation-laying reference work that covers, in detail and depth, the entire span of this philosophical tradition, from ancient times to the present. It introduces and examines the most important topics, figures, schools, and texts from the history of philosophical thinking in premodern and modern Japan. Each chapter, written by a leading scholar in the field, clearly elucidates and critically engages with its topic in a manner that demonstrates its contemporary philosophical relevance. The Handbook opens with an extensive introductory chapter that addresses the multifaceted question, “What Is Japanese Philosophy?” The first fourteen chapters cover the premodern history of Japanese philosophy, with sections dedicated to Shintō and the Synthetic Nature of Japanese Philosophical Thought, Philosophies of Japanese Buddhism, and Philosophies of Japanese Confucianism and Bushidō. Next, seventeen chapters are devoted to Modern Japanese Philosophies. After a chapter on the initial encounter with and appropriation of Western philosophy in the late nineteenth-century, this large section is divided into one subsection on the most well-known group of twentieth-century Japanese philosophers, The Kyoto School, and a second subsection on the no less significant array of Other Modern Japanese Philosophies. Rounding out the volume is a section on Pervasive Topics in Japanese Philosophical Thought, which covers areas such as philosophy of language, philosophy of nature, ethics, and aesthetics, spanning a range of schools and time periods. This volume will be an invaluable resource specifically to students and scholars of Japanese philosophy, as well as more generally to those interested in Asian and comparative philosophy and East Asian studies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-103
Author(s):  
Michael Schmitz

AbstractIn this paper I first introduce Tomasello’s notion of thought and his account of its emergence and development through differentiation, arguing that it calls into question the theory bias of the philosophical tradition on thought as well as its frequent atomism. I then raise some worries that he may be overextending the concept of thought, arguing that we should recognize an area of intentionality intermediate between action and perception on the one hand and thought on the other. After that I argue that the co-operative nature of humans is reflected in the very structure of their intentionality and thought: in co-operative modes such as the mode of joint attention and action and the we-mode, they experience and represent others as co-subjects of joint relations to situations in the world rather than as mere objects. In conclusion, I briefly comment on what Tomasello refers to as one of two big open questions in the theory of collective intentionality, namely that of the irreducibility of jointness.


Author(s):  
Makoto Ozaki

Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), another pole of the so-called Kyoto-School of Philosophy of modern Japan, attempts to construct a dialectical, triadic logic of genus, species and individual as a creative synthesis between Eastern and Western philosophy. Although the formal pattern of his method is influenced by the Hegelian dialectic, the way of his thinking is rather prevailed by Kantian dualism. This makes a sharp contrast to his mentor Nishida Kitaro, whose logic of Topos or Place qua Absolute Nothingness is criticized as all-embracing and static in character by him. The difference between them might be parallel to that of Greek and Latin theology concerning the Trinity. Tanabe never presupposes any preexistent entity as the primordial One in the eternal dimension, but rather maintains the individuality as the free subjective agent in the field of history. The dichotomy between the universal and the individual is overcome in and through the mediation of the third term— the species — as the negatively self-realized, specific form of the genus. The species, however, turns out to be the self-estrangement, when it loses the perpetually negative mediation of the free subjective activity of the individual.


Author(s):  
Réka Kiss

"In my study, I am examining a significant step in the history of the national Re-formed press between the two world wars, i.e., the weekly paper Református Figyelő (1928–1933). It is well known that the interwar period which was also called a “religious renaissance” or the “period of the second confessionalization”, is considered to be a period of renewal of religious and ecclesiastical life, deepening of faith and strengthening of denominational identity for each historical church. My study approaches the issue of church press between the two world wars from the perspective of the process of community identity building of the Hungari-an Reformed people. On the one hand, I am looking for an answer to how the con-tent of the Reformed identity changed during the century, which were the defining phenomena, historical experiences that decisively influenced the Reformed self-awareness, which were its main problems, the central topics of church public dis-course. On the other hand, my research focuses on the role of the ecclesiastical press in shaping public discourses, in building identity, the way its organizational back-ground and internal system of relations developed. Keywords: religious ideintity, Reformed Church, interwar period, church press, Ravasz László. "


2008 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 5-13
Author(s):  
William McNeill ◽  

The present paper remains modest in its scope: It seeks only to undertake some exploratory and preparatory investigations with a view to addressing a more difficult and far-reaching question. The issue, in brief, is the following: In the 1920s, Heidegger engages in an incisive and comprehensive critique of techn!, which I shall render here as “production” or “productive comportment,” arguing that it furnishes the foundation and horizon for Greek ontology, and by extension for the entire Western philosophical tradition, a horizon that is problematically reductive because the ontology it gives rise to understands the Being of beings in general in terms of independent presence-at-hand, the appropriate mode of access to which is theoretical apprehension. Not only philosophy and ontology, but science and its outgrowth, modern technicity—itself a monstrous transformation of techn!—would be an almost inexorable consequence of this fateful Greek beginning. The project of a “destructuring of the history of ontology” announced in Being and Time would seek to retrieve and to open up an entirely other dimension of Being, a dimension foreclosed by the Greek beginning and yet awaiting us precisely as the unthought of that beginning and the tradition to which it gave rise. The destructuring would take as its guiding thread an understanding of the Being of Dasein—designating the being that we ourselves in each case are—as radically temporal, never simply present-at-hand, and essentially inaccessible to theoretical apprehension. Yet the critical resource for this analytic of the Being of Dasein was, for the early Heidegger, itself provided by Greek philosophy: It was Aristotle’s insight into the Being of the human being as praxis, and its authentic mode of self-disclosure, phron!sis, that led Heidegger to see the radically different kind of temporality pertaining to human existence, by contrast with the theoretically ascertained time of nature as something present-at-hand, and provided a key insight into the essence of “truth” (aletheia) as unconcealment. Aristotle’s insight into this more primordial sense of aletheia or “truth” as the knowing self-disclosure of our radically temporal Being-in-the-world as praxis, as opposed to truth conceived as a property of logos, judgment, or theoretical knowledge, was a forgotten thread of Greek philosophy that could shed light upon the limits and foundations of the theoretical tradition that dominates the subsequent history of ontology.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document