Simulating Subjectivity

Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

Pessoa’s technique of lucid analytical self-simulation comprises a new methodology in the philosophy of mind, one which I will call—in deliberate contrast to the empirical and transcendental phenomenology of his contemporary Edmund Husserl, of whose work he appears to have been unaware—an ‘analytical phenomenology’. The method of an analytical phenomenology has two components. The first element is to simulate, in a guided or directed manner, a sensorium. Pessoa has a technical term for such acts of simulation, ‘dreaming’, his use of the term not confined to actual dreaming but to the controlled and lucid simulation in wakeful consciousness of a sensorium. The Pessoan concept of ‘dreaming’ is closely related to what has more recently been called ‘enactive imagination’.

Author(s):  
Julio Quesada

Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy?


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Hafiz Syed Husain ◽  
Mustafa Hyder ◽  
Mariam Sultana

This study expounds a phenomenological perspective on feminist critique of reason. Following the lead of Nagl-Docekal, a hypothesis is reached by which a possibility is recognized that the feminist argument which is founded on gendering the unity of reason is mistaken. This gendering ultimately results in identifying the traditional manifestations of reason as a structure of oppressive power dynamics which feminist philosophy deems masculine. Although, this investigation admits that some of the main premises of feminist argument are supported by evidence, however, the main contention is that its conclusion is problematic. A phenomenology of reason is proposed, after Edmund Husserl‟s transcendental phenomenology, with the intention of providing support for the validity of hypothesis and offer better prospects for a critique of reason. Furthermore, It is also argued that phenomenology of reason so outlined already incorporates the valid aspects of feminist critique of reason. The methodology of this investigation is comparative-analytic. The purpose of this study is to provide a philosophical foundation for feminist critique of reason which is aimed at unmasking the illicit pretensions of the oppressive dynamics exhibited in the name of reason.


Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier

This chapter brings Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose different phenomenological styles are normally opposed, into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that temporality is not a contingent attribute of existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the world, the inside and the outside, sense and non-sense, are interdependent beings. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of time is the problem of the subject's relation to time. The chapter examines how Merleau-Ponty's position in Phenomenology of Perception becomes the intermediary position between, on the one hand, the completion of the tradition and the fulfillment of modernity represented by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the “new beginning for thought” that Heidegger wants to promote, insofar as he attempts to assume or take on metaphysics.


Author(s):  
Mark van Atten

L.E.J. Brouwer was a mathematician and philosopher. He graduated from the University of Amsterdam in 1907 and remained there, from 1913 to 1951, as full professor. Brouwer was a founding father of modern topology. In the foundations of mathematics he launched ‘intuitionism’: a mathematical ontology and epistemology, based on a philosophy of mind, that yields a form of constructive mathematics. Although intuitionism was designed as a Kantian approach, Brouwer’s conception of the intuition of time supports a much richer mathematics than Kant’s. Arguably, a closer affinity with Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology transpired as the latter was being developed. A by-product of intuitionism, intuitionistic logic, found application independently of the foundational programme. Intuitionism presented the first full-scale alternative to classical mathematics and logic. Brouwer was also interested in mysticism, and in language reform in the service of spiritual and political progress.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-176
Author(s):  
Mariusz Moryń

Phenomenology was founded by Edmund Husserl and developed by the followers like Max Scheler. It is the most important philosophical system of the 20th Century. Phenomenology, in Husserl’s conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection and analysis of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. In its basic form phenomenology is the method of describing of the reality devoid of any assumptions and in consequence the key concepts in Husserl’s theory are notion of the pure consciousness and theory of transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenology thus attempts to create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective that is: consciousness and the content of conscious experiences such as judgements, perceptions and emotions.


Husserl ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
John J. Drummond ◽  
Otfried Höffe

Edmund Husserl, generally regarded as the founding figure of the philosophical movement of phenomenology—or, more precisely, transcendental phenomenology—exerted an enormous influence on the course of twentieth-and twenty-first-century philosophy. This influence was both positive and negative. The subsequent developments of, for example, existentialism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction were defined in part by how they both assimilated and departed from Husserlian views. The course of what has come to be called “continental philosophy” cannot be described without reference to this assimilation and departure and, among the many successor approaches, phenomenology remains a viable alternative. In addition, problems addressed by Husserl—most notably, intentionality, consciousness, the emotions, and ethics—are of central concern in so-called analytic philosophy. So, Husserl’s views remain central to many contemporary philosophical discussions....


