Leon Petrażycki jako twórca nowej teorii prawa naturalnego

2018 ◽  
Vol 74 ◽  
pp. 185-188
Author(s):  
Maria Szyszkowska
Keyword(s):  
21St Century ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Regulations ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Scientific Disciplines ◽  
Variable Content ◽  
Human Psyche ◽  
The Way

Petrażycki’s philosophy of law remains significant in the 21st century and adheres to the concept of democracy as a system characterized by ideological pluralism. Leon Petrażycki is often mistakenly included in legal positivism. Alike Rudolf Stammler, he is the creator of the theory of natural law of with variable content. The essential necessity of ideals in the life of individuals and society demonstrated by Petrażycki is very important because the ideals perfect the human psyche. Petrażycki’s view indicating the importance of consciousness is significant beyond other scientific disciplines. All legal regulations depend on its level of development, and determine the way of management.

scholarly journals RUDOLF VON JHERING E A GENELOGIA DA ÉTICA: O DEVIR HISTÓRICO COMO DETERMINANTE DA PROCEDÊNCIA DO SENTIMENTO JURÍDICO * RUDOLF VON JHERING AND THE GENELOGIA ETHICS: THE BECOMING HISTORY AS DETERMINING THE ORIGIN OF THE LEGAL SENSE

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Henrique Garbellini Carnio
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Natural Laws ◽  
Em 12 ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legal Sense ◽  
The Way

<p><strong>Resumo:</strong> O presente artigo tem como base a conferência dada por Rudolf von Jhering em 12 de março de 1884 para a Sociedade Jurídica de Viena, intitulada "Sobre o nascimento do sentimento jurídico". O objetivo é demonstrar algumas reflexões surpreendentes e pouco conhecidas deste importante jurista, enfatizando, em especial, a importância que ele atribui ao devir histórico na formação do sentimento jurídico, apostando que o sentido do direito é modelado pela história e não proveniente das leis naturais eternas. Jhering, propondo uma tarefa genealógica, defende de forma contundente um historicismo ético e jurídico que o distancia de um relativismo absoluto como o das clássicas posições jusnaturalistas, completamente ahistóricas, que se revela extremamente interessante para as reflexões atuais sobre a filosofia do direito.</p><p><strong>Palavras-chave:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; sentimento jurídico; historicismo ético-político.</p><p><strong>Abstract:</strong> This article is based on a lecture given by Rudolf von Jhering on March 12, 1884 for the Law Society of Vienna, entitled "About the birth of the legal feeling." The objective is to demonstrate some surprising and little-known reflections of this important jurist, emphasizing, in particular, the importance he attaches to the historical development in the formation of the legal feeling, betting that the sense of law is shaped by history and not from the eternal natural laws. Jhering proposing a genealogical task, forcefully defends an ethical and legal historicism that distances him of the absolute relativism as the way of classic natural law positions, completely ahistorical, that reveals itself highly interesting for the current reflections on the philosophy of law.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; legal feeling; ethical and political historicism.</p>

scholarly journals Demokratyczna legitymizacja prawa – tworzenie i stosowanie prawa (zarys problemu)

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-10
Author(s):  
Tomasz Bekrycht
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Communication Model ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
European Crisis ◽  
The Eu ◽  
The Way

The aim of the article by the way of introduction is a sketching out some remarks from a perspective of philosophy of law concerning the contemporary crisis, which currently take place in many countries in Europe and in the EU. The author claims that the discussions and disputes over the nowadays European crisis is based on out-of-date paradigm presumptions such as legal positivism and post-totalitarian models of law. To solve the disputes the author proposes reflection based on conception of a communication model of law and community citizens’ idea.

scholarly journals Legge morale e legge civile a difesa dell’uomo in Giovanni Paolo II

2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Palazzani
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Law And Ethics

L’autore analizza nella prospettiva della filosofia del diritto la questione del rapporto tra diritto e morale nella Evangelium Vitae. In particolare si sofferma ad analizzare le teorie che tematizzano la neutralità del diritto (nella pretesa di separare il diritto dalla morale pluralistica), quali la teoria liberalelibertaria che identifica il diritto con la garanzia dell’autonomia individuale e la teoria democratico-procedurale che fa coincidere il diritto con il voto di maggioranza. Giovanni Paolo II critica i percorsi postmoderni del diritto, riprendendo sul piano filosofico e teologico la dottrina del diritto naturale (in contrapposizione al giuspositivismo), che riconosce nell’uomo i diritti inviolabili e la dignità intrinseca. Nell’orizzonte giusnaturalista, esiste un dovere morale da parte del cittadino a criticare e a non obbedire alle leggi ingiuste e da parte del giurista e del politico ad operare per abrogare, riformarle e riformularle, al fine di adeguare il diritto positivo alle esigenze intrinseche della natura umana. ---------- The author analysis the question of the relation between law and ethics in Evangelium Vitae in the perspective of the philosophy of law. In particular, it focuses on the theories that speak about neutrality of law (separating law from moral pluralism), such as libertarian-liberalism which identifies law with individual autonomy and procedural democracy which identifies law with opinions of majority. John Paul II criticizes postmodern patterns of law, reaffirming on philosophical and theological level the doctrine of natural law (against legal positivism) which recognises in human being the inviolable rights and intrinsic dignity. In this perspective, there is a moral duty on the part of citizen to criticize and not to obey to unjust laws and on the part of jurist and politician to work for an abolition, reform and reformulation of law, to adequate positive law to the intrinsic instances of human nature.

