scholarly journals Fenomenologia

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-176
Author(s):  
Mariusz Moryń

Phenomenology was founded by Edmund Husserl and developed by the followers like Max Scheler. It is the most important philosophical system of the 20th Century. Phenomenology, in Husserl’s conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection and analysis of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. In its basic form phenomenology is the method of describing of the reality devoid of any assumptions and in consequence the key concepts in Husserl’s theory are notion of the pure consciousness and theory of transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenology thus attempts to create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective that is: consciousness and the content of conscious experiences such as judgements, perceptions and emotions.

Retos ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 795-801
Author(s):  
Felipe Nicolás Mujica Johnson

La modernidad nos dejó como legado el descubrimiento de la subjetividad y una concepción mecanicista del cuerpo humano. Así, diferentes filósofos de la escuela fenomenológica han conservado el patrimonio de la subjetividad y han trabajado para superar el dualismo cartesiano. Sin embargo, los avances filosóficos por múltiples razones no siempre fecundan en el campo pedagógico, de modo que es fundamental promover una constante reflexión filosófica en el contexto de la Educación Física. Por esa razón, se ha desarrollado este ensayo que tiene por objetivo analizar la perspectiva del cuerpo humano en la corriente fenomenológica alemana del siglo XX, en concreto, en las ideas de Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler y Edith Stein. Por medio del estudio de sus diferentes obras, se puede mencionar que hay un concepto clave en sus ideas, que es el del cuerpo vivo. Este cuerpo expresaría el espíritu o el sujeto encarnado, que experimenta la realidad a través de su ser psicofísico. Entonces, el ser humano tendría en todas sus experiencias un cuerpo vivo pero, a su vez, también físico o material. Por consiguiente, de este análisis se concluye que para superar la concepción mecanicista del cuerpo en la Educación Física, no es necesario cambiar el nombre a dicha disciplina pedagógica, sino comprender que la materia del ser humano es inseparable de su subjetividad.Abstract: Modernity left us the discovery of subjectivity and a mechanistic conception of the human body as a legacy. Thus, different philosophers of the phenomenological school have preserved the patrimony of subjectivity and have worked to overcome the Cartesian dualism. However, philosophical advances do not always fertilize the pedagogical field for many reasons, so it is essential to promote a constant philosophical reflection in the context of Physical Education. For this reason, this essay has been developed with the aim to analyze the perspective of the human body in the German phenomenological stream of the 20th century, in particular, in the ideas of Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein. Through the study of their different works, it can be mentioned that there is a key concept in their ideas, i.e. the living body. This body would express the spirit or the embodied subject, who experiences reality through his/her psychophysical being. Then, the human being would have, in all his/her experiences, a living body, but also physical or material. Therefore, from this analysis it is concluded that to overcome the mechanistic conception of the body in Physical Education, it is not necessary to change the name of said pedagogical discipline, but to understand that the human being's matter is inseparable from its subjectivity.


2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-102
Author(s):  
Robin Rehm

Kasimir Malewitschs suprematistische Hauptwerke ›Schwarzes Quadrat‹, ›Schwarzer Kreis‹ und ›Schwarzes Kreuz‹ von 1915 setzen sich aus schwarzen Formen auf weißem Grund zusammen. Der Typus des Schwarzweißbildes weist überraschende Parallelen zu den bildlichen Wahrnehmungsinstrumenten auf, die vom ausgehenden 18. bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts in den Experimenten der Farbenlehre, physiologischen Optik und Psychologie verwendet worden sind. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht diese Parallelen in drei Schritten: Zunächst erfolgt eine allgemeine Charakterisierung des Schwarzweißbildes mit Hilfe des Kontrastbegriffs von Edmund Husserl. Des weiteren wird die Entstehung und Funktion des schwarzweißen Kontrastbildes in den Wissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts typologisch herausgearbeitet. Unter Berücksichtigung des Wissensbegriffs von Max Scheler wird abschließend die Spezifik des Wissens eruiert, das die Schwarzweißbilder sowohl in der Malerei Malewitschs als auch in den genannten Wissenschaften generieren. Malevich’s main Suprematist works, such as ›Black Square‹, ›Black Circle‹, and ›Black Cross‹ from 1915, consist of black shapes on white ground. Surprisingly this series of shapes strongly resembles scientific black-and-white images used for research on colour theory, physiological optics, and psychology throughout the 19th century. This paper examines the parallels between Malevich’s paintings and the scientific drawings in three steps: It first characterizes black-and-white images in general, using Edmund Husserl’s definition of the term ›contrast‹. Secondly, the paper investigates the development and function of black-and-white images as tools of perception in the sciences. It finally discusses the specific knowledge generated through Malevich’s art and through scientific black-and-white images, following Max Scheler’s phenomenological identification of knowledge.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Gracia López-Anguita

