scholarly journals Does extreme political ideology predict conspiracy beliefs, economic evaluations and political trust? Evidence from Sweden

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 435-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Krouwel ◽  
Yordan Kutiyski ◽  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
Johan Martinsson ◽  
Elias Markstedt

A large volume of academic research has demonstrated that individuals who profess radical political ideology, both left- and right-wing, tend to share similar underlying psychological patterns. By utilizing data collected through a voting advice application in Sweden, this study aims to assess whether extreme leftists and rightists share similarities in the psychological and political understanding of how society functions. We propose three hypotheses to test this pattern: Extreme left and right individuals are more inclined to believe in conspiracy theories than moderates; they are more likely to have negative economic evaluations; and they are less politically and interpersonally trustful. By means of hierarchical regression analyses, we reveal a quadratic relationship between extreme political ideology and conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, we find a similar linkage between ideology and economic evaluations. However, the empirical analyses fail to provide evidence that extreme ideology is related to lower political and interpersonal trust.

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-97
Author(s):  
Asbjørn Dyrendal ◽  
Leif Kennair ◽  
James Lewis

Recent studies on conspiracy thinking has concluded that the strongest predictor of the tendency towards conspiratorial thinking is a one-dimensional construct-conspiracy mentality-that is relatively stable over time and valid across cultures. Lantian et al. (2016) found that a single, elaborate question can work as a measure of conspiracy beliefs. We assess the validity of this question for an untypical, religious group: self-identified Neopagans. We also test some recent findings on the relation between conspiracy thinking and paranormal beliefs, attitudes towards group equality, political identification, age, gender, and education. The general patterns hold up well in our investigation, but there was a clear distinction between conspiracy theories about powerful actors and those about minorities. The single-item measure was the largest predictor of the former kind of conspiracy belief followed by level of paranormal beliefs. Anti-egalitarianism and holding a right-wing political identity were the strongest predictors of conspiracy beliefs about minorities. Education was negatively related to conspiracy beliefs of all kinds.


Science ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 369 (6508) ◽  
pp. 1197-1201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deen Freelon ◽  
Alice Marwick ◽  
Daniel Kreiss

Digital media are critical for contemporary activism—even low-effort “clicktivism” is politically consequential and contributes to offline participation. We argue that in the United States and throughout the industrialized West, left- and right-wing activists use digital and legacy media differently to achieve political goals. Although left-wing actors operate primarily through “hashtag activism” and offline protest, right-wing activists manipulate legacy media, migrate to alternative platforms, and work strategically with partisan media to spread their messages. Although scholarship suggests that the right has embraced strategic disinformation and conspiracy theories more than the left, more research is needed to reveal the magnitude and character of left-wing disinformation. Such ideological asymmetries between left- and right-wing activism hold critical implications for democratic practice, social media governance, and the interdisciplinary study of digital politics.


Author(s):  
Roger Eatwell

‘Fascism’ is a term referring both to a political ideology and to a concrete set of political movements and regimes. Its most prominent examples were the Italian and German regimes in the interwar period. Fascist ideology is sometimes portrayed as merely a mantle for political movements in search of power, but in reality it set forth a new vision of society, drawing on both left- and right-wing ideas. Fascists stressed the need for social cohesion and for strong leadership. They were more concerned to revitalize nations by cultural change than to propose institutional changes, but they saw themselves as offering a third way between capitalism and communism. There was no fascist philosophy as such, but fascist ideology drew inspiration from earlier philosophers, most notably Nietzsche and Sorel, and was supported by several contemporary philosophers, including Heidegger, Gentile and Schmitt.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theofilos Gkinopoulos ◽  
Stefano Pagliaro ◽  
Sofia Stathi ◽  
Manuel Teresi

In this study, we investigate the effects of (a) group orientation of conspiracy theories and (b) leadership style on moral leadership, as well as the moderating role of right-wing authoritarianism in the relationship between group orientation of conspiracy beliefs and moral leadership and identification with the leader. We manipulated leadership style as democratic and despotic by producing two scenarios respectively, describing the leader of a fictional country. We also manipulated group orientation of conspiracy beliefs by producing a scenario about a conspiracy with the domestic government of the fictional country as the protagonist (in-group conspiracy) or a foreign country as the protagonist of the conspiracy (outgroup conspiracy). A pre-test study (N=100) provided evidence for the efficiency of our experimental manipulations. The main study employed a 2 (in-group vs. outgroup orientation conspiracy theories) x 2 (democratic vs despotic leadership) factorial design (N=480). Results showed that there was a statistically significant main effect of orientation of conspiracy beliefs on moral leadership and identification with the leader, a statistically significant main effect of leadership style and a statistically significant interaction effect between group orientation of conspiracy beliefs and leadership style on moral leadership and identification with the leader. A significant moderating effect of right-wing authoritarianism was found in the relationship between group orientation of conspiracy theories and perceptions of moral leadership and identification with the leader. Discussion focuses on the use of in-group or outgroup orientated conspiracy beliefs in moral leadership practice.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinan Alper ◽  
Fatih Bayrak ◽  
Onurcan Yilmaz

