The Battle for Chile

2020 ◽  
pp. 183-212
Author(s):  
Tanya Harmer

Chapter eight charts the build-up to the right-wing military coup in Chile on 11 September 1973. It examines the progressive division of the Left amid conspiracies against the government, focusing in, as Beatriz did, on the impending prospect of a coup and the strategies Allende’s team employed in response. It also examines Beatriz’s gendered experience of the battle for Chile unfolding from 1971-73. By late 1972, even Allende accepted that a coup was a serious possibility and began putting measures in place that included stopping Beatriz fulfilling the role she expected to play. As someone with intelligence and communications training who knew how to use firearms, she was ready to fight to defend the Popular Unity government next to her father. However, Beatriz’s gender and her father’s efforts to protect her blocked her from being able to. That Beatriz became a mother in late 1971 and was pregnant with her second child by early 1973 strengthened Allende’s desire to save her. Ultimately, Beatriz was forced to leave the presidential palace on the day of the coup and sought asylum in the Cuban embassy. The chapter ends with her leaving the country with her Cuban husband, daughter and Cuban embassy personnel.

2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


Significance The new government will have only 34 of the 179 seats, because policy differences among the right-wing parties, and the political strategy of the electorally strengthened anti-immigration, Euro-sceptic Danish People's Party (DF), mean DF will remain outside. Policy-making will be difficult. The government will be more economically liberal and pro-EU than it would have been with DF, but to make policy it will rely on partners across the political spectrum, especially the ousted Social Democrats -- who remain the largest party -- and DF. Impacts If DF is seen as a welfarist protector of ordinary citizens, it is more likely to repeat, at least, its 22% vote in the next election. The much-tighter immigration regime which is in prospect could taint Denmark's image and make it less attractive to foreign investment. The new government is likely to be an ally for much of UK Prime Minister David Cameron's EU reform agenda.


Significance The draft law was presented by Labour Minister Myriam El Khomry in late February and aims at introducing more flexibility in France's rigid labour market. The government has led a promotional campaign in favour of the reform, against a backdrop of opposition from trade unions, students and public opinion. Valls has watered down the most controversial proposals but even in its current state the proposed reform would be a significant step forward. Impacts The government will need to assemble a diverse majority spanning the centre-left to the centre-right in order to pass the draft law by July. Reformist trade unions support the revised version of the law but more militant unions maintain their opposition. The right wing and the main employer association oppose the revised draft which they consider not favourable enough to companies.


Intersections ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ákos Kopper ◽  
Pál Susánszky ◽  
Gergely Tóth ◽  
Márton Gerő

In recent years, many theoretical and empirical analyses about the changing regimes of Central and Eastern Europe have been written, pointing out the authoritarian tendencies and radicalization in the region. Hungary is a significant case in the changing landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. The right-wing government rules the country with incontestable force, despising and disrespecting the norms of liberal democracies. Although the general impression is that the government has such a strong grip on power that resisting it is futile, in fact, it only enjoys only the support of 30 per cent of Hungarian citizens. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect the opposition to be able to effectively mobilize against the regime. In reality, no political opponent seems to stand a chance of defeating it. In order to explain why this is so, we focus on the way Orbán constantly creates images of ‘the enemy’ that keep alive an atmosphere of vigilance that blocks the efforts of critical actors to efficiently mobilize citizens. Since the political system in Hungary is highly centralized, the prime-minister’s speeches epitomize the logic and ideology of the regime. Our aim is to understand the mechanism through which the dominant political actors frame the enemy in a system of images, thereby creating an environment where critical actors are stripped of the resources needed to mobilize against them.


Monitor ISH ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-31
Author(s):  
Igor Grdina

The paper discusses various interpretative strategies and narratives applied to the role which was played by Alexander Fyodorovich Kerensky (1881–1970) in the Russian Revolution. It critically evaluates views of the provisional government’s president as a non-radical revolutionary, whose work called for an upgrade in a ‘second revolution’, as well as the interpretation which makes him out to have been a counter-revolutionary at his core. Tracing the causes of his actions in 1917 to his personality traits, the study arrives at the conclusion that Kerensky was a revolutionary of an entirely different breed from those who removed him from power in October 1917; for him, the ‘first revolution’ was enough. The contribution also examines those of Kerensky’s actions which benefited his left-wing opponents, particularly his policy of disassembling the government apparatus out of fear of the right-wing enemy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (04) ◽  
pp. A08
Author(s):  
Esa Valiverronen ◽  
Sampsa Saikkonen

In this article, we explore scientists' freedom of expression in the context of authoritarian populism. Our particular case for this analysis is Finland, where the right-wing populist Finns Party entered the government for the first time in 2015. More recently, after leaving the government in 2017, the party has been the most popular party in opinion polls in 2021. We illustrate the current threats to Finnish researchers' freedom of expression using their responses on three surveys, made in 2015, 2017 and 2019. We focus on politically motivated disparagement of scientists and experts, and the scientists' experiences with online hate and aggressive feedback. Further, we relate these findings to the recent studies on authoritarian populism and science-related populism. We argue that this development may affect researchers' readiness to communicate their research and expertise in public.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-29
Author(s):  
Boris Guseletov