ON PRACTICES AND THE LAW

Legal Theory ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Greenberg
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Social Facts ◽  
Motivational States ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legal Domain ◽  
Domain I ◽  
The Way

In a recent paper, “How Facts Make Law,” I launch an attack on a fundamental doctrine of legal positivism. I argue that nonnormative facts cannot themselves constitutively determine the content of the law. In a response published in this journal, Ram Neta defends the view that nonnormative social facts are sufficient to determine normative facts, including both moral and legal facts. Neta's paper provides a useful opportunity to address a spelled-out version of this view, which in various forms is widely held in philosophy of law and other areas of philosophy. I begin by addressing Neta's attempts to show that descriptive facts can alone determine moral and legal facts. First, Neta's account of why it is wrong to break promises fails. In addition to other problems, it begs the question by taking for granted that a person's desires or other motivational states necessarily justify the actions that they motivate. Next, I turn to Neta's attempt to provide a counterexample to my view about law. In my original paper, I claim that the nature of the constitutive determination relation in the legal domain is what I callrational determination. Roughly speaking, a full constitutive account of the legal facts must include reasons that explain the relation between the determining facts and the legal facts. The facts on which Neta's putative counterexample depends cannot be reasons of the required sort because they take for granted what they are supposed to explain—the way in which nonnormative social facts contribute to the content of the law. Finally, I address the larger issue of how far my argument applies to other domains. I consider and reject Neta's argument that purports to show that all normative domains have the relevant features of the legal domain. I then sketch a competing picture of some normative domains.

scholarly journals Plain legal language and the basic concepts of the philosophy of law

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 27-43
Author(s):  
Jagoda Skwarek
Keyword(s):  
Public Sphere ◽  
Effective Communication ◽  
Communication Model ◽  
Legal Regulations ◽  
Plain Language ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Legal Language ◽  
Legal Studies ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
The Way

The aim of the presented article is to demonstrate the possibility of implementing the principles of the Wrocław effective communication model in research conducted by theorists and philosophers of law as well as linguists. The author reflects on the difficulty of comprehending legal language and creating texts of normative acts in an uncomplicated manner. The “plain language” standard has been used in the Polish public sphere, which is why it is worth considering that the introduction of legal regulations would permanently change the way law is made and applied. The call for a clear language in legislation has long been voiced in legal studies. The area requires in-depth research and then perhaps specific solutions in order for plain legal language to become a standard.

scholarly journals Hart y el problema del positivismo jurídico. Una reconstrucción en tres actos = Hart and the problem of legal positivism. A reconstruction in three acts

2019 ◽  
pp. 2
Author(s):  
Francisco M. Mora-Sifuentes
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Validity ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The One ◽  
Legal Identification ◽  
The Way

