The Case of the Ubiquitous Chief of Staff: How a Job Invented by and Once Confined to the Military Escaped Its Uniformed Existence and Is Now Commonly Found in Government and Corporate Offices

Author(s):  
Philip Roessler ◽  
Harry Verhoeven

This chapter explains how the surging discontent described in the previous chapter morphs into a full-blown crisis. The remarkable expression of elite accommodation between Laurent-Désiré Kabila, Army Chief of Staff James Kabarebe and Joseph Kabila, son of the head of state, protégé of Kabarebe and number two in the military hierarchy, began to unravel in early 1998. As the father–president relentlessly sought to increase his political autonomy, he pursued two policies by stealth that inflamed tensions with the RPF: Katangization—the infiltration of the security services and the state bureaucracy by fellow Katangese—and the courting of new allies, not least Tanzania which gave him a bodyguard to replace his Rwandese minders and which sent troops to secretly train a parallel army in Katanga. Relations between the comrades became so poisoned that even Council of Ministers' meetings were preceded by arms searches.


1974 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 148-155
Author(s):  
David S. G. Goodman

William Parish in “Factions in Chinese Military Politics,” ( The China Quarterly, No. 56, p. 667) argues that military factions only assumed political importance during the Cultural Revolution. Part of this argument is based on the claim that Yang Ch'eng-wu, when acting chief of staff and secretary-general of the Central Committee's Military Affairs Committee, attempted to influence the appointment of PLA cadres to provincial revolutionary committees in favour of the 5th Field Army. This influence, he demonstrates, by considering the distribution of PLA cadres with known Field Army affiliations on two groups of provincial revolutionary committees: those formed before and those formed after 8 March 1968 – the date of Yang's last public appearance. Parish argues that a significantly greater proportion of military cadres with a 5th Field Army background were appointed to those Provincial Revolutionary Committees formed before 8 March 1968, than one would have expected given the distribution of such cadres in military posts in 1966. Since he had previously argued that military appointments before 1967 were made without reference to Field Army affiliations, he concludes that Yang was engaged in factional politics. However, Parish's account of Yang Ch'engwu's activities is very much open to question on the grounds that the available evidence suggests that most military appointments to the leading positions (i.e. chairman or vice-chairman) on Provincial-level Revolutionary Committees were determined well before the formal establishment of these institutions and before Yang's dismissal.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 86-95
Author(s):  
С. П. Донченко

The whole period of the Soviet Union’s existence and the first years of independence of Ukraine didnot write and talked about the military conflict in the winter of 1939–1940. The reason for the strategicdefeat of the huge Soviet Union in the war with a small Finland. In the Soviet Union, they tried to createsuch a notion as the «Soviet people,» the relocation and mixing of a large number of people throughout thespace of the USSR. Therefore, no one has ever defined participants in events by nationality or territoriallocation. Ukrainians also did not stand out. It was only when Ukraine became independent that therewas a need to determine the participation of Ukrainians in the Soviet-Finnish war and their role. Duringthe Soviet-Finnish war, the North-West front was commanded by the future Marshal and Hero of theSoviet Union, Ukrainian Timoshenko Semyon Konstantinovich. Future Marshal and Hero of the SovietUnion, Ukrainian Kulik Grigory Ivanovich, as Deputy People’s Commissar for Defense of the USSR,participated in the preparation of Army and Artillery Parts for the Soviet-Finnish War. The commanderof the 70th division was Ukrainian Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich. Participated in the combat operations ofthe pilot-as and Hero of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian Kravchenko Grigory Panteleevich. Future Marshaland Hero of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian, Moskalenko Kirill Semenovich, during the Soviet-FinnishWar, was the head of the artillery 51st Perekopskaya Rifle Division of the Odessa Military District. Thefuture Colonel-General of the Tank Army and Hero of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian Kravchenko AndriyGrigorievich, during the war, was Chief of Staff of the 173th Motorized Infantry Division. In the threemonth conflict, nearly 40,000 Ukrainians died. Among those who fought in this war and received thehighest award – the Order of Lenin – Vasyl Petrenko from Poltava region. On the side of the USSR twodivisions participated in the war, which were completed in Ukraine. These are the 44th and 70th InfantryDivisions. The first of them fell into the environment and almost all died, trying to break away from theFinnish ring. Those who escaped were subjected to a martial law court. Division commander, chief ofstaff, chief of the police department and commissar were shot. In general, several thousand participantsin this war suffered repressions. Instructive that the Finnish side arranged the graves of the dead Sovietsoldiers. The city of Suomussalmi has a monument to the soldiers of the 44th Division, at the time whenthe names of the heroes were for gotten in the homeland.


1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-498
Author(s):  
John D. Millett

Interestingly enough, in the extensive consideration given to War Department reorganization immediately after World War I, almost no attention was paid to the possible value of the S.O.S., A.E.F., experience. Three thousand miles behind the A.E.F., in Washington, it may have seemed that there was little to distinguish between the Services of Supply and the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the General Staff with its accumulation of hostile reaction.In August, 1919, the General Staff of the War Department presented its version of desirable legislation for the reconstitution of a peace-time Army. The measure provided for a General Staff Corps to consist of a Chief of Staff with the rank of General, five assistants to be detailed from the general officers of the line, five Brigadier Generals, and 220 other officers. The bill provided that the Chief of Staff should have “supervision of all agencies and functions of the military establishment” under the direction of the President or the Secretary of War; and it went on to provide that “the Chief of Staff shall be the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and shall be charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the war program.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 89-114
Author(s):  
Alan Sked

The purpose of this articleis to clarify the relative roles of Austria and Prussia during the Wars of Liberation of 1813 and 1814. It uses the very latest research concerning the military strategy adopted and emphasizes the input of Radetzky, using his handwritten account of the campaign, a document previously ignored by historians, despite the general's position as chief of staff of the allied coalition. The fact is that Anglo-American historians have failed to investigate the politics of the military alliance of 1813–1814 that constituted the Fourth Coalition. Myself apart, the only historian to examine that alliance with any regard to the Austrian viewpoint has been Gordon A. Craig in a brief but excellent analysis published as long ago as 1966. German historians have done little better. They simply neglect the Austrian archives.


2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 300-302
Author(s):  
Simona Sharoni

Israel's May 1999 elections featured three newly retired generals, including Ehud Barak, a former chief of staff who was elected prime minister. There was consensus among most political analysts that Barak was elected primarily because of his military background. Moreover, a wellorchestrated public-relations campaign presented Barak as the most likely candidate to revive the peace process that his military commander, Yitzhak Rabin, had started. Few questioned, however, that military credentials have become almost a prerequisite to holding political office in Israel or that someone who devoted most of his life to war-making is indeed the best person to lead a peacemaking process. It would be quite difficult to understand the centrality of the military in Israeli politics, as in almost any other sphere of life, without paying close attention to the processes and practices that have shaped Israeli militarism over time. By providing readers with both the historical context and the socio-political background, Uri Ben-Eliezer's The Making of Israeli Militarism enables us to come to terms with how the “military way,” as he refers to it, came to dominate Israeli politics in general and its relationships with its neighbors in particular.


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