Aantekeninge: Verlowingsbreuk of troubreuk is geen egbreuk nie maar slegs nog in sommige moderne sosiale gemeenskappe as onregmatige daad erken?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-345
Author(s):  
JC Sonnekus

Breach of promise by a betrothed is not met with the same sanctions as breach of contract. The disappointed previously engaged party cannot approach the court for an order against the other party for specific performance. The erstwhile future spouse cannot be compelled to enter into the envisaged marriage relationship notwithstanding the doubt that surfaced about the everlasting joyous nature of this union. For the same reason, no claim for positive interest as damages will be honoured by a court. The deserted betrothed cannot claim half of the estate of the other party because she was under the impression that the marriage would have been in community of property. The unavailability of these categories of remedies indicates that the foundation of an engagement agreement should not be seen as a contract between the parties to enter into a legal relationship which will entitle them to reciprocal claims for performance. It must rather be classified as a factual relationship between two parties that is recognised in law and therefore carries consequences. A betrothed cannot simultaneously be engaged to more than one prospective future spouse in a legal system that only recognises a monogamous marriage. The unsavoury conduct of the guilty party who breached the promise to marry on the proverbial steps of the church, is, however, often the cause of damage and hardship for the innocent party and may also cause prejudice to her family when they have indebted themselves for the prospective marriage. The disappointed previous fiancée may have incurred significant costs for the bridal lay-out, the wedding feast and the intended honeymoon, but it may also include the loss of a previous job opportunity or the burdening of the claimant with the cost of a new dwelling that would not otherwise have been encountered. Common law recognised the need to reimburse the innocent party for such losses and also for the personal injury suffered if the breach occurred shortly before the marriage was supposed to be concluded or the conduct of the guilty party was especially harsh and impolite. Harbouring bad manners comes at a cost. In this contribution the historical development of the applicable claims is discussed by way of comparison with other legal systems in order to define the underlying foundation of the claims as recognised in South African law. In principle, claims founded on the actio legis Aquiliae as well as the actio iniuriarum should be available, provided the various requirements for the remedy can be met. It is questioned whether there is any truth in the premise that the continued recognition of such a delictual claim will endanger the value of marriage as a binding institution in modern society and that this excuse justifies the demise of the sanctions against such a delict in some modern societies. The well-known proverb ubi ius ibi remedium also indicates that as long as the delictual conduct of the unreliable suitor is recognised as unacceptable conduct, private law should provide a suitable remedy to the injured subject. It is presumed that parties who decided mutually to become betrothed represent to each other and to third parties that they intend to enter into marriage as a lifelong relationship and that all concerned may act according to this representation of their mutual intent. Should any of the parties experience a serious change of heart and repudiate the agreement, the other may claim for any damage suffered as a result of the breach with the actio legis Aquiliae. In addition, the contumely conduct entitles the aggrieved party to claim solatium for the injury to her personality rights. Although the claims founded in the breach of promise are often referred to as contractual claims, the case law displays many examples where the claimant for the wasted damages caused by the delictual behaviour happened to be the parents or guardian of the party left in the lurch, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant did not enter into a contract with them as the future in-laws. This points to the fact that the remedy is a delictual and not a contractual remedy and founded in the breach of trust.

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Rafał Mańko

ROMAN LAW AS A SOURCE OF LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICASummary Roman law is usually regarded as an object o f historic study and not as a practical discipline of the legal science. However, the situation is different in six South African states - the Republic of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia - which have preserved the uncodified ius commune europaeum brought by the Dutch to the Cape of Good Hope in the 17th century.The hierarchy of the fontes iuris oriundi in the South African legal system seems to be the following: the Constitution, statutes, customary law, case-law, Roman-Dutch law and Roman law. The position occupied by Roman law is in fact only subsidiary, however it is a source of law and is referred to from time to time in the case-law. On the other hand it permeates the whole legal system which is based on fundamental notions derived from Roman law, which have been preserved and developed in the treatises of the Roman-Dutch jurists and the case-law of the courts.The frequency o f citations of Roman law in the South African case-law has been an object of two major studies. One, conducted by Van Der Merve concerned the period 1970-1979, the other, by Du Plessis - took into account the cases of 1990-1991. The studies revealed that Roman sources are cited in 4,7-4,8% of the case-law. According to another study by Zimmermann, only in half o f those cases the Roman sources were relevant for deciding the case.Nevertheless, it is submitted that these figures should be treated as significant, especially when compared with the position occupied by Roman sources in the modern case law in other civilian jurisdictions. 