Author(s):  
Hanne Jacobs

Phenomenology is an approach to consciousness that originates at the beginning of the twentieth century in the work of Edmund Husserl. A phenomenological account of consciousness begins from a first-person reflection on consciousness that puts out of play our everyday or natural-scientific preconceptions about consciousness and the world and describes the structural features of our consciousness of the world. This project is carried on in the phenomenological works of authors such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, albeit with sometimes quite different emphases and aims. Insofar as phenomenology describes the structures of consciousness by virtue of which there is a world for us, phenomenology is a form of transcendental philosophy. Specifically, phenomenologists describe how the structures of intentionality, self-awareness, temporality, attention, embodiment, and intersubjectivity make possible our consciousness of worldly things, situations, and events. According to them, the world is not just an objective nature comprised of spatiotemporally extended and causally connected things; it is also always an intersubjectively accessible world that is shot through with values and organized in light of practical projects, due to which the world appears with a significance that is variable across time and space. Husserl maintains that phenomenological descriptions of the essential structures of consciousness that make possible the experience and knowledge of the world—that is, of transcendental consciousness—can also be taken as psychological descriptions of consciousness conceived as a natural event in the world. In this way, a number of contemporary philosophers draw on specific descriptive insights from the phenomenological tradition to address issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and drive the empirical investigation of consciousness forward (such as Gallagher and Schmicking 2010; Dahlstrom et al. 2015; Petitot et al. 1999; Thompson 2007; Zahavi and Gallagher 2012; Zahavi 2012). Alternatively, both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty explicitly draw on insights from psychology and psychopathology to inform their phenomenology of consciousness, which is a strategy that has also been employed by some contemporary phenomenologists (see Zahavi 2000).


2019 ◽  
pp. 143-169
Author(s):  
David Clarke

This chapter explores the intersection of music and phenomenology as potentially fertile ground for the study of consciousness. Taking the philosophy of Edmund Husserl as a touchstone, and the Violin Concerto, Op. 47 of Jean Sibelius as a case study, the chapter considers how phenomenological concepts such as epoché, noesis, eidos, and the transcendental subject all find resonances within a formal analysis of this musical work. The chapter also juxtaposes Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and his critique of the ‘natural attitude’ against Daniel Dennett’s physicalist account of consciousness and Wilfrid Sellars’ concept of the ‘scientific image’. In negotiating a pathway between these positions, the chapter considers whether music—and its determination of an autonomous aesthetic sphere—may offer a productive alternative perspective to the often competing claims of philosophy and science in our understanding of consciousness.


2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-138
Author(s):  
Tommy Akira Goto

The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), founding father of Phenomenology, was one of the most prominent thinkers of the 20th century, who not only influenced the philosophical trends of his time but also the sciences in general. Nevertheless, psychology was the science which strongly had direct influence of phenomenology which, in its turn, provided the possibility of developing a phenomenological psychology. The aim of this thesis is to (re)constitute, from a historical-critical point of view, the conception of phenomenological psychology in Husserl’s last work: The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology (Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenchaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie). At present, psychologists are developing a large number of versions of phenomenological psychology, particularly in Brazil; however, none of them have rigorously been based on Husserl’s concepts. Thus, in order to have an understanding of what constitutes to Husserl a phenomenological psychology, we present, to start with, a brief introduction to the transcendental phenomenology, explaining the variations of the phenomenological method (i. e. phenomenological levels). After that, we point out the most meaningful aspects of Husserl’s last piece of writing, concentrating our efforts on the revelation the philosopher makes concerning a crisis of the sciences and of reason, as well as his phenomenological criticism on epistemology of Psychology. At last, following Husserl’s analyses of phenomenology and psychology, we conclude that the conception of phenomenological psychology will constitute a universal science of human beings whose object of study is the animistic being. This science will have basic functions such as: a) the rebuilding of the scientific psychology and the explanation of the psychological concepts; b) the constitution of a universal science of the psychic; c) the description of the intentional experiences and d) be a propaedeutic discipline for the transcendental phenomenology. For Husserl, the authentic and genuine conception of the phenomenological psychology is important to the psychologists since that it is through the development of this discipline that they will recover the subjectivity as the original source of human life and its correlation with the world-life.


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