The article examines the results of the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, held on March 15-17, 2021. It compares the results of the leading political parties in the elections of 2017 and 2021, and describes all the leading Dutch political parties that were represented in parliament in the period from 2017 to 2021. The results of the activities of the government headed by the leader of the “People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy” M. Rutte, formed following the results of the 2017 elections, are presented. The reasons for the resignation of this government, which took place on the eve of the elections, and its impact on the course of the election campaign are revealed. It was noted how the coronavirus pandemic and the government’s actions to overcome its consequences affected the course and results of the election campaign. The activity of the main opposition parties in this country is evaluated: the right-wing Eurosceptic Freedom Party of Wilders, the center-left Labor Party and others. The course of the election campaign and its main topics, as well as the new political parties that were elected to the parliament as a result of these elections, are considered. The positions of the country’s leading political parties on their possible participation in the new government coalition are shown. The state of Russian-Dutch relations is analyzed. A forecast is given of how the election results will affect the formation of the new government of this country and the political, trade and economic relations between Russia and the Netherlands.


2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosta Josifidis ◽  
Radmila Dragutinovic-Mitrovic ◽  
Novica Supic ◽  
Olgica Glavaski

The aim of this paper is to point out the limitations of conventional approaches, articulated via political processes, in reducing income inequality. Using the panel data methods, on the sample of 21 affluent OECD countries in the period from 1980 to 2011, it is observed that the increase in labour productivity as well as preferences of voters to parties that advocate greater redistribution, contrary to common perception, not necessarily lead to reduction in income inequality. Increasing dominance of big capital in the field of technological progress changes the conventions about contribution of workers to labour productivity. The result is a weakening of workers? bargaining power in relation to employers as well as increase in gap between labour productivity growth and real wage growth, which both lead to increase in income inequality. In comparison with the other political parties, it seems that the right-wing parties are more efficient in using voters? support to implement their concept of the welfare state, which contributes to maintaining the high market-generated income inequality. Such situation could be explained that de jure power of the government depends on election results, whereas de facto power depends on the support of so-called globally-oriented super elites.


Author(s):  
María Stella Toro

Right-wing women in Chile have received relatively little historical attention, and while they have engaged in many public activities, they have usually been seen as a complementary political force, lacking independent agency and relying on directions from party leaders. This perception is related to the denials that such women usually make of their own impacts, justifying their presence in the public arena as an “obligation” to mobilize for the welfare of others, in this case, family and country. This sort of political engagement ebbs and flows according to particular political circumstances, evoking symbols, images, and discourses that have been used at different times. One example is the way that women took to banging on empty pots during the marches against the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular) to express their discontent and their inability to properly care for their families. The triumph of the Popular Unity coalition in the 1970 elections, led by socialist Salvador Allende, was met with dogged opposition from conservative women who took to the streets even before Allende’s victory was ratified in Congress. Between 1970 and 1973, women involved with political parties and right-wing ideas mobilized both in the streets and in the media; as in the case of EVA magazine, organizing spaces were configured under the discourse that, as mothers and housewives, they were called to defend the country from Marxism, suggesting that women were “naturally” endowed to protect the freedom and democracy that they believed was threatened by a leftist government. Such activism, however, was rooted in a sense of emergency and was never intended to be long-lasting, and it ended abruptly after the 1973 military coup. The actions of right-wing women raise various questions, particularly regarding the political subjectivities that they constructed, their motivations, their political conceptions, and their self-conceptions. These questions, among others, help us understand Chilean women beyond the traditional roles that they struggled so hard to preserve. The idea that their activism was solely a response to the manipulation of other political forces does not explain the complexity of the processes developed by conservative women or their presence in different historical moments. Thus, it is important to reflect on the inherently political characteristics of their engagement, notwithstanding their consistent denials of partisan considerations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavithra Suryanarayan

What explains the popularity of right-wing parties among the poor? This article argues that in hierarchical societies with high social-status inequality, cross-class coalitions can emerge among high-status voters if they believe their social status is under threat. I demonstrate this in the context of the Indian states by exploiting an announcement by the Government of India in 1990 to implement affirmative action for lower castes—an intervention that threatened to weaken the social status of upper caste Brahmans. Using unique data from the 1931 census, this article shows that areas where Brahmans were more dominant in the 1930s experienced a higher surge in right-wing voting after this announcement than other areas. Using survey data, I find that both wealthy and poor Brahmans voted for the right wing where Brahmans were dominant in 1931. The article shows how concerns about social status may make the poor open to appeals by antiredistribution parties.


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