scholarly journals Justice in the Social Distribution of Health

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-425
Author(s):  
Johannes Kniess ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Health Inequalities ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Social Good ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Bases ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Social Distribution

How should we think, from the point of view of distributive justice, about inequalities in health and longevity? Norman Daniels’s influential account derives a social duty to reduce health inequalities from Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity. This paper criticises Daniels’s approach and offers an alternative. To the extent that the basic structure of society shapes people’s opportunities to be healthy, we ought to think of ‘the social bases of health’ directly as a Rawlsian primary social good. The paper attempts to clarify the correct principle for its distribution, and its relationship to other goods that give rise to considerations of justice.

scholarly journals Axel Honneth and The Reconstruction of Justice: An Attempt to Overcome the "Distribution Paradigm"

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Stanley Souza Marques ◽  
Marcelo Andrade Cattoni De Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Reciprocal Relationships ◽  
Individual Life ◽  
Axel Honneth ◽  
The Social ◽  
Normative Reconstruction ◽  
Set Up

The article takes up the criticisms directed by Axel Honneth to the basic structure of the dominant conceptions of justice, but merely to point out the general outlines of his alternative project of justice normative reconstruction. If John Rawls and Michael Walzer structure theories of distributive justice very consistently and in order to get to the autonomy protection (already taken so) in a more sophisticated way, that to be satisfied it transcends the (mere) obligation of not interfering in the realization of individual life projects, Honneth proposes the radicalization of justice's demands. It is because he pays his attention to the mutual expectation of consideration. This point would be the new texture of the social justice. In this sense, the principles of fair distribution leave the scene to make way for principles which guidelines are directed towards the society basic institutions involved in a new goal: to set up favourable contexts for the success of plural reciprocal relationships.

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

scholarly journals Equality of Opportunity versus Sufficiency of Capabilities in Healthcare

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Efrat Ram-Tiktin
Keyword(s):  
Growth Hormone ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Breast Surgery ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Equity In Health ◽  
Norman Daniels ◽  
Short Children ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Practical Implications

<p><em>This paper compares three accounts of distributive justice in health and, more specifically, healthcare. I discuss two accounts—Norman Daniels’ fair equality of opportunity for health and Shlomi Segall’s luck-prioritarian equity in health—and contrast them with a sufficientarian account based on sufficiency of capabilities. The discussion highlights some important theoretical differences and similarities among the three accounts. The focus, however, is on the practical implications of each account in three hypothetical cases: synthesized growth hormone for short children, forms of compensation for paraplegics, and reconstructive breast surgery versus cosmetic breast enhancement. My aim is to show that by replacing egalitarian concerns with sufficiency and by focusing on capabilities (rather than opportunities), it is possible to provide a more reasonable and justifiable account of justice in healthcare.</em><em></em></p>

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?

Beyond Health Care

2019 ◽  
pp. 248-296
Author(s):  
Alex Rajczi
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Safety Net ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Social Safety Net ◽  
New Approach ◽  
The Social ◽  
American Health Care ◽  
Conservative View ◽  
The U.S

This chapter argues that this book’s examination of the American health care debate has revealed larger lessons. Latent in our discussion is a whole new approach to debates about the social minimum—one that can prove useful during inquiries into any part of the social safety net, not just health care, and that can be applied to debates in any country, not just the U.S. Specifically, the discussion in the previous chapters has hinted at a way of understanding a conservative point of view about distributive justice, one that is usually overlooked. This chapter describes it more thoroughly and explains why it is philosophically significant. The chapter then identifies the parts of the conservative view that progressives might challenge, thereby building up a picture of the progressive view itself. The chapter closes by explaining why it is valuable to frame debates over the social safety net in this new way.

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?

Socially Constructed Conceptions of Distributive Justice: The Case of Affirmative Action

1994 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-49
Author(s):  
Charles Lockhart
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Cultural Theory ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Quarter Century ◽  
Socially Constructed ◽  
The Social ◽  
Ways Of Life

In the last quarter-century Americans have carried on a lively argument over the nature of distributive justice, equality of opportunity and particularly the appropriateness of affirmative action. Indeed two distinct conceptions of equality of opportunity, drawing on conflicting underlying visions of distributive justice and adopting different stances toward affirmative action, have emerged in both academic and popular circles. Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky's Cultural Theory can be applied to explain the form and focus of this argument as a struggle between the conflicting preferences of rival—individualistic and egalitarian—ways of life. This analysis shows how the longevity and intractable character of the argument are consequences of the social embedding of preferences. That is, individualists and egalitarians cannot further their preferred ways of life with respect to these issues without engendering this conflict. The irreconcilable character of this clash is further underscored by Cultural Theory's capacity to illuminate oversights in the most sophisticated of extant efforts to bridge these opposing views.

scholarly journals Dilemmas of Rawlsian Opportunity

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Gomberg
Keyword(s):  
Working Class ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Growing Up ◽  
Apparent Contradiction ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Just Society

In A Theory of Justice and elsewhere John Rawls writes that the basic structure of any society affects the life prospects of those growing up in different ‘starting places,’ yet his conception of equal opportunity seems to require that one's opportunities not be affected by the class position of one's birth. Here I explicate this apparent contradiction and reconcile these assertions. In Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity children from working-class families have lesser opportunity to attain advantaged positions.Rawls's view cannot be easily revised to allow equal prospects for all children. Within the framework of Rawls's understanding of a just society, he is right to say that his own conception of fair equality of opportunity allows deep inequalities in life prospects.

Kant on the Highest Moral-Physical Good: The Social Aspect of Kant's Moral Philosophy

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Formosa
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Social Aspect ◽  
Highest Good ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Social Good ◽  
Dinner Party ◽  
The Social ◽  
Good Living ◽  
The Law

In §88, entitled ‘On the highest moral-physical good’, in hisAnthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View(hereafterAnthropologyfor short), Kant argues that ‘good living’ (physical good) and ‘true humanity’ (moral good) best harmonize in a ‘good meal in good company’. The conversation and company shared over a meal, Kant argues, best provides for the ‘union of social good living with virtue’ in a way that promotes ‘true humanity’. This occurs when the inclination to ‘good living’ is not merely kept within the bounds of ‘the law of virtue’ but where the two achieve a graceful harmony. As such, it is not to be confused with Kant's well-known account of the ‘highest good’, happiness in proportion to virtue. But how is it that the humble dinner party and the associated practices of hospitality come to hold such an important, if often unrecognized, place as the highest moral-physical good in Kant's thought? This question is in need of further investigation. Of the most recent studies in English that have taken seriously the importance of Kant'sAnthropologyfor understanding his wider moral philosophy, very few have considered §88 in any depth. This paper aims to help bridge this signifcant gap in the literature.

Natural and Social Inequality

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 576-601 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Aas ◽  
David Wasserman
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Social Inequality ◽  
Social Inequalities ◽  
General Concept ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Social Causation ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity

This paper examines the moral import of a distinction between natural and social inequalities. Following Thomas Nagel, it argues for a “denatured” distinction that relies less on the biological vs. social causation of inequalities than on the idea that society is morally responsible for some inequalities but not others. It maintains that securing fair equality of opportunity by eliminating such social inequalities has particularly high priority in distributive justice. Departing from Nagel, it argues that society can be responsible for inequalities not only when they are the unintended result of justifiable projects, but even when their alleviation would be very costly. Sharing Nagel’s general concept of ‘social inequality’, then, this paper proposes a far more expansive conception. We argue that many disadvantages due to disability fall under this conception. Eliminating or alleviating those disadvantages should be regarded as securing fair equality of opportunity, not improving the condition of the worst-off.

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