scholarly journals La théorie autrichienne des cycles: une théorie de la récurrence des erreurs collectives d’anticipation

2021 ◽  
pp. 51-94
Author(s):  
François Facchini

This paper offers an account of the recent development of Austrian Trade Cycle Theory. It focus on the theoretical contributions and argues that the Austrian’s explanation of Trade Cycle is a theory of collective errors of expectations and of their recurrences. Austrian economists agree to explain the errors of individuals by the nationalization of money because it leads to an excess of money supply. Nevertheless, they disagree about the cause of this excess. Two explanations have been suggested. The first one measures the excess in relation with the demand of money. The second one evaluates the excess in relation with monetary saving. They agree, on the contrary, on the reasons of the recurrence of expectation errors and their uniformity. The theory of property rights explains the recurrence of expectation errors by the socialization of risk. The expectation theory explains the collective errors by the centralisation of expectations (big player hypothesis) on the central bank decisions. Therefore, the centralization of expectations explains the instability of market process. Keywords: cycle, expectations, property rights, central banking, free banking and error Classification JEL: E32, E58, Resume: Cet article présente les développements récents de la théorie autrichienne des cycles. Il se concentre sur les apports théoriques et soutient que désormais la théorie autrichienne des cycles est une théorie plurielle de la récurrence des erreurs collectives d’anticipation. Les économistes autrichiens s’accordent pour penser que la nationalisation de la monnaie est à l’origine de l’excès d’offre de monnaie qui crée une distorsion de la structure des taux d’intérêt des prêts et induit la phase de récession. Ils s’entendent aussi sur les raisons de la récurrence des erreurs d’anticipation et sur leur uniformité. La théorie des droits de propriété explique la récurrence des erreurs d’anticipation par la socialisation des risques. La théorie des anticipations explique les erreurs collectives par la centralisation des anticipations autour des décisions de la banque centrale et rend compte ainsi de l’instabilité des systèmes économiques. Les économistes autrichiens se divisent, en revanche, sur les raisons de cet excès d’offre de monnaie. Il y a ceux qui soutiennent que cet excès d’offre se mesure par rapport à l’épargne monétaire et s’explique par la pratique des réserves fractionnaires (école de la libre circulation). Il y a ceux, au contraire, qui estiment que cet excès doit être mesuré par rapport à la demande de monnaie et expliqué par l’absence de concurrence entre les monnaies (école de la banque libre). Mots clés: cycles, anticipations, droits de propriété, banque centrale, banque libre et erreur

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
François Facchini

AbstractThis article studies the impact of a credit expansion monetary policy on output and unemployment rate. In the introduction the history of the Phillips curve and its interpretation are presented to understand why New Consensus Macroeconomics argues that monetary policy is neutral in long-run i. e. has no effect on economic activity and natural unemployment rate. This New Consensus Macroeconomics supports the independence of the Central Bank, inflation-targeting and the strategy of constrained discretion model and influences strongly the monetary policy of central bank today. The second section critics these three principles of the new consensus. It opposes free-banking to central banking system, and takes the defense of deflation to critic the inflation-targeting. Then the third section deals with long-run neutrality of monetary policy. In an Austrian Business Cycle perspective, there is neutrality of monetary only if the production structure must always return exactly to its level of before the boom. It is improbable, because the monetary policyviatax inflation and artificial variation of real interest rate has a long-run effects on the conditions of financing of entrepreneurial project andin fineall the market process dynamic.


2017 ◽  
pp. 131-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Yefimov

The review discusses the institutional theory of money considered in the books by King and Huber, and the conclusions that follow from it for economic policy. In accordance with this theory, at present the most of the money supply is created not by the Central Bank but by private banks. When a bank issues a loan, new money is created, and when the loan is repaid this money is destructed. The concept of sovereign money involves the monopoly of money creation of the central bank. In this case the most of newly created money is handed over to the ministry of finance to implement government spending.


1991 ◽  
Vol 30 (4II) ◽  
pp. 931-941
Author(s):  
M. Aynul Hasan ◽  
Qazi Masood Ahmed

Monetary policy, in general, refers to those steps taken by the Central Bank to achieve such broader objectives of the economy as growth, employment, external balance and price stability through changes in the money supply, interest rates and credit policies. The money supply thus created by the Central Bank should be in response to the changes in key macroeconomic target variables such as GNP, balance of payments, inflation, internal debt and unemployment. Indeed, a properly estimated monetary policy reaction function can provide useful information regarding such matters as to whether the Central Bank, in fact, has been systematically accommodating to the changes in the target variables. The reaction function can also provide insight into the question as to what should be the relevant indicators of the monetary policy. In addition, as argued by Havrilesky (1967), it may also play a crucial role in the formulation of long-term monetary policy strategy. The other important consideration in the development of a monetary policy reaction function pertains to the endogeneity of the monetary policy. As pointed out by Goldfeld and Blinder (1972), if a policy variable responds to the lagged (or expected) target values, then considering such a policy variable as exogenous would not only introduce the problem of misspecification but will also produce serious biases in the parameters estimated from those models. In particular, if the monetary policy variable happens to be strongly influenced by target variables, then the standard result of the relative effectiveness of the monetary policy vis-a-vis fiscal policy can be questionable on the grounds of reverse causation problem.


