scholarly journals Personal interino del sector público y nombramientos abusivos a la luz del asunto "Sánchez Ruiz/Fernández Álvarez"

Author(s):  
Ignasi Beltran de Heredia Ruiz

Laburpena: Laburpena: Aldi baterako kontratazioan gehiegikeriari aurre egiteko Europar Batasuneko eta barneko neurriek ez dute sistema bateratu bat osatu, logika estratifikatu bati erantzun diote. Arkitektura horri esker, barne-zuzenbideak Europako gidalerroetatik eta horiei eusteko tresnetatik aldendu da. Horren ondorioz (beste arrazoi batzuekin batera), behin-behinekotasun tasa onartezinak sortu dira eta fenomeno patologiko eta kroniko bihurtu da. Azterlan honek Europar Batasuneko Justizia Auzitegiaren (EBJA) doktrina aztertzen du, «Sánchez Ruiz/Fernández Álvarez» gai garrantzitsuraino, bai eta horrek sektore publikoko bitarteko langileen izendapenetan (ondoz ondokoak izan edo ez) gehiegizko behin-behinekotasunaren aurkako arauetan duen eragin sakona ere. Europar Batasuneko doktrinak azken urteetan izan duen bilakaerak agerian uzten du barne-arau-esparruarekin eta haren interpretazio judizialarekin bat ez datorrela, eta atzeraezina dela neurri eraginkorrak sartzea kolektibo horren egoera larria zuzentzeko. Azterlanak, halaber, une honetatik aurrera jarraitu beharreko araugintza- eta interpretazio-jarraibide nagusien deskribapena egiten du, eremu horretako behin-behinekotasunaren izaera erabat atipikoa zuzentzen lagundu beharko luketenak. Resumen: Las medidas comunitarias e internas para combatir el abuso en la contratación temporal no han conformado un sistema unitario sino que han respondido a una lógica estratificada. Esta arquitectura ha permitido al derecho interno operar alejándose de las directrices comunitarias y de sus resortes de contención. Lo que ha desembocando (en conjunción con otras causas) en unas tasas de temporalidad intolerables y convirtiéndose en un fenómeno patológico y crónico. Este estudio lleva a cabo un análisis de la doctrina del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea (TJUE) hasta el importante asunto «Sánchez Ruiz/Fernández Álvarez» y de su profundo impacto en las normas contra la temporalidad abusiva en los nombramientos (sucesivos o no) del pesonal interino del sector público. El recorrido en la evolución de la doctrina comunitaria de los últimos años que se lleva a cabo evidencia el desajuste con el marco normativo interno y su interpretación judicial y la inaplazable necesidad de introducir medidas efectivas que corrijan la grave situación de este colectivo. El estudio también hace una descripción de las principales directrices normativas e interpretativas a seguir a partir de este momento y que deberían contribuir a corregir el carácter absolutamente atípico de la temporalidad en este ámbito. Abstract: Both national and the European Union (EU) measures to combat abuse in temporary contracts haven’t conformed a unitary system but have responded to a stratified logic. This architecture has allowed domestic law to operate away from EU guidelines and its containment elements. These factors have led (in conjunction with other causes) into intolerable temporality rates which have become a pathological and chronic phenomenon.This essay analyses the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) doctrine up to the «Sánchez Ruiz/Fernández Álvarez» case and its deep impact on the national regulations to prevent abusive use of fixed-term appointments (successive or not) of public sector interim staff. The study of the evolution of recent CJEU doctrine that is carried out shows the mismatch with the internal regulatory framework and its judicial interpretation and the urgent need to introduce effective measures to correct the serious situation of this collective. The study provides as well a description of the policy and interpretation guidelines to follow from now on. These measures should contribute to mitigate theatypic temporality rates in this sector.

Tábula ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 201-213
Author(s):  
Julián Valero Torrijos

En los últimos años hemos asistido a un importante proceso de modernización tecnológica en España que ha afectado a las Administraciones Públicas. Más allá de las limitaciones en la regulación, en este proceso se percibe la importancia de los datos en general y de los datos abiertos en particular como uno de los ejes principales para reforzar las exigencias y principios del Gobierno Abierto. En esta ponencia se pretende analizar la evolución del marco normativo aplicable en España y ponerlo en relación con las recientes iniciativas que está impulsando la Unión Europea para promocionar la reutilización de la información del sector público y los datos abiertos. In the last few years we have witnessed a significant process of technological modernisation in Spain that has impacted on Public Administrations. Beyond the limitations in the regulation, in this process the importance of data and open data particularly is perceived as one of the main axes to strengthen the requirements and principles of Open Government. This lecture aims to analyse the evolution of the regulatory framework applicable in Spain and to connect it with the recent initiatives being promoted by the European Union to foster the reuse of public sector information and open data.


