scholarly journals Improving Access to Justice in Kenya through Horizontal Application of the Bill of Rights and Judicial Review

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-84
Author(s):  
Doris Matu

Article 20 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 states that the Bill of Rights binds all state organs and all persons. However, the extent to which natural persons and private legal persons can be held liable for human rights violations has become an issue. The courts have differed and provided mixed directions as to liability for human rights violations by private persons. Under the previous constitutional era, only decisions of public entities could be reviewed through judicial review. This article is an attempt to illustrate, with the aid of case law, the increased possibility for access to justice by the litigant in constitutional rights matters post-2010. We move from the previous era where human rights could not generally be sought against private persons to one where there is an attitude of acceptance, albeit a very cautious one, where rights can now be sought against any private persons. Also, there is hope for justice and a better society in general, if private bodies’ decisions can also be judicially reviewed. Private entities wield immense power over individuals and it is crucial to lift the veil of privacy and go to the root of the matter by evaluating their decision-making processes.

2021 ◽  
pp. 232949652110288
Author(s):  
Meaghan Stiman

In theory, participatory democracies are thought to empower citizens in local decision-making processes. However, in practice, community voice is rarely representative, and even in cases of equal representation, citizens are often disempowered through bureaucratic processes. Drawing on the case of a firearm discharge debate from a rural county’s municipal meetings in Virginia, I extend research about how power operates in participatory settings. Partisan political ideology fueled the debate amongst constituents in expected ways, wherein citizens engaged collectivist and individualist frames to sway the county municipal board ( Celinska 2007 ). However, it was a third frame that ultimately explains the ordinance’s repeal: the bureaucratic frame, an ideological orientation to participatory processes that defers decision-making to disembodied abstract rules and procedures. This frame derives its power from its depoliticization potential, allowing bureaucrats to evade contentious political debates. Whoever is best able to wield this frame not only depoliticizes the debate to gain rationalized legitimacy but can do so in such a way to favor a partisan agenda. This study advances gun research and participatory democracy research by analyzing how the bureaucratic frame, which veils partisanship, offers an alternative political possibility for elected officials, community leaders, and citizens to adjudicate partisan debates.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 989-1007
Author(s):  
DANIELE AMOROSO

AbstractAccording to the agency paradigm enshrined by the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, private conducts are attributed to a state when they are carried out on the state's behalf or under its tight control. On closer look, this legal framework proves to be unable to deal with state involvement in human-rights violations perpetrated by powerful non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or transnational corporations. These wrongs, indeed, are often put in place with the fundamental contribution of – but not on behalf of (or under the control of) – a state, with the consequence that, under the traditional paradigm, they could not be attributed to the latter. Against this backdrop, the present paper argues that a new secondary norm has been developing that provides that private wrongs are to be imputed to a state if the latter knowingly facilitated (or otherwise co-operated in) their commission. Although international practice will be duly taken into account, the analysis will be focused mainly on US case law concerning corporate liability for international human-rights violations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 9-17
Author(s):  
Eric Che Muma

Abstract Since the introduction of democratic reforms in post-independent Africa, most states have been battling corruption to guarantee sustainable peace, human rights and development. Because of the devastating effects of corruption on the realisation of peace, human rights and sustainable development, the world at large and Africa in particular, has strived to fight against corruption with several states adopting national anti-corruption legislation and specialised bodies. Despite international and national efforts to combat corruption, the practice still remains visible in most African states without any effective accountability or transparency in decision-making processes by the various institutions charged with corruption issues. This has further hindered global peace, the effective enjoyment of human rights and sustainable development in the continent. This paper aims to examine the concept of corruption and combating corruption and its impact on peace, human rights and sustainable development in post-independent Africa with a particular focus on Cameroon. It reveals that despite international and national efforts, corruption still remains an obstacle to global peace in Africa requiring a more proactive means among states to achieve economic development. The paper takes into consideration specific socio-economic challenges posed by corruption and the way forward for a united Africa to combat corruption to pull the continent out of poverty, hunger and instability, and to transform it into a better continent for peace, human rights and sustainable development.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-101
Author(s):  
Dmitry Kuznetsov

When establishing human rights violations committed by the state, should it be violation of internationally protected rights or constitutional rights, the violator is obliged to compensate for the harm caused. In the meantime, neither international sources, nor national legal acts and case law answer the question whether the obligation to compensate is exhausted by the compensation awarded in accordance with a decision of an international judicial body or such a payment has punitive nature, and the state keeps the obligation to compensate the damage within the frameworks of national proceedings. Following the first part of opening remarks the second part of the article studies universal international law approach towards the state obligation to compensate for human rights violations, it reviews positions of the International Court of Justice, the model established in international customary law of international responsibility. The third part discusses the compensation mechanism of the European Court of Human Rights and a number of cases where the Russian Federation was the respondent state. The forth part considers national regulation of the Council of Europe states and case law thereof. The author argues that the established international case law in respect of awarding compensations for human rights violations is too restrictive – it does not take into account a complex nature of this phenomenon which includes both correction of the individual applicant situation (restitution of the pre-existed situation) and prevention of similar situations in the future. It is concluded that awarding the compensation by an international body primarily constitutes a measure of international responsibility whereas consideration by a national court is a more effective means of restitution of the applicants rights and that the national court shall not deny consideration of applicants claims due to the fact that they have already been awarded compensation by the international judicial body including the European Court of Human Rights.