1994 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
S. H. Gregan

The Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika: A voluntary association or an association sui generis The Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk is seen as a voluntary association in South African law which is founded on a contractual basis. Recent case law has re-affirmed this fact. This was not always the case. Earlier case law referred to the church as a legal person (universitas). Because of the influence of English law and also the role of De Mist in the Cape during the nineteenth century, the courts have adopted the view that the church is a voluntary association The Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk, however, disagrees with this view of the courts. According to the the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk, one cannot simply talk of ‘voluntariness’ when membership of the church is at stake. The church is also not found on a contractual basis; Christ brought it together. The church is the communion of saints, because the believers, being members of the body of Jesus Christ, share in Christ and all He has. Recently an English court found that a church had the power to decide whether a preacher (rabbi) was fit to be a preacher and declared that the court will not interfere in such matters. This case could help to convince South African courts that the church differs from the ordinary voluntary association. The Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk also has the task to convince the courts in this regard and should be adamant in its stance that it should not be considered as a voluntary association, but rather as an association sui generis.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Mould

During the 1990s, rugby union formation in the Republic of South Africa developed rapidly from a system of strict amateurism to one of professionalism. Professional participants in the sport received salaries for participation, and rugby became a business like any other. As in all forms of business, rugby had to be regulated more efficiently than had previously been the case. Tighter regulations were instituted by governing bodies, and ultimately labour legislation became applicable to professional rugby. A professional sportsman or woman participating in a team sport is generally considered an employee. This means that the same principles that govern employees in general should also apply to professional sportsmen and women. The exact nature of the "player's contract", a term generally used to describe the contract of employment between a professional sportsman or sportswoman and his or her employer, deserves closer attention. It has been argued with much merit that the "player's contract", while in essence a contract of employment, possesses certain sui generis characteristics. The first aim of this article is to demonstrate how this statement is in fact a substantial one. If it is concluded that the "player's contract" is in fact a sui generis contract of employment, the most suitable remedy in case of breach of contract must be determined. The second aim of this article is to indicate why the remedy of specific performance, which is generally not granted in cases where the defaulting party has to provide services of a personal nature, is the most suitable remedy in case of breach of "player's contracts". To substantiate this statement, recent applicable case law is investigated and discussed, particularly the recent case of Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe. Suggestions are finally offered as to how breach of "player's contracts" should be approached by South African courts in future.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 16-38
Author(s):  
Ion Marian CROITORU ◽  

One can note that science tends to turn man into a master of the external and material, yet at the cost of turning him, on the level of his inner and spiritual life, into a slave of instincts altered by sin. All these, without a moral norm, become a power of destruction for man and represent issues addressed not just by bioethics, where the opinion of ‘theologians’ is consulted as well, but especially by the Church and by the Orthodoxy. The pressure of events imposes the issue of the recognition or, according to some, reformulation of the bases of ethics. Yet, this ethics ought to be constrained to a revision founded neither just on the progress of science, whose truths are partial, nor on the principles of rationalist or positivist philosophy, which try to convince man that he is no different from all the other living beings and needs to be treated in the same way as them, but on the reality of the religious fact, and, moreover, on the evidence of God’s Revelation and, implicitly, of Christian anthropology, based on the fact that man bears God’s image, not the image of man himself, as a society attempting to exclude God in an absolute manner wills to herald. According to the Holy Church Fathers, one must pursue not a concordism or discordism of theology and science but their dialogue from a theological and, implicitly, eschatological perspective. The first, namely theology, relies on the knowledge of God and the receiving of the supernatural gifts by the action of the divine uncreated energies, by means of man’s collaboration with God, which supposes man’s commitment to advance on the steps of the spiritual life: cleansing, illumination, deification. The second, namely science, relies on knowing the surrounding world and on putting to use the natural gifts, also given by God to man, and by which man investigates the reasons of things, recognising God’s power, wisdom and presence. Therefore, to theology correspond the spiritual knowledge and wisdom from Above, while to science correspond lay knowledge and the wisdom from the outside or from below.


Author(s):  
Cheryll Duncan

According to received opinion, Bernard Smith never built the new organ that Christ Church, Dublin, commissioned from him in May 1694, and the contract was later awarded to his rival Renatus Harris; documents from the courts of Chancery and King’s Bench show that narrative to be only partially true. In 1697 William Moreton, Bishop of Kildare, instituted proceedings against Smith for breach of contract, from which it emerges that Smith actually built two organs for the cathedral. However, for various reasons, including Moreton’s dithering over stops, difficulties arranging delivery and transferring money, the cost and Harris’s meddling, both agreements ultimately foundered, leaving Smith with two unsold instruments. Great St Mary’s, Cambridge, took one of them, and St Michael’s, Barbados, probably the other. The documentation, comprising the lost contract and specification for Smith’s first Dublin organ, as well as depositions from Harris, Henry Aldrich and John Blow, illuminates a shadowy corner of Christ Church’s musical history.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-645
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