TEME ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Vukašin Petrović

In this paper, we analyze the appropriate regulatory framework of the European Union which is related to the issue of the scope of trade mark, i.e. its application in practice, through appropriate judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union. More particularly, the focus of the analysis is on the factors on the basis of which the scope of trade mark as a subjective right is determined, i.e. the limits of protection acquired by the concrete trade mark. In that sense, this paper will aim to provide a detailed view of, primarily, the concept of likelihood of confusion which represents the key element for determining the scope of trade mark as a subjective right, through the view of the individual elements from which it consists, i.e. on the basis of which the existence of the mentioned likelihood is determined in each concrete case.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Michael Connolly

On the 13 July of this year, the UK Government published the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 1 more commonly called the ‘Great Repeal Bill’. Aside from the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 (and with it the proposed ousting of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice), the Bill’s purpose is to ‘convert the acquis’ of EU law and preserve any UK law implementing EU law.2 This will include ‘workers’ rights’ and with it their employment discrimination rights.3 The efficacy of such a move will be limited if the British judges fail to adopt the same interpretations of these rights as their counterparts in the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Over the years of Britain’s membership, there have been many references to Luxembourg to clarify the meaning of particular aspects of the discrimination provisions, with the Court generally giving a more liberal interpretation than the domestic courts had suggested would be their preference. One element of the law largely untouched by this process is the objective justification defence to claims of indirect discrimination. This is because the domestic courts have maintained a fiction that their interpretation is consistent with the EU formula. For no apparent reason, the domestic courts have reworded the EU formula while labelling it as being no different. This presents a major challenge for the Bill. It would be all too easy for Parliament to assume all is well with this aspect of workers’ rights, especially when the judges tell them so. Using a handful of cases, this article exposes the shortfalls within the domestic law and suggests some solutions. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the Bill (which no doubt is due for many amendments), but to focus on one important aspect of discrimination law, both pre- and post-Brexit.


2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-119
Author(s):  
Mateusz Zeifert

Abstract Prototype theory is a semantic theory according to which the membership of conceptual categories is based not on a list of criterial features, but rather on the similarity to the most representative member of the category. Consequently, conceptual categories may lack classical definitions and rigid boundaries. This article supports the claims, already made by other scholars working in the field, that prototype theory may greatly augment our understanding of legal (i.e. statutory, judicial) interpretation. Legal provisions are traditionally written as classical definitions, but they are rarely applied that way. Statutory concepts tend to be interpreted with a great deal of flexibility, using a wide array of extra-textual factors. This is especially true for the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has to deal with the challenges of the multilingual, supranational law of the European Union.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 944-949
Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm

The commentary, especially from abroad, on the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment concerning the bond-buying programme undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB) conveys the impression that something unimaginable has occurred. The German court has refused to follow the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby setting “a bomb under the EU legal order.”1 Yet there is nothing new about the risk of conflict between the two courts. It came about when the Court of Justice of the European Union implicitly presumed, in 1963,2 and explicitly declared, in 1964,3 that European law takes precedence over domestic law, even over domestic constitutional law. This view was by no means without alternative, given that the Treaties of Rome do not address the precedence of Community law. The Member States involved in the dispute denied having agreed to any such precedence in the Treaties. Even the CJEU’s Advocate General was unable to find any basis in the Treaties for the precedence of European law.4 The CJEU derived the precedence of European law from the purpose of the European Economic Community.5 It argued that there could be no common market if each Member State applied and interpreted European law however it saw fit.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (6) ◽  
pp. 1281-1298
Author(s):  
Hans-Georg Dederer

On July 25, 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, the Court) rendered its judgment in the case C-528/16, Confédération paysanne and Others. It is a landmark decision in that the Court essentially decided that genome-edited organisms are “genetically modified organisms” (GMOs) governed by the EU's regulatory framework on GMOs without exception.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-624
Author(s):  
Timo Minssen ◽  
Marc Mimler ◽  
Vivian Mak

