scholarly journals THE BEGINNING OF THE ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL AND STANDARD OIL COMPANY RIVALRY IN THE DUTCH INDIES 1865-1910

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Agus Setiawan

This paper describes the beginning of the oil rivalry in the Dutch Indies. It begins with an overview of the political and economic relationship between the United States, The Netherlands and the Dutch Indies since the mid-19th century, namely the period when the oil industries in the United States and the Dutch Indies were still at an early stage of development. Since the independence of the United States of America, the two countries had very good relations which were evident from their various co-operations, including the Treaty of Alliance which was ratified in 1782. However, the Dutch colonial government’s policies which sought to restrict the American oil companies’ investment in the Dutch Indies caused discontent amongst the American government and American oil companies, straining their relationship with the Dutch Indies.

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rex J. Zedalis

On March 7, 1995, Conoco oil company of Houston, Texas, announced that it had entered into a contract with Iran to have a Netherlands-based affiliate assist in the development of the Sirri Island oil field. In response, the Clinton administration issued Executive Order No. 12,957, prohibiting participation by U.S. entities in the development of Iranian petroleum resources. Eventually, Conoco withdrew from its contract, but in early May of 1995 the administration stepped up its pressure on Iran by issuing Executive Order No. 12,959, prohibiting U.S. entities from using foreign entities they owned or controlled to make investments in or conduct trade transactions with Iran. On July 13 of that year, the French oil company Total S.A. entered into an agreement with Iran to replace Conoco in developing the Sirri Island field, and over the next several months Iran struck nearly a dozen petroleum development agreements worth in excess of $50 million each with other foreign oil companies. Within a couple of months, both Houses of the U.S. Congress took up consideration of proposals to complicate Iran’s ability to develop its hydrocarbon resources. By the end of 1995, the proposals, which even extended to wholly foreign entities organized and operating outside the United States, had come to include Libya as well. Final passage of one of the proposals, specifically, H.R. 3107, took place in the Senate and the House in July 1996. It was signed into law as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) on August 5.


Author(s):  
Richard M. Titmuss

This chapter assesses the supply of blood in England and Wales and the United States. It presents the main national statistics in the increase in blood donation between the introduction of the National Health Service in 1948 and 1968. Whereas in some countries at the end of the 1940s blood transfusion services were in an early stage of development, in England and Wales they had been expanded earlier. The effects of the Second World War, particularly the large quantities of blood required to deal adequately with the expected and actual civilian air raid casualties, greatly stimulated the growth of a blood transfusion service on a national scale. Unfortunately, it is not possible to present any series of statistics for the United States similar to those provided for England and Wales. It is not even possible to estimate with any degree of precision the total annual volume of blood collections, transfusions, and wastage.


Author(s):  
Dilip Hiro

The discovery of oil near Masjid-e-Suleiman in Iran in 1908 by a British company aroused interest in Britain and America to explore the wider region for it. Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) secured oil concessions in Saudi Arabia from King Ibn Saud in 1933. The subsequent Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) struck oil in 1938. The importance of Saudi petroleum increased when, following Iran’s nationalization of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951, Western countries boycotted Iranian oil. The political turmoil in Iran ended with the restoration of the briefly deposed Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to the throne with the assistance of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in August 1953. He leased the rights to Iran’s petroleum to the consortium of four Western oil companies for twenty-five years. With that, the United States became the prime Western influence in Tehran. By then Riyadh had forged military links with Washington. Soon rivalry developed between King Saud, a spendthrift ruler, and his austere Crown Prince Faisal. It ended with Saud abdicating in favor of Faisal in 1964. Four years earlier, Saudi Arabia had become one of the five founders of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC).