RESUMEN: Este trabajo tiene como finalidad destacar la contribución específica de H.L.A. Hart sobre el problema del positivismo jurídico. A juicio del autor, el tratamiento que Hart dio a la polémica entre positivismo jurídico y Derecho Natural estuvo marcada por dos extremos aparentemente contradictorios. Por una parte, se abocó a clarificar las diversas tesis que anidan tras la etiqueta “positivismo jurídico”, así como las posiciones que suelen referirse como tales. Al hacerlo abrió el camino para mostrar en qué sentido no resulta ilógico defender algunas tesis asociadas al mismo o negar otras. Por otra parte, y si bien no asumió una posición que afirmase la conexión necesaria entre Derecho y moral, se ocupó también de mostrar en qué sentido tal conexión existe y es importante. Con dicho objetivo, en el primer apartado se ofrece una reconstrucción detallada sobre el tratamiento que Hart hizo sobre el problema del positivismo jurídico. En el segundo se expone el tratamiento del autor sobre el iusnaturalismo, con la intención de comprender el lugar preciso e implicaciones de su conocida tesis del “contenido mínimo Derecho Natural”. En la tercera parte se aborda la teoría elaborada por Hart sobre el positivismo jurídico, esto es, el “positivismo jurídico hartiano” y las tesis por él defendidas. Importante aquí será su posición respecto a la posibilidad de que la regla de reconocimiento pueda incorporar criterios materiales para la identificación jurídica que nos introduce en una nueva etapa de la nunca acabada polémica. ABSTRACT: The aim of this work is to address H.L.A. Hart’s contribution to the problem of legal positivism. According to the author, Hart’s approach to the controversy of Natural Law/Legal Positivism was characterized by two apparently opposing ends. On the one hand, he clarified the label “Legal Positivism” as well as other approaches that are usually referred as such. In doing so, he paved the way to show in which sense it is not illogical to defend some theses associated with it and in which sense it is not. On the other hand, despite he did not take a stand for the necessary connection between Law and Morals, he did show in what sense such connection may exist and why it is important. To this end, section one offers a detailed reconstruction of Hart’s approach to the problem of legal positivism. In section two the author’s approach to Natural Law is explained so that his well-known thesis of “The Minimum Content of Natural Law”, and what it implies, is properly understood. Section three is devoted to Hart’s theory of Legal Positivism that is “Hartian Legal Positivism”, where his main claims are presented. Hart’s claim on the possibility for the rule of recognition to incorporate material criteria for legal identification or legal validity is particular relevant because it introduces us to a new stage of the never-ending controversy. PALABRAS CLAVE: H.L.A. Hart, positivismo jurídico, teorías de derecho natural, positivismo jurídico incluyenteKEYWORDS: H.L.A. Hart, legal positivism, natural law theories, inclusive legal positivism. 

Remembering the Past in Nineteenth-Century Scotland

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
National Identity ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Collective Memories ◽  
The Past ◽  
Prevailing View ◽  
The Way

At a time when the Union between Scotland and England is once again under the spotlight, Remembering the Past in Nineteenth-Century Scotland examines the way in which Scotland’s national heroes were once remembered as champions of both Scottish and British patriotism. Whereas 19th-century Scotland is popularly depicted as a mire of sentimental Jacobitism and kow-towing unionism, this book shows how Scotland’s national heroes were once the embodiment of a consistent, expressive and robust view of Scottish nationality. Whether celebrating the legacy of William Wallace and Robert Bruce, the reformer John Knox, the Covenanters, 19th-century Scots rooted their national heroes in a Presbyterian and unionist view of Scotland’s past. Examined through the prism of commemoration, this book uncovers collective memories of Scotland’s past entirely opposed to 21st-century assumptions of medieval proto-nationalism and Calvinist misery. Detailed studies of 19th-century commemoration of Scotland’s national heroes Uncovers an all but forgotten interpretation of these ‘great Scots’ Shines a new light on the mindset of nineteenth-century Scottish national identity as being comfortably Scottish and British Overturns the prevailing view of Victorian Scottishness as parochial, sentimental tartanry

Riccardo Saccenti, Debating Medieval Natural Law: A Survey. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, XIII, pp. 155.

Mediaevistik ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 318-320
Author(s):  
Scott L. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Great Chain Of Being ◽  
History Of ◽  
History Of Concepts ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
University Of Notre Dame ◽  
Conceptual Shift

Saccenti’s volume belongs to the category of Begriffsgeschichte, the history of concepts, and more particularly to the debate over the existence or nonexistence of a conceptual shift in ius naturale to encompass a subjective notion of natural rights. The author argues that this issue became particularly relevant in mid-twentieth century, first, because of the desire to delimit the totalitarian implications of legal positivism chez Hans Kelsen; second, in response to Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being and its progeny; and third, as a result of a revival of neo-Thomistic and neo-scholastic perspectives sometimes labelled “une nouvelle chrétienté.”

On the Artifactual—and Natural— Character of Legal Institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The Law ◽  
Theory Of Law

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.

Interpretivism in Jurisprudence: What Difference Does the Philosophy of History Make to the Philosophy of Law?

2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-393
Author(s):  
Naomi Choi
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Historical Interpretation ◽  
Interpretive Theory ◽  
Legal Positivist ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Positivist Approach

AbstractTo answer the question of what difference the philosophy of history makes to the philosophy of law this paper begins by calling attention to the way that Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law is supposed to upend legal positivism. My analysis shows how divergent theories about what law and the basis of legal authority is are supported by divergent points of view about what concepts are, how they operate within social practices, and how we might best give account of such meanings. Such issues are widely debated in the philosophy of history but are often overlooked in jurisprudential circles. When the legal positivist approach to meanings is contrasted with Dworkin's interpretivism it is clear that what is needed is an alternative to both, in the form of what we might call "historical meanings" and "historical interpretation". While Dworkin's interpretivism gets it right that legal positivism is an inadequate philosophy of law to the extent that it is committed to a "criterial semantics" view of concepts, this paper argues that post-positivism in the philosophy of law need not entail a normative jurisprudence, as Dworkin would have it.

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