COVID-19 pandemic has led to popular conspiracy theories regarding its origins and widespread concern over the level of compliance with preventive measures. In the current preregistered research, we recruited 1088 Turkish participants and investigated (a) individual differences associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs; (b) whether such conspiracy beliefs are related to the level of preventive measures; and (c) other individual differences that might be related to the preventive measures. Higher faith in intuition, uncertainty avoidance, impulsivity, generic conspiracy beliefs, religiosity, and right-wing ideology, and a lower level of cognitive reflection were associated with a higher level of belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories. There was no association between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and preventive measures while perceived risk was positively and impulsivity negatively correlated with preventive measures. We discuss the implications and directions for future research.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 874-882 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul H. P. Hanel ◽  
Natalia Zarzeczna ◽  
Geoffrey Haddock

Members of extreme political groups are usually perceived as more homogeneous than moderates. We investigated whether members of the general public who share the same political ideology would exhibit different levels of heterogeneity in terms of human values across 20 European countries and Israel. We directly compared the variability across moderate-, left-, and right-wing groups. Our findings suggest that the values of more extreme (left-wing or right-wing) supporters are usually more heterogeneous than those with more moderate views. We replicated this finding for politics-related variables such as attitudes toward immigrants and trust in (inter)national institutions. We also found that country-level variables (income, religiosity, and parasite stress level) did not moderate the pattern of value variability. Overall, our results suggest that endorsing the same political ideology is not necessarily associated with sharing the same values, especially in the case of common citizens holding extreme political attitudes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-90
Author(s):  
Pratishtha Rao

This article is an attempt to explore the reasons for the recent trend of the rise of rightwing populism in the whole world. The origin of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ dates back to the French Revolution and the seating arrangements. The term ‘right’ was soon understood to mean reactionary or monarchist, and the term ‘left’ implied revolutionary or egalitarian sympathies. While populism is an idea of grouping people against ‘the elites. Both right ideology and populism are based on the segregation of society in two sections. When right wing political ideology merges with populist ideology, it is termed as “Right wing populism”. Right wing populists generally converge on issues like opposing immigration, nativism, protectionism etc. This ideology is gaining popularity rapidly in the present world order. The reasons are many, like social media, print and electronic media, civil society, economic instability, and charismatic leadership. Along with this the article also tries to find out the connection of hatred and human nature with the rise of right-wing populism. It focuses on how when hatred at the international level is justified it gives away for hatred at the domestic level as well which results in the cause and effect of right-wing populism. 


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taylor Winter ◽  
Benjamin Riordan ◽  
Damian Scarf ◽  
Paul Jose

Conspiracy theories quickly flourished as the COVID-19 pandemic emerged and this may have been an underlying factor for some individuals in their reluctance to adhere to lockdown policies. In the present study, we surveyed a community sample of 1358 adults just prior to the COVID-19 vaccine rollout in Aotearoa New Zealand. Our results supported that right-wing individuals tended to have higher hesitancy associated with taking the COVID-19 vaccine. However, we demonstrated that this association, in part, can be explained by a corresponding belief in COVID-19 related conspiracies. Further, this association only emerged when associated with a general distrust in science. Our findings indicated that public interventions seeking to increase trust in science may mitigate right-wing endorsement of conspiracy theories and thus lead to a more unified and positive response to public health behaviours such as vaccination.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pia Lamberty ◽  
David Leiser

Even though conspiracy theories often address political issues, the question of how conspiracy beliefs affect people's political action has not been satisfyingly answered. We show how conspiracy beliefs are linked to political action. Study 1 (N = 203) shows that conspiracy beliefs were linked to violence. Study 2 (N = 268) supported the notion that conspiracy beliefs were linked to weaker support for normative actions and stronger support of violent action. In Study 3 (N = 180), we explored experimentally whether conspiracy beliefs increase violent action. The longitudinal Study 4 (N T1 = 523, N T2 = 274, N T3 = 199) showed over a timespan of one year that conspiracy beliefs increased non-normative political action.


2021 ◽  
pp. 073112142110246
Author(s):  
Adam Mayer

In the last few decades, the United States has experienced several related and significant societal trends—the transition of the energy system away from coal, the intensification of partisan polarization, and the rise of a populist right-wing political ideology, perhaps best exemplified by the election of Donald Trump. We build Gramling and Freudenberg’s little-explored concept of “development channelization” to argue that nostalgic right-wing populism, grievances directed toward the federal government, and partisanship converge to potentially thwart efforts to transition and diversify rural economies. Populist nostalgia and blame are associated with support for expanding the collapsing coal industry but do not predict support for other types of development. There are patterns of partisan polarization in support for extractive industries and wind power, but many development options appear to be relatively nonpartisan. We discuss these findings in terms of populism, nostalgia, partisan polarization, and the potential for rural renewal in the United States.


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