The aim of this article is to trace the origins of some of the key concepts of Ibn Arabi’s metaphysics and cosmology in earlier Andalusian Sufi masters. Within the context of the seminal works on Ibn Arabi’s cosmology and metaphysics produced from the second half of the 20th century onwards and through a comparison of texts by the Sufi masters Ibn Masarra and Ibn Barrajān, we will see which elements are taken from previous sources and how they are transformed or re-interpreted by Ibn ʿArabī in a philosophical-mystical system that would become the point of reference for the later Eastern and Western Sufi tradition.


Author(s):  
Francesco Galofaro

AbstractThe paper presents a semiotic interpretation of the phenomenological debate on the notion of person, focusing in particular on Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein. The semiotic interpretation lets us identify the categories that orient the debate: collective/individual and subject/object. As we will see, the phenomenological analysis of the relation between person and social units such as the community, the association, and the mass shows similarities to contemporary socio-semiotic models. The difference between community, association, and mass provides an explanation for the establishment of legal systems. The notion of person we inherit from phenomenology can also be useful in facing juridical problems raised by the use of non-human decision-makers such as machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence applications.


Author(s):  
João Carvalho ◽  

This paper presents two different, although related, approaches to the problem of the experience of the other person: E. Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity and E. Levinas’ ethics. I begin by (1) addressing the transcendental significance of the experience of intersubjectivity in the broader context of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. I then turn to (2) Husserl’s solution to the paradox of constituting the alter ego, identifying and elucidating the key‑concepts of his inquiry. I hold that throughout his analysis there is a dominant underlying meaning in which the alterity of the other person is progressively suppressed and, ultimately, elided. Finally, I discuss (3) the consequences of Husserl’s analysis of the other in light of Levinas’ ethics. I hold that Husserl’s claim that there is a fundamental difference between the experience of myself and my analogical experience of the other is the basis upon which Levinas’ develops a new concept of experience, not as perception but as encounter. Upon close reading, I claim that Levinas’ revision of the topic of alterity is, ultimately, a consequence of Husserl’s transcendental analysis of intersubjectivity.


Author(s):  
Julio Quesada

Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy?


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Hafiz Syed Husain ◽  
Mustafa Hyder ◽  
Mariam Sultana

This study expounds a phenomenological perspective on feminist critique of reason. Following the lead of Nagl-Docekal, a hypothesis is reached by which a possibility is recognized that the feminist argument which is founded on gendering the unity of reason is mistaken. This gendering ultimately results in identifying the traditional manifestations of reason as a structure of oppressive power dynamics which feminist philosophy deems masculine. Although, this investigation admits that some of the main premises of feminist argument are supported by evidence, however, the main contention is that its conclusion is problematic. A phenomenology of reason is proposed, after Edmund Husserl‟s transcendental phenomenology, with the intention of providing support for the validity of hypothesis and offer better prospects for a critique of reason. Furthermore, It is also argued that phenomenology of reason so outlined already incorporates the valid aspects of feminist critique of reason. The methodology of this investigation is comparative-analytic. The purpose of this study is to provide a philosophical foundation for feminist critique of reason which is aimed at unmasking the illicit pretensions of the oppressive dynamics exhibited in the name of reason.


Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier

This chapter brings Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose different phenomenological styles are normally opposed, into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that temporality is not a contingent attribute of existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the world, the inside and the outside, sense and non-sense, are interdependent beings. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of time is the problem of the subject's relation to time. The chapter examines how Merleau-Ponty's position in Phenomenology of Perception becomes the intermediary position between, on the one hand, the completion of the tradition and the fulfillment of modernity represented by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the “new beginning for thought” that Heidegger wants to promote, insofar as he attempts to assume or take on metaphysics.


Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

Pessoa’s technique of lucid analytical self-simulation comprises a new methodology in the philosophy of mind, one which I will call—in deliberate contrast to the empirical and transcendental phenomenology of his contemporary Edmund Husserl, of whose work he appears to have been unaware—an ‘analytical phenomenology’. The method of an analytical phenomenology has two components. The first element is to simulate, in a guided or directed manner, a sensorium. Pessoa has a technical term for such acts of simulation, ‘dreaming’, his use of the term not confined to actual dreaming but to the controlled and lucid simulation in wakeful consciousness of a sensorium. The Pessoan concept of ‘dreaming’ is closely related to what has more recently been called ‘enactive imagination’.


Author(s):  
Baylee Brits

Mathesis universalis is perhaps the ultimate formal system. The fact that the concept ties together truth, possibility, and formalism marks it as one of the most important concepts in Western modernity. “Mathesis” is Greek (μάθησις) for “learning” or “science.” The term is sometimes used to simply mean “mathematics”; the planet Mathesis, for instance, is named after the discipline of mathematics. It is philosophically significant when rendered as “mathesis universalis,” combining a Latinized version of the Greek μάθησις (learning) with the Latin universalis (universal). The most significant modern philosophers to develop the term were René Descartes (1596–1650) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716), who used it to name a formal system that could support a project of scientia generalis (Descartes) or the ars combinatoria (Leibniz). In each case, mathesis universalis is a universal method. In this sense it does not constitute the content of the sciences but provides the formal system that undergirds no less than the acquisition and veracity of knowledge itself. Although mathesis universalis is only rarely mentioned in the literature of Descartes and Leibniz, philosophers including Edmund Husserl, Ernst Cassirer, and Martin Heidegger considered it one of the key traits of modernity, breaking with the era of substance (Rabouin) or resemblance (Foucault) to signal a new period defined by formalism and quantification. Thus, in the 20th century, the scant and often contradictory literature on mathesis actually produced by the great philosophers of the Enlightenment comes to take on an importance that far exceeds the term’s original level of systematic elaboration. The term mathesis universalis was rarely used by either Descartes or Leibniz, and the latter used many different terms to refer to the same concept. The complexity and subtlety of the term, combined with difficulties in establishing a rigorous systematic interpretation, has meant that mathesis universalis is often used vaguely or to encompass all scientific method. It is a difficult concept to account for, because although many philosophers and literary theorists will casually refer to it, often in its abbreviated form (Lacan references mathesis in opposition to poesis to contrast the procedures of the sciences and the arts, for instance), there is not a great deal of consistent theoretical elaboration of the term in literary and cultural theory. Although mathesis universalis is not simply an avatar of mathematics, it is difficult to establish exactly where maths ends and mathesis begins, so to speak. The distinction is murky in both Descartes’s and Leibniz’s work, and this ambiguity would become a key controversy surrounding the term in the 20th century, with Bertrand Russell arguing that the significance of symbolic logic to mathesis universalis prevented it from being a “premier” science. Along with Russell, Ernst Cassirer and Louis Couturat would contest the relation between symbolic logic and the symbolic algebra of mathesis universalis, providing the terms of the debate for 20th-century philosophical work on ontology. Mathesis universalis was also a source of debate and controversy in the 20th century because it provided a node from which to examine the status of scientific truth. It is the work of 20th-century philosophers that expanded the significance of the term, using it to exemplify aspects of Enlightenment thought that many philosophers wished to react against, namely the aspiration to a universal science and the privileging of formal systems as avenues to truth. In this respect, the term is associated with Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and especially Michel Foucault, whose extensive work on the “classical episteme” provided a popular method of characterizing the development and enduring features of Enlightenment science. Although Foucault’s rendering of mathesis universalis as a “science of calculation” in The Order of Things (1970) is the most commonly used definition in literary and cultural studies, debates centering on Leibniz’s work in the early 20th century suggest that critics still took divergent approaches to the definition and significance of the term. It is Foucault who has popularized the contraction of the term to “mathesis.”


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