1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 89-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelvin Singh

When the Venezuelan dictator, Juan Vincente Gómez, died on 17 December 1935, after ruling Venezuela with an iron fist for 27 years, an outburst of popular unrest and nationalistic fervour was unleashed against the foreign oil companies operating on Venezuelan soil. The dominant oil interests in Venezuela at the time were Royal Dutch Shell, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and the Gulf Oil Company. There were several smaller companies such as British Controlled Oilfields, a British state-owned company with a network of Venezuelan affiliates, and the Socony Vacuum Company, a New York-based company which was a significant latecomer. It was the first three aforementioned companies, however, that constituted the Big Three.1The oil companies were associated in the popular mind with the odious Gómez dictatorship and partly for this reason became the object of the people's wrath. Yet there were also practical economic and social reasons for the popular feeling against the companies. The latter paid low wages, provided miserable housing and social amenities for their workers and discriminated against Venezuelans in their employment practices.2For more than a year after the dictator's death Venezuela was in the throes of popular unrest.


2009 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke A. Patey

ABSTRACTThe efforts of American activists to pressure Asian corporations in Sudan have to date resembled a struggle to find the light switch in the dark, or swimming against a strong current. While the impact of the divestment campaign in the United States has been increasingly evident, its effectiveness in producing actual results in Sudan remains suspect. Thanks to China and a trio of Asian national oil companies, oil still flows in Sudan. The campaign's activities have failed to incorporate Sudan's wider international political and economic relations into its strategy. It has rather paradoxically sought to pressure state-owned corporations through financial market divestment. The nature of its Asian targets, reluctant Western investors and a distracted American government have obstructed the campaign from having a resounding impact in Sudan.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-38
Author(s):  
Abid Ullah Jan

The Debate Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danielle M. Nash ◽  
Zohra Bhimani ◽  
Jennifer Rayner ◽  
Merrick Zwarenstein

Abstract Background Learning health systems have been gaining traction over the past decade. The purpose of this study was to understand the spread of learning health systems in primary care, including where they have been implemented, how they are operating, and potential challenges and solutions. Methods We completed a scoping review by systematically searching OVID Medline®, Embase®, IEEE Xplore®, and reviewing specific journals from 2007 to 2020. We also completed a Google search to identify gray literature. Results We reviewed 1924 articles through our database search and 51 articles from other sources, from which we identified 21 unique learning health systems based on 62 data sources. Only one of these learning health systems was implemented exclusively in a primary care setting, where all others were integrated health systems or networks that also included other care settings. Eighteen of the 21 were in the United States. Examples of how these learning health systems were being used included real-time clinical surveillance, quality improvement initiatives, pragmatic trials at the point of care, and decision support. Many challenges and potential solutions were identified regarding data, sustainability, promoting a learning culture, prioritization processes, involvement of community, and balancing quality improvement versus research. Conclusions We identified 21 learning health systems, which all appear at an early stage of development, and only one was primary care only. We summarized and provided examples of integrated health systems and data networks that can be considered early models in the growing global movement to advance learning health systems in primary care.


Author(s):  
Esteban Correa-Agudelo ◽  
Tesfaye B. Mersha ◽  
Adam J. Branscum ◽  
Neil J. MacKinnon ◽  
Diego F. Cuadros

We characterized vulnerable populations located in areas at higher risk of COVID-19-related mortality and low critical healthcare capacity during the early stage of the epidemic in the United States. We analyze data obtained from a Johns Hopkins University COVID-19 database to assess the county-level spatial variation of COVID-19-related mortality risk during the early stage of the epidemic in relation to health determinants and health infrastructure. Overall, we identified highly populated and polluted areas, regional air hub areas, race minorities (non-white population), and Hispanic or Latino population with an increased risk of COVID-19-related death during the first phase of the epidemic. The 10 highest COVID-19 mortality risk areas in highly populated counties had on average a lower proportion of white population (48.0%) and higher proportions of black population (18.7%) and other races (33.3%) compared to the national averages of 83.0%, 9.1%, and 7.9%, respectively. The Hispanic and Latino population proportion was higher in these 10 counties (29.3%, compared to the national average of 9.3%). Counties with major air hubs had a 31% increase in mortality risk compared to counties with no airport connectivity. Sixty-eight percent of the counties with high COVID-19-related mortality risk also had lower critical care capacity than the national average. The disparity in health and environmental risk factors might have exacerbated the COVID-19-related mortality risk in vulnerable groups during the early stage of the epidemic.


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