Abstract This contribution analyses the first decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the qualification and regulation of stand-alone software as medical devices. Referring to the facts of the case and the applicable European Union (EU) regulatory framework, the Court specifically found that prescription support software may constitute a medical device. This would even be the case where the software does not act directly in or on the human body. Yet, according to the CJEU, it is necessary that the intended purpose falls within one or more of the ‘medical purpose’ categories of the regulatory definition of ‘medical device’. The case has important implications, not only for specific legal debates, but it also signifies a paradigm shift with a rapidly increasing digitalisation of the health and life sciences. This highlights the demand for continuous debates over the necessary evolution of the regulatory framework applying to the interface of medical artificial intelligence (AI) and Big Data.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-67
Author(s):  
Patrícia Fragoso Martins

This article deals with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Uber cases, highlighting some implications of those judgments in the fields of competition and regulation. Uber is widely referred to as the paramount example of sharing economy. With this background, there has been intense debate on the need for a new regulatory framework and on the avenues left open by competition law. Although not addressing said issues directly, by considering Uber a carriage company, and not merely an electronic platform, the Court of Justice has contributed to “thicken the plot” on both these fronts.


Author(s):  
Isaac MERINO JARA

LABURPENA: Justizia Auzitegiak 2000ko martxoaren 21ean emandako epaian —Gabalfrisa, C-110/98tik C-147/98ra arteko gai metatuak— xedatu zuen auzitegi ekonomiko-administratiboek «jurisdikzio-organotzat» hartuak izateko baldintzak betetzen zituztela, arazo prejudizialak aurkezteko ondoreetarako. Hau da, epai horrek ez zituen bere egin Saggio abokatu nagusiaren ondorioak, zeinen arabera prozedura ez baitzen kontraesanezkoa eta auzitegi ekonomiko-administratiboak ez baitziren independenteak. Ostera, Justizia Auzitegiak (Sala Nagusia) 2020ko urtarrilaren 21ean emandako epaian —Santander Bankua, C-274/14— zera dio: auzitegi ekonomiko-administratiboa ez da jurisdikzio-organotzat hartuko, ez delako independentea. Europar Batasunean eta Espainiako barne-zuzenbidean gertatu diren aldaketek funtsatzen dute norabide berria, bai eta jurisprudentziaren bilakaerak ere —Justizia Auzitegiaren 2018ko otsailaren 27ko epaian laburbildua; Associação Sindical dos Juízes portugueses, C‑64/16—. ABSTRACT: The Judgment of the Court of Justice of March 21, 2000, Gabalfrisa, accumulated cases C-110/98 to C-147/98, considered that Spanish Administrative Tax Courts fulfilled the requirements to be treated as «courts or tribunals» for the purpose of being able to raise questions for a preliminary ruling, ignoring the conclusions of Advocate General Saggio, who denied the contradictory nature of the procedure and, furthermore, their independence. On the other hand, the recent judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of January 21, 2020, Banco de Santander, C-274/14, refuses to consider the Spanish Administrative Tax Courts as a judicial body, since they are not presumed to be independent. The modification of doctrine is explained by the changes produced both at the level of the European Union and at the level of Spanish domestic law, and, specifically, by the jurisprudential evolution produced at the Court of Justice summarized in its judgment of February 27, 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes portugueses, C 64/16. RESUMEN: La Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de 21 de marzo de 2000, Gabalfrisa, asuntos acumulados C-110/98 a C-147/98, consideró que los Tribunales económico-administrativos cumplen con los requisitos para ser considerados «órganos jurisdiccionales» a los efectos de poder plantear cuestiones prejudiciales, desoyendo las Conclusiones del Abogado General Saggio, quien negaba el carácter contradictorio del procedimiento y, asimismo, su independencia. En cambio, la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (Gran Sala) de 21 de enero de 2020, Banco de Santander, C-274/14, rechaza considerar al Tribunal Económico Administrativo de órgano jurisdiccional, dado que no es independiente. La modificación producida se explica por los cambios tanto a nivel de la Unión Europea como a nivel del derecho interno español, y, asimismo, por la evolución jurisprudencial producida, que ha sido resumida por el Tribunal de Justicia en su sentencia de 27 de febrero de 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes portugueses, C‑64/16.


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