scholarly journals A Phenomenological Perspective On Feminist Critique Of Reason

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Hafiz Syed Husain ◽  
Mustafa Hyder ◽  
Mariam Sultana

This study expounds a phenomenological perspective on feminist critique of reason. Following the lead of Nagl-Docekal, a hypothesis is reached by which a possibility is recognized that the feminist argument which is founded on gendering the unity of reason is mistaken. This gendering ultimately results in identifying the traditional manifestations of reason as a structure of oppressive power dynamics which feminist philosophy deems masculine. Although, this investigation admits that some of the main premises of feminist argument are supported by evidence, however, the main contention is that its conclusion is problematic. A phenomenology of reason is proposed, after Edmund Husserl‟s transcendental phenomenology, with the intention of providing support for the validity of hypothesis and offer better prospects for a critique of reason. Furthermore, It is also argued that phenomenology of reason so outlined already incorporates the valid aspects of feminist critique of reason. The methodology of this investigation is comparative-analytic. The purpose of this study is to provide a philosophical foundation for feminist critique of reason which is aimed at unmasking the illicit pretensions of the oppressive dynamics exhibited in the name of reason.

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Syed Hussain ◽  
Mustafa Hyder ◽  
Mariam Sultana

This study expounds a phenomenological perspective on feminist critique of reason. Following the lead of Nagl-Docekal, a hypothesis is reached by which a possibility is recognized that the feminist argument which is founded ongendering the unity of reasonis mistaken.This gendering ultimately results in identifying the traditional manifestations of reason as a structure of oppressive power dynamics which feminist philosophy deems masculine. Although, this investigation admits that some of the main premises of feminist argument are supported by evidence, however, themain contention is that its conclusion is problematic. A phenomenology of reason is proposed, after Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology,with the intention of providingsupport for the validity of hypothesis and offer betterprospects for a critique of reason. Furthermore,It is also argued that phenomenology of reason so outlined already incorporates the valid aspects of feminist critique of reason. The methodology of this investigation is comparative-analytic.The purpose of this study is to provide a philosophical foundation for feminist critique of reason which is aimed at unmasking the illicit pretensions of the oppressive dynamics exhibited in the name of reason.


Author(s):  
Julio Quesada

Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy?


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-141
Author(s):  
Marlin Tolla

Phenomenological perspective is one of the approaches in archaeology especially applies to the use of sensory experiences of the past peoples through material cultures. Phenomenological approaches is based of some German philosopher such as Edmund Husserl, MartinHeidegger which put their attention to perceptions and knowledge which are based on experience of daily lives. Phenomenological approach have been produces a great impact through some works of archaeologist especialy from the group of Post-Procesualist such as Christian Tilley and others in attempt to interpretated the landscape phenomenon in Britain archaeological sites. In relations with that, the phenomenology approaches will be used to analysed the groups of megaliths chambers in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (northern Germany) according to the cosmological significance.ABSTRAKPenomenologi adalah salah satu pendekatan yang digunakan dalam arkeolologi terutama dalam menganalisa ‘experience’ atau pengalaman manusia pada masa lalu melalui budaya material yang ditinggalkan. Pendekatan ini diadopsi dari filosof Jerman seperti: Edmund Husserl dan Martin Heidegger yang menekankan bahwa esensi dari presepsi manusia adalah terletak pada ‘pengalaman’ yang ditemukan di setiap hari. Pendekatan ini kemudian diadopsi oleh arkeolog terutama yang berasal dari grup Post-prosesualis seperti Christian Tilley dan lainnya terutama dalam menginterpretasikan arkeologi landskap. Merujuk pada hal ini, megalitik di Mecklenburg-Vorpommern diindikasikan sebagai ‘buah’ dari pengalaman oleh manusia pada masa lalu dalam menginterpretasikan alam sekitar mereka terutama dalam hubungannya dengan kosmologi.


Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier

This chapter brings Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose different phenomenological styles are normally opposed, into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that temporality is not a contingent attribute of existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the world, the inside and the outside, sense and non-sense, are interdependent beings. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of time is the problem of the subject's relation to time. The chapter examines how Merleau-Ponty's position in Phenomenology of Perception becomes the intermediary position between, on the one hand, the completion of the tradition and the fulfillment of modernity represented by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the “new beginning for thought” that Heidegger wants to promote, insofar as he attempts to assume or take on metaphysics.


Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

Pessoa’s technique of lucid analytical self-simulation comprises a new methodology in the philosophy of mind, one which I will call—in deliberate contrast to the empirical and transcendental phenomenology of his contemporary Edmund Husserl, of whose work he appears to have been unaware—an ‘analytical phenomenology’. The method of an analytical phenomenology has two components. The first element is to simulate, in a guided or directed manner, a sensorium. Pessoa has a technical term for such acts of simulation, ‘dreaming’, his use of the term not confined to actual dreaming but to the controlled and lucid simulation in wakeful consciousness of a sensorium. The Pessoan concept of ‘dreaming’ is closely related to what has more recently been called ‘enactive imagination’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-176
Author(s):  
Mariusz Moryń

Phenomenology was founded by Edmund Husserl and developed by the followers like Max Scheler. It is the most important philosophical system of the 20th Century. Phenomenology, in Husserl’s conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection and analysis of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. In its basic form phenomenology is the method of describing of the reality devoid of any assumptions and in consequence the key concepts in Husserl’s theory are notion of the pure consciousness and theory of transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenology thus attempts to create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective that is: consciousness and the content of conscious experiences such as judgements, perceptions and emotions.


Husserl ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
John J. Drummond ◽  
Otfried Höffe

Edmund Husserl, generally regarded as the founding figure of the philosophical movement of phenomenology—or, more precisely, transcendental phenomenology—exerted an enormous influence on the course of twentieth-and twenty-first-century philosophy. This influence was both positive and negative. The subsequent developments of, for example, existentialism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction were defined in part by how they both assimilated and departed from Husserlian views. The course of what has come to be called “continental philosophy” cannot be described without reference to this assimilation and departure and, among the many successor approaches, phenomenology remains a viable alternative. In addition, problems addressed by Husserl—most notably, intentionality, consciousness, the emotions, and ethics—are of central concern in so-called analytic philosophy. So, Husserl’s views remain central to many contemporary philosophical discussions....


2019 ◽  
pp. 143-169
Author(s):  
David Clarke

This chapter explores the intersection of music and phenomenology as potentially fertile ground for the study of consciousness. Taking the philosophy of Edmund Husserl as a touchstone, and the Violin Concerto, Op. 47 of Jean Sibelius as a case study, the chapter considers how phenomenological concepts such as epoché, noesis, eidos, and the transcendental subject all find resonances within a formal analysis of this musical work. The chapter also juxtaposes Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and his critique of the ‘natural attitude’ against Daniel Dennett’s physicalist account of consciousness and Wilfrid Sellars’ concept of the ‘scientific image’. In negotiating a pathway between these positions, the chapter considers whether music—and its determination of an autonomous aesthetic sphere—may offer a productive alternative perspective to the often competing claims of philosophy and science in our understanding of consciousness.


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Khristos Nizamis

Investigating the P?li suttas, compiled prior to the development of Abhidhamma, from a phenomenological perspective reveals an internally coherent and consistent doctrine/theory whose crucial theme is the intentionality and subjectivity of consciousness. Reductive interpretations tend to interpret the basic Buddhist principle of ‘non-self ’, and its correlative repudiation of the concept/conceit ‘I am’, as entailing a rejection of any genuine (phenomenological) meaningfulness for the term ‘I’ as a legitimate expression of subjectivity, intentionality, and consciousness. Indeed, it is occasionally even claimed that Buddhas and Arahants cannot possess subjective intentional consciousness at all. In the following reflections, then, a few key aspects of an alternative (phenomenological) perspective upon early P?li Buddhism are introduced and sketched out, whereby it is argued that the presence of subjective intentional consciousness, even in the case of Buddhas and Arahants, is not only presupposed by the suttas, and is not only quite unproblematic for early Buddhist doctrine/theory, but is also actually of fundamental importance for the very possibility of Buddhist truth and practice. Thus, early Buddhist doctrine/theory is not only non-reductive; it also eminently invites a deep dialogue with, and a serious and detailed interpretation from the perspective of, Transcendental Phenomenology.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document