scholarly journals Axel Honneth and The Reconstruction of Justice: An Attempt to Overcome the "Distribution Paradigm"

Author(s):  
Stanley Souza Marques ◽  
Marcelo Andrade Cattoni De Oliveira

The article takes up the criticisms directed by Axel Honneth to the basic structure of the dominant conceptions of justice, but merely to point out the general outlines of his alternative project of justice normative reconstruction. If John Rawls and Michael Walzer structure theories of distributive justice very consistently and in order to get to the autonomy protection (already taken so) in a more sophisticated way, that to be satisfied it transcends the (mere) obligation of not interfering in the realization of individual life projects, Honneth proposes the radicalization of justice's demands. It is because he pays his attention to the mutual expectation of consideration. This point would be the new texture of the social justice. In this sense, the principles of fair distribution leave the scene to make way for principles which guidelines are directed towards the society basic institutions involved in a new goal: to set up favourable contexts for the success of plural reciprocal relationships.

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (137) ◽  
pp. 401
Author(s):  
Denilson Luis Werle

O artigo pretende examinar a relação entre reconhecimento e autonomia na teoria da justiça de Axel Honneth construída a partir da reconstrução normativa das relações intersubjetivas de reconhecimento mútuo presentes nas práticas sociais e instituições políticas e jurídicas das sociedades modernas. Para entender tanto seus fundamentos normativos quanto para examinar suas possibilidades concretas de realização, a questão da justiça não deve ser formulada em termos meramente distributivos e alocativos, mas sim do ponto de vista da reconstrução de suas gramáticas implícitas nos conflitos sociais e políticos e sedimentadas na estrutura básica da sociedade. A justiça deve ser vista como um conceito relacional orientado para o diagnóstico crítico das relações de dominação social e política arbitrárias, tendo como objeto primário os diferentes contextos e práticas de socialização das pessoas e grupos, tendo em vista primeiramente as estruturas e relações intersubjetivas, e não os estados subjetivos ou supostamente objetivos de provisão de bens e de satisfação de necessidades.Abstract: The article aims to examine the relations between recognition and autonomy in Axel Honneth´s theory of justice. This theory is based on the normative reconstruction of the interpersonal relations of mutual recognition which are present in the social practices and political and legal institutions of modern societies. To understand its normative foundations as well as examine its practical possibilities of realization, the question of justice should not be made on purely distributive and allocative terms, but by reconstructing the “grammars” of justice, that are implicit in social and political practices and sedimented in the basic structure of society. Justice must be seen as a relational concept designed for the critical diagnosis of arbitrary relations of social and political domination. The primary subject of justice is the different contexts and practices of individual and group socialization. It should first bear in mind the structures and interpersonal relations and not the subjective or putatively objective states that provide goods and satisfy needs.


2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.


Author(s):  
Rodney G. Peffer

I take up the "What is equality?" controversy begun by Amartya Sen in 1979 by critically considering utility (J. S. Mill), primary goods (John Rawls), property rights (John Roemer) and basic capabilities in terms of what is to be distributed according to principles and theories of social justice. I then consider the four most general principles designed to answer issues raised by the Equality of Welfare principle, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare principle, Equality of Resources principle and Equality of Opportunity for Resources principle. I consider each with respect to the more general normative principle that whatever theory of social or distributive justice we accept should be as ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive as feasible in real world circumstances. In this context I take up the problems of expensive tastes, expensive disabilities, lowered or manipulated preferences or ‘needs,’ and differential needs versus differential talents and abilities. I argue that the best solution is to adopt a modified version of Rawls’ theory which takes primary social goods as that which is to be distributed but which demands a Basic Rights principle that insures basic subsistent rights (as well as basic security rights) as the most fundamental principle of morality (and social justice), and then demands that Rawls’ Difference Principle be applied lexically to the ‘material’ goods of income, wealth, and leisure time, but done so that the social basis of self-respect is never undermined.


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-425
Author(s):  
Johannes Kniess ◽  

How should we think, from the point of view of distributive justice, about inequalities in health and longevity? Norman Daniels’s influential account derives a social duty to reduce health inequalities from Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity. This paper criticises Daniels’s approach and offers an alternative. To the extent that the basic structure of society shapes people’s opportunities to be healthy, we ought to think of ‘the social bases of health’ directly as a Rawlsian primary social good. The paper attempts to clarify the correct principle for its distribution, and its relationship to other goods that give rise to considerations of justice.


Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This volume of essays addresses a wide range of issues in contemporary political philosophy, from the different branches of liberalism and their relation to capitalism, to the basic institutions of a liberal society that underwrite political and economic justice. Samuel Freeman is a leading political philosopher and one of the foremost authorities on the works of John Rawls. This volume contains nine of his essays on liberalism, Rawls, and distributive justice. Freeman organizes his chapters into a narrative arc: from liberalism as the dominant political and economic system in the Western world, to the laws governing interpersonal transactions in a liberal society, to the broad social and political structures that determine distributive justice. Freeman analyzes the primary differences between the classical and high liberal traditions; shows why libertarianism is not a liberal view; argues for the social rather than global bases of distributive justice; demonstrates why Rawls’s difference principle supports a property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism; and shows how Rawls’s liberal principles of justice and the difference principle are to be applied in both ideal and non-ideal circumstances, effectively responding to criticisms by Amartya Sen, G. A. Cohen, and others.


Author(s):  
Alan Ryan

This chapter examines the impact of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice on the liberal audience that took it up. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls offers a defense of civil disobedience that would make politically motivated disobedience a much more acceptable part of our political life than either the U.S. Supreme Court or the English judiciary seems likely to contemplate. Furthermore, his views about the subservience of economic institutions to “social justice” place him firmly on one side of what is currently the most fiercely contested dividing line in politics in Britain today. The chapter also considers Rawls's use of the theory of the social contract to support his arguments; his principle of “the priority of liberty”; and his “difference principle.” It asserts that Rawls is safe from those critics who maintain that what purports to be a defense of liberalism actually collapses into a wholesale collectivism.


2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (131) ◽  
pp. 393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nythamar De Oliveira

O artigo propõe uma reconstrução normativa da crítica comunitarista ao liberalismo, revisitando a crítica iniciada por Michael Sandel com relação à teoria da justiça em John Rawls e reformulada por “simpatizantes” comunitaristas (Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, Alaisdair MacIntyre) e pensadores políticos da Teoria Crítica (Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Axel Honneth), sobretudo quanto aos problemas correlatos do individualismo metodológico, da concepção de bem e da socialidade.Abstract: The article proposes a normative reconstruction of the communitarian critique of liberalism, recasting the critique initiated by Michael Sandel vis à vis John Rawls’s theory of justice and reformulated by communitarian “sympathizers” (Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, Alaisdair MacIntyre) and political thinkers of Critical Theory (Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Axel Honneth), especially as for the related problems of methodological individualism, the conception of the good, and sociality.


2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 620-622
Author(s):  
Bruce Miroff

Why have American liberals been losing most political contests in recent decades? Theorist Thomas A. Spragens argues that the core of liberalism's problems lies in an ill-conceived transformation in public philosophy. In a “political treatise informed by scholarly resources” (p. ix), he defends an older liberalism, which he describes as populist and progressive, and decries a new one that he associates with the social justice approach of John Rawls. Shifting his attention back and forth from theory to practice, Spragens constructs an argument that liberalism will not recoup its political fortunes until it rediscovers its “populist heart” (p. xvii). Bearing some resemblance to previous treatises by Richard Rorty and Michael Sandel (along with important differences that Spragens notes), Getting the Left Right is provocative and powerful as theoretical critique and advocacy, but is less effective in providing a historical explanation for contemporary liberalism's troubled state.


10.18060/210 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-327
Author(s):  
Denise L. Levy

Trends in contemporary social work include the use of an eclectic theory base. In an effort to incorporate multiple theories, this article will examine the social problem of homophobia using two different theoretical perspectives: John Rawls’ theory of social justice and lesbian feminist theory.Homophobia, a current social problem, can be defined as “dislike or hatred toward homosexuals, including both cultural and personal biases against homosexuals” (Sullivan, 2003, p. 2). Rawls’ theory of justice and lesbian feminist theory are especially relevant to the issue of homophobia and provide a useful lens to understanding this social problem. In this article, these two theories will be summarized, applied to the issue of homophobia, and compared and contrasted based on their utility.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Reagan

Paul Ricœur devoted much of his last ten years to studies and analyses of justice and recognition. This paper will trace the indelible bonds between justice and recognition and claim that recognition is a necessary condition for justice and that justice is the telos or goal of recognition. I begin this paper with a review of the multiple meanings of recognition in the two famous French dictionaries, the Littré (1859-1872) and the Le Grand Robert (1985). In his book, The Course of Recognition (2005), Ricoeur groups recognition under three headings, recognition as a form of knowledge or cognition (epistemological), self-recognition, and recognition of the other on the social and judicial level.The complexities of the meanings of “to recognize” and “recognition” are important in their roles in the realm of justice. I include in the concept of justice, the judiciary, both civil and criminal; distributive justice; and, social and political justice. For each one of these, there are multiple meanings of recognition that are important to understanding their foundation and their scope. There are meanings of recognition that are relevant to other aspects of social justice as the recognition of marginal, oppressed, devalued, groups as deserving of being treated as equals. The structure of my paper is to go through the various meanings and categories of meanings of “to recognize” and “recognition.” I give an account of each of the types of justice and show how various kinds of recognition are relevant to each kind of justice.


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