Why Share? Owners’ Motives for Profit-Sharing and Firm Profit

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 14311
Author(s):  
Jinyun Sun ◽  
Jiwen Song ◽  
Zheng Tianyi
Keyword(s):  
Profit Sharing ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Firm Profit

scholarly journals Pricing Linkage between Islamic Banking and Conventional Banking: The Case of Bangladesh

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 84
Author(s):  
Sarwar Uddin Ahmed ◽  
Ashikur Rahman ◽  
Samuel Parvez Ahmed ◽  
G M Wali Ullah
Keyword(s):  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Specific Rate ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Loss Mechanism ◽  
Monthly Data ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Conventional Banks ◽  
The Relationship

<p><em>Islamic banking is based on profit and loss mechanism where the use of interest is prohibited.  Unlike conventional banks, these banks do not charge a specific rate of interest, rather provides financing in exchange for profit sharing.  However, there are studies claiming that, in practice, Islamic banking is same as conventional banking with regard to the use of interest. It is also claimed that, Islamic deposits are not interest-free, but are closely attached to conventional deposits.  On this background, the objective of this study is to examine the relationship between pricing in Islamic banks vis-à-vis conventional banks by taking the case of Bangladesh. We have used monthly data during the period of 2009-2013. The findings of the study showed that, there is no statistically significant difference between the monthly average lending rates of Islamic banks and conventional banks. However, there is significant difference between deposit rates. The existence of causal relationship was inconclusive, and requires further analysis.</em></p>

scholarly journals Analysis of Umkm Cooperation Ratio in the Context of Musyarakah in Yogya Purwakarta Toserba Food Court

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-166
Author(s):  
Rachma Frattiwi
Keyword(s):  
Data Collection ◽  
Venture Capital ◽  
Qualitative Analysis ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cooperation Agreement ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Approach Method ◽  
Collaboration Agreement ◽  
Mutual Agreement

This research was conducted at the Yogya Purwakarta Toserba Food Court. The problem that occurred at the Yogya Purwakarta Toserba Food Court was that the concept of the collaboration agreement that was carried out tended to be wrong. The purpose of this study was first to determine the cooperation agreement undertaken by the UMKM with the "Yogya Rasa", namely the system of cooperation agreements for results. Cooperation agreement for profit sharing here is a cooperation agreement made by one party with another party. Where one party provides facilities or infrastructure in the form of a place in the form of a counter while the other party occupies the counter with a profit sharing system. second to find out the suitability of the Musyarakah contract concept. The cooperation agreement that has been carried out by the UMKM with the manager of Yogya Toserba Food Court is in accordance with the Syirkah Mudharabah concept in which this collaboration is carried out by the first party contributing capital and work at the same time while the second party only contributes only venture capital while profits are shared according to mutual agreement. This research uses descriptive qualitative analysis approach method. Data collection can be done by the method of observation, interviews and documentation

scholarly journals Sukuk (Obligasi Syariah) dalam Perspektif Keuangan Islam

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179
Author(s):  
Maula Nasrifah
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Mutual Respect ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Private Placement ◽  
Proof Of Ownership ◽  
Maturity Date ◽  
The Future

Islam strongly encourages investment so that possessions can be productive and bring benefits in the future, of course, using a good and right way, which is in accordance with Islamic sharia, like mutual respect and does not harm others. The type of investment can be varied, we can invest through the capital market, one of which is sukuk. Sukuk are securities that are proof of ownership (claim) on assets, whether in the form of tangible, intangible or project contracts from certain activities that require the issuer to pay revenue-sharing to the Sukuk holders and pay back the Sukuk in maturity date. The principle in Sukuk transactions is in the form of emphasis on fair agreements, recommendations for profit sharing systems. In Sukuk transaction, a number of certain assets are needed which to used as the basis for conducting transactions using a contract based on sharia principles. The types of Sukuk in terms of Sukuk Ijarah, Sukuk Mudharabah, Sukuk Musyarakah, Sukuk Istishna’ with the method of issuing in bookbuilding, auction methods and private placement. In sukuk transactions there is a requirement for Underlying Assets as well as activities or processes which have been based in accordance with sharia. This shows that investing with sukuk is not worrying for investors who want to transact with sharia financial institutions. Keywords: Investing, Transaction, Sukuk

scholarly journals INVESTIGATION OF REVENUE SHARING, TRANSPARENCY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE TO PROFIT DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-81
Author(s):  
MISMIWATI MISMIWATI ◽  
TONA AURORA LUBIS ◽  
ENGGAR DIAH PUSPA ARUM
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Distribution Management ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
For Profit ◽  
And Performance ◽  
A Company ◽  
Performance Research

This study was conducted to determine the effect on Profit Distribution Management recorded in Bank Indonesia on financing for profit sharing, transparency and performance. Research conducted using RGEC Method to determine the level of performance in the company and the population of this study is a company listed in the Jakarta Islamic Index of 2012-2016. The results of this study indicate that mudharabah variables have an effect but not significant to PDM, ROA and CAR have significant effect to PDM while musharaka, transparency, FDR, GCG and BOPO have no significant effect to PDM.