Author(s):  
Colin Faragher

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the grounds for judicial review. These include irrationality—meaning unreasonableness—which is now linked to the principle of proportionality. In addition, the relevant case law and key principles concerning distinction between procedural and merits based judicial review are fully explained. The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on judicial review is assessed generally. The emergence and development of the ‘outcomes is all’ approach to judicial review where breach of convention rights is alleged is explored by examining a number of significant House of Lords cases.


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Guy Davidov ◽  
Maayan Davidov

Research on compliance has shown that people can be induced to comply with various requests by using techniques that capitalise on the human tendencies to act consistently and to reciprocate. Thus far this line of research has been applied to interactions between individuals, not to relations between institutions. We argue, however, that similar techniques are applied by courts vis-à-vis the government, the legislature and the public at large, when courts try to secure legitimacy and acceptance of their decisions. We discuss a number of known influence techniques – including ‘foot in the door’, ‘low-balling’, ‘giving a reputation to uphold’ and ‘door in the face’ – and provide examples from Israeli case law of the use of such techniques by courts. This analysis offers new insights that can further the understanding of judicial decision-making processes.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Tamir

In the two decades since Israel’s constitutional revolution, the Basic Laws have come to enjoy normative supremacy and demonstrate efficacy by enabling judicial review of the legislative and the executive branches. Yet, they have not assumed an integrative role in the Israeli society. In terms of their substance, the Basic Laws are incomplete in scope. In terms of the procedure leading up to their enactment, they lack public legitimacy. This can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that the Supreme Court was the key political actor responsible for retroactively upgrading the Basic Laws from regular laws to constitutional norms. This paper argues that the only document in the history of Israel possessing the potential to fulfill an integrative role was the Declaration of Independence. Due to its intrinsic ‘transitional’ characteristics and the unique socio-political circumstances surrounding its drafting, this founding document could and should have been perceived as a transitional constitution. This transitional constitution established Israel’s basic values and opened the way for an incremental constitutional process that continued with the enactment of the Basic Laws, and that will culminate only with the drafting of a full constitution. However, owing in part to the narrow conception of transitional justice, the Declaration was never interpreted as such. This historical error could have been corrected in 1994 as the identical principle clause of Israel’s two Human Rights Basic Laws—which constitute Israel’s (partial) Bill of Rights—declared that the human rights regime in Israel should be “respected in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence”. Yet, this opportunity was once again not seized. This failure carries unfortunate consequences for the Israeli constitutional regime since unlike the Basic Laws, which enjoy formal normative supremacy yet nonetheless suffer from legitimacy deficiencies, the Declaration bears the potential to fulfill an integrative constitutional function.


Author(s):  
Anthony Gray

In recent years, we have seen continued erosion of an individual’s right to silence. The most recent attempts in the author’s home country, Australia, include a current proposal to adopt the United Kingdom approach, and allow inferences to be drawn from a failure to answer questions at an early stage of investigation, in circumstances where later the person does provide an explanation. An attempt to protect the right to silence in Australia at constitutional level is challenging, because Australia is one of the few Western nations that has not seen fit to enact an express bill of rights. This article will consider whether arguments might be made that, at least in some contexts, infringement of the right to silence is, nevertheless, contrary to the requirements of the Australian Constitution. Courts in other countries around the world have also recognized the right to silence in some circumstances where legislatures have attempted to limit it, and these will be considered in the Australian context, acknowledging appropriate contextual differences. Many countries are faced with the difficulty of reconciling fundamental due process principles with the need for effective investigatory powers sufficient to deal with evolving criminal threats. It will be instructive to consider how a successful balance has been accommodated in a range of jurisdictions. It is believed that the law of the author’s home country could be greatly enriched by engaging with North American and European case law, as this article will seek to demonstrate. The article is considered to be of interest to those outside of Australia, to understand the difficulties in protecting fundamental human rights when an express bill of rights does not exist in the relevant country, and to consider how other ways may be found to protect such rights. In this way, this article will use Australia as the example of a country without an express bill of rights, and will consider how, in that context, fundamental human rights can practically be protected by the courts. The conclusions are considered relevant to a range of nations. Specific examples include Singapore and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent India, as will be explained.


ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla M Zoethout

AbstractOver the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems more and more inclined to use foreign sources of law, that is to say, law that does not originate in the Convention itself or in one of the Member States of the Council of Europe. Unlike in the US, there is little discussion in Europe about this form of judicial dialogue in the case-law of the ECtHR. This paper seeks both to clarify transnational dialogue by the ECtHR and find ways to justify this practice, against the backdrop of the American debate on this topic. First, the concept of transnational judicial dialogue is analysed (Part II). Then judicial dialogue as it presents itself in the judgments of the ECtHR is assessed, especially when non-Convention or foreign law is being used in a substantive way (Part III). Subsequently, an attempt is made to define when and why the use of foreign law by the ECtHR can be considered a justifiable approach in judicial decision-making (Part IV). The paper rounds off with some concluding remarks (Part V).


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