The discussion of the South African case law on the quantification of damages arising from wrongful arrest and detention which commenced in part (1) of this series, continues in the present part. In part (1), the Constitutional Court judgment in Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 (4) SA 458 (CC) which emphasised the respect and reverence for the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty, and De Klerk v Minister of Police 2018 (2) SACR 28 (SCA) as well as the recent Constitutional Court judgment in the same case – De Klerk v Minister of Police 2020 (1) SACR 1 (CC); [2019] ZACC 32 (22 August 2019) – were among a host of important cases discussed. The Supreme Court of Appeal cases on quantification of damages for wrongful arrest and detention also discussed include: Mashilo v Prinsloo 2013 (2) SACR 648 (SCA); Minister of Police v Zweni (842/2017) [2018] ZASCA 97 (1 June 2018); Minister of Safety and Security v Magagula (991/2016) [2017] ZASCA 103 (6 September 2017). The first section of this part continues with the discussion of the other instances not involving failure to take the detainee to court within 48 hours or consequences of the accused person’s first appearance in court whereby Hendricks v Minister of Safety and Security (CA&R/2015) [2015] ZAECGHC 61 (4 June 2015); Mrasi v Minister of Safety and Security 2015 (2) SACR 28 (ECG); and Ramphal v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 (1) SACR 211 (E) are among the cases discussed. The second limb of the discussion in this part concerns the issue of wrongful arrest and detention under the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 where the law has developed side by side with the traditional law of wrongful arrest and police negligence as illustrated by the case of Naidoo v Minister of Police 2016 (1) SACR 468 (SCA).


2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-123
Author(s):  
J J Kritzinger

In a recent publication No Quick Fixes a number of knowledgeable people dealt with some contemporary  challenges to the church in its mission in the South African context. In this article the reader is introduced to these, but  the focus is on those aspects of the challenge which arise from the two main influences in the spiritual sphere: on the one hand the overwhelming secularising influence of the modern western worldview, and on the other hand the increasing emphasis on the return to the values of traditional Africa, as formulated in the movement for the African Renaissance.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Magabe T Thabo ◽  
Kola O Odeku

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 creates a system in which there is a separation of the powers exercised by the different branches of the State. It also creates a system of checks and balances. The exercise of a power by one arm of state is checked by another to ensure that there is no abuse of state power. Organs of state ought to respect each other and the powers allocated to them by the Constitution. To this end, no organ of state should encroach upon the domain of the other organs. However, the courts wield enormous power because they are the ultimate guardians and custodians of the Constitution in South Africa. Courts have the power to declare any law or conduct unconstitutional. Where decisions have been taken by other arms of the State on matters falling within their exclusive domain and such decisions violate the Constitution, courts have a duty to intervene in order to make organs of state act within constitutional bounds. However, courts should not be overzealous and should not encroach upon the powers of the other arms of the State when exercising their judicial power and authority. Against this backdrop, this article analyses how the South African courts have cautioned themselves to exercise self-restraint in order not to usurp or encroach upon the powers of the other arms of the State while exercising their judicial authority and power.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 373
Author(s):  
Rudi Oosthuizen

Taxpayers who use intellectual property (such as patents and trademarks) in their trade in the production of income may obtain the right of such use in a number of different ways. The nature of the transaction granting the taxpayer the use of intellectual property items determines the tax treatment thereof. Taxpayers may be able to claim deductions for the cost of using these items in terms of specific income tax sections or the general deduction formula as outlined by the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. There are also a number of other sections in the Act which may affect the timing and extent of the deductions allowed. This article investigates the various income tax deductions which may be available to taxpayers in South Africa who make payments in respect of intellectual property. It considers the effect of important recent case law and changes to tax legislation on the timing and extent of these deductions and suggests a framework which can be applied to assist the taxpayer in understanding the structure of such deductions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 138 (4) ◽  
pp. 748-760
Author(s):  
Tjakie Naude

South African case law has long held that standard terms may be incorporated into a contract by mere reference, and that it is unnecessary for the user of the terms to make the text of the terms available to the other party. The so-called railway ‘ticket cases’ from the early twentieth century started this approach. More recent case law involving contracts concluded by fax has confirmed the possibility of incorporation of standard terms by mere reference, without the text of the terms having been made available. This contribution argues that times have changed with increased access to the internet, and that the user of standard terms can reasonably be expected to make their text available to the other party, for example by making them available on a website. It draws on comparative study of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts. It also shows that legislation requires standard terms to be made available anyway in the consumer context, as well as in the case of electronic contracts. Writers of books on the law of contract should discuss the relevant rules.


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