The Calculation of Premiums for Profit-Sharing Group Death Benefit Policies.

1955 ◽  
Vol 13 (02) ◽  
pp. 118-124
Author(s):  
P. J. H. Green
Keyword(s):  
Profit Sharing ◽  
For Profit ◽  
The Difference

The type of contract which will be considered is a renewable oneyear term assurance on a group of lives which provides, in addition to a capital sum on the death of any life, that if at the end of the year the total claims in the year are less than some fraction,k, of the premiums paid, then a fraction,l, of the difference will be refunded.Suppose thatPis the net andP′the office premium fornlives assured for a sum of 1 each and thatq(r)is the probability that exactlyrdeaths will occur during the year, then,wherecis the integral part ofkP′. Sinceequals the expected deaths,μsay, the equation may be written,whereand.

scholarly journals Motives for Profit Sharing: A Study of Canadian Chief Executive Officers

2005 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 712-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Long
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Telephone Survey ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Company Size ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Executive Officers

This study seeks to explain why companies do or do not introduce employee profit sharing, through a telephone survey of chief executive officers at 626 Canadian companies. In addition to examining some of the usual contextual variables, this study goes beyond previous work by directly questioning CEOs about their motives for adopting or not adopting profit sharing, and by including managerial philosophy as a possible factor in their decision-making process. Results indicated that managerial philosophy and company size were the two key predictors of incidence of profit sharing. However, the firms most likely to adopt profit sharing in the future were those experiencing a high growth in sales coupled with a low growth in employees. Surprisingly, unionization was not related to either présence of, or intention to implement, profit sharing.

scholarly journals Public-Private or Master-Servant? Examining the Implementation of the Serious Disease Insurance Scheme in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 1490
Author(s):  
Yingying Ma ◽  
Zhuojun Liu ◽  
Shuguang Shen
Keyword(s):  
Information Exchange ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Social Security Programs ◽  
Serious Disease

China’s Serious Disease Insurance Scheme (SDIS) was set up to relieve the financial burdens on serious disease patients. It is a crucial part of the national basic medical insurance scheme, which is regarded as one of the largest government-funded social security programs in the world. The most significant institutional innovation of the SDIS is that the approach of a public–private partnership (PPP) is applied in an attempt to facilitate the efficiency of its implementation. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the implementation of the SDIS in China through PPPs, and to identify the problems to be tackled if the Chinese government intends to make such a plan work better for the majority of urban and rural residents. With the effective support from local officials and practitioners, the authors of this paper collected copies of SDIS contracts of multiple cities in Guangdong, one of the most developed provinces of China. Guided by a research framework drawn from the PPP literature, details of contract enforcement were also examined. The authors discovered that the role of local states is rather dominant; they have manipulated contract drafting and implementation. Additionally, current mechanisms for profit sharing, risk sharing, and information exchange have placed insurance companies in a rather disadvantageous situation. To achieve the sustainable development of the SDIS, the authors suggest that a further reform on implementation of a PPP must be pushed forward.

ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE, RISK SHARING AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY IN ISLAMIC BANKS

2006 ◽  
Vol 09 (03) ◽  
pp. 269-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
SIMON ARCHER ◽  
RIFAAT AHMED ABDEL KARIM
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Asset Risk ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Management Fees ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Banks Set

Islamic banks do not pay interest on customers' deposit accounts. Instead, customers' funds are placed in profit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA). Under this arrangement, the returns to the bank's customers are their pro-rata shares of the returns on the assets in which their funds are invested, and if these returns are negative so are the returns to the customers. The bank is entitled to a contractually agreed share of positive returns (profits) as remuneration for its work as asset manager; however, if the returns are zero or negative, the bank receives no remuneration but does not share in any loss. In the case of Unrestricted PSIA, the investment account holders' funds are invested (i.e., commingled) in the bank's asset pool together with the bank's shareholders' own funds and the funds of current account holders. In that case, the bank's own funds that are invested in the asset pool are treated the same as those of Unrestricted PSIA holders for profit and loss sharing purposes; however, the shareholders also receive as part of their profit the remuneration earned by the bank as asset manager (less certain expenses not chargeable to the PSIA holders). This remuneration (management fees) represents an important source of revenue and profits for Islamic banks. From a capital market perspective, this arrangement presents an apparent anomaly, as follows: shareholders and Unrestricted PSIA holders share the same asset risk on the commingled funds, but shareholders enjoy higher returns because of the management fees. On the other hand, competitive pressure may induce the bank to forgo some of its management fees in order to pay a competitive return to its PSIA holders. In this way, some of the PSIA holders' asset risk is absorbed by the shareholders. This phenomenon has been termed "displaced commercial risk" [2]. This paper analyzes this phenomenon. We argue that, in principle, displaced commercial risk is potentially an efficient and value-creating means of sharing risks between two classes of investor with different risk diversification capabilities and preferences: wealthy shareholders who are potentially well diversified, and less wealthy PSIA holders who are not. In practice, however, Islamic banks set up reserves with the intention of minimizing any need to forgo management fees.

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