Author(s):  
George Bragues

Though now almost entirely forgotten, Herbert Spencer was among the most widely read thinkers during the late nineteenth century. As part of his system of synthetic philosophy, Herbert Spencer addressed the topics of money and banking. This philosophic system articulates a concept of justice based on the principle of equal freedom. Invoking this principle, Spencer rejected a government-superintended regime of money and banking as unjust. Instead, he morally favored a system of free banking. Spencer also defended this system on economic grounds. His argument was that banks could be self-regulating in their management of the money supply, on the condition that the government limit its activities in the financial sphere to the enforcement of contracts. While Spencer’s case is not beyond questioning on philosophic and political grounds, he offers a distinctive and forceful analysis.


2000 ◽  
Vol 220 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-301
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

Summary Understanding the factors determining overnight rates is crucial both for central bankers and private market participants, since, assuming the validity of the expectation theory of the term structure of interest rates, expectations with regard to this “monadic” maturity should determine longer term rates, which are deemed to be relevant for the transmission of monetary policy. The note proposes a simple model of the money market within a two-day long reserve maintenance period to derive relationships between the relevant quantities, expectations concerning these quantities for the rest of the reserve maintenance period, and overnight rates. It is argued that a signal extraction problem faced by banks when observing quantities such as their aggregate reserve holdings and allotment amounts of monetary policy operations is at the core of these relationships. The usefulness of the model is illustrated by applying it to the analysis of three alternative liquidity management strategies of a central bank.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 434
Author(s):  
Bakhouya Driss

Globalization brings new challenges to the Algerian government. This issue implies a serious establishment of a domestic and a foreign economic stability in an attempt to confront the changes of the new economic wave. One of the reform requirements in this context is represented by the independent policy of the central banks. This consideration stems from the crucial role played by this institution in the economy (regulation of the money supply, organization of credits…). Algeria for instance embarked on this line of reform via various laws and jurisdictions. The study sheds light on the autonomy of the Algerian central bank through the law No. 03/11 in connection with the Monetary and Credit Law. The study states that the independence of the central and is a pivotal condition to increase the performance of the banking institutions in Algeria. The second point is that this autonomous policy of the central bank leads inevitably to a stabilization of the financial and economic indices of the country


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-62
Author(s):  
Jelena Vitomir ◽  
Đorđe Lazić

External and internal economic shocks can threaten the macroeconomic stability of a small economy. In the currency board regime, there is no role for the Central Bank as a macroeconomic stabilizer in the event of an external or internal shock. In this paper, the research is based on the analysis of eight countries with small economies with currency boards or discretionary monetary policy. The impact and connections between changes in EURIBOR, interest rates, inflation measured by the GDP deflator, money supply and GDP in the period 1997-2015 are analyzed. The paper proves that in countries with a currency board, whose regimes have a harmonized relationship with the European Central Bank and EURIBOR, interest rate shocks are less pronounced. The analysis of the links between EURIBOR, interest rates, money supply, inflation and GDP is not statistically significant in the "experiment" countries. In the control sample of countries with a variable exchange rate, the situation is heterogeneous for individual countries, but statistical significance has been determined in relation to EURIBOR and inflation. We conclude that EURIBOR may be one of the generators of exogenous shocks. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), there are much more significant internal transmission mechanisms that lead to macroeconomic imbalances. The growth of deposits was preceded by the growth of loans and money supply. This led to a fall in interest rates which the Central Bank of BiH (CBB&H) could not influence due to the currency board. However, the fall in interest rates did not yield the expected results. GDP has shrunk, inflation is falling, while at the same time the high unemployment rate has remained unchanged. The nominal exchange rate of the domestic currency was determined by law, but there was an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which affected the increase in the foreign trade imbalance. The result of the currency board is price stability, nominal exchange rate stability and money supply growth. Negative results are: appreciation of the real exchange rate, faster growth of imports and maintaining a very high unemployment rate. Macroeconomic developments in the BiH economy do not always have the right course that can be expected in mature economies. The achievements and applicability of standard macroeconomic policies are very limited.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin Cornel Dumiter

Abstract Recently, the remarkable trend upon central bank independence and the efficient monetary policy were seriously highlighted in the monetary economics field. Starting from 1990s’ central bank independence was at the core of policy making and central banking problems, because of the widespread economical, political, personal and budgetary autonomy of the central bank. Nowadays, we can observe an increasing trend upon central bank transparency, for evaluating more accurate the central bank’s performances by the wide public, mass-media and financial markets. Consequently, a central bank must encompass a high degree of accountability and responsibility, because of the final liability in case of failure. In this paper we present, analyze and assess the construction of the most important indices regarding central bank independence, transparency and accountability in a chronological manner, presenting also the advantages and disadvantages of these indices related to actual practices of central banks. Moreover, we analyze the analytical results of the empirical testing of these indices with a considerable impact upon the developed and developing country group. In regard with the empirical results of different authors, we suggest the importance and the necessity for constructing an aggregate index for measuring central bank independence, transparency and accountability, based on de jure stipulations and the actual practices of the central banks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Jacob Stevens ◽  

This paper models a representative bank, and uses this model to explore the assumptions and implications of a selection of money-creation theories. It is shown that the money-supply process tends toward the logic of exogeneity as banks' fears about liquidity stress increases. At present, banks do not fear liquidity stress because central banks are operating under a floor system with a superabundance of reserves following unsterilized quantitative easing. Secondly, a role for a ‘central-bank digital currency’ is suggested as a useful complement to reserves policy in an economy with large or collusive banks.


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