AbstractIn his contribution Carsten Hefeker points out that most of the official arguments concerning the necessity of the Stability and Growth Pact are not convincing. Nevertheless, a mechanism that credibly avoids excessive debts and deficits is needed in most member states. It would be more useful, however, if such rules would focus on overall debt rather than on deficits. In addition, he advocates to create an external control for such fiscal rules, independent from the Commission and ECOFIN. He concludes that the Pact does not need to become more flexible, but more credible.Friedrich Heinemann states that much of the recent reform debate on the Stability Pact is based on a fundamental misconception: The Pact has not been established as a guiding tool for welfare - maximising politicians, but in order to limit detrimental incentives from fiscal short-sightedness. “Stupid” elements like the three-per-cent deficit ceiling have a clear and beneficial strategic function as boundary within the national budgetary process. Furthermore, simple rules are superior to smart ones in increasing the political costs of high deficits in terms of public awareness. The critique on the pact′s missing flexibility is correct mainly regarding its lose logical link to long-run sustainability. Increasing flexibility in a cyclical sense, however, is not a reform priority. Already today the Pact leaves sufficient leeway for responsible politicians. Instead, the reform focus must be on depoliticising the pact in the sense of limiting Council power in the deficit procedure. More flexibility must not come without depoliticising. He recommends that any reform should only be carried into effect with a significant time lag in order to limit the reputation damage which would be the consequence of any quick institutional response to the Pact′s recent crisis.In his paper Klaus F. Zimmermann argues that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been subject to criticism ever since its inception. He points out that it overlooks business cycle developments within the framework of the consolidation process; it adopts a too short-term view of the stabilisation target which is also hardly under control of policy-makers; and it deals with policy imperfections in a sub-optimal way. Therefore, a reform of the SGP is urgent. The author suggests that the rules must be handled more flexibly. In his opinion, a mediumterm budgetary target and a focus on public expenditures to tackle the pro-cyclical bias is needed. To restore credibility, the task of supervision should be transferred to an independent European institution.
CRITICAL SIZES OF STANDING NUCLEAR BURNING WAVES IN SYSTEMS WITH EXTERNAL CONTROL
